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GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS

A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR FROM ITS REVIVAL AFTER THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE END OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT SWEDE, AND OF THE MOST FAMOUS CAMPAIGNS OF TURENNE, CONDÉ, EUGENE, AND MARLBOROUGH.

*WITH 237 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND
TACTICAL MANŒUVRES, CUTS OF UNIFORMS,
ARMS, AND WEAPONS*

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OF "THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," "A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," "PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAPTAINS," "ALEXANDER," "HANNIBAL," "CÆSAR," ETC., ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES—VOLUME I.



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To
THE AMERICAN SOLDIER

WHO, NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED
THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY

These Volumes
ARE DEDICATED

“Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, César, Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugène et Frédéric ; lisez, relisez l'histoire de leur quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modélez-vous sur eux, — c'est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre le secret de l'art ; votre génie, ainsi éclairé, vous fera rejeter des maximes opposées à celles de ces grands hommes.” — NAPOLEON.

“La tactique, les évolutions, la science de l'officier de génie, de l'officier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre dans les traités ; — mais la connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par l'expérience et par l'étude de l'histoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines.”
— NAPOLEON.

PREFACE.

THAT the immense gap of sixteen and a half centuries which intervenes between the last campaign of Julius Cæsar and the first campaign of Gustavus Adolphus is left almost untouched, must be justified by once more reminding the reader that the author has made no attempt to cover the history of war, but seeks only to indicate the origin and growth of what to-day we call the art of war. No preface, however long, can explain the purpose of the volumes of which these two are a part, so well as the few words of Napoleon which have been chosen as a motto, and which follow the dedicatory page. "Read, reread the history of their eighty-eight campaigns," says this last of the Great Captains. A history of the origin and growth of the art of war is in reality only the story of the campaigns of those leaders whose deeds have created the art. The history of war is beyond limit; to treat it in equal detail would call for hundreds of volumes, and the author has contemplated no such work.

A distinguished professor of history¹ recently wrote the author: "You will have an embarrassing wealth of material in the military changes from Cæsar to Gustavus Adolphus. As I run over the time, I see how you can use your narrative skill on the slaughter of the legions of Varus in the Teutoburg forest; the hurried marches of Aurelian while his soldiers sung that wild song of slaughter given by Flavius Vopiscus; the Goths of Alaric and the Huns of Attila, and the struggle

¹ Samuel Willard, LL. D.

of armed mobs at Chalons; the skillful work of Belisarius; the saving of Europe by Leo the Isaurian, to whose work the picturesque battle of Tours was but a supplement; the campaigns of Charlemagne, earliest in modern times to march converging columns upon an enemy; knights and crusaders, and that greatest of all cavalry battles, greatest that ever was or ever will be, Dorylæum; the Normans at Hastings; the Swiss piling up the rampart of ten thousand dead at St. Jacobs; the vain charge of Talbot, representative of the outgoing chivalry, against cannon and earthworks at Chatillon; these, and two score more of the illustrations of the change from the old to the new,—how can you leave them out—how can you put them in?" And just because none of these acts in the drama of history had any influence on the art of war, it is not within the scope of this work to narrate them. Many of the deeds of the Great Captains, indeed, had no such influence; but though these may none the less have found a place in their general military history, there is nothing to warrant the author in going outside of the Great Captains to dilate upon mere acts of heroism or mere scenes of carnage.

Hence, though the period between Munda in 45 B. C. and the Danish campaign of 1611 is dismissed with a mere summary, the author does not believe that he has left any gap unfilled in the actual history of the art of war; and as its revival began with Gustavus Adolphus and was carried forward more or less expertly by his successors, it will be found that from the beginning of the seventeenth century down to 1815, the narrative in these and future volumes will cover most of the important wars.

Every nation, in gazing at the glories which surround its victories and its heroes, is apt to lose sight of the comparative standing of the latter. To the Prussian, Frederick the Only stands out unequaled; to the Scandinavian, Gustavus; to the

Frenchman, Napoleon ; to the Austrian, Prince Eugene or the Archduke Charles ; to the Englishman, Marlborough or Wellington. It is only when each of these generals is grouped with the others on the theatre of war where he played his part, that one can properly gauge his place among the captains. To some of us Anglo-Saxons it may seem heresy to assume that Prince Eugene was equal as a general to the Duke of Marlborough. And yet, such was the case. Alone, he conducted more successful campaigns, he won more victories and he did more first-rate work than Marlborough ; while at Blenheim, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, he bore half the burden and won half the renown. When the facts are looked at dispassionately, the place assigned to each of the great generals in these volumes will, it is believed, be borne out by the mature judgment of any military student not suffering from patriotic astigmatism.

It is comparatively easy to write up a campaign without a map. This tell-tale absent, errors can be more easily covered ; a general allegation will suffice for a more specific one. But the author has striven to so illustrate his work with charts as that every statement may be readily checked off by reference to the terrain. The ancient maps of the country and of battle-fields, while full of information and suggestiveness, are apt to be topographically wrong and hence misleading ; it is hoped the maps and charts in these volumes will prove more acceptable. The same care has been expended on them by personal visits to the battle-fields as was given to former volumes ; but they are intended rather to illustrate the text and to aid in comprehending the campaigns than as samples of the geographer's art. The amount of ground to be covered has resulted in their being made on a smaller scale than heretofore.

Little space could be spared for the exploits of individual

generals or divisions; the battle descriptions have been confined to what was strictly essential to a clear understanding of the manœuvres. Particular heroism has been rarely mentioned; except in the case of the leading generals, it does not fit into the scheme of the work.

Dates in the old records are inaccurate and puzzling; but the New Style (ten days later than the Old Style) has been followed,—it is hoped without many errors. The political history of the times has been only incidentally mentioned; the author can scarcely vouch for its being free from error,—he pretends to no knowledge of the intricate state imbroglios of the sixteenth century.

The authorities to which these volumes are indebted are very numerous. Having no knowledge of Swedish, the author has been obliged to rely upon German, French or Italian translations of the home records; but such eminent men as Droysen have carefully covered this ground; and most of the better class of historical works, such as Geijer's *Sveriges Historia*, or *Gustavus' Letters*, exist in German. Moreover, the campaigns which made Gustavus forever great were rather a part of the history of Germany than of Sweden.

The following works, among others, have been laid under contribution, some of them very freely: Arkenholtz, Beauvain, Bülow, Chemnitz, Coxe, Desormeaux, Droysen, Duvivier, Dudik, Feuquières, Förster, Gallitzin, Gfrörer, Grimoard, Gualdo Priorato, Harte, Hurter, Julius, Kausler, Keym, Khevenhüller, Lediard, Lossau, Mauvillon, Oman, Puffendorf, Quincy, Ramsay, Ranke, Swedish *Intelligencer*, Soden, *Le Soldat Suédois*, Sporschill, *Theatrum Europæum*, Villermont, Voltaire, Zaber, Zanthier, a great number of memoirs, dispatches and letters of many of the generals, and old *Netherland*, *Nürnberg* and other German records. The author has drawn from too many eminent historians and critics

to do less than acknowledge gratefully his indebtedness to each and all. But he has uniformly got his best suggestions from visits to the battle-fields, which, however changed in minor details, still remain substantially as they were.

Parts of the work have been much condensed; but the reader can readily understand that it would have been easier to write thrice the number of pages than to contract so vast a subject into what may be placed in two short volumes. It is a far more satisfactory task to go into the minute details of a single campaign than to deal superficially with the manœuvres of many; but though the scheme of this work necessitates in places severe condensation, the author trusts that no important matter distinctly contributory to the art of war has been slighted.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE ERA OF CAVALRY. 378-1315	1
II. REAPPEARANCE OF INFANTRY. 1315-1500 . . .	10
III. CHANGES IN TACTICS. — SIXTEENTH CENTURY . .	22
IV. THE SWEDISH ARMY-CHANGES. 1523-1632 . .	28
V. THE SWEDISH ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS. 1611- 1632	47
VI. THE YOUNG PRINCE AND KING. 1611-1617 . .	63
VII. THE POLISH WARS. 1617-1625	79
VIII. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. RELIGIOUS PHASE. 1618-1625	86
IX. THE DANISH PERIOD. 1625-1630	100
X. THE POLISH WARS CONTINUE. 1625-1627 . .	117
XI. THE POLISH WARS END. 1628-1629 . . .	131
XII. THE SWEDISH PERIOD BEGINS. JANUARY TO JUNE, 1630	145
XIII. GUSTAVUS LANDS IN GERMANY. JUNE TO AUGUST, 1630	157
XIV. GUSTAVUS ATTACKS THE ENEMY. SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1630	172
XV. WINTER-QUARTERS AT BÄRWALDE. JANUARY, 1631	192
XVI. GUSTAVUS AND TILLY MANŒUVRE. FEBRUARY TO APRIL, 1630	201
XVII. MAGDEBURG. SEPTEMBER, 1630, TO MAY, 1631 .	215
XVIII. GUSTAVUS ADVANCES TO THE ELBE. JUNE AND JULY, 1631	229
XIX. TILLY INVADES HESSE-CASSEL AND SAXONY. AU- GUST, 1631	244

XX. BREITENFELD. SEPTEMBER 17, 1631	257
XXI. TOWARDS THE MAIN. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1631	272
XXII. MAINZ. NOVEMBER, 1631	288
XXIII. TO THE DANUBE. DECEMBER, 1631, TO APRIL, 1632	301
XXIV. THE CROSSING OF THE LECH. APRIL 15, 1632 .	312
XXV. THE REAPPEARANCE OF WALLENSTEIN. JANUARY TO JUNE, 1632	325
XXVI. NÜRNBERG. JULY AND AUGUST, 1632	341
XXVII. THE ASSAULT ON THE ALTE VESTE. SEPTEMBER, 1632	353
XXVIII. SPARRING. SEPTEMBER, 1632	364
XXIX. BACK TO SAXONY. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1632	373
XXX. LÜTZEN. NOVEMBER 16, 1632	386
XXXI. THE MAN AND SOLDIER	398
XXXII. NÖRDLINGEN. 1633-1634	412

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PORTRAIT OF GUSTAVUS, <i>after Van Dyke</i> (Munich Gallery)	PAGE
	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Knight. (15th Century)	6
Dismounted Knight. (13th Century)	7
Knight. (15th Century)	7
Knight in Armor. (13th Century)	8
Knight. (12th Century)	9
Swiss Halberdier. (16th Century)	11
Swiss Sergeant Halberdier	11
Swiss Pikeman. (16th Century)	11
Swiss Captain. (16th Century)	12
Lance and Halberd Heads. (16th Century)	12
Bernese Soldiers. (15th Century)	13
Swiss Pikeman. (16th Century)	13
Genevese Mercenary. (15th Century)	14
English Long-bowman. (14th Century)	14
English Long-bowman. (14th Century)	14
Cross-bowman. (12th Century)	15
Cross-bowman. (12th Century)	15
Cross-bowman. (15th Century)	15
Cross-bowmen. (15th Century)	16
Hand Gun	18
Bombard of Rhodes (calibre, 22 in.)	18
Big Cannon. (15th Century)	18
Bombardelle. (15th Century)	19
French Gun. (15th Century)	19
Hand Bombardelle. (15th Century)	19
Mounted Culverineer	19
Cross-bow. (15th Century)	20
Cross-bow. (15th Century)	20

Hand Culverin, 1480	21
Arquebusier, 1507	21
Officer. (14th Century)	27
Danzig Citizen Soldier (taking oath)	32
Lansquenet. (16th Century)	33
Musketeer, 1572	33
Pikeman, 1534	34
Pikeman, 1572	34
Grenadier, 1696	35
Officer of French Foot, 1647	35
Arquebus and Rest. (16th Century)	36
Musketeer, 1630	36
Match-lock, Stockholm Museum	37
Wheel-lock, Stockholm Museum	37
Pistol Flint-lock (1613), Stockholm Museum	37
Early Bayonets	38
English Soldier (unequipped)	39
German Officer, 1630	39
Dragoon, 1616	40
Hungarian Irregular. (17th Century)	40
Croat	41
Siege-guns, Stockholm Museum	42
Three-pounder Regimental Gun, Stockholm Museum	43
Three-pounder Leather Gun, Stockholm Museum	43
Early Mortars	44
Early Mortar	44
Culverin, 1500	46
Suit worn by Gustavus at the Dirschau Combat	49
Swedish Musketeer	50
Swedish Pikeman	50
Swedish Officer	51
Swedish Cuirassier	52
Swedish Ensign of Cuirassiers	53
Cannon suggested in the 15th Century	62
Axel Oxenstiern	68
Sweden and the Baltic	71
Riga	82
Arquebus. (16th Century)	85

The Bohemian Revolt	91
Tilly	95
Tilly's Manœuvres in Baden	97
Halberd with Gun (16th Century)	99
Christian of Denmark	103
Map of Danish Period	104
Wallenstein	105
Stralsund, partly from an old plan	111
Genevese. (16th Century)	116
Polish Horseman	118
The Vistula-Oder-Elbe Country	120
Danzig and Vicinity	122
Operation at Mewe	124
Stuhm Operation	138
Albanese Horseman	144
The Landing-place	158
Oder-Elbe Country	160
Stettin	162
Pikeman of Thirty Years' War	171
Ribnitz	174
The Attack on Garz	188
"Advance Pikes!"	191
Swiss Pikehead. (15th Century)	200
Demmin	202
Frankfort	211
Halberd Head	214
Magdeburg	221
Swiss Sword. (15th Century)	228
The Werben Camp	239
Burgstall Operation	241
Horse and Equipments used by Gustavus at Lützen	243
Elbe-Main Country	245
Leipsic and Breitenfeld	249
Brigade and Half-brigade	256
The Armies in Line	262
Battle of Breitenfeld. (2d Phase)	267
Gustavus, by Van Mierevelt	271
The Main Country	284

Mainz	292
Landsknecht. (16th Century)	300
Statue of Gustavus Adolphus in Stockholm	311
The Upper Danube Country	313
Crossing of the Lech	315
Match-lock. (15th Century)	324
Nürnberg	338
Arquebus. (16th Century)	340
The Rival Camps	342
Swords. (16th Century)	352
Gustavus Adolphus, from Augsburg bust	363
A Burgundian. (15th Century)	372
Region near Lützen	378
Gustavus praying before Lützen	385
Battle of Lützen	387
Musket Battle-axe. (16th Century)	397
Fusee Arrows	411
Battle of Nördlingen	417
French Sergeant, 1630	420

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

I.

THE ERA OF CAVALRY. 378-1315.

As the ranks became filled with mercenaries, the Roman legion fell from its high estate. Hand to hand tactics gave way to missile weapons, the bow came into fashion, and ballistic machines and portable stakes appeared in line of battle. The barbarians grew in efficiency beyond the legionaries, and to protect the vast frontier of the empire, cavalry came to be essential. Adrianople proved that horse could ride down foot, and mounted service became the more honorable. German cavalry, enlisted by the emperors, proved its preëminence, and the footman sank into insignificance. While the western nations relied on hard knocks, the Byzantines kept up a species of military art, — one of form and stratagem, rather than pure tactics or strategy, in which valor was prized, but discretion ranked higher. The Teutonic races depended on stout infantry: in their great raids there was little horse. Feudalism introduced the mailed knight, who for centuries reigned supreme. Useful in holding back the Moor, the Viking and the Magyar, he was not a soldier in the best sense; his instability equaled his courage. He knew but one tactics, — to charge straight at the enemy, — and he was frequently routed by bad ground. Armies were set up in deep squares, and accident often decided the day. Armored mercenaries succeeded the knights, but were no better. Feudalism called for castles; castles led to a war of sieges. Of strategy and tactics there was none. The Crusades were full of prowess; they gave us no military lessons, except that of blind devotion.

THE feature characterizing the history of the art of war, from the fall of the Roman empire to the era of the Reformation, is the rise of cavalry as the main reliance of nations, and the corresponding decadence of infantry. This condition lasted for many centuries, until the English long-bow and the

Swiss pike and halberd, coupled to the growth of firearms, again reduced the horseman to his true level. Cavalry is an essential arm ; even the rapid-firing weapon of to-day cannot quite displace it ; but it is neither fitted to stand alone, nor to dominate infantry. Only when the footman is the main reliance of the commander can the art of war reach its highest development.

We have seen how the Roman legion, which was at its zenith when the burgess-soldier's stanch courage put a term to Hannibal's splendid bid for the conquest of Italy, degenerated by easy and natural gradations until it became a merely mercenary body, unable to cope with the barbarian invaders of the peninsula. In proportion as it forfeited character it became burdened with ballistic machines, it grew unwieldy, and lost so much of its marching speed that, to have at hand forces which could effectually be transferred from one threatened point on the enormous imperial frontier to another, the Emperor Constantine began to increase the cavalry by taking from each legion its auxiliary *turmæ*, and collecting these into large bodies destined to serve alone.

The enemies of Rome, moreover, were no longer the ill-armed savages of yore. Their weapons and accoutrements had been vastly improved by contact with the empire, and the legion could not slash its way through a body of mere human brawn,—still less so with its own diminished stanchness. That the old Roman quality had perished was abundantly proven by the numerous ballistic machines, and by the beams and stakes carried along on pack-mules, not for the ancient purpose of intrenching the nightly camp, but to save the legion from cavalry attacks on the field of battle. These supplementary engines and tools meant that the legion had been reduced to an un-Roman defensive.

In the battle of Adrianople (A. D. 378), the Gothic squad-

rons accomplished what cavalry had never compassed since Hannibal's Numidians waded in the gore of Cannæ,—they destroyed a Roman army. This battle was the capstone to the belief that it was more honorable to fight on horseback than on foot, for the Goth had found that, unassisted, he could ride down the vaunted Roman legionary. While this was due more to the deterioration of the foot than to the melioration of the horse, yet while the latter continued to gain, the former continued to lose. For a thousand years to come cavalry was uppermost. It naturally deemed itself the superior of foot, as indeed it became and remained,—until the long-bow of the hardy British yeoman mowed down the supercilious French chivalry at Crécy.

Adrianople made it evident that the legions alone could no longer uphold the Roman supremacy.

With this lesson in mind, Theodosius began to enlist bands of Teutonic chiefs, and from now on the Roman soldier quite lost caste, and the barbarian horseman became the pillar of the empire. Indeed, he proved his right to the title by riding down the veteran Gallic legions which had risen under Magnus Maximus, and by more than one other noteworthy deed of prowess.

Another change soon became apparent. The Roman footman, already used to the support of ballistic machines and portable stakes in the line of battle, began to rely more and more on missile weapons, and to discard the arms of close quarters. The bow for the first time became a Roman weapon. Not but what the bow is an admirable arm, especially against cavalry; it has asserted itself at intervals from remotest ages; but it was a new thing to see the Roman legionary take kindly to long-distance weapons, and a thing to excite one's pity.

Cavalry reigned supreme. At a later day the Gothic horse-

man rode to and fro throughout Italy, and still further proved that infantry, such as the Roman legion had then become, was no match for the best of mounted troops. All Europe soon vied in arming and training cavalry, and infantry sank to a still lower level. It was fit only for garrison duty, — to defend walls. The Roman cavalry ended by adopting the bow, and became the same body which had annihilated Crassus on the plains of Mesopotamia. Horse-archers and horse-lancers were the choice of the day. The latter, the heavy squadrons, were more unwieldy, but they were able at least to ride down the Oriental horse-archer.

It was thus arose all over Europe the idea that cavalry should be the chief and only arm; the idea that mounted service alone was honorable; the idea that the footman was a sloven and a coward.

The Byzantines were, in matters military, the legitimate successors of the old Roman empire. Their armies for centuries held back the barbarian inroads from the east; they were, during their life, the best of their kind. They have been much disparaged by historians, and in a sense it is true that the Byzantines were not successful; but for all that, they had an art in their wars, while in the west of Europe thews and sinews won the day. And while the doughty blows of the Frank appeal to our Saxon instinct of manliness rather than the ambush, stratagem and studied method of the Byzantine, yet the latter showed more intelligence in what he did and in the way he did it. Several books of tactics remain to us from this era, and the means of successfully combating the various races that might be met — Frank, Magyar or Saracen — were assiduously discussed. Moreover the eastern emperors did succeed in holding their territory against western assaults for generations.

The strength of the Byzantines lay in their heavy cavalry,

and this they set up in two lines and a reserve, whose three successive shocks told well. Courage was valued highly, but discretion and a knowledge of how to utilize varying conditions were deemed a better quality. Bull-headed pluck was not so highly considered as it was in the west; stratagem showed a higher kind of soldierly ability, — even treachery held its place in the Byzantine scheme. A similar tendency was shown in the seventeenth century in the preference of manœuvres over battles; and was not Hannibal called perfidious because he resorted to ruse in his unequal struggle against ponderous Rome? Despite these facts, which sound worse in the telling than they actually were, the Byzantines, so far as an art in war is concerned, were a half dozen centuries ahead of any nation in the west.

From the era of the Byzantine empire onward for many centuries it is impossible to speak with much accuracy about war or the art of war. History there is none; chronicles mislead. Of war there was much; of art in war there was little — as we understand it, none — until Gustavus Adolphus again infused method into what others had done with no method at all. Strategy had rarely shown itself since the days of Cæsar; tactics was whatever suited each nation or tribe, and never rose to the rank of grand-tactics. If a commander was able enough to pattern his battle-tactics to the ground on which he fought and to the work he had to do, he was deemed a marvel of originality and skill.

All nations did not go to war mounted. It was Gothic infantry, not horse, which marched down the Italian peninsula under Totila; but it was the cavalry of Belisarius and of Narses which proved fatal to them; and for three centuries the Franks kept increasing their proportion of mounted men. The bulk of the Teutonic forces remained foot; and while Charles Martel and Charles the Great had a goodly array of

cavalry, their armies were really infantry, supplemented to a moderate extent by horse.

When the kingdom of Charles the Great was broken up and the local counts began to acquire a semi-independence, feudalism arose, and horsemen acquired still greater importance. They had their merits. It was they who kept back the vast inroads of that era from north, east and south. Without them Christendom might have been overrun; no wonder the knight in armor won the regard of the whole earth.

In England the superiority of the horseman was not demonstrated until the battle of Hastings, when William's horse, backed by his archers, did their share in overthrowing Harold's brave but reckless axemen; but the superiority of the knight in armor was as marked during the feudal period in Britain as it was on the continent.



Knight. (15th Century.)

From the establishment of feudalism until the Swiss at Morgarten and the English at Crécy proved the ability of good foot to withstand the best of cavalry, the horseman was preëminent. He was not a good soldier; he had no idea

of discipline; courage, a certain ability to use his cumbrous weapons, and the sort of faith in his own invincibility which helped to render him invincible, were his only recommendations. There was no art in what he did. His only tactics was to charge straight at the enemy on sight. When he charged on good ground, no foe could resist his impact; but he might end his gallop in a marsh, or against a palisade. At Mansoura, St. Louis' knights were entangled in the streets

of a town and utterly worsted. The knight was ignorant of art. Each army was formed in three great columns or "battles;" these galloped upon the enemy similarly marshaled, and, after a tussle of hours, one or the other would be forced back, often by an accident of *terrain* or on account of the loss of a leader. To set a successful ambush was a rarity which was applauded as a wonder. For many centuries armies moved into the enemy's territory, not to secure a strategic point, but to ravage the land and secure plunder from the harassed people. Victualing by any method was not attempted, and so soon as one section was eaten out, another must be sought, irrespective of its military value.

Battles were rare. The rival armies did no reconnoitring, and thus at times scarcely knew each other's whereabouts. They met by accident more often than by design, and not infrequently sent word to each other to meet at a given spot and fight it out,—as the Cimbri had invited Marius to battle at Vercellæ. Even then it exceeded their ability to marshal their forces on fair terms, for it took all



Knight. (15th Century.)



Dismounted Knight.
(13th Century.)

day to deploy a small marching column into line of battle. A modern army manœuvres thrice as rapidly.

The feudal knight was so utterly without discipline or reliability that mercenaries gradually crept into favor. But the mercenary was cast in the same mould; he was a man in



Knight in Armor.
(13th Century.)

armor, if not a knight, and was equally bold and useless, though more loyal to his chief. So long as he was paid, he would stay with the colors, which was more than you could count on in the knight. The mercenary became the support of autocratic monarchs; but when, at the end of a war, bands of mercenaries began to move to and fro over the face

of the country, seeking a new lord and fresh campaigns, they became of questionable utility and unquestionable danger.

The feudal system called for castles; castles led to a war of sieges rather than a war of manœuvring and fighting. Many of these castles were to the armies of that day more serious obstacles than Ehrenbreitstein or Gibraltar to a modern force. They began by being simple in construction; they ended by being elaborate and solid. There were but two ways of capturing them: starvation or undermining the walls, and to the latter the mediæval armies were ill adapted. These castles robbed war of all skill, and reduced operations to the scale of raids which disregarded their existence, or to a series of tiresome sieges. For generations after the invention of gunpowder, artillery had small effect on these solid feudal structures; less than the ancient catapults and rams.

The Crusades were the typical work of the mailed knight; and as this warrior made practically no impress on the art of war, so the Crusades teach us no useful lessons. Both were equally unpractical; each served its purpose, but neither war

nor warrior was worthy of imitation, unless it be in the guileless devotion of the latter. There were abundant and splendid feats of arms; there was nothing to repay study. To record all the deeds of valor which war has evoked is but to record the history of the human race; our task is to evolve the history of the art of war from these deeds: in other words, to separate from the mere acts of courage those instances of intelligent application of courage which have added to our knowledge of what constitutes modern war. The thousand years during which cavalry was the sole dependence of Europe have in this sense few lessons for the military student.



Knight. (12th Century.)

II.

REAPPEARANCE OF INFANTRY. 1315-1500.

It was the plucky peasant of Switzerland and Britain who reestablished the value of foot. The Swiss carried an eighteen-foot pike, or a heavy halberd; and in their muscular grasp these weapons were irresistible. They fought in an echeloned line of three solid bodies, which cavalry could not break, nor the infantry of the day withstand, and they were hardy marchers. At Morgarten (1315) they destroyed an army of knights in a mountain pass, and at Laupen (1339) one in the open field. Only when broken could they be beaten, as they later were by the Spanish sword and buckler. Equally splendid was the record of the English long-bow, with its cloth-yard shaft. At Crécy (1346) this weapon utterly overthrew the French chivalry; Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415) proved that the day of infantry had come back. The long-bowman behind his stakes could not be approached by cavalry; when broken or on the march he was like other foot. Swiss and Briton proved to the knight in armor that he was not invincible. Zisca's wagon-fort was another link in the same chain; the Hussites became a terror in Germany. The disappearance of feudalism, the growth of intelligence, and the invention of gunpowder all contributed to reestablish warfare as a science. The cross-bow began to be replaced by the musket; and the unwieldy knight gave way to the more active footman. As kings gained power and raised their own armies, war became more regular; and toward 1600 conditions arose which might rehabilitate the art of war.

It was the courage of the hardy peasantry of two western nations quite as much as the invention of gunpowder, which put a term to the ascendancy of the feudal knight, and reestablished infantry as the arm which should bear the brunt of battle. The English long-bowman with his cloth-yard shaft found that he could annihilate the best of cavalry from a distance; the Swiss pikeman proved that armored knights could not ride down his steady array of protended spears. These facts were a revelation, and at once modified the posi-



Swiss Halberdier.
(16th Century.)

tion of the horseman in war. Each represented a new development of shock and missile tactics. The Swiss array was a modern revival of the old phalanx of Philip and Alexander; and, though the bow was one of the most ancient of weapons, it had never yet been what the English yeoman made it.

The Swiss pike was eighteen feet long, with a steel head of from twelve to thirty-six inches, was grasped in both hands, and held shoulder high, with a downward slant. The second, third and fourth rank pikes protruded beyond the front; the rest were held upright. This arm resembled in length and application the sarissa of Macedon, but it was differently held. Around the central pennon of the Swiss column stood the halberdiers, who wielded an eight-foot heavy-headed weapon which could cleave the best of armor, lop off arms or legs, or even, it is said, decapitate a horse. Without the upland brawn and tremendous national spirit which inspired the Swiss, however, even these weapons would have availed nothing. It was hardy strength, the love of country, and the instinct of liberty which lent them terror.



Swiss Sergeant
Halberdier.

The Swiss were rapidly



Swiss Pikeman.
(16th Century.)



Swiss Captain.
(16th Century.)

mobilized and swift on the march. Like the early Roman legions, they always attacked, and wearing no armor, could not only keep well ahead of the cumbrous armies of the day, but descend on the enemy's line with an impetus like the avalanches of their native hills. They employed light troops, cross-bowmen, to skirmish ahead of the columns, and these retired into the intervals when the charge was opened.

The Swiss had no great generals. It was the courage and steadfastness, the weapons and skill of the men which won. But they had an admirable battle-field tactics. They marshaled three columns, Vorhut (vanguard), Gewaltshaufen (power-mass)

and Nachhut (rear-guard), and launched them on the foe in echelon, with the advantage of successive impact, independence of movement and the safety of each column from partaking of the repulse of another. At times the three columns were marshaled with the centre or the wings in advance, a partial checker-wise formation. The wedge and the hollow square, or "hedgehog," showed that the Swiss had studied the tactical forms of antiquity.



Lance and Halberd Heads.
(16th Century.)

The first victory of the Swiss foot, at Morgarten in 1315, was not due to its superior formation or tactics. The feudal horsemen were lured into

an icy mountain-pass, with a precipice above them on the right, and a lake below them on the left; and here they were destroyed by rolling logs and bowlders down upon their line, and thus hurling them into the gulf beneath. This, coupled to a furious front attack with the deadly halberd, gave the knights no room to set their lances in rest, or to swing their swords. Morgarten was not a battle; it was a surprise and butchery; but it opened the eyes

of the arrogant knight to the fact that, even though he be afoot, a man's a man for a' that.

At Laupen (1339) the Swiss infantry, quite unsustained and in the open field, met, with its serried ranks and bristling pikes, an array of heavy horse backed by the best infantry of the day. The foot was quickly dispersed, and all the power of the armored knights could not drive the columns from their ground. Infantry, after a



Bernese Soldiers.
(15th Century.)

dozen centuries of decay, had again proved its worth.

Bannockburn accomplished the same end in another part of the world and in a different way.

It was only by similar tactics to their own — by dismounted heavy cavalry, or by bodies of footmen formed on the same




Genevese Mercenary.
(15th Century.)

method, such as the Landsknechte of Germany — that the Swiss met their match. Later on the Spaniards, with sword and buckler, found that they could annihilate the Swiss column, if, like the legionaries against the phalanx at Pydna, they could but once penetrate a gap. Foot could be matched by foot; but infantry had asserted its superiority over horse, and in a combat between the two arms, the pike was useful when sword and shield were of no account; the Swiss column

had a distinct advantage over the Spanish line.

What placed a limit to the utility of the Swiss column was the revival of castrametation and the improve-



English Long-
bowman.
(14th Century.)

ment of artillery. A column with long spears was ill adapted to carrying works, nor could it live under well-plied salvos of cannon. These weak points, and yet more intercantonal jealousies and a consequent deterioration in discipline, eventually sealed the fate of the Swiss array.



English Long-
bowman.
(14th Century.)

Of even more interest than the Swiss footman's mastery of cavalry is the wonderful

result obtained by the long-bow of the Englishman. Until the reign of John, the cross-bowman had been in the ascendant. Whatever its origin, it was Edward I. who brought the long-bow into favor. At Falkirk (1298) the long-bowmen did wonders, and while at Bannockburn (1314) want of support caused their overthrow, it was they who at Crécy (1346) proved to the haughty chivalry of France that a new era had arisen. With their flanks protected from the charges of horse and their stakes set up before them, the line of

long-bowmen, vomiting its fire of three-foot shafts, could not be reached by the best of cavalry. Poitiers (1356) was cumulative testimony, and Agincourt (1415) made it plain beyond cavil that infantry was regaining its proper place in war.

That the French, later in this century, won victories against the English is due to the fact that they had learned to



Cross-bowman.
(12th Century.)

attack the enemy only at a disadvantage, and not when the long-bowman could put in his best work; they fell upon them on the march in lieu of assaulting their chosen ground. Once broken up, the long-bowmen were no more invulnerable than any other foot; they were in fact at the mercy of cavalry charges, or of stout infantry armed with good hand to hand weapons and vigorously led.



Cross-bowman.
(12th Century.)



Cross-bowman.
(15th Century.)

That the knights recognized the growing value of infantry is well shown in the fact that large bodies were now frequently dismounted to fight on foot, and that with their heavy armor and weapons they could more than once bear down the lighter line of unmailed infantry, — provided always that they had not to march far or fast.

The Germans learned another lesson as to the efficiency of foot, in the Hussite wars of the fifteenth century. John Zisca was an extraordinary man. He well understood that his half-armed, undisciplined peasant rabble, with all their religious zeal, could not cope with trained troops, and least of all with feudal cavalry. But he stood at bay, and with his wagon-



Cross-bowmen. (15th Century.)

fortress scheme developed into a science of defensive tactics, he, too, helped teach the heavy-armed rider that the footman, well used, was more than his equal. This wagon-camp tactics grew to be so exact that Zisca's armies changed from the defensive to the offensive, and moved to and fro over the land with more swiftness than their opponents; and woe betide the heavy horse which dared to charge in on the wagon-burg. The Hussites, in open field, would march into the very teeth of a German army. They were marshaled in five columns, the artillery and cavalry in the centre; outside this two short wagon-columns, and then again two long ones. As by magic, the short wagon-columns would gallop up to form a front line and back to form a rear one; the whole structure was lashed together with

chains or ropes ; on each wagon mounted its special squad of defenders, and lo, in the twinkling of an eye, almost a Roman camp in the midst of the enemy's battalions. And from out this camp would sally men with flails and pikes, whose fanatical fury was irresistible. So dreaded were they that a handful of Hussites would sometimes disperse an army. Nothing but artillery could successfully demolish these wagon-burgs, and Zisca had always a superior equipment of guns to silence the enemy's. German armies could finally not be got to face the Hussites. This tactics was not within the domain of regular warfare ; but it was an instance of able adaptation of means to end, and a further proof of the value of the footman properly put to use. Internal dissensions among Bohemians finally broke up this remarkable method of defensive tactics. But while it existed, it worked towards the same end of destroying the ascendancy of horse.

So long as the feudal power remained in force, there was small chance of a revival of the art of war. But princes, dissatisfied with the untrustworthiness of the forces raised under the feudal system, resorted to mercenaries, either in time of war, or to protect their real or pretended rights against their own vassals. Feudalism outgrew its usefulness. It accomplished its mission and gave way to something better, taking with it that warrior who from one point of view is the *preux chevalier* of all the ages, and from another the typical armed bully, — the mailed knight.

References to explosive substances like gunpowder, or to burning substances like Greek fire, are to be found in works literally as old as Moses. Among later references, some of the Brahmins of Alexander's time are said by Philostratus to have been able to "overthrow their enemies with tempests and thunderbolts shot from their walls ;" Archimedes, at Syracuse, is said by Plutarch to have "cast huge stones from



Hand Gun.

his machines with a great noise ;” Caligula is stated by Dion Cassius to have had machines which “ imitated thunder and lightning and emitted stones ;” and Marcus Gracchus in the eighth century gives a receipt of one pound of sulphur, two of willow charcoal and six of saltpetre, for the discharge of what we should call a rocket.

The use of Greek fire was understood as early as the sixth century, but powder was earliest used in China, perhaps a thousand years before Christ, and was introduced to European notice by the Saracens. Neither Schwartz nor Bacon can be said to be its inventor. Early in the fourteenth century cannon and gunpowder appear to have been known in Florence ; in 1338 mention is made of them among the stores in the Tower of London and the arsenal at Rouen ; and in 1346 guns — perhaps hand guns — are said to have been used at Crécy.



Bombard of Rhodes. Calibre, 22 in.
Threw Stone Ball of 650 pounds.


It is certain that the Spanish Moors, shortly after 1326, had made the use of gunpowder, fire-arms and cannon well known in western Europe, and by the end of the century they were the common property of all armies. At first their high cost precluded their use ex-



Big Cannon. (15th Century.)

cept in sieges and the defense of towns; it was much later, at the battle of Rosabeck, in 1382, between the Dutch and French, that field-artillery appeared.


At the end of the fourteenth century guns were cast of bronze, copper and



Bombardelle. (15th Century.)

iron, and called *bombardæ*. Some of these were huge specimens, which consumed large charges of powder, and hurled stone balls of from one hundred to one thousand pounds weight. Mortars appeared in Italy about the middle of the

fifteenth century.



French Gun. (15th Century.)


The French first made use of field-artillery, which could be transported in the army train.

That which accompanied

Charles VIII. to Italy in 1494 was, comparatively speaking, light, rapid of fire and well served. Other nations gradually fell into line, and Gustavus made artillery of really light calibre.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-

ries part of the infantry bore fire-arms. These were at first extremely crude, being merely a gun-barrel lashed to a stick and set off



Hand Bombardelle.
(15th Century.)




Mounted Culverineer.

by a match; but by the end of the sixteenth century they had all grown to have a lock, and the form of the weapon began to approach the musket.

In the second half of the fifteenth century firearms and artillery had become a necessary part of the equipment of an army. The feudal organization was disappearing, and


the power of kings received more recognition. Both these things combined to make possible a revival in the art of war. Standing armies had become the rule, and war was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the nobleman. As infantry resumed its sway and cavalry was



Cross-bow.
(15th Century.)

set back to its proper function ; as artillery improved and discipline was enforced, those conditions gradually obtained on which Gustavus Adolphus exercised so marked an influence. Since the Byzantine art disappeared, there had been no basis on which to build such a thing as a science of war ; but a proper basis was now formed.

By the middle of the sixteenth century the cross-bow disappeared, and infantry



Cross-bow. (15th Century.)


was armed with pikes, halberds and muskets. At first the musketeers were but ten or fifteen to a large company ; but the number increased until, early in the seventeenth century, two thirds of the men were armed with muskets. They all wore light helmets and breastplates.

The Dutch, in their wars against Spain, made marked tactical progress. Particularly, Maurice of Nassau improved

the musket and lock, made rules for the footmen, introduced the cadenced step, and prescribed many evolutions, ployments and deployments. Other able soldiers were working in the same direction. The Dutch army was in wretched condition when it came into the hands of Maurice, then a mere lad. The soldier was robbed of his pay and rations to enrich the officers. The small force of twelve thousand men could be increased only by city train-bands and foreign auxiliaries, and it had to meet the best infantry in Europe—the Spanish. Maurice changed all this, much as Gustavus and Cromwell did later, and made a pattern army. He equalized the regiments, increased the firearms in the company from thirty to sixty-four, and by giving carbines to much of his horse created a mounted infantry. Above all, Maurice was the first to show how big a rôle the spade can play in war. His military success was commensurate with his intelligent efforts.



Hand Culverin. (1480.)



Arquebusier. (1507.)

III.

CHANGES IN TACTICS.—SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

HEAVY horse had fought in column; then in one long line; later the column was resumed. The foot was ployed into big battalia or "battles," huge squares of pikemen thirty or forty deep, with cross-bowmen or musketeers on the corners or sides. As artillery and firearms improved, the depth was reduced. These battles stood in line or checker-wise, and skirmishers operated in front of and between them. Up to the fifteenth century the horse stood in front of the line of battle; later it was mixed with it, and a reserve was kept. From the sixteenth century the cavalry was put on or behind the flanks. Artillery was too heavy to follow troops; it delayed their marches, and always fell to the victor. Parallel order was invariable; the lines were cumbrous, and battles were bloody because the troops once in could not be got out of action. Pursuit was unknown. Marches were in close column, with van and flankers, but at no great distance. The train was enormous. Food was got by plunder. The use of mercenary troops introduced rank and command; those who raised the men became the officers. There was no discipline. Punishments were Draconic; rewards brilliant. Up to about 1500 prisoners had been killed; the system of ransom then sprang up, to the sad increase of the train. Earthworks around camps grew into use. In besieging fortresses treachery was resorted to, and the ancient siege devices were used until the introduction of artillery. The art of besieging remained crude until the sixteenth century, when the Italians, and later the Dutch, improved it, and engineering began to take on a better form.

PRIOR to the sixteenth century it had been a habit to draw up heavy cavalry in one long line (*en haye*). The rule then grew up of marshaling all cavalry in solid columns, which opened in order to use their firearms. The foot was likewise marshaled in heavy squares, called battalia or "battles." The cross-bowmen, later the musketeers, formed the front and rear ranks of these battles, and a file on each flank. The rest of them were posted on the four corners in bodies, of

which, when the front rank had fired, it retired behind the rest to load. The depth of these battles long remained thirty to forty men ; but as artillery became more dangerous, early in the seventeenth century, it was reduced to ten and eight men, and even to five. As a general rule, the pikemen and halberdiers fought in close, the cross-bowmen and musketeers in open, ranks ; in other words, the long-range and hand to hand fighters kept to their appropriate formations. The fight was opened by volunteers, or men chosen by lot (*enfants perdus*, forlorn hopes), who skirmished out in front, and though they rallied in groups in case they were attacked by cavalry, they were often ridden down.

In line of battle, the cavalry, up to the fifteenth century, was wont to be in front, the foot in the rear. Later, the columns of foot were for mutual support mixed with those of horse in the same line, as the fire of the cross-bowmen would, it was thought, make the work of the horse more easy ; and a reserve of heavy horse and foot was kept in the rear. From the sixteenth century on, the foot stood habitually in the centre, the cavalry on the flanks, or behind the flanks. There was no set battle-order. The battles were placed in one continuous line, or checker-wise, or at times in concave order. Open ground was sought and, if possible, with the sun and wind in the rear.

The artillery was placed in batteries at any commanding part of the line, and the horses or oxen which dragged it were sent to the rear. It could neither follow the troops in a victory nor sustain an advance, and in case of disaster was sure to fall into the enemy's hands. Despite these demerits, artillery grew in importance : its advantages outweighed its shortcomings.

The introduction of firearms brought about many changes. Open order became essential, and cavalry looked on its fire

as superior to the cold weapon. The horsemen awaited a charge and received it with salvos of musketry, while during a charge the men stopped to fire a volley, or often several; though, if without firearms, they still charged as of old. The dragoons dismounted and fought on foot. The infantry fought in open or closed order, according as it bore missile or close-quarter weapons.

The rival lines were slowly formed behind a cloud of skirmishers. Duels between champions or small bodies were frequent. Parallel order was almost invariable; flank attacks or turning movements were rare or accidental. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries battles were often sanguinary, and ended in the annihilation of one army. Firearms reduced the casualties because battles were sooner decided. Pursuit was almost never undertaken. It was in fact a traditional habit to remain three days on the field of victory, to celebrate the event and to divide the booty.

Marches were conducted in as heavy columns as the roads allowed; the cavalry and foot were mixed; the artillery, strongly escorted, was in a separate column. Van- and rear-guard and flankers were put out, but at no great distance. The baggage-train grew enormously in size; non-combatants and women accompanied the army in almost incredible numbers, and the soldiers were followed by their prisoners and booty, in whatever fashion they could be transported. Compared to the orderliness of an army of to-day, the army of three hundred years ago was worse than a mob.

During the feudal era, rank and command, as we understand it, did not exist; but the employment of mercenary troops gradually evolved a system. The monarch appointed the army commanders and the colonels; the latter selected as captains the men who raised the companies; the captains chose their lieutenants; and the men were often permitted to

select the petty (or non-commissioned) officers. This ancient device was substantially the system which prevailed in raising volunteer regiments during our civil war.

On recruitment the men were expected to report with a given number of days' rations, after which the prince they served was supposed to keep them in victual; but this was so ill done that plunder was the universal means of subsistence. There were no magazines until much later; regular requisitions on the enemy's territory were unknown, food was usually brought from the army's base, and this was a long and tedious process, whose irregularity forbade rapid manœuvres, and gave rise to hunger and sickness, to desertions and plunder. Nor until long after regular armies had become the rule was there any method in feeding troops, and their payment was even more shiftlessly conducted than the rationing.

Even so late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the feudal organizations showed no discipline whatever; but the growth of mercenary organizations made severer methods imperative. In the sixteenth, Ferdinand the Catholic in Spain, Francis I. and Henry II. in France, and Charles V. in Germany made codes of laws for their respective armies. Under these codes the punishments were Draconic, and rewards were allotted for courage and exemplary service; but unless a general was able and much beloved by his men, no laws could keep up a discipline such as to-day we take for granted.

Prisoners in feudal times had been habitually treated with such cruelty that few escaped with their lives. Only the nobles could buy release. But little by little a system of ransom sprang up under which even the common soldier could hope for freedom. This was a step in the right direction, but it increased the train to a dangerous degree, and hampered still further the movements of troops.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries armies camped

without much artificial protection, though the wagons were used as defenses ; but firearms soon made it essential for camps to be surrounded by earthworks, on which guns were mounted. The profiles of these works gradually became more marked, and bastions and outworks were erected. Especially the artillery parks were fortified lest the guns should be captured.

In attacking fortresses, the ancient means of rams, movable towers, catapults and ballistas, Greek fire and like devices remained in use until the introduction of gunpowder. Walls of circumvallation and contravallation were thrown up, and mining was commonly resorted to. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries great advance was made in the conduct of sieges, especially by the Italians. These new methods, improved on in the Netherlands, led up to the modern art of engineering. Treacherous dealings were first essayed with the commandant of a strong place, or with a friendly party within walls. Secret escalade might be attempted. If neither was available, a regular siege was undertaken. Trenches were dug, at first without system, later in zigzags. Batteries were erected to command the enemy's walls, and breaches were operated. Powder was too costly to use in mining ; walls were undermined by heat, as in antiquity. The besieged kept up a heavy fire, threw burning substances at night to light up the siege-lines, built outworks from which to disturb the operations, made sorties, and defended themselves from assaults with stubbornness. To a storm-captured fortress no quarter was given, and the defenders fought with this knowledge.

The wars in the Netherlands in the last half of the sixteenth century gave a great impetus to engineering. Outworks grew in extent and importance, and inner works were built to enable the besieged to hold the fortress even after

the loss of the walls. Regular sieges were long drawn out. Trenches were opened beyond cannon-shot; covered trenches or saps nearer to; and breastworks at given distances took the place of parallels. All but the breaching batteries were placed so as to command the tops of the walls. Many of our common devices, such as mantelets, fascines, sand-bags, had their modern origin in these days. Breaches were carried by storming parties made up of volunteers. The besieged gradually learned in a cruder way all the arts of defense which are now put into use.

The rôle played by the invention of gunpowder has been exaggerated; it was an effect, not a cause; gunpowder was but one manifestation of the growth of the world out of the darkness of the Middle Ages; the advance in military art was another. It was in reality the dawn of the new era of intelligence, the emergence from the ignorance which had engulfed Europe for a thousand years, which lay at the root of all these improvements. It was time mankind should redeem itself.



Officer. (14th Century.)

IV.

THE SWEDISH ARMY-CHANGES. 1523-1632.

FROM Alexander to Cæsar, the art of war rose to a great height; from Cæsar to Gustavus, it sank into oblivion; Gustavus re-created it. Gunpowder gave a new direction to war. Ancient arms were simple; armies needed no magazines, nor trains to carry munitions, and everything tended to battle. When firearms and cannon were introduced, the strong places where the munitions lay became so important as to be fortified, and armies sought rather to capture these than to fight battles. Hence a system of sieges. Armies could not go far from their munitions; artillery was heavy; marches were slow and tedious; victories could not be made decisive by pursuit; and all war was formal. Troops were raised by recruitment or press-gangs, and their quality was bad. Sweden first created a national militia, and its regular army, drawn therefrom, had no mercenaries. In France there were then but fifteen thousand men as a standing army. Marked tactical advance was soon made, and troops grew more mobile. Infantry was the bulk of the force; pikemen gradually gave way to musketeers, especially for light troops. The file was still deep; but Gustavus reduced it to six, which deployed to three deep to fire. The men wore light armor and a pot helmet. The pike was shortened. The musket, after many stages, grew light enough to dispense with the crutch-rest; paper cartridges were introduced; and finally the bayonet was added. The foot got organized into companies and regiments, and rank and command were settled. Fire grew more rapid, especially among the Swedes, but minor tactics was crude. Cavalry consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons; light horse existed in eastern Europe only; all was organized into cornets and regiments. Cavalry had grown to rely on its firearms; Gustavus taught it to charge at a gallop. The Swedish artillery was far ahead of any other. Gustavus made light and handy guns, which could keep up with the troops and fire with rapidity; and he invented fixed ammunition. At one time the king used leather guns. The artillery was reduced to a system of regular calibres, and the handling of guns became a science.

It is desirable to review part of what has been said in former volumes, in order to lead up to the military status of Sweden, when Gustavus Adolphus was on the throne. His-

tory shows us three main periods in the art of war : the first from remote antiquity to the decadence of Rome ; the second, during the Middle Ages, and down to Gustavus ; the third, from the beginning of Gustavus' work to the present day. During the first period, the art of war under the Greeks and Romans, and notably under Alexander, Hannibal and Cæsar, attained a height such that, in view of the uncertainty in warfare and of the changeableness of tactics arising from the rapidity of modern invention, it may be said to dispute the palm with that of the nineteenth century. During the second period, the art of war sank to its lowest level, as letters and arts were forgotten, and began slowly to rise, as people again became intelligent ; and to this rise the introduction of gunpowder contributed. From the genius of Gustavus in the third period, the art of war acquired a notable impetus and a life which, invigorated by the great deeds of Frederick and Napoleon, has brought it to the present high development.

It was the introduction of gunpowder into Europe which gave the key-note to the new science of war, so different from that which obtained among the ancients. The two periods in which war has really flourished, and which have been not over three hundred years in length, were separated by a gap of many centuries. The distinction between the two was a marked one.

The armies of the Greeks and Romans were, as a rule, not numerically large. Their method of victualing troops was such that food could be found almost everywhere, and it was not usually necessary to establish storehouses of provisions or to bring rations from a great distance. The weapons of the ancients were simple, and those which did not last long — spears, darts and arrows — could be readily manufactured in any place, and by the soldiers themselves. Great arsenals of military stores were unessential to an army in the field ; nor

had powder and ball, or other ammunition, to be brought up from the rear to supply the waste of battle. For this reason the ancients had no need of fortresses, or depots in their rear. Communication with home was of less importance than after the introduction of gunpowder with all its machinery, and the reasons which make the security of a base so essential in modern times were to the ancients of no moment whatever.

With the ancients battle was the one important feature. The nature of their weapons brought them at once into close quarters, and kept them there. To withdraw an army from battle with a moderate loss if things went wrong was impossible, — to all but the very few great generals. There was no artillery to keep the enemy at a distance and arrest his pursuit while the beaten troops were retired out of action; and the rival lines were too much intermingled to make this possible if there had been. Battles commonly resulted in victory for one side and fearful massacre for the other.

The average generals of antiquity needed no art except the art of fighting battles, — in other words, tactics. To them what we call strategy was an unessential art. They marched their armies out to a convenient plain in which to fight, and everything depended on the victory they there might win. The great captains of antiquity were undeniably able strategists as well as fine tacticians; but strategy is the very essence of intellectual common sense, and their clear vision enabled them to see the advantage of doing that which we have now reduced to rules and called a science, — which indeed is but a collection of those things which the great captains have taught us how to do.

In modern times, when the introduction of firearms, for infantry and cavalry alike, became universal; when much artillery accompanied armies; when their numerical force became larger, and they had to be fed and supplied with


ammunition from magazines in their rear, the importance of these depots became so great that they were invariably turned into fortresses; and their value lent an equal importance to the lines of communication out to the army depending upon them. These lines had to be protected at all hazards, for their interruption for even a few days might bring disaster to the army thus cut off.

Again, the transportation of rations and material of war required long trains, and consumed much time. The loss of a convoy or of a fortress was as harmful as the loss of a battle. Thus in a certain sense battles forfeited their original importance, and people took instead to manœuvring on the enemy's communications or to capturing his fortresses.

Victories, to be decisive, must as a rule be followed by vigorous pursuit; and the armies of the early period of gunpowder, loaded down, depending on depots, and followed by a horde of non-combatants, often exceeding in number the arms-bearing men, were cumbrous and unsuited to pursuit. A further reason why battles were followed by so little gain was that they were delivered only to defeat, destroy or inflict loss on the enemy — from purely tactical reasons — without any ulterior purpose. The art of making battle subserve a larger purpose in the general campaign-scheme, so that a victory shall be of due effect, was not then understood. It is, in modern times, of recent origin. Thus, though there was an effort to make war a science, to reduce it to rules, the lack of broader knowledge and the cumbrous method of the day rendered the average campaigns, even up to the end of the seventeenth century, slow, long drawn-out and indecisive; full of wrong, ill-digested methods, of a curious sort of formality or subservience to certain hard and fast rules.

Sweden was the first country in Europe which built up for herself a regular and at the same time national military

organization. In other countries what army there existed was small, — had originally served as a species of guard of honor to the king. In case of war, troops were raised by conscription, or under a rude militia system, by voluntary or press-gang enlistments, or by the purchase of mercenaries. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the soldier of fortune



Danzig Citizen Soldier (taking oath).

From an old print.

was a typical character, equally useful and unreliable in war, and dangerous in war and peace alike. These men earned their livelihood by arms as a trade, not as a profession; they expected to live on their pay and rations, and they hoped to grow rich by plunder. The free towns were garrisoned by their citizens, who were enrolled in a regular body for the defense and policing of their city; in case they needed additional forces they resorted to mercenaries.

Sweden was a noteworthy exception. As early as the sixteenth

century the Vasa kings laid the foundation of a national regular army, and Gustavus Adolphus perfected it. The Swedish army was a pattern organization, in which there were no mercenaries. It consisted of a given number of regular troops, raised, paid, fed and equipped by the state, and back of these stood a militia kept up by the people. The regulars were intended for wars outside the national territory, the militia for the defense of the fatherland; and the regulars were kept at full strength by drafts from the militia. The raising of the troops was based on a careful system of land-tenure, under which all able-bodied males from fifteen years up were called into service; and Gustavus introduced

a novel method under which each soldier was supposed to own and to be supported and equipped by a certain parcel of land, rising in size and importance according to arm and grade.

The militia consisted of eight cavalry and twenty infantry regiments, each raised in whole or in part in a given district from its own inhabitants, and kept on foot at the expense of that district. The men there liable to duty assembled at a given time under its standard, and each district raised from three hundred to six hundred men. King Eric strove to make the conscripts from each set of twelve districts into a regiment, but these proved too irregular in size. The early number of three thousand to a regiment was finally reduced to eleven hundred and seventy-six; and Gustavus equalized companies and regiments. The militia was carefully drilled, kept at its full complement by annual drafts, and relieved from taxes and some other burdens. As Sweden was poorly populated, and the militia contributed to the regular contingent no more than twelve or fifteen thousand men a year, Gustavus was eventually compelled to resort to mercenaries to fill his war-thinned ranks; and regiments came to his army from all parts of Germany, the Netherlands and England. But the Swedes were the leaven of the lump.



Lansquenet.
(16th Century.)



Musketeer.
(1572.)

The other nations of Europe boasted no such settled organization. All middle Europe was split up into petty princi-



Pikeman.
(1534.)

palities, of a size which precluded armies worthy the name. Of the Catholic German troops, Wallenstein's were perhaps the best; Tilly's ranked next. Of the Protestant German troops, the Saxons were deemed to hold the palm, though they did not prove it at Breitenfeld; then the Hessians, and the army of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the latter being patterned on the Swedish. Denmark had practically no army system. France, at the time, had only fifteen thousand men as a standing army, with cadres that could be increased to fifty thousand in case of need, of which ten thousand would be mounted. This was a mere fraction of what she called out under the Grand Monarque.

Though there had been little advance in general military organization, the tactical systems of the various countries had improved. William and Maurice of Orange, Spinola, Henry IV. and Coligny each contributed something to the discipline and structure of troops; and Gustavus put on the capstone in the Swedish army changes. The wars in the Netherlands and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had shown up the defects which had come down from feudal times, and the bright intellects among rulers and their servants set themselves the task of supplying the remedy. But to create a system which should permanently affect the art of war remained for Gustavus Adolphus.

Infantry, in the early part of the seventeenth



Pikeman.
(1572.)

century, consisted of pikemen and musketeers, and with the efficiency of firearms the latter increased from one third to two thirds of the force. In Swedish companies of one hundred and fifty men, there were seventy-five musketeers and fifty-nine pikemen, the rest being petty and commissioned officers. The musketeers were reckoned as light troops, best fitted for scouting and outpost service; they had a pot

helmet, a sabre and a musket. The pikemen were the heavy armed, and were deemed superior in value, — what we should call the troops of the line. They

had full body-armor, and until the seventeenth century thigh-pieces. Their eighteen-foot pikes were finally replaced by partisans, with eleven-foot shaft, and two-foot double-edged head, four inches in width. Later, the length of the partisan and shaft appears to have been cut down to not over eight feet. Gustavus foresaw that musketry was the arm of the future, and gradually decreased the number of pikemen as well as took from the weight of their armor to add to their mobility. In 1631 he

Officer of French
Foot. (1647.)



Grenadier. (1696.)

introduced entire regiments of musketeers. The distinction between riflemen who fired guns and grenadiers who threw hand grenades dates back to him. The word "grenadier" was coined at the defense of Ratisbon by the Swedes in 1632,

when those soldiers who took the risk of handling and casting hand grenades from the walls were given extra pay ; for the riflemen could fire from behind cover as they could not. The officers of infantry carried a partisan and a sword. Bowmen did not exist in Germany.



Arquebus and Rest.
(16th Century.)

In 1623 Gustavus organized the Swedish companies of one hundred and fifty men, set up in files six deep. Four companies made a "squadron" or battalion ; eight companies a regiment ; three regiments a "great regiment" or brigade. Some regiments enlisted in foreign parts had but one hun-


dred and twenty men to the company. The companies and battalions stood in line with varying intervals between them.

The arming of the infantry underwent a considerable change. There appears to have been a number of "double-pay" men (veterans) as far back as Eric's time. They carried the pike and wore armor, and numbered at times nearly three fourths of the force. The old arquebus and cross-bow, heavy and clumsy, with their forked rest, were replaced by the musket ; but this still needed a rest. It was provided with a match-lock, a device originally more reliable than the flint-lock, which often missed fire ; but gradually the latter was improved, and drove out the match. About 1626




Musketeer. (1630.)

Gustavus lightened the musket sufficiently to dispense with the crutch, and introduced the wheel-lock; and in his wars against the Poles, not above taking a hint from any source, he resorted to the old Roman, or, one might say, the English long-bowman's habit of



Matchlock. (Stockholm Museum.)

having the men carry sharpened palisades, not for camping, but to erect a defense against the Polish lancers from behind which they could fire upon them. This was a species of survival of the musket-rest;



Wheel-lock. (Stockholm Museum.)

it finally became only an iron-pointed rod; and to it some have ascribed the origin

of the bayonet. It was carried after a while in the train, as it loaded down the men and militated against rapidity.

The next important improvement in firearms, and this was first made in the Swedish army, was the introduction of paper cartridges. Of these the men carried ten, together with spare powder and ball, in car-




Pistol Flint-lock. (1613. Stockholm Museum.)

tridge-boxes or "bandoliers" slung across the chest from left shoulder to right side; while a sword hung in a belt from right shoulder to left side. The bayonet and flint-lock

were introduced in France some time after Gustavus' death; and the troops armed with this handy musket (*facile — fusil*; though the name probably came from *focus* — fire, Italian *focile*) were called fusiliers. The bayonet was mounted on a wooden plug to be inserted in the bore of the musket. It first made its appearance in the wars in the Netherlands.

Infantry, in all the European countries, finally got divided into regiments and companies; but these were of no especial numerical strength. The company occasionally ran up as



Early Bayonets.

high as three hundred men, and the regiment to over four thousand. Gustavus' regular regiments were more uniform. The companies had one hundred and fifty men, and eight to twelve companies made a regiment. In 1630 eight companies were deemed a battalion or regiment. It goes without saying that the exigencies of active service often changed all this. A note by Oxenstiern

exists which speaks of foot regiments varying between fifteen hundred and nineteen hundred men; cavalry regiments with from four to eight companies; and they must have varied much more. To one who has served with regiments which from one thousand men would run down, in the course of a campaign, to two hundred or less, this seems a very small variation; but Swedish recruits were used to equalize old regiments, not to make new ones. The Swedish militia regiment varied according to the population of the district in which it was raised. In the bulk of the countries of Germany about two thousand men made up an infantry regiment, and its officers were a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, quartermaster and regimental clerk; a barber and one assistant, who were surgeon and apothecary; a provost-marshal and one as-

sistant; a chaplain and one assistant; a judge advocate and his clerk. The infantry company had a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, two sergeants, one muster-clerk, a quartermaster, an armorer, six corporals, two drummers and a fifer. In active service there were ninety to ninety-four common soldiers, fifteen upper and twenty-one lower file-leaders and four muster-boys.

Loading and firing, with the constant improvement in firearms, grew more rapid; and yet it took ninety-five to ninety-nine "motions" to complete the operation, though Gustavus had abolished a large number of useless ones. On the other hand, the minor tactics of the foot-soldier was very crude, and was confined to the

simple facings, wheelings, ployments and deployments. The solid masses or phalanxes of the Spanish style remained in use by all

but the Swedes, while Gustavus set up his men six deep, the pikemen in the centre, the musketeers on the flanks or in small intermingled bodies, and later three deep.

The cavalry consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons, the latter being mounted infantry. There had been mounted arquebusiers, but Gustavus gave these weapons



German Officer. (1630.)



English Soldier
(unequipped).

up in favor of lighter firearms in all cavalry regiments.

In the imperial armies were heavy cavalry, carbineers and Croats or Hungarian irregulars. These three species of horse were known by different names in different countries, and



Dragoon. (1616.)

varied in them all. When Gustavus came to the throne, the cavalry was still considered the more honorable arm; but the nobility, which grew poorer as the commonalty gained in intelligence, were unable voluntarily to keep this arm up to its ancient standard, and Gustavus was finally compelled to recruit his cavalry in the same manner as his foot. It was not strong; in Sweden were only some thirty-five hundred mounted troops. As the firearm gained in efficiency, horse-armor was discarded; the lance gave way to the more useful carbine, and the dragoons, introduced into the Swedish army from Germany in 1611, were furnished with an infantry musket and dismounted to fight. They were really bodies of infantry, comprising both musketeers and pikemen, and mounted to enable them to move fast. They lacked the cavalryman's distinctive boots and spurs. Yet they were not bad cavalry; their record as such was good. The cuirassier retained helmet, cuirass of front and back pieces, sword and two pistols; but from this time on light cavalry has constantly gained in relative efficiency over the heavy.



Hungarian Irregular.
(17th Century.)

Like foot, the horse was organized into regiments and companies, the latter also called "squadrons" or "cornets." The Swedish cavalry regiments had a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel

and major, a quartermaster, regimental clerk and a barber-surgeon. The cavalry cornet, or company, had a captain with four horses, a lieutenant and an ensign with three horses each, two corporals with two horses each, a quartermaster with two horses, a muster-clerk, a chaplain, a provost, a barber, a farrier, each with one horse, two trumpeters and one hundred and two common soldiers; or, all told, one hundred and fifteen men with one hundred and twenty-five horses. The strength of the cavalry regiments of other countries was very various, and the difficulty of procuring horses often dismounted great numbers of men. The imperial companies averaged one hundred horses, the regiments eight hundred. The Swedish regiments of cavalry had eight cornets, aggregating one thousand horses.




Croat.

The main trouble with the horse prior to Gustavus' day was its slowness in charging. It would ride up to the enemy, when each rank would successively fire and then wheel off to reload. The light horsemen served as scouts; the heavy cavalry lacked *élan*, never undertaking the true rôle of horse. The Swedish cuirassiers, on the contrary, were taught to ride at a gallop, to fire their pistols at speed, and then take to the naked weapon. If they were superior to the German cavalry in any one point, it was in their better tactics, and this was Gustavus' doing. On the whole, the Swedish cavalry, barring discipline, was no better than the German; perhaps the heavy cavalry was not as good as the best German squadrons, on account of the smaller size of the Swedish horses, nor the light as good as the Croat irregulars.

But there was no question as to the superiority of Swedish artillery. Gustavus Adolphus introduced marked changes in this arm, mainly by making the guns and carriages lighter and handier, and by adapting their movements to those of the other arms and to the requirements of the battle-field. In this, as in all his military efforts, his motto was mobility and rapidity of fire.

There were, according to size, three kinds of guns: siege, ship, field. The twenty-four-pounder siege-gun weighed three tons; the twenty-four-pounder field-gun only twenty-seven hundred pounds. The twelve-pounder siege-gun weighed a ton and a half, the twelve-pounder field-gun only eighteen hundred pounds. The six-pounder siege-gun weighed three



Siege-Guns.

a, Twenty-four pounder; calibre, 5 inches; weight, 6,000 pounds. (Stockholm Artillery Museum.) *b*, Twelve-pounder; calibre, 4 inches; weight, 2,600 pounds. (Stockholm Artillery Museum.) *c*, Six-pounder; calibre, 3.3 inches; weight, 1,700 pounds. (Stockholm Artillery Museum.)


fourths of a ton; the six-pounder field-gun twelve hundred pounds. There were also three-pounders and two-pounders for field use. The ship-guns were intermediate in heft. There was some variation in these measurements and weights. The heavy siege-guns took thirty-six horses to move, and could not go into the field. There were various patterns of guns, can-

non-royal, culverins, falconets, single and double (*i. e.* heavy and light) and mortars; but the latter were not much used. All these pieces were extremely unhandy. The single cannon-royal was twelve feet long and called for twenty-four horses to transport it; culverins needed sixteen.

One of Gustavus' artillery officers, von Siegeroth, in doing practice work with guns, new and old, had found that shorter guns, properly constructed, were equally effective. In 1624 Gustavus commanded all old and unserviceable ordnance to be recast into newer patterns; and a year later he himself contrived a gun which one horse or three men could handle to good effect. This gun was intended as a regimental piece; and each regiment had one and later two of them. It was an iron three- and four-pounder, and the cartridge, which weighed less than a pound and a half, consisted of the charge held in a thin turned wooden case, wired to the ball. This was the first artillery cartridge,



Three-pound Regimental Gun.
Calibre, 2.6 inches; weight, 450 pounds.
(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)



Three-pound Leather Gun.
Calibre, 2.6 inches; weight, 450 pounds.
(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)

the original fixed ammunition. The gun was afterwards introduced into other European armies as the *pièce Suédoise*. Not only had it the virtue of lesser weight, but its cartridge was always ready, and it could be fired eight times

to six shots of a musketeer with the awkward arm of the day.


Gustavus' merit thus lay in making guns which could be handled more like our own than the cumbrous ordnance then in use. In the wars against the Poles he employed with

profit the so-called leather cannon, a fact which shows how lacking in power the artillery of the day must have been. These guns were invented in the early twenties by Colonel Wurmbrandt, and consisted of a thin copper tube reinforced



Early Mortars.

by iron rings and bands, then bound with rope set in cement, the whole covered with sole leather. The tube was made to screw in and out, as it grew heated by from eight to twelve discharges and had to be cooled. The gun-carriage was shaped out of two oak planks. Three men could carry a gun, which without carriage weighed ninety pounds, and was fired with a light charge. Of fourteen of these cannon only is mention made ; and after being used in 1628-29 in Poland, they disappeared in favor of the king's four-pounder cast-iron guns. These last named regimental guns remained in common use in Europe until the artillery was reorganized and massed by Frederick. The capacity for evolutions and the rapidity of fire of Gustavus' batteries excited universal admiration. Grape and canister were generally employed in the field-guns, round shot only in siege-guns. Gustavus used his cannon in masses



Early Mortar.

as well as with regiments, and the excellence of his artillery largely contributed to his successes. This arm with the Swedes was immensely superior in effectiveness to that of any other European army; the king was the first to show of what artillery was really capable.


Mortars throwing bombs were first used at the siege of Lamotte in 1634. Hand grenades, shells, fire-balls, etc., came into more general use as the German chemists made their many new discoveries. Artillery-practice grew to be something of a science; experts took it up, and the troops were better instructed. The regimental guns were attended by grenadiers detailed for the work; and there were special companies for the reserve guns. Musketeers supported the guns among the Swedes; cavalry was wont to do so in the imperial army.

In this connection the following extract from Holingshed's Chronicles, showing what English ordnance at the end of the sixteenth century was, may not be uninteresting:—

The names of our greatest ordnance are commonly these: *Robinet*, whose weight is two hundred pounds, and it hath one inch and a quarter within the mouth. *Falconet* weigheth five hundred pounds, and his wideness is two inches within the mouth. *Falcon* hath eight hundred pounds, and two inches and a half within the mouth; *Minion* poiseth eleven hundred pounds, and hath three inches and a quarter within the mouth; *Sacre* hath sixteen hundred pounds, and is three inches and a half wide in the mouth; *Demi-Culverin* weigheth three thousand pounds, and hath four inches and a half within the mouth; *Culverin* hath four thousand pounds and five inches and a half within the mouth; *Demi-Cannon*, six thousand pounds, and six inches and a half within the mouth; *Cannon*, seven thousand pounds, and seven inches within the mouth; *E-Cannon*, eight thousand pounds, and seven inches within the mouth; *Basilisk*, nine thousand pounds, eight inches and three

quarters within the mouth. By which proportions also it is easy to come by the weight of every shot, how many scores it doth flee at point blank, and how much powder is to be had to the same, and finally how many inches in height each bullet ought to carry.

The Names of the Greatest Ordnance.	Weight of the Shot.	Scores of Carriage.	Pounds of Powder.	Height of Bullet.
Robinet	1 pound.	0	$0\frac{1}{2}$	1 (inch)
Falconet	2 pounds.	14	2	$1\frac{1}{4}$
Falcon	$2\frac{1}{2}$ pounds.	16	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$
Minion	$4\frac{1}{4}$ pounds.	17	$4\frac{1}{2}$	3
Sacre	5 pounds.	18	5	$3\frac{1}{4}$
Demi-Culverin	9 pounds.	20	9	4
Culverin	18 pounds.	25	18	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Demi-Cannon	30 pounds.	38	28	$6\frac{3}{4}$
Cannon	60 pounds.	20	44	$7\frac{3}{4}$
E-Cannon	42 pounds.	20	20	$6\frac{3}{4}$
Basilisk	60 pounds.	21	60	$8\frac{1}{4}$



Culverin. (1500.)

V.

THE SWEDISH ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS. 1611-1632.

GUSTAVUS was unable early to uniform his troops, but he gave each a special color of regimental flag. In arms and equipment there was uniformity, and the men were warmly clad in their peasant's dress, and had waterproof fur-lined boots for winter. His first improvement was to lessen the file to three deep in firing; but the pikemen stood in close serried order, six deep. The brigades had alternate bodies of musketeers and pikemen, and foot was mixed with horse in parts of the line. All changes tended towards rapid fire and mobility. The cavalry from ten was also cut down to three ranks, and was played into column to charge. From an inert body Gustavus made it an active one. Though the artillery was used in masses, each regiment kept its own pieces. In battle the skirmishers held the ground while the line formed; then the cavalry cleared the front, the artillery opened, and the line advanced, first to fire, then to push of pike. In marches Gustavus dispensed with a rear-guard when marching toward, with a van when marching from, the enemy. His men were rapid goers. In battle he paid keen heed to the *terrain*, and made his three arms work together. The discipline of the Swedes was wonderful; good conduct was universal; the usual military crimes were quite absent. The pay was small but regular; the food was ample, and was obtained, not by plunder, but from magazines carefully provided. The troops were quartered in towns or fortified camps. The train was much decreased. Religious duties were strictly observed. Promotion went by seniority and service. Rewards and punishments were just. There were regimental schools for the children of soldiers, many of whom, as well as their wives, went with the troops. Loose women were not tolerated. As an engineer, Gustavus was far ahead of his day; he had many experts; fortification was wonderfully well done; and field-works were constructed rapidly and efficiently. The Swedish navy as well as the army was largely increased and brought to a state of high efficiency.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS is usually referred to as the originator of uniforms. This is not strictly correct. Some of the Swedish regiments were known by a color, not of the uniform

but of the standard. Ehrenreuter's regiment had red silk for its ensign; the Vizthum regiment, old blue; Winkel's, blue; Teuffel's, yellow; Hepburn's, green; the Pomeranian regiment, white; the three Hanse regiments, black. The ensign was of one solid color, on which figured an emblem. Such was one of white damask, with the royal crown surmounted by a rose, and "Gustavus Adolphus" on one side, and on the other, "Touch me not or you'll get burnt;" or, again, a blood-red standard, with a flame and a figure bearing sword and scales, and the motto "For King and Justice."

For many years Gustavus had no uniforms for his troops. At the beginning of his reign the men served, each in the peasant's dress in which he reported. In arms and equipment alone was there uniformity, save in so far as the peasants dressed alike. In 1613 a uniformed royal body-guard was organized, and in 1621 Gustavus ordered that the soldiers of the line be clad alike so far as possible, instead of in the long jerkin and smock-frock of the peasant, "so that they should not be despised among the nations of the outland." A year after he ordered that companies and regiments be uniformly clad; but all this took time. The clothing of the Swedish peasant was coarse, but being hand-made it wore well, and a good garment might not be lightly discarded. So that even in 1626 people spoke of the Swedes as ill-appearing louts in bad clothes. The uniformed troops indeed donned their uniforms only on dress occasions, as at the visit of princes, or at reviews in their honor. They sometimes had holiday insignia issued for special use; at the Altmarkt Conference the men on duty wore blue and gold tabards. When the matter got settled, the men appear to have worn a sleeveless tunic and loose knee-breeches, which, indeed, was the national cut of dress; and over this their

armor and equipments. An undergarment covered the arms ; the legs were clad in coarse woolen stockings and the feet in shoes or bootees, according to season, for the foot and dragoons ; in boots for the cavalry. The infantryman wore at times a species of gaiter from the knee down. Clothing depots were established at several of the Swedish cities ; but although the work was all done in these depots, the patterns are said to have come from Paris, then already the centre of fashions, small and great. It is true that Gustavus eventually arrived at uniforming his troops ; for years his efforts lay in that direction, but he aimed still more at providing warm and useful clothing. The men had fur garments and gloves, fur-lined boots and woolen stockings, and many had a sort of Russian bootee of waterproof leather.

These were in part issued to the troops, in part bought by the individual soldiers. It was the protection afforded by such clothing that enabled Gustavus to conduct his winter campaigns in Germany, — to the astonishment and confusion of his enemies.

The chief improvement in the tactical formation, and this was brought about by the introduction of gunpowder, lay in the lessening of the depth of the file ; and yet it is curious how old-fashioned soldiers like Tilly stuck to their deep battles when artillery was becoming effective. Gustavus made many other changes in the formation and manœuvring of the troops. Infantry had already got set up in not exceeding ten ranks. The musketeers stood in closed files but with open ranks, which gave space for the rank which had fired to retire to reload, and they sometimes attacked in open order, almost in what we should call a skirmish line ; the pikemen



Suit worn by Gustavus at the Dirschau Combat. (Stockholm Museum.)

stood in closed ranks and files. Gustavus first reduced the formation of musketeers to six ranks, which for firing closed into three; this remained the pattern for many years, and at the close of the Thirty Years' War was universal. The battle disappeared, and was succeeded by a proper fire line.



Swedish Musketeer.


In line the pikemen were placed

in the centre, with the musketeers on the flanks or grouped at the corners of the bodies; or else the divisions of musketeers and pikemen alternated.

A mass of men ready for action was called a *tertia*, or battalion (*battle*), or squadron. In Germany and Spain these battles were several thousand strong; among the French they consisted of not

over five or six hundred men. Gustavus first brigaded his regiments, and gave to many brigades a peculiar color of standard.

The exigencies of the service demanded frequent changes, and we hear of brigades of two regiments formed in five lines, of which the two rear ones were the reserve, and in them the divisions of pikemen and musketeers alternated. Such a formation is shown in Lord Reay's sketch, of which later; but it was not universal. Or again, the brigade was set up in three lines, so as to show more front; this was the formation adopted by



Swedish Pikeman.

Gustavus at Breitenfeld. At still another period the brigade was formed with a division of pikemen in advance, and four divisions of musketeers in two lines in the rear. At Lützen, a dozen Swedish companies were ployed into column, one behind the other, and had eight companies in one line as a reserve. Any one of these brigade-formations was handier in movement, and less endangered by artillery, than the usual deep masses; and it was particularly useful from having the reserve to call upon.

It seems odd that there should not be more certainty as to the organization and minor tactics of an army of modern days; but matters were in a transition period, due to the constant improvements in ballistics, and there is no moment of time when any one method universally obtained, even in Sweden. It might be difficult, when arms of precision call forth so many changes, to say just what the organization of infantry is to-day, or may be within five years. Going back to include our civil war, in view of the changes in all civilized countries, it might indeed puzzle one to state without great prolixity just what a regiment or a brigade is; and records were not so carefully kept in the seventeenth century. Many of the foreign regiments in Gustavus' army had each its own formation and drill, which it was wise not to alter, lest the efficiency of the body should be affected.

Taught by his studies, Gustavus revived the ancient habit of mixing small detachments of infantry with cavalry. He made these composite bodies from two hundred to four hundred strong, and gave each one a field-gun. On important occasions he detailed men from different organizations to form a *corps d'élite* of musketeers.



Swedish Officer.

The infantry commonly fired in salvos by ranks, succeeding ranks coming forward, while the one which had fired retired through the intervals to reload. Gustavus introduced the habit of having the front rank kneel so as to fire without shifting ranks, as this was apt to unsettle the line. On occasion he used what was virtually a fire by file.

The cavalry had hitherto been formed in from four to ten ranks. Gustavus cut it down to three ranks, which much increased its mobility. The fancy skirmishing (*caracoles*) was abolished, as well as the use of firearms as the sole resource in the attack. The king insisted that the squadrons should charge at a gallop with pistols or naked blade; a style quite in accordance with his own tremendous fire and energy.



Swedish Cuirassier.

The Swedish cavalry rode in two or more lines, company in rear of company, or checker-wise; occasionally in one line *en muraille*. Other horse still relied on its fire alone, which made it excessively slow. There were exceptions: no better cavalry stood in line than splendid Pappenheim's; but as a rule the cavalry of the day was inert. With Gustavus, on the contrary, even the dragoon partook more of the impulse of the cavalry-

man than of the stolidity of the infantry soldier; while in the other armies the dragoon remained a mere well-transported footman. In his intelligent management of both these arms Gustavus soon had imitators. His victories showed the superiority of his system so thoroughly that the whole

world turned from the ancient methods to study what he had introduced.

It was the habit in all armies to place the horse in the wings; and a sort of precedence by seniority that decided the place in line made the constant shifting of regiments awkward and dangerous. Gustavus kept cavalry in the wings, but he also placed cavalry companies in rear of each line of infantry, where they served to aid in re-establishing any sudden check.

The artillery was posted along the front, or on advantageous ground. Under Gustavus the three arms supported each other much in the modern way. Herein consisted the value of the king's method. His army became a well-designed machine, with all parts operating smoothly, instead of a disjointed mass, whose several parts worked out of time, and failed at the critical moment to sustain one another.

The acts of a battle were these. The ground was first held by the small bodies of skirmishers, who, from their dangerous calling, were called forlorn hopes, or *enfants perdus*; and behind these the lines quietly formed in parallel order. Then, often not waiting to withdraw these skirmishers, the cavalry charged down the front to clear out the curtain they had formed, to the destruction of friend and foe alike; which done, the artillery opened fire along the entire line. Under its smoke the cavalry — usually on the flanks — would charge again; the foot would get into musket-range,



Swedish Ensign of Cuirassiers.

and if it could unsettle the enemy, would finally come to "push of pike." There being rarely anything like grand-tactics, or a battle plan, the lines got much intermixed. Whichever side could retain the best semblance of formation, or rather the side which showed the less confusion, would be apt to win.

An army marched usually in van-guard, main force and rear-guard; Gustavus dispensed with rear-guard when marching towards the enemy. Light troops formed the van and flankers. There were two or three columns, each a line when in order of battle, and so formed that the platoons or companies could readily wheel into line. Occasionally the columns marched checker-wise. Armies began to get over more ground than formerly; especially the Swedes made good marches; but the rate was not equal to the best of this century.

In battles more heed was now paid to topography, and the operations were better suited to it. Artillery played a more decided rôle. The utility of reserves came into recognition. While the order of battle remained parallel and there was no grand-tactics, yet flanking marches, the advance of a second line through a wearied first line, and other like manœuvres, were not uncommon. Gustavus made none but parallel front attacks. The value of his tactics lay in the disposition of the troops: in so placing the pikemen as to cover the musketeers; the musketeers as to sustain the pikemen; while each brigade sustained the other and each was all-sufficient to itself, with well-protected flanks, like a small movable fortress. But it was rather the mobility of each separate body than its solidity which lent it self-sustaining power.

The parent of grand-tactics is ability to manœuvre; without mobility bodies cannot do this; and Gustavus, from the

new conditions imposed by gunpowder, first wrought out details which enabled men to move rapidly on the battle-field. Basing on his work, later commanders introduced what we now know as grand-tactics. Gustavus especially saw how to adapt his troops and position to the topography and the conditions ; he seized the vital moment in a battle and made the most of it. To him belongs the credit of first, in modern times, forcing the passage of a rapid river in the face of a strong and able enemy. And even though he failed in his assault on the Alte Veste, Gustavus showed the world that there need be no hesitancy in storming intrenchments or strong positions. Both operations had imitators.

As the king's was better than any other European army in organization, so it was superior in discipline and *esprit de corps*. The Swedish primeval peasantry was excellent ; big-fisted and stout-hearted, it in no wise feared danger or suffering. The Swedes "do not defend their men with walls, but their walls with men" was a contemporary saying. Since they had emerged from serfdom many peasants had acquired property, and each proprietor was held to furnish a man to the government or to the army. The crown had grown to rely greatly on the people, and the reason the Vasa family had so strong a hold on the masses was that they always sided with the peasantry against the nobles and clergy.

The pay of the Swedish troops was small ; the narrow exchequer of the country allowed no greater. The budget in 1630 was twelve million rix dollars ; but the troops were regularly paid during the life of Gustavus Adolphus. There is no table in the Swedish archives which details the entire pay-roll, and there is some question as to the amounts. The several records vary greatly. The following strikes us as high ; but we do not know what each officer had to maintain, or what deductions may have been made for rations, clothing,

arms, etc. A lower scale is given in other records. The pay of the generals and staff was: Field marshal, 1,000 rix dollars a month; colonel-general of artillery, 600; colonel and chief of scouts and colonel and chief quartermaster, 500 each; colonel and quartermaster of cavalry, 300. The rate of pay of the lesser staff-officers was presumably assimilated to that of their regimental grade.

The scale of regimental pay in the foot was:—

Colonel	184 rix dollars a month.
Lieutenant-colonel	80 “ “ “
Major	61 “ “ “
Chief quartermaster	30 “ “ “
Chaplains (2) each	18 “ “ “
Judge advocates (2) each	30 “ “ “
Surgeons (4) each	12 “ “ “
Regimental clerk	30 “ “ “
Clerk of council of war	18 “ “ “
Provost-marshals (4) each	12 “ “ “
Assistant of marshal	10 “ “ “
Beadles (2) each	3 “ “ “
Hangman	7 “ “ “

The scale of company pay was:—

Captain	61 rix dollars a month.
Lieutenant	30 “ “ “
Ensign (ancient)	30 “ “ “
Sergeants (2) each	9 “ “ “
Assistant ensign	7 “ “ “
Assistant quartermaster	7 “ “ “
Armorer	7 “ “ “
Company clerk	7 “ “ “
Musicians	4 “ “ “
Corporals (6) each	6 “ “ “
File leaders (15) each	5 “ “ “
Under leaders (2) each	4 “ “ “
Privates	3½ “ “ “
Officers' servants	3 “ “ “

In the cavalry the rates were considerably higher, — especially for the field-officers.

The troops were fed from magazines, — one of the most important of the improvements of Gustavus, who established depots in suitable localities, and saw to it that they were kept full from Sweden, or by systematic contributions from the countries traversed. There was a regular staff of commissaries who distributed provisions to the regiments in bulk, and they were then issued to the men by the major, who seems also to have been charged with the fatigue and policing duties of the camp. Sutlers or traders were permitted at times to set up their booths near by. During Gustavus' life the troops were well cared for ; after his death things went on in a more hap-hazard way, and the army was apt to be fed and paid from the results of plunder.

Gustavus quartered his troops in towns or cities ; if in fortified camps, in huts or tents. Wherever they were, camp and garrison duties were obligatory, and discipline was never relaxed.

The baggage-train was much decreased by Gustavus. A cavalry company was allowed ten wagons ; an infantry company three, the regimental staff eight. To us this seems a large allowance ; but the train and camp-followers of an army in the seventeenth century were far beyond any modern limit.

The one thing which made Gustavus' army a power was the infusion of the man himself into its very pith. The Swedish troops were instinct with strong religious feeling, and exhibited the qualities that spring from it, — good behavior, obedience, absence of crime, cheerful courage and good discipline. At the root of this lay Gustavus' own example, which was a never-varying pattern of soldierly bearing. Regular morning and evening prayers were introduced by the king ; he first

commissioned chaplains. Before battle there was a service by the priests, and a dedication of the army to the service of God. Regular days of prayer were appointed at intervals in General Orders, and Gustavus caused to be printed and distributed to the army a special Soldiers' Prayer-Book. In Germany it was to most men a wonderful sight to see the distinguished field-marshal kneeling upon the ground beside the humblest private in earnest prayer.

Promotion went strictly by seniority and services; nepotism was unknown. The highest in the land must begin at the foot of the military ladder, as the king himself had done.

At the siege of Riga, in 1621, Gustavus issued a set of field regulations which long remained in force. They established a regimental court-martial, of which the commanding officer was president and "assessors" elected by the regiment were members; and a standing general court-martial, which had the royal marshal of Sweden as president and higher officers as members. To the monarch was the last appeal. Provost-marshals might arrest on suspicion any offender, and imprison and bring him before the court; but they might not hang for any offense, except resistance to their orders. The regimental court tried for thieving, insubordination, cowardice and all minor crimes; the higher court had cognizance of civil causes in the army, treason and the more serious crimes. Decimation, by beheading or hanging, was the lot of any regiment which ran away in action, and the regiment was thenceforth held to lie out of camp and do menial service till it retrieved itself. "Riding the wooden horse" with a musket tied to each foot, shackles, bread-and-water-arrest, were common. There was no flogging. Even small breaches of discipline were severely punished, and misdemeanors were visited impartially with regard to persons. The higher crimes were punished with death, among others theft, plunder, violence to

women, cowardice, or the surrender of a fortress, except in extremity. The articles of war were excellent. The universal testimony is that there were few breaches of discipline. But they did occur: in 1631, Gustavus had to issue an *adhortatorium* to the troops on account of acts of plunder, and a number of men were executed. As a rule, however, the Swedish soldiers were exemplary, in word and deed, far beyond the soldier of that century. An officers' tribunal or court of honor existed for passing on their misdoings. Gustavus was especially severe on dueling, which was forbidden under pain of death. It is related that he permitted two officers, who especially requested leave, to meet; that he himself attended the duel, and said to the principals: "Now, gentlemen, at it, and stop you not till one of you is killed! Moreover, I have the provost-marshal at hand, who will at once execute the other!" Cheerful prospect!

A soldier's wife was allowed to accompany the regiment; but the bane of the German army, a troop of loose women among the camp-followers, was unknown. In each regiment were schools for the children of soldiers, many of whom, according to the curious custom of those days, accompanied their fathers, even on campaigns. As crimes were remorselessly punished, so were services adequately rewarded, by promotion, presents of money and pensions. But excellent as it was, it must be admitted that the perfect organization of the Swedish army did not outlive Gustavus himself.

All other European armies at this time were alike, and characterized by disorder and indiscipline. The troops were rarely paid, ill-fed and scantily clothed. The officers were over-luxurious; the men barely provided for. The troops were carelessly quartered in the towns or wherever it came easiest, and their presence was the signal of grievous oppression; while in the wake of a marching army stalked desola-

tion. The baggage-train was enormous, as the men were permitted to carry along their plunder, and the number of non-combatants is hard to credit. In one army of forty thousand men, one hundred and forty thousand camp-followers are said to have been counted. The armies were full of cut-throats, outcasts and soldiers of fortune, and their conduct was that of highway robbers, even in the land of friends. Despite capital punishment for a number of crimes, and the penalty was often exacted, such a body could not be kept from gruesome atrocities, from which indeed neither man, woman nor child escaped. But prisoners had come to be well treated because they were expected to pay ransoms; and acts of heroism were not uncommon. Rewards were as marked as punishments. Especially Wallenstein was distinguished for the severity of his punishments and the splendor of his rewards.

Gustavus was himself an expert, and he organized a superb corps of engineers. In Germany, folk were astonished to see scores of men of science accompany the army, and to note the way they were put to use in intrenching positions. Franz von Traytor was the "general of fortifications," or, as we should say, chief of engineers; and an engineer-officer named Porticus was noted for excellent work. There was a special corps of miners; but the entire army was drilled in throwing up fortifications and in pontoon-bridging. Even the cavalry were taught to throw a bridge. By spreading this knowledge so thoroughly throughout the army, Gustavus could intrench himself on unavailable ground, and quickly repair and make serviceable the walls of places he captured. He wrote a series of "Instructions" on this subject which are clear and sound. He had learned all that the Netherlands had to teach, and had bettered on some of it.

Field-fortification in this era was common. Outlying posts


were defended by redoubts and star-shaped forts with palisades, drawbridges and all manner of entanglements. Armies in the field, as well as those besieging strong places, covered themselves with works more or less complicated. A camp was not dissimilar to the Roman camp, with its wall and ditch, streets of tents, parade-ground and careful divisions, the difference being mainly one of arms and organization. Gustavus adopted the system of field-fortification which had been brought to perfection in the Netherlands; but he altered it in many ways. Instead of having a single line of unbroken works, he would build a series of mutually supporting isolated works, in two or more lines. In his camps he placed his troops with a much greater front than usual, and allowed each regiment to have its baggage in its own rear.

Rank and command were as follows: The king was supreme. Next came the royal marshal. Over a large army there was a general-field-colonel, and over smaller armies, commanders, general-commanders and field-m Marshals. In 1623 there were only two commanders, Jacob de la Gardie and Hermann Wrangel. There were field-majors, and general-field-majors. Bernard von Thörn, who came to Sweden from the Netherlands with a regiment of foot, was made a general-field-major. Then came colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors, and then the company officers. In 1626 there were fifteen colonels and nineteen lieutenant-colonels. In 1630 Gustavus Horn was made field-marshal, Åke Tott and John Banér generals. The nucleus of a general staff was begun; Kniphausen was its chief, and he was succeeded by Baudissin. The chief of artillery in Germany was the twenty-seven-year-old, but exceptionally able, Colonel Torstenson.

Permanent fortification was rather blindly borrowed from the system of the Netherlands. Sieges were formally conducted with lines of circum- and contra-vallation carefully

prepared. Regular trenches, as we understand them, did not appear till towards the end of the Thirty Years' War. The means of siege was laborious rather than scientific; nor can it be claimed that Gustavus was peculiarly able in his sieges.

The navy was much increased. Many ships were bought in Germany; more were built by Swedish private capital. In 1630 the *Mercury* of thirty-two guns was the flagship. The *Westerwik* had twenty-six guns, the *Apollo* and *Pelican* twenty each, the *Andromeda* eighteen, the *Rainbow* thirteen, the *Stork* twelve, the *Parrot* ten, the *Black Dog* eight, the *Dolphin* two. In 1632 there were five admirals and fifty-four ships of war, whose crews numbered from forty-eight to one hundred and sixty men.



Cannon suggested in the 15th Century.

VI.

THE YOUNG PRINCE AND KING. 1611-1617.

GUSTAVUS VASA, the grandfather of Gustavus Adolphus, was a prince of exceptional force. He introduced Protestantism into Sweden, raised and educated the peasantry, and took their part against the priests and nobles. He fostered commerce and created a merchant marine. All the Vasas were able, cultured and strong; but there was a touch of insanity in the family. Eric showed it and was deposed. John had a tendency to Romanism, and his son Sigismund turned Catholic on inheriting from his mother the throne of Poland. By this act he forfeited the Swedish crown; and Charles, the father of our hero, was made king. Gustavus was born in 1594, was carefully educated, and showed wonderful ability. He mastered several languages and was a keen student. His character as a lad was the promise of the man; he was a good writer and a fine speaker, and was physically strong, open hearted, brave and religious. At eleven he entered the army, and was allowed to attend the meetings of the royal council. He watched the Russian campaign of 1610, and engaged in that of 1611 against Denmark. Though only successful in part, he showed intelligence, persistency and marked originality in what he did. Charles IX. died this year, and Gustavus, who, though only seventeen, was at once crowned, found himself at war with Russia, Poland and Denmark. The campaign of 1612 exhibited ability; but it was only successful in so far as it enabled Sweden to make a peace by purchasing from Denmark some territory in 1613. Next year there were no operations, but in 1615-16 the young king attacked Russia from Finland and won a large strip of territory. The eyes of Europe began to be attracted to him. In 1617 Russia ceded the conquered provinces, and the war closed.

THE grandfather of Gustavus Adolphus, the great Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560), was a man of sound and powerful character, and a truly noteworthy Protestant prince. It was he who laid the foundation of the growth of Sweden. When he came to the throne, the Swedes were all but a semi-barbarous people, who, said the king, were so shortsighted as to rob

every merchant who ventured among them. The Reformation did so much for the country, however, that a hundred years later Gustavus Adolphus saw his people as advanced in intelligence and culture as any nation of northern Europe; and the Swedish nobility held high rank among the aristocracies of the Continent. The growth of Lutheranism in Sweden was not merely a religious revival; it was largely due to political facts. Gustavus Vasa, its founder, though a great man, was far from a profoundly religious man; but he saw that by confiscating the estates of the church, he could help forward the national finances as well as bind the nobles to his cause; and that by getting rid of the priests, who all desired a single and Catholic Scandinavia under the rule of Denmark, he would establish his own family more firmly on the throne. It was he, in fact, who made the throne hereditary in the Vasa family. In addition to introducing Protestantism, Gustavus I. established a commerce for Sweden by favoring the middle class as against the nobles; and he added largely to the territory of the country by means of encroachments on his neighbors that were equally in fashion then as now. It was this head of the Vasas who created the Swedish fleet, and who improved the style of ship-building by bringing Venetian workmen to instruct his own thorough but less subtle designers. Under him the Swedish merchant marine grew to a reputable size. Gustavus Vasa left his crown to his eldest, and dukedoms to his other sons, and was succeeded in turn by his first son Eric, his second son John and the latter's son Sigismund; and then by his fourth son Charles IX., the father of Gustavus Adolphus.¹

The entire family were able men and broad. The Vasas stood so far above any of the other Swedes that they may be said to have reigned by a sort of Homeric right. Not only

¹ See Vasa Family-Tree, page 65.


possessed of force of character and brains, most of them were highly cultured, well read in literature, and versed in the arts and sciences. Many were truly noble men. The Vasa blood had a markedly good strain.

King Eric was able, but he showed evidences of the insanity which, coupled to its vigorous intellect, unquestionably resided in the Vasa family. He was deposed in 1567, and his brother John ascended the throne. John inclined to Catholicism, though he never avowed so much; but he married Catherine Jarghellon of Poland, and when the Jarghellon monarchs died out, his son Sigismund was made king of Poland, and, as was imperative, became a Catholic at the same time.

In order not to forfeit his claim to the throne of Sweden by his change of religion, Sigismund granted extravagant privileges to the nobles; but the country had a parliamentary government, the four Estates — nobles, clergy, citizens, peasants — having each a voice, and the three last named were stanch Protestants. Despite Sigismund's efforts, even by force of arms, to make Sweden a Catholic country, he failed in his end, was eventually deprived of the crown, and

VASA FAMILY-TREE.

Gustavus Vasa (I.) 1523-1560.



retired to Poland, breathing vengeance. In 1604 Charles IX. became king, and the throne was entailed on his eldest son, Gustavus Adolphus, and his descendants, "being Protestants." With this patriarchal family back of him, the prince came honestly by his ability, his uprightness, his courage and his energy.

Gustavus II., or Gustavus Adolphus, was born in Stockholm, December 19 (N. S.), 1594, son by his second wife of the then Duke Charles, whose nephew Sigismund was on the throne. By his first wife Charles had had but one daughter, Catherine, who married Count John Casimir, and became the life-long friend and adviser of the future monarch, and the progenitress of the succeeding kings.

Charles was not as brilliant as most of the Vasas, but he was practical to the last degree, a quality at the time of more importance than high culture; the mother of Gustavus had that which Charles lacked, and the young prince was surrounded by every advantage which strong intelligence and high mental and moral aims could bring him. If Charles IX. wanted some of the burly intellectual qualities of the family, he none the less exhibited in a high degree the common-sense ability of his father. He did much for the military organization of the kingdom; he compiled the first code of Swedish laws; he labored hard at the financial status and equalization of taxes, and gave a new impetus to mining; he ordered topographical surveys of the kingdom to be made; and he prepared the way for his son in a fashion which could scarcely have been bettered.

Charles was happily born to reign over an unspoiled people. The Swedish peasantry was rude and ignorant, but it was stout and loyal. Like the soil of New England, the Scandinavian land had trained its dwellers to work and to endure; and religion had made them earnest and true. In

fact, his faith represented to the Swedish peasant his fealty to both God and king, much as it does to the Russian of to-day, but with a broader intelligence.

Gustavus Adolphus was a lad of great personal beauty and strength, and his naturally alert mind was a pregnant soil for careful training. Even in his boyhood he showed that breadth of quality which later in life lent him such preëminence, — a deep and earnest religious nature, strongly imbued with the tenets of Protestantism, an unswerving moral character, warm affections, great amiability, frankness and a strict sense of rectitude. Coupled with these from earliest youth there were noted in him that species of courage which absolutely ignores danger, and those habits of mind and heart which are wont to call forth the manly virtues. And as this species of character usually possesses its purely human side, so we find in the king certain failings in temper and tricks of thought which all the more endear him to us. He was not a mere king of high heels and wig and ermine cloak ; he was a man enacting his rôle in the face and eyes of all the world.

Many a pretty story is told of his childhood. “Do not go into that wood,” said his nurse to him one day ; “there are big snakes there !” “But just give me a stout stick,” replied the brave little fellow, “and I’ll soon kill them all !” One day, when he was taken to see a naval review, an officer of rank asked him which ship he preferred. “Why, that one there,” replied the five-year-old prince. “And why, Your Royal Highness ?” “Because she has got the most guns.” It was natural that his tastes should run to war ; it was part of the Vasa education as well as inheritance.

The lad was a close student, and took a keen interest in languages, sciences and *belles-lettres*. His education was conducted under the oversight of his father and mother, and of

Axel Oxenstiern, who later became his prime minister as well as most intimate friend. His father drew up a memorandum of routine for him, which, by no means lacking the same religious impulse, stands out for its common sense in marked



Axel Oxenstiern.

contrast to that drawn up by the father of Frederick the Great. Charles had the utmost faith in the future of Gustavus. *Ille faciet*, said he on his death-bed, when an unusually knotty question arose which had puzzled him and his council, and which he was fain to put into other hands.

Gustavus' masters were selected after consultation with the Swedish Estates. His special tutor was John Skytte, clerk of the

supreme court, assisted by a German, Helmer (or Otto) von Mörner, both traveled men and able; Count de la Gardie was his military instructor, and later one of his trusted generals. Sweden was noted for inviting distinguished foreigners to its court, and never failed to make the best use of their abilities.

Gustavus became an exceptionally clever linguist. He read and could fairly express himself in Greek, Latin, Dutch, Italian, Russian and Polish, beside his native tongue; he read history to good effect, — Xenophon in the original was his favorite book, — and was well rounded in his studies. During his campaigns, Grotius' Commentary, "*De Jure Belli et Pacis*," was his constant companion. He has left us a history of the Vasas which is distinguished by its clear grasp of his subject and dignified style; he spoke and wrote with equal pointedness and force, and was considered to be the

best orator in Sweden. Many of his poems, particularly the religious ones, are still sung by rich and poor in Sweden, as Luther's are in Germany. In gymnastic sports, and in the use of weapons, he was unexcelled, and was a skillful horseman. Not only had he courage, but his bodily strength and health were exceptional. On one occasion, when he felt an attack of fever coming on from undue exposure, he sweated it off by a prolonged and violent fencing-bout with young Count Brahe. His temper was exceedingly quick, and in his youth a blow followed a word with scarce an interval; but he always made honest and ample amends for his hastiness, and later in life he learned the rare virtue of self-control. The eyes of all Sweden were early riveted on the promising heir to the throne, and great things were hoped of him.

When, in 1604, Gustavus reached ten years of age, his cousin Sigismund had already been deposed on account of his Catholic fanaticism, which had pushed him to acts intolerable to the Swedes, and Gustavus' father, as Charles IX., sat upon the throne. Sigismund retired to Poland, and both he and his powerful kingdom threatened and proved to be the most dangerous opponents Sweden could have.

In his eleventh year Gustavus entered the army at the lowest step, and worked his way patiently up. As a training in statecraft he was allowed to sit at the meetings of the ministry, and the council soon learned to appreciate his worth. Quite without pedantry, — a thing which speaks volumes for his instructors, — the lad exhibited a clean-cut idea of the strength and weakness of Sweden, of its proper rôle in the economy of northern Europe, and of his own duties as future ruler. The death of Philip II. had relieved hordes of soldiers of fortune from duty in the Netherlands, and many men trained in this famous school of war came


to Stockholm to offer their services to the king, who was expected soon to measure swords with Poland. These veterans were dear to Gustavus, because from them he learned of the warlike deeds of Maurice of Nassau, his special hero. War was even then his pride and his dream; the old Viking blood throbbed lustily in his veins.

Much to his chagrin, Gustavus was not permitted to serve in the Russian campaign of 1610, but he went to Finland and watched it near by under the guidance of de la Gardie; and when he reached the age of seventeen, his father, with the consent of the Estates, declared him of age, — “worthy of wearing a sword,” — and he was given a small command in the war with Denmark in 1611.

The Goth was strong in the young prince; it seethed indeed in the Vasa blood: Eric at times showed the tiger instinct; prosaic Charles once challenged the king of Denmark to personal combat. And in this his first taste of war, Gustavus showed the utmost coolness and disregard of danger, riding up into the immediate vicinity of the enemy when out reconnoitring, and scanning them through his glass, quite unconscious that fear was an instinct with most men.

The young general raised some forces in West Gothland and essayed to relieve Kalmar, then under siege; but fortune seemed to favor the Danes, who captured the fortress as well as Elfsborg on the west coast. Young Gustavus, however, shipped his detachment over to Öland, and took this island and the fortress of Borgholm. On his return there fell into his hands a letter from the Danish commander of the small fortress of Christianopel, begging the Danish king for five hundred horse. Gustavus at once made use of this lucky accident. He clad five hundred Swedes in Danish fashion, led them himself to Christianopel, reached the place at night, was admitted, and took possession of the fortress. These

early exploits showed the stuff of which the prince was made, and exhibited that ability to utilize favorable opportunities which later became so marked a trait.



Sweden and the Baltic.

Genius for war is only genius given a warlike direction. The same mental tissue which makes the poet, the astronomer or the musician, if coupled to vigorous character, and

given the opportunities of war, will make the captain. But the character must equal the intellect, and the opportunity be of the highest.

During the reign of Charles IX. Sweden was but a small and unconsidered country. Beside Stockholm, her only cities of importance were Westerås, Örebro and Kalmar. Gothenborg did not grow to be important until after Gustavus' death. Sweden's neighbors were, moreover, all in a position and mood to push her hard. Denmark held the key to the Baltic by her two fortresses of Kronborg (Elsinore) and Helsingborg on either side of The Sound, and the southern provinces of the Swedish peninsula, as well as all Norway, belonged to the Danish crown. Sweden could reach the sea only by the river Göte, at the mouth of which was the fortress Elfsborg, and this, though in Swedish hands, was largely neutralized by the not far distant Danish fortress of Bohus. Thus holding the key of the Baltic, Denmark claimed to control its commerce, and was a neighbor much to be dreaded. One of the dreams of Christian IV. was once more to organize a single Scandinavian dynasty under the rule of his own house ; an aspiration that made him anti-Swedish to the core. Holland had also asserted herself in the commerce of the Baltic, but not in such a manner as to provoke war. All she desired was free trade everywhere and non-interference.

War with Russia, then a minor power, had been going on for some years, for Sigismund and Charles IX. were each seeking to place on the Russian throne a claimant friendly to his own interest. Apart from politics, the matter resolved itself into a struggle for Livonia between Sweden and Poland, and at the time of Charles' death, Sweden had obtained a sort of foothold in that province. Russia's ambition was to recover her Baltic possessions, and the king of Poland was intent on regaining the crown of Sweden.

The only other prince who had a hand in the game of northern European politics was George William, the elector of Brandenburg. This sleepy potentate had no broader idea of policy than to hold on to what he already had, and to keep out of war either for religion or any other cause. He was the distinct reverse of what a Hohenzollern is apt to be.

It was on October 30, 1611, that Charles IX. died. As a matter of precedent, Gustavus Adolphus could not ascend the throne until he was twenty-four years old. But so exceptional were the circumstances surrounding Sweden that within two months, on December 17, 1611, the ministry, to whom, as a species of regency, Charles had confided Gustavus and the welfare of Sweden, clad the seventeen-year-old prince in the fullest power as king; the people accepted him as such; and during his twenty-one years' reign, no Swedish subject ever regretted this action. Gustavus chose Axel Oxenstiern, himself only twenty-eight years old, as prime minister, and during life was devoted to him as one of the best of his statesmen and generals. Oxenstiern was as prudent and calm as Gustavus was impetuous and high-strung. The two, with a friendship so unusual between king and minister, could not have been better matched. The qualities of each were a complement of those of the other. It seems strange enough that these two men, whose united ages were but forty-five years, should have thus set forth on so gigantic an undertaking.

Few young monarchs have ever been so harassed on taking up the reins of government. Gustavus' situation recalls forcibly that of Alexander. Not only was there great distress in many parts of Sweden, not only were the finances of the country on a questionable basis, but Sweden was actually at war with Denmark, Russia and Poland; and these countries were apt to hold the young king cheap.

It was manifest that Gustavus could not cope with all

these powers at once ; that his only safety lay in finishing, if possible, the war with each one singly. The conflict with Denmark was the most pressing ; the others were all but dormant, and could be staved off for a season.

Christian had begun the war in April, and within two months had appeared before and captured Kalmar, and greatly strengthened its works. The fortress of Elfsborg was also in the possession of the Danes, and the young king foresaw that to attempt their recapture would involve more time than he had at command. He determined on an incursion into Danish territory, as an easier means of accomplishing his object, and in 1612, leaving a force in the vicinity of Elfsborg to prevent further aggression by the Danes from that quarter, he marched with the bulk of his army into Schönen, where Christian had stationed a detachment.

According to the military art of the day, this was an unusual if not unwise proceeding. To undertake a sharp offensive on one point of the theatre of war as a defensive measure to another part, simple as the problem is, would never have occurred to the average general of the early seventeenth century. But Gustavus had not studied the lives of great captains in vain. Convinced that he was right in his theory, he followed up his movement by besieging Helsingborg. The plan should have succeeded, but the Danes, with a sudden onslaught on his army, placed him in grave danger, and forced him to raise the siege. This failure neither discouraged the young king nor drove him from his purpose. Its effect was the reverse ; his mood was elasticity itself, and he determined on an irruption into Norway ; but this too proved fruitless, and despite good calculation the whole campaign came to naught.

A severer test of Gustavus' character and ability could scarcely have been made. No doubt there were many innuen-

does by the wiseacres of broken maxims of the science of war ; such a failure would have drawn the temper of most men. But like Frederick after Mollwitz, the king only saw the clearer and felt the more reliant ; and the operations, though unsuccessful, go to show that the bent of the future great warrior's mind had already grown beyond the formal limitations of the military art of his century.

One incident in the campaign came close to putting a term to the king's career. In a battle on the ice on the lake of Widsjö, he and his horse fell through, and he was with difficulty rescued. Military manœuvres on the ice, or the engulfing of many men, are no rarities in these northern latitudes. This was but one of a series of accidents and wounds, generally brought on by the king's inordinately reckless gallantry. He is the captain who most resembles Alexander in the Homeric quality of his courage. He could not keep out of the fray.

Meanwhile the Danes, under personal command of Christian, prepared an expedition against Elfsnabben and Jönköping. The latter was a border fortress, and both were important places from a military standpoint, to hold which would give the Danes a secondary base for the invasion of the interior of Sweden. Gustavus had taken up a position near by, to forestall any such movement, but was, both by land and sea, distinctly weaker than the enemy. Harboring small respect for his youthful opponent, Christian made bold to push for Stockholm, hoping to capture it out of hand during the absence of the king. He had already reached Waxholm, within a half dozen miles of the capital, when Gustavus, catching the alarm, returned at the head of a small force, roused and armed all the able-bodied population, and marching boldly out to meet Christian at Waxholm, compelled him to withdraw.

Disappointed in the results of this unimportant campaign, and under the influence of England, Christian, who utterly lacked the moral equipment of Gustavus, and who was moreover held much in check by his nobles, a turbulent, unreasonable set of men, now expressed his willingness to make peace. Gustavus, who was a soldier to his finger-tips, felt bitterly the necessity of ending by negotiation a first war which he would fairly have ended by the sword; but he was glad to be rid at any price of his nearest and most dangerous enemy, and Christian, at the peace of Knaröd, January 19, 1613, yielded up Kalmar, and later Elfsborg and his other conquests, on payment by Sweden of an indemnity of a million rix thaler, about eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars. This was a heavy tax for so small and poor a country, but the peace was made with honor, and was abundantly worth thrice the money. A special tax was imposed for the ransom of Elfsborg, and Swedish territory was left intact.

No sooner rid of Denmark than Gustavus turned to the Russian question. His father had already conquered Ingria and Carelia. His old tutor, de la Gardie, the general there in command, had won a reputation for energy and fair military skill. Gustavus' younger brother, Charles Philip, had some time before been selected as a candidate for the Russian throne, which at this time was a shuttlecock between several rival factions, but Charles IX. had not approved the act, and Gustavus now declined to assert the claim by arms. His sole purpose was to prevent the king of Poland from putting on the throne a tool of his own. Nor did he in 1613 consider himself quite ready to undertake so extensive an affair; for the Danish war had delayed his preparations.

It was at this time that Gustavus' love affair with the beautiful young Countess von Brahe occurred, and it has been said that this too contributed to his delays. At all events,

nothing was accomplished until the next year, 1614, by which time he had fully completed his equipment for a Russian campaign.

Michael Feodorovitch, the ancestor of the Romanoffs, had been elected czar; but de la Gardie, on behalf of Sweden, protested against the choice, for the general still favored the pretensions of his young prince. Though Gustavus' object was more an effort to strengthen the grasp of Sweden on the Baltic than to push his brother's claims, he was none the less keenly bent on war. After some effort, he managed to patch up a two years' truce with Poland, and sent Charles Philip with troops to Wiborg, in the Swedish province of Finland, to protect it from invasion. Some exchanges had already taken place between de la Gardie and the Russians, and the war was fairly inaugurated.

In 1615 the young monarch marched with an army from Finland into Ingria, past the present site of St. Petersburg, took Angdov by storm, conquered the whole province, besieged Pleskov, which was strongly fortified, and, finally successful in reducing it, made proposals of peace through the mediation of Great Britain. But these were rejected. In this campaign de la Gardie was the young king's second in command, and his teacher in the art, as he had been his tutor in the science, of war. He was to Gustavus what old Schwerin was to Frederick, or Parmenio to Alexander. But Gustavus himself made good use of his experience. Like these other great captains, from the start he overshadowed his pedagogue, and laid the first foundations of Swedish discipline. In lieu of the fearful acts of violence which accompanied the raising and the progress of any army of that day, all was order and quiet system. Even the Russians acknowledged that the behavior of the Swedes was vastly better than that of their own troops in their own land.

Every one who placed himself under Swedish protection was in fact protected ; the army was fed by contributions regularly levied and paid for ; plundering by individuals was punished by death. What the regulations prescribed from the cabinet was actually carried out on the field. The reputation of the young king began to spread all over Europe. The one man who gauged Gustavus accurately was Wallenstein, though he would allow him no ability as compared with himself. " By all means help Sigismund to crush him," said he at a later day. " He is a worse foe than ever was the Turk."

Gustavus was early approached to take part with the Protestants of Germany, where the wise foresaw the bitter struggle which promised to break out. An envoy from the University of Heidelberg came to beg him to act as mediator between the Lutherans and the Calvinists ; and Landgrave Moritz of Hesse asked him to join a Protestant alliance for mutual protection. But while the young monarch watched events with a keen eye, he wisely refrained from any undertaking which might interfere with his activity against his hereditary enemies, and especially Sigismund. He kept on good terms with Christian, who, though he was often a cause of grave anxiety, never again overtly attacked Sweden, but with fair honesty held to the " brotherly compact " he had sworn with Gustavus over his wine ; and a truce was made with Russia looking towards a peace. The year 1616 was spent in Finland, in building up this province, much exhausted with the burdens of war ; and by the treaty of Stolbowa, February 27, 1617, Russia, hard pressed between Sweden and Poland, definitely ceded to Sweden the provinces of Ingria and Carelia, with the fortresses of Kexholm, Noteborg, Ivan-gorod, Janra and Koporie, and paid over a considerable sum of money.

VII.

THE POLISH WARS. 1617-1625.

HAVING vainly striven to make peace with Poland, and having secured only a truce, Gustavus set to work to carry out his projected army changes, and at intervals traveled in Germany. In 1620 he married the sister of the elector of Brandenburg. At the end of the Polish truce, in 1621, he sailed with a fleet to Livonia, and laid siege to Riga. Poland was harassed by the Turks, and though the siege was difficult, Riga fell in September, and the king occupied Courland. Thus hemmed in, Sigismund made a fresh truce, which, with one or two interruptions, lasted till 1625. The Polish king was under the control of the Jesuits and of the emperor, and would not agree to a permanent peace, looking on Gustavus as illegitimately king. The intervals made by the several truces gave Sweden leisure to establish herself on a sound financial and military basis, one which for her size was exceptional; and estates, people and king all worked in hearty harmony.

HAVING happily settled the differences with Denmark and Russia, Gustavus strove to transform into a permanent peace his two years' truce with Sigismund; but his best efforts produced no effect on this fanatic. Sigismund plotted in every conceivable manner against the country of his birth; and that war must eventuate was not doubtful. But circumstances delayed the crisis. The truce, already several times extended, was again in 1618, and very fortunately for Sweden, renewed by Sigismund, owing to the other complications of Poland, — mainly the invasion of the southern part of that kingdom by Bethlen Gabor, prince of Transylvania, — and through the mediation of King Christian. This aid was a first-fruit of the peace Gustavus had made with Denmark, and afforded the young monarch the leisure to carry out the changes in

discipline and tactics which he had already so auspiciously begun.

During 1619 and 1620, at intervals in this work, Gustavus traveled, generally *incognito*, through a part of western Europe. Shortly after his accession — as already mentioned — he had had a passionate attachment for a beautiful young lady of the Swedish court, Countess Ebba von Brahe (who used, by the way, to accompany the king's playing of the flute, on which it is hoped that he was a better performer than that other great captain and petty musician of Sans Souci); and though his devotion was entirely honorable, the queen-mother contrived to break up his purpose of sharing his throne with the lady. In this connection it may be noted that there is but one record of immorality against Gustavus. He had by a Dutch lady a natural son, born in 1616, who, at Lützen, won his spurs on the field where his father fell. In an age of sexual laxity, this was a clean record. It was politically essential that Gustavus should wed; Sweden must have an heir, and after a trip to Berlin as Captain Gars (Gustavus Adolphus Rex Sueciae) he married the sister of the young elector of Brandenburg. From this alliance the Swedish Estates were warranted in hoping much; for Brandenburg was able to help in the complicated business with Poland. During this period of travel Gustavus' letters show that his thoughts were never away from home, nor his activity less in testing all the new things he saw which might contribute to the perfection of his army or the building up of Sweden. He journeyed as far as Heidelberg; the cultivated beauties of the Palatinate must have struck him as a singular contrast to his own rugged plains; and what he learned of places and people enabled him the better to understand the religious struggle which had already been inaugurated, and in which he was destined to bear the giant's part.

The Thirty Years' War was already two years old, and terror reigned in many parts of Germany. Gustavus foresaw that Sweden, though geographically removed from the scene of conflict, would sooner or later be drawn into the vortex ; and in 1621 he sought once more to renew the truce with Poland, but in vain. Sigismund, under the political control of his relative the emperor, and under the religious control of the Jesuits, then the growing power of the Roman Church, could not be influenced, especially as a fourteen years' truce which he had just concluded with Russia saved him harmless from danger in that quarter. War supervened, but Sweden was in every sense more ready than ever before, and people and ministry alike sustained their young monarch with hearty good will.


If war it must be, no better time could perhaps have been chosen for Sweden. During the five years' respite Gustavus had organized both her finances and her troops. Taxes had been carefully laid, and the raising of men for the army had been systematically based on a tenure of land which equalized the burdens. The priests from the pulpit preached the war, the nobility was encouraged to yield its best efforts to the cause, and the soldier was given an honorable position in society. The officer who bore him well was considered the equal of the noble, and the aristocracy was thus merged into the military scheme. For the first time in modern days there arose a new form of government, — the military monarchy. East Gothland had fallen to the crown on the death of Gustavus' cousin John, diminishing the chances of internal strife ; and his marriage, it was thought, had given him a political foothold in Germany despite the opposition of Poland.

As a first act in the opening of the campaign of 1621, Gustavus set out to conquer Livonia, to which the Swedish royal family ever since King Eric's time had some preten-

sions, though pretensions of this kind, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were wont to have a slender basis. With a fleet of one hundred and fifty-eight vessels, the king landed twenty-four thousand men, mostly infantry, at the mouth of the Dwina River, took the fort commanding it, and opened the siege of Riga on August 13. In this and his future Polish wars Gustavus had the assistance of his later so celebrated generals, Horn, Banér, Torstenson and Wrangel.

The siege of this important city proved difficult. It was strong, contained a goodly garrison, and, though on the score of religion Livonia was not warmly attached to Sigismund, the city had a public-spirited population. The Poles were noted for stout, if spasmodic, fighting. Luckily for Gustavus,

Sigismund was unable to send reinforcements to Riga because of an inroad of three hundred thousand Turks, the result of his defeat at Jassy the year before; and no imperial aid was forthcoming. The siege was vigorously pushed; a line of contravallation was built, and the army divided into four unequal corps according to the lay of the land. The king was personally active in every step of the operation. While insisting on discipline unknown at that day, he encouraged the men by



Riga.

his presence and enthusiasm, and afforded them the example of what a commander-in-chief should be. He had the true soldier's way of winning their love. Gustavus thrice offered terms to the garrison before opening a bombardment, and a belated army of relief, ten thousand strong,

under Prince Radziwill, was attacked and beaten. Two of the outer works, a redoubt and a half moon, were taken by storm ; but two other assaults were driven back, and Horn and Banér both wounded. Mining was then resorted to in September ; a gallery of the king's own invention was laid on to cross the wet ditch ; this was partly filled up, and everything was prepared for an assault in force upon the breaches opened. Annoyed at the stubborn defense, the king had determined to explode all the mines at once, to storm the place, and give it up to plunder ; but in the six hours' truce granted September 16, before the assault should begin, the garrison wisely concluded to surrender. The siege had lasted four weeks. Well satisfied at the victory, Gustavus treated the people of Riga with generosity, and after banishing the Jesuits, who had behaved in a peculiarly hostile manner, took an oath of fealty from the town. The campaign had opened felicitously.

From Riga Gustavus marched through Courland to Mittau, and as a matter of strategic safety, placed a friendly garrison of two thousand men in the town ; for the duke of Courland was on terms of amity with Sweden.

Before moving into Poland, where he hoped to compel a peace, the king again approached Sigismund with offers of negotiation. Sigismund was only half tractable ; he would not conclude peace ; but owing to the trouble which the Turks and Tartars were giving him, he did agree to continue the truce another year, leaving to the Swedes, as a guaranty, the already conquered part of Livonia. Hereupon Gustavus evacuated Courland, and returned to Stockholm, late in 1621. The promise of the campaign had been fulfilled ; but quiet was not restored without another warlike incident.

The king's brother, Charles Philip, died in 1622 ; he himself had as yet no heir ; and these circumstances renewed the

aspirations of Sigismund to the Swedish throne. Nothing could better fit into the plans of the Emperor Ferdinand, and under the advice of the latter, Sigismund began to think of carrying the war into Sweden. As Poland had no fleet, Sigismund betook himself to the free city of Danzig, hoping to build ships in its harbor, a work for which its vast commerce and connection with the Hanse towns afforded ample means. A less suspicious mind than Gustavus' would have seen no harm in this; but the Swedish king was alert; towards the middle of June, 1622, he appeared before Danzig with a strong fleet, and after some negotiation compelled the city to bind itself to neutrality. This prompt action led up to the proposal of an armistice by Sigismund himself, and to a further renewal of the old truce; whereupon Gustavus returned home. Signed in June, 1622, this truce left Sweden in possession of Livonia, and of some places in Courland; it was kept up by more or less irregular extensions for three years.

Sigismund's unwillingness to make peace was not unnatural. The Catholic princes of Germany looked on Protestant Gustavus, who came of the junior Vasas, as an usurper of the Swedish throne, and would gladly have seen Catholic Sigismund back in his place. They feared Gustavus' restlessness, and were ready for anything to humble him. The Jesuits ceased not to foster the oppression of the Protestants. Under their influence, Sigismund would not enter into a permanent peace, for that was treason to his religion, while a truce was a mere military incident. On the other hand, Gustavus showed himself at all times ready to make terms with Sigismund, on the basis of the good of Sweden. His constant offers of peace remind one of Cæsar's many proposals to Pompey. Both Cæsar and Gustavus were no doubt honestly desirous of peace on terms satisfactory to the cause of each;

each was careful to place himself on record as a peace-maker, though neither would have given up a substantial part of what he deemed his rights. Of the two, however, Gustavus was by far the more frank and upright in his protestations. If ever a man said what he meant and stuck to it, it was the king of Sweden; Cæsar veiled his meaning in diction which never committed him to any definite action.

At home Gustavus was sure of his ground. The unity of king, ministry and people was in marked contrast to the condition of any other country of Europe. Scarce a chapter in the world's history exhibits affection, confidence and mutual helpfulness between prince and people in equal measure. The king took no step without consulting the Estates, and they and the ministry never failed to sustain him. In the new organization of the Swedish army, which, in 1625, he more formally undertook, he had the hearty support of all classes. Under it, a regular army of eighty thousand men was raised, in addition to the equally large militia system already adverted to. He was now ready for any war which must come, though he felt that he was not yet prepared definitively to embrace the cause of his German brother Protestants.



Arquebus. (16th Century.)

VIII.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. RELIGIOUS PHASE. 1618-1625.

THE Thirty Years' War originated in the desire of the Catholic princes of Germany to prevent the growth of Protestantism, and in the desire of the emperor to make his rule a real instead of a nominal one. These two aims so lacked consistency that many princes would work for one and not the other. There were seven prince-electors who chose the emperor; there was a German Diet, but it did not represent the people. The several potentates were practical autocrats; the Diet was their meeting-place; only the free cities governed themselves. The emperor's power was small; though nominally the fountain head, he could enforce his will only by the ban of the empire. The two religions were more at odds in temporal than spiritual matters. Much of the property of the Catholic bishoprics had been secularized where people had adopted the new religion, and the Peace of Augsburg, in 1552, had settled questions thus arising. Fifty years later things could not revert to that status, and yet the Catholics were bent on recovering, the Protestants on holding, what they had since taken. Maximilian of Bavaria was the champion of the Catholics; Christian of Anhalt of the Protestants. The Lutherans and Calvinists did not act in common; the leading Protestant princes were not helpful. A Protestant Union was formed in 1608 to prevent the Catholics from retaking what the Protestants already had; a Catholic League followed. Though the struggle went on, war was not precipitated until 1618, when Bohemia drove out her new king, Ferdinand, and the emperor undertook to replace him. In 1619 Ferdinand himself was elected emperor, Frederick of the Palatinate was chosen king of Bohemia, and the war was prosecuted in earnest. There was no community of action among the Protestants, and neither party won success until, in 1620, Frederick was defeated near Prague by the imperial general Tilly, and driven from Bohemia, while Mansfeld and later Christian of Brunswick, who commanded Protestant armies, were driven up into the Weser country. The armies of the day, living by plunder, were barbarous beyond telling, and the land suffered much. Tilly kept on, until by 1623 all south Germany was reduced, and the emperor resolved on putting down Protestantism in north Germany as well. Mansfeld and Brunswick alone stood in the way.

THOUGH the operations of the Thirty Years' War, prior to the entrance on its stage of the great Swede, have little value as a military study, a few pages must be devoted to the subject to show the desperate situation of the war when Gustavus finally threw himself into the scale against the empire and the persecution of the Protestants. As little time as possible will be taken from the more important phases.

The remote causes of the war were twofold: the purpose of the Catholic powers to weld the chains of religion on protesting Europe; and the purpose of the emperor to make his rule a real instead of a nominal one over entire Germany; for the Hapsburgs had long dreamed of a universal European empire. These two purposes were inconsistent; they could not live together. Potentates who would work faithfully to compass the religious end would sacrifice religion to prevent a reëstablishment of imperial rule. And it was this inconsistency which brought about the eccentricities of the war, and lay at the root of the never-ending changes among the contestants; which led Catholic France to subsidize Protestant Sweden, and prevented Maximilian of Bavaria from working kindly under his brother in the faith, the Emperor Ferdinand.

Not but what the Protestants were to blame. The Lutherans and Calvinists were as incapable of continued joint effort, as they were intolerant of each other's dogmas; and their quarrels, quite as much as the diverse purposes of the Catholics, operated to prolong the struggle. It was the knot of this imbroglio that Gustavus Adolphus essayed to cut; and implacable as were the contestants, unreasonable as were their motives, he succeeded, before his early death, in permanently preventing the emperor from fettering Protestantism, and in giving the death-blow to imperialism. He thwarted the realization of both the causal aspirations. The sixteen

years of awful warfare which succeeded his death were due to the shortsightedness and petty jealousies of those who continued the struggle in his name, and who during his life had worked with reasonable unanimity with or against him. The *motif* of the war was religious toleration; what Germany began, France completed; but it was Gustavus who made the success of France a possible thing.

There were four phases to the 'Thirty Years' War: the Religious, the Danish, the Swedish, the French.

To us English peoples, the construction of the German empire in the seventeenth century is an enigma. We hear that there was an emperor, and we read of a diet, and it is hard to comprehend why the people had no voice in the government. But they practically had none whatever. The land was ruled by a few princes, each possessing within his own borders almost absolute power.

There was a vast number of small principalities, among which were seven princes called electors, who, on the death of one, chose the succeeding emperor. Three of them were religious: the archbishops of Cologne, Trier and Mainz; four of them were temporal: the king of Bohemia, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and the elector-palatine. The emperor was the acknowledged successor of the Roman Cæsars and of Charles the Great; but he had no real power, except in so far as he was also king of some particular country. As emperor he held a mere empty title. He was supposed to be the source of everything; from him all holdings of kingdoms, principalities and powers were deemed to have been derived, but the princes who so held under him resented the slightest interference with their acts.

The Diet was in no sense a popular assembly. Far from being a mouthpiece of the people, it did not even represent the smaller princes. It was a mere congress of the larger

autocrats, to arrange their, so to speak, international rights. The only power the emperor could exert against a prince was to put him to the ban of the empire, a mild species of lay excommunication, which hurt him not the least, provided he had a good army and a full treasury, and was at peace with his neighbors. To be sure, Germany was divided into *Circles*, each of which had an imperial court to decide questions between the princes; but the decisions were far from being always fair, and yet farther from being generally respected.

The Estates of the empire, some of the princes to wit, met in the Diet in three Houses. The electors, excepting the king of Bohemia, who only voted in the election of an emperor, formed the first; the second contained a number of smaller princes, ecclesiastical and lay; the third, deemed an inferior body, was filled by representatives of the free cities. Except for the latter, the people was utterly without representation. Nothing better proves this than the fact that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the vast majority (stated at ninety per cent.) of the population of Germany was Protestant, while the Diet was opposed to Protestantism; and the further fact that most of the lay princes, members of the Diet, as individuals sustained the new religion, if they did not actually profess it. This condition of affairs was fraught with, and naturally resulted in, war.

Under Charles V., the Convention of Passau, in 1552, led to the Peace of Augsburg, which attempted to settle the many vexed questions arising from the very natural seizure of Catholic Church property in entirely Protestant countries; but the Augsburg terms provided nothing for the future, and only Lutheranism, not Calvinism, was recognized. Meanwhile, the new religion was growing, and matters could not practically be measured by a standard fixed at any given time. There

were further seizures of ecclesiastical property and rifling of monasteries ; and eight of the great northern bishoprics became Protestant. The bishop, as he was still called, was in reality only a prince who sometimes spoke of himself as Administrator. So things went on for a generation or more.

The Protestants did not grow in wisdom as they grew in stature. Theological quarrels arose among them, which gave the Jesuits, as being all of one mind, a fair claim to a hearing ; and finally the Catholics began once more to gain ground. The two main questions in dispute were the rights of the Protestant administrators, and the status of the secularized lands. At the end of the century the Catholics insisted on going back to the Augsburg basis of 1552 ; the Protestants desired to modify matters to suit the conditions of the day. The disputes waxed hotter, but there appears to have been more hostility manifested by the princes than the people. As a rule, the Catholic and Protestant populations tolerated each other fairly well.

All this grew worse and worse. Maximilian of Bavaria was the champion of the Catholics ; Christian of Anhalt, a Calvinist, was the leader of the Protestants ; John George, elector of Saxony, a Lutheran, played the part of peace-maker.

Maximilian was an able man with an ample treasury and a good army. He held to the Peace of Augsburg as the only true measure of values, and to conform to this meant to uproot all that had been done in more than fifty years. The Protestant princes found the ownership of the ancient Catholic lands altogether too convenient to be given up ; and their faith agreed with their liking. The most unprotected part of Protestantism was in the south German states, which lay between Catholic Bavaria and the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg on the one side, and those of Worms and Speyer,

the electorates on the Rhine and the Spanish possessions on the other. These south German Protestants were mainly Calvinists, as their brethren in the north were mostly Lutherans.

Christian of Anhalt was a stanch Calvinist, and an able politician, in fact too much of a diplomat. Maximilian wisely armed; Christian sought to accomplish results by finesse. Every one foresaw an irrepressible conflict.



The Bohemian Revolt.

Finally, in 1607, a religious riot in Donauwörth induced the emperor, with only a show of trial, to put it to the ban, and Maximilian was appointed to execute the decree, which he did with inexcusable rigor. At this, the free cities of the south — Nürnberg, Ulm and Strasburg — took alarm, and in 1608 a Protestant Union, under the leadership of Christian (and incidentally of Frederick of the Palatinate), was formed for mutual defense. To it belonged Hesse-Cassel, Würtem-

berg, Baden-Durlach and many of the free towns; Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt refused to join; Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Pomerania and Brunswick-Lüneburg remained neutral. The Union in the same year was followed by the creation of a Catholic League under Maximilian, which was joined by nearly all the princes of south Germany, the Main and lower Rhine; but the emperor took no part in it. The two parties — Union and League — stood ready for war, and succeeding conventions and diets effected nothing toward peace. John George of Saxony, who was a good sportsman and a deep drinker rather than a wise ruler, despite his extensive power and his good intentions, had not the personality to enforce his moderate views, and the seething of the trouble went on. It is fruitless to follow all the phases of the singular struggle; but it never ceased until finally, in 1618, it broke out into open war.

In 1611 Rudolph, king of Bohemia, who was also archduke of Austria and German emperor, was driven from the throne of Bohemia by his brother Matthias, who next year, on Rudolph's death, was elected emperor. The Bohemians had extorted from Rudolph a sort of imperial charter for freedom of conscience. This charter Matthias sought to undermine, and in the Bohemian Diet of 1617, the Estates were persuaded into acknowledging Matthias' cousin, Catholic Ferdinand of Styria, as hereditary king of a throne which had always been elective. Thus the House of Austria fastened its talons upon Bohemia, and shortly, as was to be expected, the persecutions of the Protestants became more marked.

In 1618 the Bohemians rose under Count Henry of Thurn, the new king was deposed, his regents expelled in the famous defenestration of Prague, the Jesuits were driven from the land, and thirty directors were chosen who appealed for help to their brother Protestants. John George of Saxony refused

any except such aid as would reconcile them to the empire, but Frederick of the Palatinate took up their cause in theory. The Protestants in Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia and Upper Austria began to arm. Every one was expecting a struggle and sought to be ready. The emperor was fairly driven into war; but his low treasury and internal troubles prepared for him a difficult task.

Bohemia raised thirty thousand men. Count Mansfeld, an able officer but distinctly a soldier of fortune, just at the end of his service under the duke of Savoy, joined the Bohemians with a small division; Silesia and Brunswick sent troops. Neutral Brandenburg and Saxe-Weimar promised secret aid, and other countries, notably Holland, money. Negative assistance in the way of an attack on Austria was hoped from Protestant Bethlen Gabor, and even from the Turks.

Three strong places in Bohemia had remained true to the emperor: Catholic Pilsen, Budweis and Krummau. Instead of advancing at once on the emperor, Counts Thurn and Mansfeld engaged in a siege of these fortresses, and Pilsen was actually taken. The emperor sent against them small armies under Dampierre and Bouquoi, the latter a general educated in the best school of that day, the Netherlands; but the operations of 1618 were trivial, and the Bohemian Diet, which had pulled down its king, showed no sign of replacing him by any effective government. The Protestant Union naturally promised its aid; but the disagreements between its members made the assistance of questionable utility to the Bohemians.

The succeeding winter was made noteworthy by the beginning of depredations on the part of the unfed, unpaid troops, of license which was the disgraceful characteristic of the Thirty Years' War, and which ended by transforming Germany into a desert and retarding her progress a hundred years.

In 1619 Matthias died, and in August Ferdinand II., the deposed king of Bohemia, was elected. Moravia and Silesia had openly revolted. Mansfeld remained during the year in Bohemia to watch Bouquoi. Thurn marched through Moravia on Vienna, and actually reached and cannonaded the city. Almost any man but Ferdinand would have succumbed ; but the future emperor was made of iron, and luckily for him Dampierre turned to help Vienna and drove Thurn away, while Bouquoi faced Mansfeld and beat him in a battle near Prague. Thurn returned to Bohemia, and Bouquoi took to the defensive ; Dampierre made an unsuccessful foray into Moravia. None of these operations had any result.

Never was a better chance for independence thrown away. Had the joint forces of Bohemia and its allies been used in one body, they could at this moment have secured anything at the gates of Vienna ; but the Bohemians resorted to political means in lieu of pushing the war with military vigor. They chose as their king Frederick of the Palatinate, who was son-in-law of James of England, and who, they believed, possessed friends of the helpful sort. Their calculations proved false. Frederick — as king of Bohemia and elector-palatine — would become the strongest prince in Germany, possessing two out of the seven electoral votes, a fact which aroused the keenest jealousy of every other potentate, especially John George, and even stirred up the Union ; while, on the other hand, King James did naught to aid his kinsman. The Bohemians made a treaty with Bethlen Gabor, though the latter was too busy in seeking to tear Hungary from the emperor's grasp to be more than an indirect ally ; and they appealed to Gustavus for assistance. Bouquoi, with twelve thousand men, retired to the imperial capital, and established a camp on the left bank of the Danube, below Vienna, backing on the river, a position curiously considered by the mili-

tary men of that time the strongest a general could hold. Thurn with ten thousand men joined Bethlen Gabor with sixteen thousand; the two essayed in vain to drive out Bouquoi, and at last, wearied with winter campaigning, Bethlen Gabor made a separate peace with the emperor, and Thurn was compelled to retire. His several advances on Vienna, too much in detail, had borne no fruit. But they had been brilliantly conceived.

These two years, neglected by Bohemia, enabled the emperor to conduct a strong offensive in 1620. He had utilized his time by inducing jealous Saxony to side against Frederick; by inciting Bavaria and Spain to activity; and by frightening the Union into withdrawing its aid from the



Tilly.

new king of Bohemia, so as to defend itself. The Lower Palatinate was soon threatened by twenty thousand men under the Spanish general Spinola, who marched up the Rhine from the Netherlands to Mainz, and, despite the Union, reduced all the Palatinate on the left bank of the Rhine; while Maximilian mobilized the Bavarian troops, and the Catholic League collected an army at Donauwörth. The Bohemians were inexpertly led by Christian of Anhalt, who was barely able to hold them together. The duke of Bavaria, whose general-in-chief was the celebrated Count Tilly, a Walloon, Jan Tzerklas by name, reduced the Protestants of Upper Austria in August, joined Bouquoi's forces, and with fifty thousand men marched into Bohemia. Frederick, whose friends at the first sign of danger all seemed to forsake him,

withdrew with his army towards Mansfeld at Pilsen. The Bohemian armies were ill supplied, suffered from disease, had no discipline, and plundered right and left. Frederick and Mansfeld did not agree. The latter remained in Pilsen, and Frederick retired towards Prague. Tilly, whose army was equally ill behaved and ill supplied, followed Frederick sharply, and on November 8, 1620, at the battle of the White Hill, near Prague, utterly defeated him. Frederick fled the country, and was put to the ban of the empire. The operation on the part of Tilly deserves praise. He had profited by his opponent's weakness.

Bohemia was soon subjugated. Mansfeld held Pilsen some time, but eventually retired to the Upper Palatinate. The land was punished in a frightful manner, according to the fanatical method of the day. The elector of Saxony, meanwhile, reduced Silesia, and was allowed to annex Lusatia as his reward. John George was a peace-maker, or at least he was consistent in so proclaiming himself, but he was always ready to earn a new strip of territory, and he kept his eye on the main chance.

In 1621 the emperor set himself to reduce the Palatinate; Frederick would not sue for amnesty. Spinola had already put his foot on the Lower Palatinate, and was visiting the land with the wonted atrocities. Hesse-Cassel, Strasburg, Ulm and Nürnberg made terms. England, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland sought to encourage the Union to better efforts, but this body lacked a capable leader whose hands were free, and it broke up in April. Mansfeld endeavored to defend the Upper Palatinate for Frederick, but his troops were if anything more lawless than the enemy's, and it was well that he was eventually forced to retire.

It is impossible to describe the barbarity of these armies. The soldier was a professional who hired himself to the gen-

eral promising the greatest chance of plunder, and there was not a vice or a brutality from which he shrank, even among friends, while in the enemy's country, murder, rapine and incendiarism were the rule of every day. "Do you think my men are nuns?" asked Tilly, in answer to complaints of ruffianism; and yet Tilly's army was comparatively well in hand. Neither man, woman nor child escaped the ruthless savagery of the soldier of the Thirty Years' War, — excepting always those under the control of Gustavus Adolphus. And such soldiers were all the less efficient, for their habits clashed with every military plan; armies moved to seek plunder, not success. Yet such was the method of raising and maintaining troops that it was deemed a matter of course that these things should be. The effect on the country or on the army was not considered.

From the Upper, Mansfeld marched to the Lower Palatinate, where he won some slight successes against Spinola, and then sat down in Hagenau, watching Tilly on the Neckar, and Spinola on the Main. Meanwhile, Bethlen Gabor again appeared on the scene. Bouquoi had been killed, and his army was in full retreat. If Frederick was in desperate straits, Ferdinand's position was far from easy.

Now came an accession of forces for the Protestants.

Early in May, 1622, Christian of Brunswick, an adventurer almost as desperate as Mansfeld, starting from the north, and the margrave of Baden-Durlach from the south, each with



Tilly's Manœuvres.

twenty thousand men, marched to join Mansfeld, who crossed the Rhine, and after meeting the margrave at Wiesloch, defeated Tilly in an ambush. But, wasting his time, he allowed Tilly to join the Spanish forces, and to march on the margrave, who had again separated from him. Falling on him at Wimpfen on May 6, before Mansfeld could come up, Tilly defeated him, meanwhile holding Brunswick in check by a detachment of Spinola's troops borrowed for the occasion. On these being later withdrawn, Brunswick marched down to the Main country to join Mansfeld. But Tilly caught him crossing the river at Höchst June 20, attacked him in the rear, and badly cut him up. Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankenthal now easily fell to Tilly.

Space forbids us to detail this, as well as many other interesting operations. Tilly had manœuvred skillfully. By keeping in one body he had prevented the junction of three armies of twenty thousand men each, and beaten them in detail, by a set of manœuvres which abundantly deserve study. They are one of the early instances of clever strategic work following upon the blank page of the Middle Ages. And yet Tilly was not usually fertile in strategic manœuvres. Mansfeld and Brunswick were finally driven out of the Lower Palatinate, passed through and devastated Alsace and Lorraine, and retired to Metz; and from thence, after a brush with the Spanish troops, Mansfeld, with his army, entered the service of the Netherlands.

Claiming his reward for Tilly's accomplishment, Maximilian was made elector, and given the Upper Palatinate. Emboldened by success, the emperor resolved to carry the war to the north against the dukes of Mecklenburg, Brunswick and Pomerania. He had reason for congratulation.

The war was thus transferred to the Weser. Frederick had dismissed Mansfeld and Brunswick from his employ;

but far from disbanding their forces, these generals foresaw means of subsistence and renown in marching their armies to another section. There was nothing they so little desired as peace. Each was fighting, not for Protestantism, but for himself. North Germany was as much opposed to them as it was to Tilly. If Mansfeld and Brunswick had not moved north, it is improbable that the emperor would have sent Tilly beyond the Palatinate; some kind of a peace would have been patched up. But these free lances kept about their work, and the men who were supposed to be the champions of the new faith grew to be its most intolerable foes.

Mansfeld, in 1623, devastated the Catholic holdings on the left bank of the Rhine with his Netherlands troops, while Brunswick lay beyond the Werra with some twenty-five thousand Dutch and north Germans, near Göttingen. Tilly moved upon him, crossed the river in his front, and sent a detachment around his left wing. This time, however, the veteran counted without his host. Brunswick fell successively on each part of Tilly's army, and beat it singly. But losing part of his forces by disbandment, he fell back to join Mansfeld. Tilly followed, and attacking him August 6 at Stadtlohn, west of Münster, on the Ems, defeated him with grievous loss. Only six thousand men out of twenty thousand succeeded in joining Mansfeld. No further operations were undertaken this year, but all the armies went into winter-quarters, accompanied by the usual course of atrocious devastation of the countries they occupied.



Halberd with Gun. (16th Century.)

IX.

THE DANISH PERIOD. 1625-1630.

GUSTAVUS had repeatedly been appealed to by the German Protestants for aid; but his Polish wars kept him too busy to respond. Recognizing that eventually Sweden would be involved, he expected to coöperate, but in his own fashion. France, England and Holland, all anti-Hapsburg, had been irregularly furnishing funds to the Protestant armies, but lacking a worthy leader, there was no consistent action. In 1625 Gustavus offered to undertake the war on certain distinct terms; but Christian of Denmark underbid him, and England made a treaty with Christian, under whom Brunswick and Mansfeld were to serve. Thus began the Danish phase. To oppose Christian was Tilly, the Bavarian general; and the celebrated Wallenstein was commissioned by the emperor to raise an army. The two had seventy thousand men to Christian's sixty thousand. Living by plunder, all these armies weighed heavily on the land. While Tilly advanced against Christian, Wallenstein defeated Mansfeld at the Dessau bridge; but he then weakly followed when Mansfeld pushed south to join Bethlen Gabor in Transylvania, thus wasting the campaign. Mansfeld's army was eventually disbanded, and Wallenstein returned. Meanwhile Tilly defeated Christian at Lutter in 1626, and in 1627 drove him well back into Holstein. Wallenstein now arrived, took the reins, and pushed Christian into the Danish islands. All Germany was the emperor's, save the free cities and Stralsund; but from this latter place, in 1628, Wallenstein, after a long siege and heavy loss, was driven back. King Christian sued for peace, and in 1629 was let off on easy terms, so that Wallenstein might devote himself to Gustavus, who was shortly to come upon the scene. The war had been remorselessly conducted, and without broad method. Results had been obtained rather from weak opposition than by able measures.

To detail the complicated political and religious events of the Thirty Years' War is without the scope of the present work; nor can we dwell on its early military manœuvres. With the exception of a few of Tilly's and Wallenstein's, the marches and countermarches of the plundering hordes

have no value; the military history of Gustavus, and of a few great captains who succeeded him, claims our attention.

During all this seething of the German imbroglio, Sweden was engaged on other business. As a strong Protestant, Gustavus was ambitious to help his downtrodden brethren of the faith; but he was a stronger Swede, and he looked primarily to the welfare of his fatherland. That this welfare was bound up in its religion, Gustavus had the intelligence to see, as his grandfather, the great Gustavus I., had seen; that the European conflict could be settled only by the sword and by means of strange political alliances; that, unless Sweden soon took an active part in the struggle she would eventually be passively crushed: all this was plain to him, and the young king was ready to act so soon as the time was ripe. But though hot-headed in the fray, though embracing with exceptional fervor a cause he had once joined, Gustavus was cool and dispassionate, prudent and calculating, in the cabinet. True Swedish polity would not permit him to undertake a work which might lay him open to the treachery of Sigismund, which might again bring Sweden under the dictation of Poland; nor could he put his hand to so great a business unless he was more amply equipped with the sinews of war than his own poor land could furnish. In the work to be done he was willing to join the man to whom public opinion was now pointing, King Christian of Denmark, or he was ready to see the latter undertake it single-handed. But of first importance to him was peace or a lasting truce with Poland; Gustavus would not needlessly sacrifice Sweden upon the altar even of Protestantism; she must be placed beyond danger from outside foes; and such a peace or truce Gustavus set himself resolutely to conquer. Not closing his eyes to the suffering in Germany, he limited his action to his manifest capacity.

There was, moreover, a feeling in Gustavus' mind, that, in a military sense, he could best aid the Protestant cause by an advance upon the emperor's dominions through Silesia, — by reaching out towards Bethlen Gabor, who had married the sister of his queen, and was one of his devout admirers. This plan likewise necessitated a previous conquest or neutralization of Poland, some place near which would then serve as a base of operations.

This idea was in fact worked out from the then standpoint in much detail. While Christian of Denmark should conduct a campaign in support of the Protestants in the west of Germany, Gustavus, with Danzig or Stettin as a base, would march up the Oder through Silesia, straight on the emperor's hereditary possessions. The Silesians, mainly Protestants, would, as he knew, rise in his support and contribute heavily in recruits; Bethlen Gabor would fall upon Poland and help to compel her neutrality; the countries to be marched through were fruitful and able to sustain large armies; the road was practicable, the Warta being the only considerable river to be passed. But all this demanded money; and England and Holland — who alone had elastic finances — would not produce it. With reference to this plan, it must be remarked that Gustavus recognized that it had weaknesses; for Bethlen Gabor was the most unreliable of men, and Poland was not beyond being a serious enemy in his rear. But it was much his habit to deal in the possibilities of any given situation. He had the true gift of imagination, without which the captain, alike with the musician, the poet, the astronomer, never grows to his greatest stature. We shall encounter many of his imaginings. They all had their practical value.

For twelve years before Gustavus had any part in the Thirty Years' War, hostilities and atrocities had been con-

stantly going on; and France, England and Holland, unwilling to see the Hapsburgs gain the upper hand in Europe, but without consistent plans, had been alternately subsidizing and forsaking the Protestant princes of Germany. These three moneyed powers could not work in unison, having each a different motive and aim. In 1624 Gustavus made to England a proposal to undertake the German business on condition that a port on the south shore of the Baltic was assured him, and another in the North Sea; that he should have abundant subsidies; that England should pay for seventeen thousand of the fifty thousand men he deemed essential; that Denmark should be neutralized by an English fleet in The Sound; and that he himself should have sole command of all forces under arms.

But Christian was negotiating towards the same end; he was willing to accept much lower terms; he could not see as far as Gustavus did; and his offer the English government accepted in 1625. Until 1629 the Thirty Years' War was in what is known as the Danish period. The Danish king's object in undertaking the war cannot be said to have been as ingenuous as that of the Swede; he acted more from a desire to enrich himself out of the bishopric of Bremen and other neighboring ecclesiastical foundations, than from any strong championship of Protestantism. Nor was he fitted to the task of commanding the armies of several nationalities, officered by men of diverse training and ideas, which the Protestants would put under



Christian of Denmark.



Danish Period.

arms. But the Swedish monarch's war kept Sigismund away from Christian's field, which was a help *pro tanto*, and Christian never doubted his own ability. It was no doubt well that Gustavus was left to finish the Polish problem before he undertook a war so distant from the Vistula. He could afford to bide his time.

Christian thus assumed the lead of the German Protestants. To oppose him the emperor in 1625 commissioned Wallenstein to recruit an army. Tilly still commanded the forces of Maximilian. The Dane was promised a busy campaign.

England agreed to subsidize Mansfeld and Brunswick, who joined the new commander-in-chief, thus giving him some sixty thousand men. But these troops were not rendezvoused until November, 1625, while Tilly had crossed the Weser into lower Saxony in July. Lukewarm towards Mansfeld, the British subsidies were irregular ; but the latter's career as a bold and measurably successful adventurer was heightened in brilliancy by relying largely on his own resources.

Christian's opening was weak ; though he had in his service Count Thurn, and the margrave of Baden-Durlach (young Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, later so celebrated, was present too), he merely garrisoned sundry places and sat down in a fortified camp at Bremen, to conduct a small war with Tilly, who duly appeared in his front. He was apparently unmindful of the fact that Wallenstein was rapidly putting afield an army for the emperor, and that dan-



Wallenstein.

gers were encompassing him on every side. Between them Tilly and Wallenstein may have had seventy thousand men.

Albrecht von Waldstein, or Wallenstein, was born a Bohemian Protestant, and educated as a Moravian ; but though he early threw himself into the arms of the Jesuits, his religion was limited to belief in himself and the tenets of astrology. He entered the service of the emperor as a young man, and earned his praise and gratitude by many able military and

diplomatic schemes. He became wealthy by marriage, wealthier by his own speculations, and was already prince of Friedland, and one of the most powerful men in Bohemia, when Ferdinand needed to raise an army.

It is alleged that Wallenstein agreed with Ferdinand that he would sustain his army on the country ; but it is probable that the emperor promised to support it. That his low treasury forbade his carrying out such an undertaking made the matter come to the same thing. On the other hand Wallenstein probably agreed that there should be no plundering ; that he would raise victual by contributions from the regularly constituted authorities. It was all one ; the countries through which Wallenstein passed were invariably left a desert. To create an army was what both emperor and general aimed at ; the means by which it was raised or fed or paid was immaterial to either.

Wallenstein's method of supporting his army was no other than that of the adventurer Mansfeld, but he did it in a more systematic way, acting in every land he entered as if he were the supreme lord, whose only law was *I will*. He paid his men well ; he took good care of them ; he kept them out of danger until he disciplined them into the semblance of an army ; he was himself magnificent, and deemed nothing too good for his followers. Tilly, on the other hand, was a rough, blunt soldier, whose men worked hard and had but an occasional reward in the sack of a town. Wallenstein's army was on a much more splendid, if no more efficient scale.

The Czech was unquestionably an able strategist ; he preferred, to be sure, to avoid battle and resort to manœuvre ; but according to the art of that day, he had few peers. An equally shrewd politician, he harbored schemes looking towards the unity of Germany under the Hapsburgs, with equality of the two religions, in which schemes he himself should figure

as leader ; but these material strivings not unfrequently interfered with his better military knowledge. Unlike a great commander, he did not call the political situation to the aid of his strategy ; he rather subordinated his strategy to his political desires, forgetful that it is only after victory that one may gainfully do this. While Wallenstein served a Catholic master, he had the breadth to see that in religious toleration lay the best chance to spread the imperial power ; and toward this end he constantly strove.

Jealous of any competition in the field, Wallenstein resolved to open a campaign on his own lines about the left flank of Christian. He passed from Bohemia into Saxony, crossed to the right bank of the Elbe at Dessau, where he fortified a strong bridge-head, and prepared to advance on the Danish king. To counteract this advance, Mansfeld, who had been in the Lübeck country and in Brandenburg, crossed the Havel, took Zerbst, and in late April, 1626, marched boldly on towards the Dessau bridge. His attempt, April 25, to capture it failed ; Wallenstein held his men behind their defenses, and at the right moment debouched upon Mansfeld's exhausted troops, which had shown some gallantry in the advance, and cut his army to pieces.

Mansfeld was elastic. With the help of John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, he again recruited forces in Brandenburg and Silesia (the devastation of the war and the burning of homesteads made half the population ready to enlist), and at the end of May moved towards Hungary, via Crossen, Gross Glo-gau and the Jablunka Pass, to join Bethlen Gabor, who was again at war with the emperor. Wallenstein, sending to Tilly some six thousand men under Merode, followed Mansfeld, a fact so singular, so eccentric in both a military and a colloquial sense, that only the fear of grave danger to Ferdinand from the joint operations of Mansfeld and Bethlen Gabor, can

explain it. By some authorities he is stated to have received especial instruction from Vienna to follow Mansfeld, and that under these he unwillingly directed his march via Jüterbogk towards the Oder. It was a creditable thing for Mansfeld to lure an old and able soldier like Wallenstein after him, and away from his proper sphere; and it was equally discreditable to Wallenstein to be so lured away by a man to whom he would have referred with a sneer.

Mansfeld was not as fortunate as his manœuvre was bold. In December, 1626, Bethlen Gabor made a new peace with Ferdinand, and Mansfeld was driven to disband his army and to make his own way to Venice, where he died. Brunswick had died in the spring. Neither of these soldiers of fortune lived to see the awful burning of the fire they had so largely helped to kindle.

Wallenstein's retrograde march had been useless, and he did not again get to work in north Germany until late in 1627. He had wasted two campaigns.

While Wallenstein was thus occupied, Tilly followed up King Christian. In May, 1626, Christian marched towards the Elbe to the aid of Mansfeld, or rather to lay his hand on the Weser bishoprics, but found that both he and Wallenstein had moved towards Hungary. He attacked the Dessau position, but, aided by a reinforcement from Tilly, the garrison left there by Wallenstein drove him back, and he retired to Brunswick, and sat down to the siege of several towns. Nothing but smaller operations took place between the rival armies, and these mostly fell out in favor of Tilly. After taking Göttingen, and learning that Christian had advanced on him as far as Nordheim, Tilly moved toward the reinforcements Wallenstein had sent him, drew them in, and turned on his adversary. Christian withdrew, but Tilly followed him up, reaching him at Lutter, August 27, 1626;

Christian's unpaid troops fought in a half-hearted manner, and Tilly defeated him badly. Christian retired to Holstein to recruit. This operation redounds to Tilly's credit, and caused the Protestant princes to shake their heads as to Christian's ability to carry out his programme. German Protestantism was not to be thus conserved.

In truth, Christian was in a bad way. The common folk had a song, of which the refrain ran, "Perhaps within a year he'll be, A king without a kingdom." He sent embassies everywhere, — to England, Holland, Venice. France and Holland gave only a part of the promised subsidies; yet by praiseworthy exertions he got together in the winter of 1626-27 an army of thirty thousand men. Cut off from the lower Saxon Circle, he had thrown that part of Germany into a defensive attitude; and now Brunswick turned to the emperor; Mecklenburg ordered the Danish troops out of its territory, and Brandenburg sent reinforcements to the Poles.

The wonderful imperial successes of the past five years in war and politics had left only Mecklenburg, Pomerania and Denmark to uphold the integrity of the Protestant faith. Ferdinand dreamed of extending his empire to the Baltic; and there were folk, even Protestants, who deemed such a consummation not wholly to be regretted; for as against the ill-doings of Mansfeld and Brunswick, Ferdinand and the empire stood for order. His armies opened the campaign of 1627 by reducing Silesia; Tilly crossed the Elbe at Arthenburg in August, and moved into Holstein. Christian stoutly defended himself against Tilly's advance; but Wallenstein, who had marched with nearly a hundred thousand men through Silesia and Brandenburg, burning and plundering, and extorting all manner of contributions, now appeared on the scene. Sending Arnim to Pomerania, and Schlick to Mecklenburg, each with a small army, Wallenstein crossed

the Elbe at Winsen towards the end of August, and moved into Jutland. Tilly, meanwhile, had again beaten Christian in September, and the king, leaving garrisons in Glückstadt and other strong places, had gradually retired up the peninsula to avoid further battle. On the arrival of Wallenstein, who, as the emperor's general, claimed to be the ranking officer, Tilly was sent back across the Elbe, ostensibly to protect the joint communications, but really to be got out of the way, while Wallenstein cleared the peninsula of the Protestant forces, and drove the Danes to take refuge in the islands, whither, having no fleet, he could not well pursue them. Though one of his titles was that of "Imperial Admiral," he had no ships, and could not isolate towns with a harbor.

There was widespread opposition to Wallenstein's military sway, and especially to his soldiery. He had scarcely a friend in north Germany. Every one protested against Ferdinand's army, while technically remaining loyal to the emperor. The great Czech's work was, however, done with zeal and military intelligence; and he was shortly rewarded by Ferdinand with the duchy of Mecklenburg, which, having sustained Denmark, was declared to be forfeited; and he had already been created duke of Friedland. The end of 1627 saw the emperor in full control of the shore of the Baltic, save only Stralsund, and in possession of all its abutting countries. Pomerania was occupied; Wismar and Rostock were taken; only the Hanse towns and Stettin still held their own. Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel were the sole provinces which maintained any show of independence.

It must be said to Wallenstein's credit that, however intolerable his régime, he was not fighting the battles of the Jesuits, or of religious oppression. To him Protestant and Catholic were one. His controlling idea was imperialism —

Hapsburgism — and to accomplish this he was willing to lay all religious disputes aside. But Ferdinand could not recognize his duties as emperor apart from his duties as a Catholic, and Wallenstein was compelled to follow his dictation. The Czech was at the height of his glory. He dreamed himself the conqueror of Germany, at the head of a powerful army, in the new rôle of deliverer of the empire, advancing



Stralsund.

Partly from an old plan.

on the Turks, and taking Constantinople. He forgot the Catholic League; he forgot Maximilian and Tilly. And he forgot in his dreams, but not in reality, the king of Sweden. So long as Gustavus held sway on the Baltic, as he now did, Wallenstein's power was an uncertain term, — and he knew it. He had been watching the career of the "Snow King," as he jeeringly called him, and while he did not hold him at a great value, as measured by his only standard, himself, he

yet saw in Gustavus' holding of the Baltic grave cause to fear for his own schemes.

Stralsund was now the saving clause. This strongly fortified city was of equal importance to all Protestants. England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, the Hanse towns, all joined to help her. She could, like Danzig, be provisioned from the sea. Gustavus had always recognized the value of Stralsund as the best strategic base on the Baltic. He had at one moment conceived the idea of conducting a defensive campaign in Germany, and of going to Stralsund in person to organize it from there. It would be fatal if the Catholic League should control so important a harbor. He had already sent Stralsund supplies, and dispatched six hundred men under a good officer, Colonel Rosladin, with a naval adviser, Admiral Flemming; and in 1625 he had made a twenty years' treaty, offensive and defensive, with the town.

Stralsund was not one of the so-called free cities, but was practically on the same basis, though she owed nominal allegiance both to Pomerania and the emperor. But she declined to admit the imperial army, whose ill fame had preceded it, whereupon Wallenstein ordered his lieutenant, Count Arnim, to besiege the city. Arnim already held the island of Rügen, and soon took Dänholm, which commanded the mouth of the harbor; but in March, 1628, the Stralsunders drove him out of this latter island.

The town held a number of old soldiers, six hundred Danes, and six hundred Swedes, and the citizens were instinct with courage. In May Gustavus had sent them a cargo of powder, and Christian, who was now in earnest, joined in putting Stralsund on a solid footing. Wallenstein, angered at the unexpected resistance, was fain to come to the aid of his lieutenant. "I will take Stralsund, were it hung to heaven by chains," he is, somewhat doubtfully, quoted as

saying; and to a deputation of citizens he pointed to his table: "I will make your city as flat as this." The citizens sent their property and families aboard ship or to Sweden, but showed no signs of yielding. Wallenstein, surprised, nettled, disconcerted, kept on with the siege, but made no progress. Soon after his arrival at Stralsund, about the end of June, he ordered a storm, and kept it up three days. But it was met at all points, despite valor, ability and immense excess of force. No greater result followed a twenty-four hours' bombardment. Without a fleet, or means of creating one, the siege ran the same course as Gustavus' siege of Danzig. On July 9 and 10 more Danish troops and a Danish fleet arrived, and a week later two thousand Swedes under Leslie and Brahe. Wallenstein felt his weakness, and abated his demands, but with no result; and on July 24, 1628, he retired from the siege with a loss of twelve thousand men, baffled. Stralsund had taken the first step in saving Protestantism in Germany.

In 1628 matters in Germany were ripe for absolutism. The Jesuits anticipated full control of European affairs. The ideal of Ferdinand, to recover the lost dignities and power of the empire; and either the ideal of Maximilian, to recover for the church its lost property, or the ideal of Wallenstein, to found unity on a military government, seemed about to be realized. Gustavus' ideal of a *Corpus Evangelicorum* — or union of all Protestant powers for self-defense — had not been formulated. No part of Germany now stood out except the Hanse towns; and to reduce these seemed but a small work compared to what had already been accomplished. To a deputation of Hanse towns which pleaded for Stralsund, Wallenstein had replied: "I will have Stralsund first, and each of you in turn after!" But when they had conquered all Germany, it was on this commercial rock that the efforts

of Ferdinand and Wallenstein were wrecked. Truly, money is the sinews of war.

Meanwhile Stade, at the mouth of the Elbe, had been taken by Tilly, but Glückstadt held out, and in January, 1629, Tilly retired from this place, though Wallenstein lent his personal aid. The towns, the merchant class in other words, had demonstrated that they were greater than these vaunted generals; stronger in their rights than the successor of the Cæsars. They had put a limit to their conquests.

It was the siege of Stralsund which brought conviction to the mind of Gustavus that Sweden must and now might throw herself into the scale against the Hapsburgs. He was farsighted, as Christian was not. Denmark had been subdued on land, but though at sea she still held her own, Christian had lost courage. Finally begging for mercy, Wallenstein, who recognized, if he did not acknowledge, his own limitations, was only too ready to show it. At the Peace of Lübeck, May 12, 1629, Christian was freed from the obligations he had taken on himself at the inception of his luckless campaigns. In this Danish period of the Thirty Years' War, the emperor had been completely successful; but Christian was treated with uncommon leniency, for Wallenstein wanted securely to shelve him before he undertook to master Gustavus; and on the promise that he would thereafter stand aloof from German affairs, Christian even received back the lands which the emperor had taken.

Wallenstein had already received his reward. Maximilian was now given the Upper Palatinate and that part of the Lower Palatinate which is on the right bank of the Rhine, coupled to its electoral vote; and within these lands Protestantism was soon interdicted.

The emperor had begun the war by seeking to discipline some rebellious subjects; he had ended by conquering all

Germany. The Edict of Restitution — issued May 19, 1629 — compelled the Protestants to restore to the Catholics all the religious property acquired by them since the Peace of Passau in 1552; and Wallenstein was charged to see this done. The archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the bishoprics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Ratzburg, Miznia, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus and Camin, and one hundred and twenty smaller foundations, were torn from the Protestant clergy and their congregations, and restored to the Catholics. With Wallenstein at the head, this was not done leniently: all Germany, from the Alps to the Baltic, groaned under the awful manner of the doing. Protestantism was fairly proscribed. In some localities it was worse than in others. In Nördlingen there was not a single Catholic, but the imperial commissioners nevertheless marked all the churches and their property for surrender to Catholic priests.

To be truthful, the fault had lain with the Protestants. They had never stood by each other, nor acted for any time in concert; their political jealousies had been stronger than their religious aspirations. On the other hand, the emperor, both in politics and war, had shown a persistency worthy of a better cause; while his generals, Wallenstein and Tilly, and his right-hand man, the elector of Bavaria, had well seconded his courage and intelligence.

Meanwhile two strong men had been watching the successes of Ferdinand: Richelieu from his jealousy of the Hapsburgs and dread of their ascendancy; and Gustavus from his love of Sweden and fear that Protestantism would be trodden out of Germany.

There is little in the campaigns of the first twelve years of this war which savors of what to-day we call military method. Occasional smaller pieces of work were excellently done, but

the whole was unsystematic, and the grand strategy of the field was forgotten in the political ideas of the leaders, and in the commissariat demands of the armies. In a country parceled out like Germany, this was not to be wondered at. The armies marched hither and yon without consistent purpose. Allies did not work into each other's hands. A town rich in booty was as much an objective of every commander as a fortress at a key-point or the army of the enemy; and the habit of living on the country was coupled with atrocities, the recital of the least of which makes one's blood curdle. Wallenstein, Tilly, Mansfeld and Brunswick were guilty of acts of savagery which would stamp them with eternal infamy, — except that such was the era. Marches were mere devastating raids, only then having an ulterior object when the conquest of a province lay in the way; and the fact that it was believed that no fortress should be left in the rear of a marching army made all operations slow and indecisive.

We shall see a different method while Gustavus Adolphus is in the field.

All this anticipates the Polish campaigns of Gustavus from 1625 to 1629, to which we must now return.



Genevese. (16th Century.)

X.

THE POLISH WARS CONTINUE. 1625-1627.

IN 1625, unable to prolong the truce with Poland, Gustavus, with twenty thousand men, set sail for Livonia, and thence invaded Courland. Here he was met by a Polish army, which he defeated at Wallhof in January. His idea still was that he might aid the Protestants by pushing a column through Silesia. In 1626, with reinforcements, he sailed for Pillau, which he took, though it belonged to Brandenburg; then advanced on Königsberg, and down towards Danzig, seizing all the towns on the way, and besieged this, to the Poles, essential harbor. Sigismund came up with an army and blockaded Mewe, which the Swedes had taken; but Gustavus relieved it by a brilliant *coup*. In 1627 the Poles under Koniecpolski tried, before the king's arrival, with partial success, to raise the siege of Danzig; and cut off some of the Swedish reinforcements; but when Gustavus reached Danzig, affairs changed. The king, too venturesome, was here wounded, and matters remained at a standstill. In August the Poles drew near; and in an ensuing engagement Gustavus was again and more severely wounded. While invalided, a naval engagement took place off Danzig, in which the Swedes were beaten, but the siege was not raised. When convalescent, the king captured some surrounding towns, and more effectually shut in the place. Owing to his late arrival and two wounds, this campaign was not of marked gain.

AFTER the completion of the new military organization of Sweden, and the failure of all attempts to negotiate a permanent peace with Sigismund to replace the existing truce, Gustavus, like a true soldier, made up his mind, if war it must be, to open hostilities by vigorous measures. With twenty thousand men, on a fleet of seventy-six vessels, he again set sail for the mouth of the Dwina, in June, 1625, captured Kockenhusen and other points held by the Poles in Livonia, and reduced the entire province. The attempt of a Polish colonel with two thousand men to retake Riga failed, the

detachment being all but destroyed; and a second one by Marshal Stanislaus Sapieha, with three thousand men, was driven off with a loss of all the guns. From Riga Gustavus crossed the border into Courland and captured Mittau and Bauske. The cold weather had come, but the king was better equipped to conduct a winter campaign than the enemy; for his men, with their fur-lined boots of waterproof, oiled leather and thick stockings, and otherwise coarsely but serviceably, warmly and uniformly clad, could keep the field at any season.

Field - Marshals Leon Sapieha and Gosiecowski, with twenty-six hundred cavalry and thirteen hundred foot, ad-



Polish Horseman.

vanced to the rescue of Bauske. Gustavus went out to meet them, relying mainly on his excellent infantry, for he had little horse. Early recognizing the value of foot, it was he who first in modern times put it in its proper place with relation to the other arms. He believed in it; and, moreover, the Swedish horses were too small for anything but light cavalry, so that, until bigger animals

could be got in Germany, he fain must put up with what he had. Once Gustavus found how much reliance he could place upon his foot, he never ceased to devote his best energies to its development. On the other hand, the Polish generals' reliance was on their superior cavalry, which was their nation's favorite arm.

Gustavus had as yet commanded in no pitched battle, and

he was eager to measure swords with the enemy. The armies met at Walhof, in Courland, January 16, 1626, and the king utterly worsted the Poles, with loss of sixteen hundred killed, many prisoners, much of the artillery, baggage and many standards, the Swedish loss being small. There are no details of this battle. Except the king's brief dispatches home, which dwelt on results rather than tactics, there is no record from which we can divine his method of attack. The fire in the Castle of Stockholm in 1697 destroyed many papers which might have given us more light. Sapielha fled to Lithuania, followed by Gustavus, who on the way took Birzen and another strong place; which success accomplished, the king again endeavored to make peace. But part of the embassy which he sent to Warsaw was seized, and with difficulty released. Peace was not upon the cards. The king demanded of Lithuania a heavy contribution in money, and, the season being advanced, left de la Gardie to secure his conquests in Livonia, and returned to Stockholm, with the intention of attacking from another quarter in the spring. Being still restricted in strategic operations by the Polish war, the king thought that by advancing up the Vistula, he might connect on his right with Christian of Denmark, or Mansfeld, and on his left with Bethlen Gabor. This project was the one already referred to for a joint effort to reach the heart of the empire. But it was never put into execution.

From Stockholm, on June 15, 1626, the king, with twenty-six thousand men on one hundred and fifty ships, sailed to the coast of East Prussia, landing near the fortress of Pillau, at the mouth of the Frische Haff. This place belonged to his brother-in-law, the elector of Brandenburg, as duke of Prussia, then a fief of Poland; and Gustavus asked permission to occupy it as a storehouse, and a strong place to protect his reëmbarkation. But the inert elector demanded



The Vistula-Oder-Elbe Country.

three weeks to consider the matter ; Gustavus had no time to spare ; he summarily took Pillau, and by equally unanswerable arguments compelled the elector to neutrality. With his characteristic bluntness he said to him : “ I am aware that you prefer to keep a middle course, but such a course will break your neck. You must hold on to me or to Poland. I am your brother Protestant, and have married a Brandenburg princess ; I will fight for you and defend this city of yours. I have good engineers, and know a bit of the business myself. I doubt not I shall defend it against Poland or — the devil. My men, if you like, are poor Swedish peasant louts, dirty and ill-clad ; but they can deal you lusty blows, and shall soon be given finer clothing.” His acts, moreover, argued better than his phrases.

In case he should make an advance through Brandenburg, Gustavus did not lose sight of the fact that his army would be moving into a position where it would become the strategic centre of a line, of which the king of Denmark, who stood between the Elbe and the Weser, was the right, and Mansfeld, on the Oder, was the left. All his lines of advance were duly weighed, and his active mind made potential plans far ahead. But his immediate task was simpler ; and superior to any plan for joining the German struggle was the intent to cut Poland off from access to the Baltic, as he already had Russia, by the occupation of the entire coast line. He never lost sight of his great aspiration, “ *Dominium Maris Baltici*.” He gauged its value rightly.

Gustavus continued his advance. Königsberg was threatened until it promised neutrality. Braunsberg, Frauenburg and Tolkemit were surrendered July 1–3, and the Jesuits here and elsewhere were expelled from the cities, and their goods confiscated ; for these priests were mixed up in every political matter, and did infinite harm. Elbing, July 6, and Mari-

enburg, July 8, followed suit, as well as all the towns of West Prussia. But Dirschau and Danzig, which had broken neutrality, and were in dread accordingly, held out. Gustavus moved on Danzig, and camping in the Werder, near the mouth of the Vistula, reconnoitred the town and the fortress Weichselmünde. He then began to recruit from the conquered districts, and crossing the Vistula on a bridge of boats



Danzig and Vicinity.

below Dirschau, July 12, he stormed that town and Mewe, to hold which cut Danzig off from her trade with the interior. The king's hope was not only to take Danzig as a base and depot for himself — "*sedes belli*" was the phrase of the day — but to hamper the Poles by cutting off from them access to an essential harbor. Everything looked promising, when suddenly Sigismund appeared on the theatre of operations with thirty thousand men, and camped at Graudenz, several days' march up the Vistula.

Danzig was a strong place. It disputed with Novgorod the title of richest mart of eastern Europe. It was a free city, owing mere nominal allegiance to Poland, and was a prize for him who controlled it. But it could be provisioned from the sea, which Gustavus seemed unable to prevent. Danzig proved valuable to the Swedes as an object-lesson; and from his experience here the king was able to show Stralsund how to defy Wallenstein; but though it had this secondary value, its obstinacy in holding out largely neutralized the Swedish successes in the four years of the Polish war.

The presence of Sigismund quite altered Gustavus' plans. Though much weaker than the Poles, the king deemed it wise at once to march against them. The fortresses he had taken were no permanent defense; he must beat the Poles in the field. Led by Sigismund and his son, Vladislav, the enemy advanced to Marienburg; on meeting the Swedes, a few * unimportant skirmishes occurred, when the Poles withdrew, crossed the Vistula near Neuenburg, and began a siege of Mewe from the south.

The Swedish commandant was prepared to resist to the uttermost, but Mewe needed victual, and, though such an operation was then unusual, Gustavus personally headed a reinforcement and succor-train for the garrison with three thousand foot and three hundred horse. Despite due attempts at secrecy, the plan was discovered; the Poles essayed to stop the convoy, and with light horse and some artillery occupied a position athwart its path. Rather than bring the whole Polish army down upon himself, the king resorted to a ruse, gave his movement the appearance of a reconnoissance, and proceeded to withdraw. His clever dispositions deceived the Poles, and throwing out Count Thurn with part of his force to divert the enemy's attention by active demonstrations, he himself made a detour with his convoy somewhat out

of sight and covered by horse. Thurn performed his work so well that the Poles, under the impression that the Swedish garrison was about to be drawn from Mewe, and that the place would fall to them in any event, made no serious advance. Their manifest rôle was to attack sharply, and

to closely observe the place to ascertain the real purpose of the Swedes. They did neither.



Operation at Mewe.

Thurn had a severe skirmish with the Polish light horse, which alone had been put in, and was obliged to withdraw a space for fear of being cut off from the king. But he held the force in check, and the Poles, though they had abundant time, neglected to reinforce it. Gustavus managed luckily to run

his convoy into Mewe from the north side, and then turned to protect the withdrawal of Thurn.

The Poles had used but a small part of their troops, though in actual numbers ten to one of the Swedes. They feared that Gustavus was in force, and feinting to draw them from their good position. A simple demonstration on either of the Swedish flanks would have disclosed the true situation, and been fatal to the king's project. Gustavus retired safely up river to Dirschau, and the Poles raised the blockade of Mewe. Their loss, stated at five hundred men, far exceeded that of the Swedes.

It is rare that a fortress has been re-victualled in this fashion in the teeth of so numerous besiegers. As an opera-

tion it was quite unusual then, and is not usual at any period. The management of the affair was perfect. In the fighting Gustavus had himself led his men, and, as was his wont, run grave danger, being, it is said, twice captured in the fray, and twice cut out by his immediate companions. He had tested the quality of the Poles, who, except for undoubted bravery, had little in the way of good soldiership to recommend them, and did not appear to be dangerous opponents. Sigismund's generals had a narrow appreciation of what a large army should do which blockades a town, and finds itself attacked by a handful of the enemy seeking to relieve the place. Bold as Gustavus' attempt had been, he was well seconded by Polish hebetude. On the succeeding day he marched in force into Mewe. Sigismund, less persistent in war than obstinate in politics, made signs of desiring peace, but coupled his proposals with impossible conditions. Placing his troops under Oxenstiern in winter-quarters, for the year was far spent, the king returned to Stockholm. The ministry and people supported his refusal to listen to the Polish conditions, and a more reasonable proposal was drawn up and sent to Warsaw; but as Sigismund did not answer before the next year, the war went on.

The command of the Poles, at the opening of 1627, was given to Crown-Marshal Koniecpolski, who was sent to raise the siege of Danzig. Gustavus was at home; but the Swedes held Putzig, Dirschau, Mewe, Elbing and Pillau, thus encircling the city. To break through this line, Koniecpolski saw that Putzig afforded the easiest means, and he was as successful in his venture as he was bold. The garrison of Putzig, unfortunately short of both munitions and food, was quickly reduced to straits; but though surrendering, it obtained the right to march out with colors flying. This again opened the communication of Danzig with Germany, and neutralized all

Gustavus' work so far done. Nor was this the end of ill-luck. Eight thousand recruits, coming to the Swedes from Germany, were met by Koniecpolski on the march from and driven back to Hammerstein, and the place forced, on April 15, to capitulate, in a manner not creditable to the Swedish garrison. The officers were made prisoners—among them Colonels Streif and Teufel—and the men released on a year's parole. This was a notable piece of partisan warfare.

During this period of Swedish reverses, Gustavus had been kept in Stockholm by contrary winds. By no means cast down by these backsets, he doubted not to overcome them when he should reach the ground. Sailing from Elfsnabben May 4, he landed on the 8th at Pillau. When he reached the army at Dirschau with the six thousand troops he had brought, he found it increased by recruitment up to thirty-five thousand men. But to his surprise he also found that the elector of Brandenburg had taken up arms against him, and had raised four thousand "blue coats" for his suzerain Sigismund. These were intrenched near Pillau, at Lochstädt. Gustavus made short work of the matter; he set out, speedily captured the little Prussian army, and forcibly enlisted the entire body under his own standard. George William learned his lesson, and thereafter remained neutral.

Gustavus began by a careful reconnoissance of the works surrounding Danzig. The citizens had occupied the "Danzig Head," or strip of land at the west mouths of the Vistula, and here was a redoubt which Gustavus especially desired to reconnoitre. While thus engaged, May 25, 1627, viewing the works from a boat, he was wounded by a bullet in the flesh of the hip, which laid him up, and further delayed operations. During this period the Poles concentrated their forces; Sigismund threatened de la Gardie in Livonia, and the king was compelled to send Horn to his assistance.

Gustavus Adolphus was personally much too venturesome for a commanding general. In this particular the family tendency to insanity perhaps manifested itself; but his was as admirable a form of the disease as that of "Macedonia's Madman." The same day on which he was wounded, he had been almost captured by two Polish horsemen, who suddenly sprang upon him while out reconnoitring and far from his attendants; and but a few weeks before, he had barely escaped being cut down in a cavalry skirmish. But no expostulations were of any avail. Gustavus would run risks fit only for officers of lower rank. For this venturesomeness Oxenstiern attempted to take him to task, saying that a monarch had no right to risk a life so needful to his subjects. But Gustavus cited Alexander, and the necessity of showing his men that they must despise danger. "What better fate could overtake me than to die doing my duty as king, in which place it has pleased heaven to set me?" he quietly replied. In this particular the monarch could not be controlled.

Meanwhile, Koniecpolski drew within six miles, and undertook, on August 18, a reconnoissance of the Swedish position. Gustavus headed a body of cavalry and drove back the Polish horse, which retired through the village of Rokitten. This place lay in a country much cut up by hills and ravines, and the village was held by Polish infantry and artillery. Gustavus had placed some batteries on a convenient hill, with orders to attack the village, and had galloped up an adjoining height to reconnoitre, when he was again wounded through the right shoulder, near the neck. The Swedes, somewhat disheartened, withdrew.

The bullet was deep and could not be cut out, and the wound proved dangerous. Gustavus at first feared that it was his mortal hurt; and, indeed, he was kept from duty for

three months. Meanwhile the siege went slowly on. It is related that the king's body physician, while dressing the wound, was led to say that he had always feared this or worse, as His Majesty so constantly courted danger. "Ne sutor ultra crepidam," answered the royal patient.

On recovery Gustavus recaptured Putzig, and once more cut Danzig from its communication with Germany, while a Swedish fleet under Sternskjöld blockaded the port. The Danzigers had also patched up a fleet; and under command of Admiral Dickmann, a Dane, they made, November 28, an attack on the Swedish navy, and inflicted a severe defeat upon it, but not without heavy loss of their own. Dickmann and Sternskjöld both fell, and a Swedish captain — some say Sternskjöld — blew up his ship rather than surrender. This naval battle exhibits the strength and ability of Danzig. The misfortune seemed to cap the adverse occurrences of the year, though the Danzigers had won but an empty triumph, and at a loss of five hundred of their best sailors. A stronger fleet was brought up, and Gustavus began to draw his lines closer about the city. In order to do this effectually, it was essential to capture two towns south of the Frische Haff. The king, though not yet convalescent, headed the party against Wörmditt; General Tott that against Guttstädt. The former was taken by storm; the latter surrendered. No further operations, save another minor naval fight in the harbor of Danzig, occurred this year, and Gustavus returned to Stockholm in December, partly for the benefit of his health.

The campaign of this year was of small account, — indeed almost a failure, — owing to the adverse weather, which kept the king from the scene of action, and to the aggravating delays occasioned by his wounds. It was fortunate that the enemy took no better advantage of their opportunities.

Nothing can excuse their carelessness in not assuming the offensive during this period, in connection with the garrison of Danzig. The Poles never lacked courage, but they were rarely well led. A vigorous policy must have occasioned serious complications to Gustavus' lieutenants, and might have brought disaster; for Gustavus had not sufficient forces to blockade so strong a place as Danzig, and at the same time hold head to an army fully equaling his own, and vigorously directed. Koniecpolski opened against Gustavus' lieutenants with vigor; but he drew back to a strict defensive after the arrival of the king.

There were uncompleted fortifications on the Bischofsberg and Hagelberg, near Danzig, which it has been said should have been attacked by Gustavus, but even their capture would not necessarily have brought about the fall of the place; for the Swedish ordnance, though the best then known, was not capable of reaching every part of the town from those eminences; and the Danzigers would have fought hard. It seems that Gustavus might have been wiser to resort to a simple blockade, and in July, before the very dilatory enemy was ready, to fall on and cripple him for the campaign. Had he accomplished the latter, he could have turned on Danzig with a better chance; for without the moral support of the presence of Sigismund's army, the town would scarcely have resisted so stoutly; and easy terms might have secured it.

Moreover, in a military sense, the Swedes were not well placed. The time for the Polish army to attack Gustavus was while his attention was taken up by the siege. His desire to capture Danzig before moving on the enemy was perhaps a mistake. As Lossau has pointed out, had the Poles defeated Gustavus while he lay near the city, so as to punish his army badly and thrust it back towards the west,

his line of retreat would have been through an extremely poor country, in which an army, especially one partly broken up, could scarcely subsist; whereas an advance on the Polish army up the Vistula, even if resulting in defeat, would have given Gustavus a better chance to retire and to save his army whole. But these were new problems of war, unknown to the soldiers of the day; and the Swedish monarch was slowly working them out. He cannot be held to look at war from our own point of view, illumined as it is by the work of a Frederick and a Napoleon, as well as by his own; for he was still hampered by the fear of fortresses, so strong a sentiment of his era. And happily Koniecpolski showed indolence to a degree which corrected the evils which might have flowed from Gustavus' position and wounds.

Danzig had so far resisted Gustavus' best efforts. It was a proud city, without religious prejudices, and while owing slender allegiance to Poland, it held its own rights at a high value. In this it was seconded by Holland, and morally sustained by all powers which preferred not to see the Baltic reduced to the position of a Swedish lake.

It must be said to the credit of Wallenstein's foresight that he was constant in his advice to the emperor to assist the Poles. If Gustavus was allowed to win success he would prove the worst enemy the empire could have, he wrote to Ferdinand. He would gladly have accepted Gustavus as an ally, if the monarch could at a cheap price be kept from entering into the German imbroglio, where he himself was now enacting the chief rôle. With his usual habit of sowing by all waters, Wallenstein even sought diplomatic means of establishing communication with Gustavus, meanwhile doing his best to cripple him, and instructing his lieutenant on the Baltic, Arnim, to prevent the Swedes at all hazards from landing in Pomerania or Mecklenburg.

XI.

THE POLISH WARS END. 1628-1629.

AGAIN joining his army near Danzig, in 1628, Gustavus pushed the siege; Koniecpolski indulged in making sundry diversions; but the king marched out against him, and in a sharp battle drove him up the Vistula. Danzig was about to fall, when unusual floods overflowed the country, and drove the Swedes out of their works. Gustavus had been studying the German situation, had made a treaty as to Baltic trade with Denmark, and had thrown a force and munitions into Stralsund. When the emperor overran all north Germany except the free towns, the king saw that he must shortly enter the contest, and he pushed the Poles hard for a peace. In 1629 the emperor sent a force to join them, and operations became active. The enemy moved sharply on Gustavus, and with initial success, but within a few days he turned the tables and defeated them with heavy loss. This, coupled to the exhaustion of Poland and the intervention of France, brought about a six years' truce, under which Gustavus held all his conquests. In these Polish wars Gustavus, like Cæsar in Gaul, had trained his army for its future work in Germany, and himself in war's broader problems. He had learned to know his men and they to lean on him; and he had gradually transformed the slow-moving army of the day into an active and mobile force. He was now ready to enter the lists for Protestantism.

DURING the winter, in relation to commerce in the Baltic, Gustavus had made a treaty with Denmark, which granted him a passage through The Sound,—a matter of prime importance. In the spring of 1628 he left Stockholm with thirty ships. Near Danzig he encountered seven of the city's vessels, of which he took five and sank one; and landed probably near Putzig. The Swedish fleet cruised opposite Danzig, but could not prevent the place from being victualled by Polish blockade-runners. The army was still concentrated near Dirschau, in its location of last year, but Gustavus desired to establish a foothold at some point nearer to Dan-

zig ; he selected and personally headed a body of seven thousand men, and, unexpectedly to the enemy, threw them across the Vistula, on a quickly constructed bridge, to the island called the *Kleine Werder*, which he took. This island gave him a better position from which to threaten and choke off the place. No serious fighting is spoken of ; very likely none occurred ; but in this respect there are many gaps in Swedish annals ; we have more data about Cæsar's battles than those of Gustavus. The Swede did not write commentaries ; and his dispatches are usually bare of military detail, though full of matter dwelt on at that day.

Without undertaking any serious operation, Koniecpolski endeavored to interrupt the siege by diversions against several of the towns held by the Swedes. He captured Mewe, again took Putzig, and, gradually approaching Danzig, hoped to effect something which might raise the siege. Gustavus detailed General Tott with a cavalry force to watch these operations. Tott fell into an ambush west of Grebin, but though surrounded by thrice his force, he cut himself out without harm ; he even captured some prisoners and flags, and brought in the news of the enemy's force. Unwilling to attack the Swedish army, Koniecpolski annoyed the besieging force materially, and Gustavus determined to rid himself of his interference. Immediately upon this affair of Tott, leaving a part of his forces before Danzig, he suddenly marched with the bulk of them on the Polish army, met and attacked it not far from his camp, — the exact locality, curiously, is not known, — and by his sharp initiative well kept up, the mobility of his foot and his vastly superior artillery, defeated it with a loss of three thousand men, four guns and fourteen flags, and drove it well up the Vistula. Koniecpolski himself fell, heavily wounded.

It is a grievous loss in the study of the life of Gustavus,

that so little is known of these Polish battles ; so little of the siege of Danzig. Here was a general engagement with a high percentage of loss, and yet even the battle-field is neither named, nor can it be identified. This war was the monarch's schooling, as Gaul was Cæsar's, or Spain Hannibal's ; but we know as much of Hannibal's Iberian, and much more of Cæsar's Gallic, battles than we do of these.

The king now tightened his grip on Danzig, by land and sea. It would soon have been reduced by hunger, had it not been for a serious flood in the Vistula, which drove the Swedes out of their trenches and camps, and forced Gustavus to raise the siege all but totally. And at the same time Sigismund came on the scene with heavy reinforcements for Koniecpolski, which complicated the situation still more.

Sigismund was more implacable than ever. Approaches from the Dutch states-general to bring about a peace were met with refusal. Leagued with the emperor, Spain and all the Catholic powers, and under the thumb of the Jesuits, he would listen to no argument. He looked forward to the probable arrival of a Spanish fleet in the Baltic as well as to an imperial auxiliary corps from Germany ; he had received subsidies from both branches of the Hapsburgs, and the Polish parliament had voted him generous supplies. Moreover, as the emperor, in 1628, had succeeded in gaining the upper hand in Germany, Sigismund was emboldened by the failure of the Swedes at Danzig to hope, not only to drive them from Poland and Livonia, but eventually to carry the war into Sweden, and again lay claim to the throne of his ancestors.

After the failure of their own disjointed efforts, there had been but two sources from which the Protestants of Germany could expect assistance : from Gustavus, or from Christian of Denmark. They had enlisted the services of the latter to no great profit, and as it was inexpedient for Sweden to under-

take two wars at the same time and the Polish king would not make peace, they could, for the moment, not count on Gustavus. But when Christian was driven back by Tilly and Wallenstein to the confines of Jutland, many of the Protestants again turned to the king with urgent appeals for help. Wallenstein had already selected Stralsund as the most available base for operations against Sweden or Denmark, and was blockading it. Such a threat to the Baltic had naturally brought Christian and Gustavus closer together, and the treaty they made included an agreement to defend the freedom of the Baltic. Christian went personally to Stralsund, provisioned it, and saw to its proper manning; and the Danish fleet destroyed several vessels sent by Sigismund to the help of Wallenstein. All this had occurred during the king's own blockade of Danzig; and finally Wallenstein was compelled by Stralsund's brave resistance, as well as by the command of the emperor, who disapproved of his generalissimo's obstinacy, to give up the blockade. This imperial reverse was in reality a Swedish victory; for it was due to the heroic defense of the town by the garrison which Gustavus had sent thither under Colonel Leslie.

The siege of Stralsund was so noteworthy a failure from every point of view that it alone, says Lossau, suffices to dispute the place of Wallenstein among remarkable generals. And yet Wallenstein was a great soldier. Did not Gustavus fail before Danzig?

The defense of Stralsund opened to Gustavus himself an important foothold for operations in Germany, as well as for the protection of the Baltic; and that he had well weighed this fact is shown in the treaty which he made with the city, one extremely favorable to it and of equal value to the projects of the king.

The imperial party paid small heed to Gustavus. Wal-

lenstein by no means underrated the king, but he distinctly overrated himself. Had he stated the case as he saw it, he might have placed Gustavus next to himself among the coming captains of Europe, — *proximus, sed longo intervallo*. His structure of mind had not the self-confidence which accurately gauges the opposition while relying on its own powers; it rather possessed the self-esteem which arrogates all to its own capacity and allows nothing to the opponent. This was the secret of Wallenstein's great strength, and of his singular weakness as well. He won where self-assertion alone can win; when he met equal power, he lost.

The emperor did not keep Sigismund provided with money as had been agreed, and had Polish coffers not always been at a low ebb, the king might have found it more difficult to maintain his footing near Danzig. After the raising of the siege, Gustavus received considerable accessions of troops, including two thousand cavalry from Germany under Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig; but he was unable to bring the Polish army to a decisive battle on terms which he could accept. Koniecpolski confined himself to small operations and occupied strong positions; and Gustavus was fain to content himself with half measures. The Swedes took Neuenburg, Strassburg with much material, and Schwetz; and one detachment under Baudissin undertook a gallant raid to the gates of Warsaw, where it produced the utmost consternation, while Wrangel made a bold foraging expedition inland from Elbing. Later Baudissin was captured, but exchanged. The Poles made a few unimportant gains, and on one occasion actually surprised the Swedish army; but they failed to follow up their successes.

The singular political complications made the war in Germany drag slowly on. Having won his exceptional triumphs, the emperor, as we have seen, began tampering with Chris-

tian of Denmark, and finally (1628-29) a congress was held at Lübeck, and May 22, 1629, peace ensued. From this peace, Gustavus, king of Sweden, and Frederick, ex-electoral of the Palatinate, were expressly excluded. Gustavus had sent his representatives to the congress, but Wallenstein had arrogantly refused them admittance; nor was any notice taken of the king's protest by either the emperor or Wallenstein. Gustavus had at the time sent an embassy to Ferdinand; but he recalled it when excluded from the Lübeck Congress; nor would he receive an imperial mission, because in the accompanying documents the title of king had been formally denied him. But he made a public demand for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. The refusal of Wallenstein to recognize Sweden was one of the immediate reasons of Gustavus undertaking the Protestant cause in Germany; for it was the one thing wanting to convince him that Sweden would shortly become involved.

The successes of the emperor and the many high-handed acts of Wallenstein had the effect of bringing the Protestants into warmer sympathy, and his brethren in Germany once again turned to Gustavus for leadership. Distinct appeals had been theretofore made in 1615, 1619, 1621 and 1622; but never had the cause so sadly needed help, nor Sweden been so nearly ready. The conditions seemed to drag the king against his will into the contest which had been going on for ten years. France had already flung herself in the scale, out of antagonism to Spain and fear for the balance of power in Europe, and had offered herself as intermediary to procure a peace with Poland, so as to untie Gustavus' hands. It was fully determined in Sweden, so early as February, 1629, that Gustavus should at no distant date move to the assistance of Germany.


In the beginning of this year (1629), during the king's

absence at home, Wrangel fell upon the Polish army in its winter-quarters. The latter retired, but Wrangel followed, caught up with it at the village of Gurzno, near Strasburg, beat it, and drove it to Thorn, which place, however, he could not take. The Poles, severely oppressed by the burdens of the war, earnestly desired peace, but Sigismund was ready to consent to no more than a short truce even under the pressure of the Brandenburg and Dutch ministers ; and this truce even was so made as to be capable at any time of being broken.

Meanwhile an imperial army under Count Arnim, of seven thousand foot, two thousand horse and some artillery, was approaching to aid the Poles. Gustavus joined the Swedish army in June, about the time when Arnim made his junction with Koniecpolski at Graudenz. As Sweden was at peace with the empire, this was a gratuitous act of war by the emperor ; it was really intended to retard the Swedish interference in Germany, and it accomplished its purpose. There was a considerable body of Swedish horse at Marienwerder, and this the king now reinforced with foot to meet the enemy's threat, sending at the same time a protest to Wallenstein for his breach of the comity of nations.

Gustavus had eight thousand foot and five thousand horse. Koniecpolski, with his much superior forces, determined to deliver battle. His plan was good, and might have been dangerous to any one not watchful. On June 27 he marched from Graudenz along the river flats towards Marienwerder, purposing to bear off to Stuhm and turn the left flank of the Swedes. But Gustavus had already concluded to retire to Marienburg, and his column was defiling along the Stuhm road. So soon as he was instructed as to Koniecpolski's march, he sent the rhinegrave with a body of eight hundred horse to protect the narrows between the lakes at Stuhm, so

as to head off the enemy from the marching column and oblige them to make a long detour, and with strict orders not to bring on an engagement, but merely to occupy the enemy's



Stuhm Operation.

attention. The enemy's cavalry reached Honigfeld; the king's orders were not obeyed, and when he shortly arrived with the rear-guard of his army, he found that the rhinegrave had attacked, fallen into an ambushade, and been beaten with a loss of two hundred men. In his endeavor to sustain him, a hot combat of cavalry ensued. Gustavus again was in the thick of the fray, and narrowly escaped death or capture. A Polish cavalryman seized him by the

shoulder-belt, but Gustavus slipped it over his head and escaped. His party was beaten back, but the defile at Stuhm was held, and the whole force regained Marienburg. He had lost a number of men, flags and guns.

The fault had lain with the landgrave; but it appears from this engagement that Gustavus' light cavalry was not always as watchful as it should have been, or not always put to proper use. Perhaps the lack of enterprise on the part of Koniecpolski may have bred this carelessness. Nothing trains cavalry except an active enemy.

Gustavus' spirit was singularly elastic. Unable to sit still under defeat, he went again at the problem, and soon retrieved his disaster. The enemy advanced to the river Nogat, really a part of the delta of the Vistula. Gustavus

moved upon them, and in a sharp and decisive encounter, defeated them with a loss of four thousand men. The details of the battle are not known. Some historians ignore it. But it is manifest that the campaign did not end with a defeat of the Swedes. The sole evidence of many of the operations of Gustavus lies in the dispatches from the army to the home government; and the king's singular modesty of statement robs the after-world of much it ought to know. His letter to Oxenstiern about the battle of Breitenfeld might be the description of a small cavalry combat. There were no war-correspondents in those days, and the Swedish officers were too busy with making history to write it. Fancy a battle in our day in which the enemy forfeits four thousand men being thus lost to fame! Triumphal columns are erected by some nations to perpetuate battles where the loss has been but a dozen! And yet this is not without parallel in modern days. Many of the actions about Petersburg in 1864 and 1865, where casualties ran up into the thousands, are barely recorded with a name; many outpost-combats where hundreds bit the dust are known only as "the picket-fight of such a date."

The ill-success of their late venture had a further tendency to make the Poles long for peace; and the barbarous conduct of the troops of Arnim, a pestilence which broke out in the camp of the allies and kept the country people from bringing in supplies, the growing fear of Gustavus, and the dwindling prospect of success combined to make Sigismund more tractable. Negotiations were opened in August, 1629, and, under the influence of the French ambassador, were ended in a six years' truce. This was signed, on October 5, at Stuhmsdorf; and by its terms Sweden retained all Livonia; Memel, Pillau and some other places in ducal Prussia; Braunsberg, Tolkemit and Elbing in Polish Prussia. Danzig remained neutral, but by a separate treaty agreed to pay

two thirds of its customs into Gustavus' treasury. Sweden restored the rest of Poland and Courland to Sigismund. But in case no peace should result from the truce, Marienburg was to be again surrendered to Sweden, being meanwhile held by the elector of Brandenburg in trust. Gustavus was formally recognized as king, — a marked concession by Sigismund.

Richelieu no doubt had weight in bringing about this truce; he was the last ounce in the scale; but it is scarcely doubtful, even if France had not acted as intermediary, that Sigismund would have concluded peace. He and his subjects were exhausted by the war.

Thus, after eight years, ended the early wars of Gustavus Adolphus. The king had conducted six campaigns against Poland, and two against Denmark and Russia. These campaigns, not possessing the importance of his later ones, and lacking a record of their remarkable features, — for it is often the details which show up the military ability displayed in a campaign, — were yet what trained Gustavus in the habits of war, and permitted him to view the struggle in Germany from a broader basis of experience; they were a practical school in which he could teach his right hand the cunning it would so soon need on the European stage, and his army could be hardened into a body fit for its arduous task. He entered the Danish war a young and inexperienced leader of men; he emerged from the last Polish campaign ready equipped to prove himself in the coming two years one of the world's great captains.

In these campaigns Gustavus had observed the practical working of his new army organization, and learned *à fond* the then existing system of tactics and strategy. He was enabled to gauge the advantages of his own method, which, in the short remaining term of his life, he moulded into what

was the origin of the modern art of war, — into what brought the world back to dispositions both intellectual and humane. These campaigns had been conducted against different peoples, — Danes, Russians, Poles, — and the king had gleaned varied experience. He learned the habits of different leaders and armies, and strove to adapt his own ways to theirs. His infantry underwent a good schooling against the large and excellent forces of Russian and Polish cavalry, and learned to protect itself against this arm. It was swift on the march, and steadier in defeat and victory than any imperial troops, even if no more stanch in battle than the Walloons of Father Tilly. His own cavalry the king had gradually improved by imitating the Poles, and by adding discipline and *ensemble* to it. There was superb horse on the other side, the Black Brigade, for instance, under its model cavalry leader, Pappenheim; but, headed by the king, the Swedish was as good. Had it earlier met the German cavalry, it could not have held head against it. Gustavus' artillery, much improved in organization, drill and technical knowledge, gave a wonderful account of itself. He had studied what the Turks had done, and had profited by their errors. They had got the biggest guns which could be cast; he made his handy, quickly served, and accurate of aim. Theirs were of all sizes and patterns; he reduced the matter to some sort of scale. There were heavy guns, needing thirty-six horses to transport; siege-guns, much smaller; and field-guns, six-, four- and two-pounders, the latter being handled by one horse. The regimental four-pounder could be fired faster than a musket; and the leather cannon, originally adopted for their small weight, were driven out by the monarch's light metal gun.

Swedish success was largely due to technical engineering and ordnance skill, which seconded the energy and ingenuity infused by Gustavus into the armies under his control. As

an engineer, he was far ahead of Wallenstein or Tilly. He understood the value of field-works in their best sense; his engineer companies were numerous; and by quickly building works to protect his men, he would stand on ground the enemy would abandon.

Under Gustavus' watchful eye, every branch of the service had grown in efficiency. Equipment, arms, rationing, medical attendance, drill and discipline, field manœuvres, camp and garrison duty, reached a high grade. Energy and extra exertion were recognized; luxury was discountenanced; the troops looked earnest, severe, but they were kindly. The officers had all served from the bottom up, and had learned to work and to obey. Promotion was by seniority and merit. Justice was pronounced. Of the many Romanists in the Swedish ranks, none complained of unfair treatment.

As in the little, so in the large. Gustavus treated each country he entered with a strict eye to economics, instead of sucking out its life-blood. The population made no complaints, and he could nourish and keep his men together in camp, when the enemy must disperse in cantonments, and run the risk of being destroyed before concentration.

In the seventeen years Gustavus had been king, each campaign had added to the skill and efficiency of the Swedish army. There was no question of its distinct superiority over any European army of its day. And chiefly was this shown in substituting the idea of mobility for the old idea of weight. Speed was the watchword of Gustavus' tactics; it was his speed which won his victories. His motto was, "Action, action, action!"

In these campaigns, too, not only had Gustavus learned to know his generals and men, but they had gauged their monarch-leader; and there had arisen that mutual confidence, esteem and affection which only the great captain effectually

commands. As there was no danger or labor which their general and king did not share, in which he did not bear an equal part, so the Swedish army saw in him a harbinger of victory, a sure protection in disaster; Gustavus' own character, bravery, religious ardor, honesty and humanity infused itself into every soldier in the army. Nothing can exaggerate the advantage which this good understanding between chief and army gives; no leader who lacks the divine spark ever reaches its full measure.

In listening to the last appeal of the Protestants to undertake their cause, Gustavus was actuated by faith in his religion, by an honest sense of the dangers and needs of Sweden, and by feelings in which personal or national ambition had no foothold. It is a difficult task to twist even isolated remarks or letters of the king into a semblance of personal ambition; it is impossible, from the whole of his utterances, to deduce any ambition but that of serving his country and his country's God. His address to the Estates in 1630 plainly shows his mood: "The Hapsburgs are threatening Sweden, and must be met instantly, stanchly. It is a question of defending the land of our sires. The times are bad, the danger is great. Let us not look at the unusual sacrifices and load we must all unite to bear. It is a fight for parents, for wife and child, for house and hearth, for country and religion." And the people's answer was as full of courage and of meaning as the king's address. It was like the upswelling of the old Roman burgess-blood when the unparalleled disaster of Cannæ threatened the state with annihilation; it was like the uprising of the North when the nation was threatened with disruption in 1861. Heavier taxes were willingly paid; individuals built and equipped vessels; every man laid aside his private broils and griefs, stood shoulder to shoulder and linked hands with his neighbor for God, King and Fatherland.

The openly expressed opinion of Wallenstein, — in a certain respect a measure of this great but arrogant man, — with regard to the undertaking of the king of Sweden to lead the Protestant cause in Germany, was well shown in his boast that he would “drive the Snow King from Germany with rods if he should dare to show his face there;” and Ferdinand, puffed up with his wonderful successes, echoed the opinion with: “So we have got a new little enemy, have we?” But Wallenstein knew better, if Ferdinand did not. His private correspondence and statements show a clear appreciation of the danger which the arrival of Gustavus threatened to his carefully erected structure. Alone, Wallenstein ruled Germany as its strongest warrior; with Gustavus there, he knew that he had a rival, he feared that he might find his master.



Albanese Horseman.

XII.

THE SWEDISH PERIOD BEGINS. JANUARY TO JUNE, 1630.

IN twelve years (1618 to 1630) the emperor had overrun all Germany. No one had been found to hold head to Wallenstein and Tilly, and the Protestants turned in despair to Gustavus. It was a wrecked cause he was to champion, and none of the Powers lent active aid. Happily Wallenstein was put aside, and France was ready to pay money to check the dangerous rise of the Hapsburgs. Gustavus entered the lists. Whether Sweden should conduct a defensive or an offensive war was promptly settled by the king, sustained by his Estates and people. Though he placed too much reliance on the Protestant princes, his general calculations were just. The motives of the king were honorable; he had no personal ambition; he proposed to protect the interests of Sweden and of Protestantism, — and what Sweden needed was a “bastion” on the south shore of the Baltic, to enable her to control that sea. The winter of 1629–30 was a busy one. Munitions were collected, taxes equalized, troops raised and equipped under the new system, and seventy-six thousand men were placed under arms, of whom thirteen thousand were destined for Germany. This number the king expected to double by recruitment there, for the emperor had at least one hundred thousand men. What Gustavus took with him was a mere nucleus for accessions from the German princes.

BEFORE the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was about equally divided between the Protestant and Catholic princes; and when the former took up arms, the emperor's authority extended over not more than half of the territory which is comprised between the Rhine and the Oder, the Alps and the Baltic. At the expiration of twelve years of war (1618–1630) the entire territory named had been overrun by the imperial forces, save only the free towns of the north, Stettin and the fortress of Stralsund. The

Protestants had begun the war with encouraging prospects; they were now disunited and cowed. It was under these conditions that from many sources entreaties reached Gustavus to come to the rescue of his brothers in the faith; it was these conditions which the monarch faced in becoming the champion of Protestantism.

Gustavus had for at least two years foreseen that he must take a hand in the German imbroglio; early in 1629 such action was fully determined; but when, in 1630, he finally appeared upon the scene, he was called on to contemplate so wrecked a cause, that the boldest soldier with inexhaustible resources would scarce have cared to face it; while he stood almost alone, with the sole good-will of poverty-stricken Sweden at his back, and the very men who most ardently besought his aid were the ones who afforded him the least assistance. He had no earnest allies. Denmark was neutral if not an enemy, though Christian proffered friendship in public. France was uncertain, for though Richelieu was bound on the destruction of Austria and tendered subsidies, his method and his ultimate aim were not those of Gustavus. England could not be relied on. Holland, though the states-general approved its attitude, was jealous of Sweden's prestige in the Baltic, and was ready to take a hand in the matter from purely commercial motives, — ready to gain by Gustavus' defeat as much as by his victories. Lübeck and Hamburg limited their helpfulness to trading silver for the army-chest against Swedish copper. The dukes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg tendered assistance indeed, as well as the margrave of Baden, the administrator of Magdeburg and Landgrave William of Hesse; but we shall see how much this meant. And meanwhile Poland was bitter as gall, and Bethlen Gabor was dead. Not a power was ready to throw itself heartily into the scale; the German princes were

at odds among themselves and cowed by overwhelming misfortune; and while the Hanse towns had armed to protect themselves, they cared not to aid Protestantism for any but selfish motives. Money was their god.

The one thing in Gustavus' favor was that the grasping measures of Ferdinand had for some time excited the gravest discontent among even the Catholic princes; that the savage cruelties and ruthless devastation of the war had exasperated the Protestants and roused the horror of Europe. All potentates looked with distrust upon the growing manifestations of imperial ambition; for Austria now had at her feet the very liberties of Germany. Whither might not Ferdinand's greed of power lead him? On the other hand, most of the Protestant princes, to save themselves, had accepted the emperor's sway; some of them, led by personal motives, were in accord with him; others again sought protection in a neutral bearing. A mere handful, notably the dukes of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg, as well as the free towns of the Hanseatic League, still maintained a bold front of opposition, while Stralsund had held her own with the aid of a Swedish garrison, and Magdeburg had stood a siege by Wallenstein. But with these few brave exceptions, Germany had bowed her head to the stroke, showing neither power nor will to withstand the imperial dictation, or to fight for her religion or independence. Ferdinand was master. The German princes would probably have gone over to him in a body, had they not feared his future policy. He had the entire matter in his grasp. But no man is all-wise; Ferdinand foolishly quarreled with his electors on a side issue, and lost their loyal support, while the Edict of Restitution, issued in March, 1629, completed the break-up of confidence.

Not only were none of the other European powers anxious to come to Germany's assistance, but none of them were pre-

pared to do so. England was busy with intestine disquiet, and in the end of the year made peace with Spain, which for once drew her closer to the Hapsburgs. The Netherlands were still at war with Spain, and the last thing they wanted was an inroad by the victorious armies of Wallenstein, Tilly or Pappenheim. Spain herself was Hapsburg, and were she not so, she had, in addition to the war in the Netherlands, the Mantuan imbroglio in Italy. Denmark had been beaten into peace, and then bought into neutrality for a price, and Christian was morbidly jealous of Gustavus, and ready to do anything underhand to thwart his plans. The Turks were an uncertain element. Brandenburg had sent troops to Poland, and had scarcely forgiven Gustavus' foray on her territory. Saxony felt bound by her oath to the emperor to resist armed aggression, while John George, the elector, was intent on peace at any price. The other Protestant princes were either frightened or reduced in means beyond power to help.

Only France and Sweden remained. Though France had at first inclined towards the emperor, or at least towards the League and Bavaria, when matters took too decided a turn in Ferdinand's favor, Cardinal Richelieu clearly saw that political gain lay in aiding the Protestants, so as to weaken the power of Austria; but as Catholic France could not openly enter the lists on behalf of Protestantism, Richelieu preferred to use his influence with Sweden to take up the cause, relying for eventual results upon the location and healthy condition of the Swedish nation and the proven talents of its king.

The two marked features of European politics of the day were thus Austria's aggressiveness, and the change of the foreign policy of France.

It was not difficult to induce Gustavus to enter into this

plan. The Swedes, in his opinion, needed a "bastion" on the southern shore of the Baltic in order to maintain their supremacy on this sea; and Stralsund was just that. But Gustavus' demands were at first deemed too high by France. He asked a considerable lump sum down and six hundred thousand rix dollars a year as subsidy. This Richelieu declined, though his general course remained helpful, and he eventually came to Gustavus' terms.

Sweden was neither a populous nor a rich country. She numbered but a million and a half of souls, and her annual budget ran up to not exceeding twelve million rix dollars. But she made up in a great degree for this weakness in material resources by the simplicity and strength of her people, her well-regulated government and particularly her remarkable military organization. The army had been tried in its eight years' war against Denmark, Russia and Poland; and the genius of its king, sustained by the love and devotion of his people, and coupled to the strong Protestant sentiment of the nation, made Gustavus a noteworthy champion. Many reasons weighed with Sweden and the king. That the emperor had sent an army to help the king of Poland against him while he was at peace with the empire; that the Swedish embassy had been thrust from the congress at Lübeck and heaped with contumely, rankled deeply in Gustavus' nature. Sensible, frank and generous, he was yet sensitive in matters relating to his dignity, and prompt to resent any affront to Sweden. The oppressions of the Protestants appealed strongly to both king and nation. Danger unquestionably threatened Sweden now that Germany had succumbed, and Gustavus was ambitious to show that his country was not a cipher in the religious and political complications of Europe.

When the question came up as to whether Sweden should wage a defensive war within her own borders, or an offensive

war in Germany, many of the more conservative statesmen inclined to the former view, notably the prime minister, Oxenstiern. The emperor, said he, had one hundred and sixty thousand veteran troops, while Protestant Germany was exhausted. How could Sweden with her small army enter the lists against such a host, and without aid? Better spend money on a strong fleet and hold the south shore of the Baltic. Oxenstiern's idea was perhaps not a mere inert defensive, for he was willing to argue the other plan; but he proposed to conduct any offensive which might be undertaken to the east of the Oder, and to remain strictly on the defensive in Pomerania. The king gave many reasons against this. His idea was merely to observe the country to the east of the Oder, and to resort to a stout offensive in north Germany. Sweden, he argued, could count more than Oxenstiern would allow on the aid of the Protestant princes and free towns of Germany, if once upon its soil. The Hanse towns, which had held a convention at Lübeck in November, 1629, where they had agreed to arm for mutual defense, now sought alliance with the several Protestant powers, and had made efforts to secure the aid of Sweden. Stralsund must not be forsaken. Wallenstein had made a bid for the Hanse towns by flattery, which failing, he had attacked Stralsund by force. This city had shown the ability of the free towns to defend themselves, and no time must be given for the idea of defense to grow cold. Magdeburg had proven her stanchness. All were now ready to aid. It was imperative for Sweden to hold the German coast of the Baltic, and prevent the emperor from building a fleet. An offensive war in Germany would cost Sweden less than the defense of her own soil; and the saving for her people of the atrocities of such a war as was being waged on the mainland was a manifest duty. The defense of Sweden could well be left to its militia and fleet, if a Swedish

army opposed the emperor in Germany. Delay was the most dangerous thing of all. Should he once become absolute master in Germany, the emperor could no longer be controlled, and Sweden would be in greater danger than ever.

In order to feel the pulse of the nation, the king convened in Upsala eleven of the leading Swedish senators ; and on mature discussion of the case presented by the king, these men unanimously agreed that an offensive in Germany was the wiser course.

In the event, Gustavus was mistaken in his reliance on the willingness or ability of the Protestant princes of Germany to lend their aid ; he had gauged them at too high a value, for they proved to be controlled by their fears or their selfish interests rather than by the good of their religion or their country. But he was not mistaken in his financial estimates ; for in 1632 the war consumed only one sixth of the Swedish revenue.

The king's plan was comprehensive ; and he never lost sight of the value of the sea. Unless he controlled the Baltic, he had no base whatsoever, and what he proposed was quite as much to equip a big Swedish fleet and a fair-sized Swedish army, as it was merely to land Swedish forces in Germany and there conduct a land campaign. That a base on the Baltic had no value without a powerful Swedish fleet no man saw more plainly than the king ; for years he had striven for *dominium maris Baltici*.

Gustavus' motives in undertaking this war have been the subject of grave discussion and much disagreement. It cannot be alleged that they were purely religious, that it was solely as the champion of Protestantism that he risked so much. But it may be honestly claimed that he had no personal ambition to subserve. He was by birth and nature a Viking, a species of colonizing fighter ; but he neither sought

foreign conquest nor foreign gold. Sweden later became over lustful for both ; but Gustavus strove first for the defense of his fatherland, and next for the defense of his religion. He has been accused of seeking to create a Protestant German empire with himself as its ruler ; but there is no tangible evidence to sustain this view, while there is a multitude of testimony to controvert it. No monarch ever had a more intimate friend and confidant than Gustavus possessed in Axel Oxenstiern, his chancellor, trusted adviser and one of his able generals ; nor was there ever a man in whom truth was more ingrained. Many years after Gustavus' death, when the subject first grew into a controversy, Oxenstiern wrote in a private communication : " King Gustavus Adolphus wanted the Baltic coast ; he harbored the idea of some day becoming emperor of Scandinavia, and this land was to contain Sweden, Norway, Denmark to the Great Belt and the lands abutting on the Baltic. With this in view it was that he first concluded a peace with Denmark, as favorable as it was then possible to endure, and later one with Russia with regard to the Baltic. He took the coast and river mouths from Poland by seizing the lucrative customs. Then he attacked the Roman emperor, and demanded as war-indemnity from the German princes, to whom imperial lands should be given in exchange, Pomerania and Mecklenburg. Denmark was also to be clipped of all territory down to the Great Belt, and Norway was to become ours. It was on these lines that this great king intended to construct an independent kingdom. But that, as the saying goes, he desired to be German emperor is not true."

So unbounded was the confidence of his subjects that the king had little difficulty in impressing his opinion on the people, the Estates and ministry, and shortly the work began. He opened negotiations with the anti-Hapsburg peoples. He

appointed his brother-in-law, Count John Casimir, his representative in Sweden, commissioned to act with the advice of the council and of Field-Marschals de la Gardie and Wrangel. He made arrangements for internal government for a long absence, leaving explicit instruction as to land administration, recruiting and taxes, loans, victual and war material for the future. He accumulated present moneys and supplies to accompany the army. He ordered new fortresses to be built on the coast opposite Denmark. He strengthened his fleet and built a number of transports.

There were great preparations in Sweden during the winter of 1629-30. The nitre and sulphur works were kept busy shipping to the powder-mills at Naka and Wättinge. Calculations were made for furnishing a ton and a half of powder per regiment per month, and about fifty cartridges per man, plus twenty-four hundred pounds of lead and thirty-six hundred pounds of match punk, of which the consumption was necessarily large. The armories in all parts of Sweden were driven ; and armor, helmets, partisans, pikes, spades and picks were turned out by government and by private firms. Each regiment was to have issued to it five hundred and seventy-six muskets and bandoliers, four hundred and thirty-two sets of armor, four hundred and thirty-two pikes and one thousand and eight helmets and swords. In addition, forty-eight partisans were issued to the three officers and three non-commissioned officers of each of the eight companies, and sixteen drums to the regiment.

In order to equalize taxes so that the aristocracy should not escape, a mill-tax, or tax on corn, had been laid in 1625 ; in 1627 it was changed to a poll-tax ; and now, in 1630, a war-tax was added. The income in 1630 was about twelve million rix dollars, of which three fourths was spent on the war ; but in 1631 and 1632 the cost ran down to five and a

half and two and a fourth million rix dollars ; for German and foreign subsidies began to help out.

The clergy preached the cause as heartily as the recruiting officers enforced it. All males from sixteen to sixty must report at the local rendezvous, and those who were not householders or who worked for wages were first enrolled. Of the rest, each tenth man was drawn by lot from those between eighteen and thirty, excepting miners, especially in the nitre and sulphur mines, and manufacturers of arms and ammunition. Only one son was taken from a family ; a man having no sons was excused. On enlistment, papers in triplicate were made out, much as with us, and the men were subsequently mustered in companies. The troops assembled at Kalmar, Elfsnabben and other places for shipment to general rendezvous, in May, 1630.

Arrangements had been made for raising men abroad as well as at home. Kniphausen and Spens were recruiting to good effect in England ; Falkenberg, in the Netherlands, had no luck. Many recruits were got from the mustered-out soldiers of the late Danish war, and in Brandenburg, Poland and Danzig. In June, 1629, Colonel Morton arrived with two regiments of Scotchmen.

In the conquered towns of Livonia and Prussia there were still twelve thousand men. These were left as a reserve under Oxenstiern, who recruited them up to twenty-one thousand. Six thousand more, under Leslie, were in Stralsund and on the island of Rügen. Leslie was active in recruiting, and the Hanse towns furnished a few men. By the early months of 1630 there had been organized an army of seventy-six thousand men, of which forty-three thousand were Swedes ; and in the fleet were three thousand more. Of this total, thirteen thousand were destined for Germany, to which were added, by reinforcements during 1630, twenty-three hundred

men from Sweden, twenty-eight hundred from Finland, two thousand from Livonia, thirteen thousand six hundred from Prussia, and the six thousand garrison of Stralsund, an aggregate of about forty thousand men. There were left in Sweden sixteen thousand men, in Finland six thousand five hundred, in the Baltic provinces five thousand, in Prussia seven thousand six hundred, — thirty-five thousand men in all.

The cost of the forty thousand men in Germany was estimated at eighteen hundred thousand rix dollars a year, or forty-five rix dollars per man. This amount varied during Gustavus' reign from forty-one and one third to fifty-two rix dollars per man per year. Cheap enough service for any class of men, and the Swedes were of the best.

Gustavus had no doubt that he would receive considerable accessions from the friendly princes of Germany; and men from the disbanded armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick, it was believed, only waited his arrival to join his standard in large squads. The armies of Denmark and Poland, lately mustered out, would furnish abundant recruits. His thirteen thousand men would, he calculated, be increased to a substantial body so soon as he placed foot on German soil. But as against the seventy-five thousand aggregate on Gustavus' muster-rolls, of which he led but thirteen thousand to Germany, Wallenstein and Tilly were yet afoot, with armies which easily reached a hundred thousand men.

Gustavus issued no formal declaration of war. The attack on his ally, Stralsund, made the war appear to him a defensive one. But certain negotiations between the king and the emperor, which Gustavus well knew would come to nothing, were carried on for a while through the intermediation of Christian of Denmark. Stettin, the capital of Pomerania, was being threatened by the imperial army, and Gustavus felt that he must save the town. He was ready to sail from

Elfsnabben, whither all the troops were forwarded, by the end of May, but adverse winds kept him in port three weeks. His forces were embarked on two hundred transports, protected by thirty men-of-war.

The mouths of the Oder were to be the point of debarkation, and Gustavus had made himself familiar with every rood of the country. From this point he proposed to seize, or treat with, the cities along the coast on either side of Stralsund, and especially Stettin, and make his base strong by a depot at the latter place, from whence he could advance up the Oder. The general plan was fully worked out; the details had to wait upon the conditions of the moment.

Pomerania had never been friendly, and had given aid and comfort to the imperialists; but when the news came that Gustavus would probably land on her shores, Duke Bogislav, a very old man, sent an embassy to Gustavus to pray him not to make a *sedes belli* on his territory. Gustavus answered, without mincing words, that on their own attitude depended his conduct to the Germans when he should have reached their shores. He should sail for Pomerania, establish himself within her borders, and use her as by her future acts she deserved to be used.

Before embarking, the king issued a proclamation appointing three days of public fasting and prayer for the success of the cause.

After making all arrangements for the government of his kingdom, Gustavus' three-year-old daughter Christina was accepted as his heir; to her all Swedes swore fealty, and the king left the fatherland in May, 1630, on what was to him and to all the world a holy mission, — to accomplish it, indeed, but never to return.

XIII.

GUSTAVUS LANDS IN GERMANY. JUNE TO AUGUST, 1630.

GUSTAVUS sailed May 30, and landed at the mouth of the Oder without opposition, the imperial generals retiring to Garz and Anklam. Occupying Usedom and Wollin, he set his fleet to cruise along the coast, advanced on Stettin, and though Duke Bogislav sought to preserve his neutrality, took and garrisoned it; upon which a favorable treaty was made, and the Swedes camped in Oderburg, near by. Every place taken was strongly fortified. As the enemy held the rest of the coast, the communication between Stralsund, Stettin and East Prussia was not secure, and Gustavus set to work to extend his holding, and to blockade the places along the coast which he could not take, while the enemy strengthened Garz, and there encamped the bulk of their force. The king first intended to secure his foothold and the line of the Tollense in his front; but while so operating, the enemy took Clempenow and Pasewalk, massacred the garrisons, and seized the Tollense. Oxenstiern, from East Prussia, was pushing out towards the king, who kept steadily at work making firm his standing on the coast; Magdeburg declared in favor of the Swedes, and Colonel Falkenberg was sent thither to take command.

THE troops were embarked June 9, 1630; and after a delay of three weeks, waiting for a favorable wind, the fleet set sail with its burden so precious to Protestant Germany. Heavy weather still further retarded its progress in the open off Stockholm; a stormy passage ensued, during which the shipping beat about several days, and was with difficulty kept together; but it finally made land, and anchored July 4 in the lee of the island of Rügen, close to Usedom, near the mouth of the Peene River. The two hundred transports and men-of-war had aboard six thousand sailors, ninety-two companies of foot, one hundred and sixteen companies (half-squadrons) of horse, and eight hundred guns of all calibres.

Denmark had recently made efforts to purchase the island

of Rügen, an acquisition which would have made a base at the mouth of the Oder quite insecure for Sweden. For some time the imperialists had held the bulk of the island, of which a large part belonged to the city of Stralsund; and as it was essential to clear the coast, it was determined by Gustavus that Rügen should be recaptured. On March 13 Leslie took the island of Hiddensee, and garrisoned it with three hundred men; on the 29th he put over troops to Rügen, and captured the works at the several landing-places out of hand. The imperialists tried in vain to eject the Swedes, and at the end of April retired wholly from Rügen, except a garrison of three hundred men in one of the forts, which on June 7 likewise fell. Rügen was thus secured to the Swedes.



The Landing-place.

The imperial general, Torquato Conti, a cruel man even among the wolves of that day, and equally incompetent, was at Anklam, twenty miles to the south. So soon as he heard of the fleet being sighted, he sent detachments to light fires along the beach, hoping Gustavus would believe that a large hostile force was on hand. But the ruse failed; Conti lost his best chance of dealing the Swedes a hearty blow as they landed, and his parties retired from the coast. Boats, ordered some time before by Gustavus, were on hand under control of his own officers; the king headed the landing parties, and the troops were disembarked on Usedom. As Cæsar is said to have fallen when he reached Africa, so Gustavus, on landing here, stumbled on the gang-plank, and slightly injured his knee; but he is not recorded to have turned the matter into an omen. The Swedish blood flowed too calmly to need such


adventitious aid. On putting foot on shore, he knelt and offered up unaffected prayer ; then seized a spade, and began himself the work of intrenching a line to cover the landing. It took two days to disembark ; the companies were successively set to work ; an old line of defenses was occupied ; new ones were drawn up, and soon the first intrenchments of Peenemünde, which place was included in the circuit, were completed. Victual issued to the men had been mostly consumed in the long delay and passage ; provisions had been ordered to be collected in Stralsund, but the king found on hand only a small supply. It was not an encouraging beginning.

Gustavus was wont to speak his mind ; and for this lack of provision he roundly held to task John Skytte, to whom he had committed the business ; he moreover sent urgent dispatches to Oxenstiern, in Prussia, to hurry forward supplies ; and feeling reasonably secure, on July 28 he sent six men-of-war and thirty-six other vessels to the chancellor for their transportation.

Further to protect from inroads the coast already occupied, Gustavus ordered a suitable naval force to cruise between Travemünde and Rügen. Two days after landing, he took twelve hundred musketeers and a small body of horse, and started out southerly towards the region opposite Wolgast to reconnoitre the country. Arrived there, he found that the imperialists had built a fort on the island to protect the crossing. Reconnoitring the rear of the fort from the water, and sending back for a force of four thousand men, and all the horse which had already got mounted, Gustavus prepared to take the place ; but the imperial garrison retired to the mainland.

On July 11 Gustavus left a thousand musketeers in the fort, and with three thousand foot and twenty-five hundred

horse set out to sweep Usedom clear of the enemy. The imperialists had built two forts to protect the passage from Usedom to Wollin across the Swine inlet. On the Swedes' approach the garrison fled over to Wollin, burned its boats



Oder-Elbe Country.

and the Wollin defenses, and retired to the back of the island. Gustavus managed to get boats, put across to Wollin, garrisoned the fort, and made after the fugitives as far as the Divenow inlet, but was too late to prevent their burning the bridge across it. Having thus secured the mouths of the Oder, the king returned to headquarters in Usedom.

No sooner landed than Gustavus incorporated in his army five thousand of the garrison of Stralsund. He had made good progress; for not only did his possession of Stralsund, Usedom and Wollin secure the mouths of the Oder, but it gave him an almost certain claim to Stettin, the capital of Pomerania, still in the hands of Duke Bogislav. The entire coast of north Germany, save Stralsund, the island of Rügen, what Gustavus had taken and Stettin, was held, however, by the imperialists. Happily, Wallenstein was away, and no one made any sensible effort to arrest the Swedish advance.

Pomerania is divided into two parts by the Oder, and Stettin, from its position, was a natural capital of the duchy. It had been besieged by the imperialists, but without success. General Savelli was in the country southeast of Stralsund, while Conti was on the west bank of the Oder. When the imperial generals saw that the Swedes had actually landed, they retired, Savelli to Anklam and Conti up the Oder to Garz on the left and Greifenhagen on the right bank. This gave Gustavus a chance to thrust himself in between the two parts, and he made arrangements to advance on Stettin.

In April, before leaving Sweden, the king had sought to influence this well-fortified city in his behalf, and we have seen that Stettin had stoutly defended itself against the imperialists. While Conti was lax, Gustavus was active. He left Colonel Leslie in command of Wollin, General Kagg of Usedom, and both under Knipphausen, to whom was committed the general supervision of the territory so far taken; he detailed officers to patrol the coast to secure all possible landing-places; and went in person to the southern part of Usedom near the Swine, to collect boats on which to ship a suitable force for an advance on Stettin. On July 18 he had seventy-four companies, eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-three men, ready to be shipped. On July 19 they

were put aboard such vessels, fifty-one in number, as were of suitable draught to sail up the river. Next day the fleet made Stettin by noon, and Gustavus landed part of the

troops near the castle of Oderburg below, where he took up a good position.

One would expect to see the Evangelical powers of Germany unite to receive Gustavus with open arms. Nothing shows their supineness more than the fact that, save only Stralsund, — and this was held by his own garrison, — not a city, not a prince, not a circle, did aught to welcome the champion they had called. Every one waited to see how his perilous undertaking would result, before com-



mitting himself to the Swedish monarch's support. It was an ill beginning; had not Gustavus been of a buoyant nature, he might have faltered now; but worse was yet to come.

Pomerania would have liked to remain neutral, and Bogislav tried his old tactics to influence the Swedes to leave him so; but Gustavus would none of it. Colonel Damitz, the commander of Stettin, under orders of the duke, declined to admit the Swedes; in fact, threatened to fire on the flotilla if it should approach closer. He sent a drummer as bearer of a message, who was speedily turned back with answer that Damitz should come himself, as the king of Sweden was not in the habit of recognizing messages from men of regimental rank. The colonel came with some ambassadors from the duke, but they had no authority to allow the occupation of

the city; nor was any headway made until the king told Bogislav in so many words, at an interview which was shortly held, that he would countenance no neutrality on the part of the Germans, and that he had made suitable arrangements to take Stettin by force if not willingly yielded. Neither would he tolerate delay. "Every procrastinator is not a Fabius," said he. Gustavus already divined that the anticipated German support would not be forthcoming, and he proposed to handle this lethargic temperament without gloves. Stettin was given up.

The Swedish troops, owing perhaps to the lateness of the hour on that day, did not march into Stettin through the city gates, but through some incomplete defenses, and took formal possession on July 20. As the imperial forces were gathering near by at Garz, Gustavus would not prejudice his position by a minute's loss of time.

A treaty was concluded by which Swedish influence was made predominant in all matters, commercial and political, and three thousand men of the Pomeranian garrison of Stettin, under Damitz, were taken into the Swedish service as the "White Brigade." They proved to be excellent troops. The city of Stettin was garrisoned by three regiments and three companies of the Swedish guard. Having paid a goodly sum of money, Bogislav was permitted to resume nominal sway in Pomerania. The real control remained with the Swedes.

This acquisition of Stettin was a vast gain for Gustavus, and an equal detriment to Ferdinand. So far the foothold had been got without the loss of a man. Gustavus had secured his base of operations, and there shortly came an accession of troops from Prussia, from disbanded men who had served with Mansfeld or under the Danish flag, and from other sources. The conditions were such that a man could earn his bread as

a soldier with greater safety from the perils of war than as a farmer, and many sought refuge in the ranks. These new enrollments ran the effective of Gustavus' army up to twenty-five thousand men.

After having thus yielded to Gustavus, Bogislav could scarcely make his peace with the emperor, though he with good right claimed that the imperial troops had abandoned him. Pomerania was pronounced rebellious, and the cruelties of the imperial forces were redoubled, a fact which added to Gustavus' welcome as a possible deliverer.

About this time there are said to have been several attempts to assassinate the Swedish king, prompted by fanatical Roman Catholics; but such matters have no special interest for us here.

Gustavus' habit was to secure his every step. A notable engineer, he put his knowledge into daily practice. Stettin, in lamentable condition, was at once taken in hand, and its fortifications strengthened according to the best art. Leslie had been ordered to do the like by Stralsund, as well as to fortify Bergen, the chief city of Rügen, to restore the works at the ferry, to erect forts at several important places, to make strong the camp at Peenemünde, and to fortify all the villages on Usedom. Wollin and Cammin opposite were to be placed in a state of good defense; the Divenow to be held by redoubts; and the bridge to the mainland to be rebuilt, and strengthened with a bridge-head.

The works of Stettin were extended to beyond Oderburg, with trenches, redoubts and well-devised lines, and near Oderburg was erected a large camp. In four days, by using the entire laboring population, the work was substantially done, and the army quartered there, except the three garrison regiments in the town.

Gustavus had brought only foot to Stettin. The cavalry —

thirteen companies under Colonel Teuffel — had been ordered to follow with one thousand musketeers, by way of the bridge at Wollin. The march of Teuffel was somewhat delayed; and Gustavus, growing anxious, sent out a scouting party to see what had become of the column. In this party was an officer who had formerly been an imperialist. He now deserted, and gave the enemy all the news he had been able to gather; but though the imperialists broke up on July 23, to intercept Teuffel, this officer headed them off and reached camp in safety.

To celebrate worthily his successful landing Gustavus appointed July 23 as a day of prayer, and it was duly observed throughout the army.

While it is true that Gustavus had strongly established himself on the Oder, there was still a deal left to be desired. The imperialists held the whole country into which he had thus driven a wedge; they extended in a huge semicircle around his position at Stettin, from Colberg on the east, which was held by a big detachment, to Wolgast on the west, where troops were assembling; while the camp which they had established above Stettin, at Garz and Greifenhagen, allowed them to make a diversion on any point along the Oder — say Pölitz, or the mouth of the Ihna — from which they might cut off the Swedes from Stralsund and the Peenemünde camp.

The town of Damm, opposite Stettin, was an important point commanding the east branch of the Oder. On July 22 Gustavus sent Count Brahe with his squadron to seize the place; and this drew within the Swedish lines the entire Oder stream and the mouth of the Plöne River. As an outpost a fort was begun between Stettin and Garz, and large stores were accumulated in Stettin. Damitz was told off to take Stargard, which capitulated after a short struggle. Treptow and Greifenberg were shortly after taken; Damitz seized

Sazig in the beginning of August; and Naugart and Plate were captured. This series of operations gave the Swedes the possession of the territory inclosed by the Oder, Plöne and Rega rivers, and cut Colberg off from Garz and Greifenhagen. Each place taken was strengthened and garrisoned.

In reconnoitring towards Garz on one occasion, Gustavus again subjected himself to undue risk. He rode ahead with an escort of twenty horsemen, followed by a second detachment of seventy, and entering a defile not previously explored, he fell into an ambush, his escort was overpowered, and he himself was captured. His captors did not know him, and as good luck would have it the rear squadron rode up in season to rescue him. It was by mere chance that he had not been cut down.

Gradually the king extended his grasp towards Oxenstiern in Prussia, whom he ordered to send an able officer to occupy the Stolpe country, while he himself proposed to invest Colberg. Rügenwalde, by a lucky accident, was seized by a force of three small Scotch regiments from Pillau, under Colonel Munroe. This body, sent out on another errand, had been shipwrecked; but by a combination of daring and good sense, Munroe contrived to turn ill into good fortune, and seized the town. He won warm commendation from the king.

On the other hand it is related that an enterprising Swedish colonel conceived the project of a sudden attack on an outlying post of the enemy's at Garz; but, not possessing the virtue of silence, his plan leaked out, the enemy heard of it, and the attack was beaten back with loss. Though the officer brought in two stands of colors, the king gave him a sharp reprimand on the score of allowing his plan to become known. No courage or good conduct could excuse an idle tongue, said he.

Quite as important as the closing in on Colberg was to

reach out overland towards Leslie in Stralsund. Gustavus was theoretically well placed, with Oxenstiern on his left and Leslie on his right; but practically he was not certain in his communications with either. Only by water could he surely reach them. The imperialists still held Uckermünde and the Peene country, Anklam, Wolgast and Greifswalde. Especially Anklam was important, as it threatened Usedom, and here, on Gustavus' landing, Savelli had taken up his stand. But the imperialists were lacking in wisdom. Lest Gustavus should advance south from Stettin, the bulk of the forces in the Peene country were drawn into the Garz-Greifenhagen position, and Gustavus ordered Kagg from Usedom to occupy Anklam. So little could he understand the fatuity of the imperialists, that in the same breath he cautioned Kagg against a possible *ruse de guerre*. Anklam was taken and at once fortified; though as the population was not favorable to the Swedes, the work was slow.

Uckermünde was also occupied; and Barth, near Stralsund, fell to Gustavus without effort. Wolgast, one of the very important places, as it held the key to the road from the Swedish camp at Peenemünde to the continent, capitulated to Kniphausen, July 28; but the garrison retired to the castle, and held out with stubborn courage till August 16. Greifswalde seemed no longer tenable for the imperialists; and yet it held out.

The result of these manœuvres was practically to control the coast from Stralsund to Wollin on one side of the Oder mouth, and the shutting in of Colberg on the other.

Still Gustavus' occupation was far from being a perfect one. His main army lay in three detachments: his own at Oderburg and Stettin; Kagg's basing on Usedom, as a link in the chain; Kniphausen's on Peenemünde or Stralsund. Until all three were so placed as to be able to act as one

body, Gustavus would not rest content. Nor would the possession of Anklam suffice. Unless the Swedes held the line of the Tollense, they could scarce present such a front to Savelli as to prevent his puncturing their defense. And though Stolpe alone would not control Farther (eastern) Pomerania, this section might wait. Hither* (western) Pomerania was of greater importance, and this the king set out to occupy.

Such, then, was the first problem before Gustavus could venture on a march to Mecklenburg, which was one of his early projects. Kagg had already got a footing on the Peene, but as the imperialists might at any moment move on him, or on Kniphausen from the Mecklenburg garrisons, because they held the fords over the Tollense at Treptow and Demmin, Gustavus gave Kniphausen instructions to move forward on all places in his front; while Kagg was so to operate as to seize the line of the Tollense and prevent Kniphausen from being taken in flank while he pushed out from Stralsund. The joint operation would forestall reinforcements to the places they might attack.

A small Swedish outpost had already been pushed as far as Clempenow, and on August 12 Savelli, from Greifswalde, where he still was, sent a detachment to watch it. So soon as he heard of the fall of the Wolgast fort, he himself broke up from Greifswalde, and at the head of nearly all his force marched, by way of Demmin, on Clempenow, receiving on the way a reinforcement from Garz. On August 28 he stormed Clempenow. The garrison of barely a hundred men — far too small a force to put where it was — defended itself with true Swedish heroism; nearly the whole number fell; one officer and six men surrendered. This gave Savelli control of the Tollense region, and he at once strengthened Demmin, Loitz and Clempenow, while he garrisoned Trep-

tow, Neu-Brandenburg and Friedland. By this salient, basing on the Tollense and with apex at Greifswalde, the Swedes were thus held back to the coast, and Kniphausen feared that Savelli would push on Anklam.

But Savelli had another idea. It was not so much a strategic success as a momentary triumph he desired. The small and unprotected town of Pasewalk was held by a hundred and fifty Swedes as an outpost to Stettin. It should have been occupied in greater force, but Gustavus felt that he needed all his troops in Oderburg, especially as he was organizing a movement to Mecklenburg, and was reluctant to eat up his aggregate in garrisons. For the moment, indeed, he was in Stralsund; and it is possible that he did not know how small a force there was. Savelli sent to Pasewalk a body of a thousand men, and on a foggy morning in early September the imperialists surprised the place, of whose condition they had learned by the treachery of some townsmen. The citizens who were on duty fled at the first assault; and the Swedes were left to defend themselves in scattered detachments against the overwhelming force. Nothing could be done to save the place. They fell, arms in hand, to the last man, and the town was burned to the ground.

The Swedes and imperialists could boast of about even luck, but the Swedes had illustrated the noble qualities infused into them by their monarch.

On the other side of the Oder, Oxenstiern was at the head of the reserves in Pillau and Elbing. To open proper land communications with him, and to afford safe transportation for reinforcements and victual from there, Cammin and Colberg had still to be taken. The duty of clearing the country between the Oder and the Elbing region was now intrusted to Kniphausen, with whom Oxenstiern coöperated. According to the then military idea, that every strong place should

be either taken or observed before any advance could be made beyond it, this was no easy business.

It had been originally agreed between Bogislav and the imperialists that the two most important fords of the lower Oder, Garz and Greifenhagen, should remain in the hands of the Pomeranian troops. On Gustavus' landing, Conti had forcibly demanded admittance to these places; the commandants yielded, and moving in, Conti strengthened the works, and imagined that he was after a fashion blockading Stettin. Astride the river, he lay strongly intrenched in the Garz camp on the left bank of the Oder, connected with the right bank by a bridge and a bridge-head, whose approaches were covered by the little town of Greifenhagen. Though his strength did not warrant Conti in interfering with the king's operations on the coast line and lower Oder, yet Garz and Greifenhagen were really the gates of Brandenburg, and merely to hold them was a benefit. All Conti pretended to do was to ravage the neighboring country, and to attempt to throw succor into Colberg. At the same time a small imperial force was assembling in western Mecklenburg.

It is no part of our province to detail the fiendish devastation, burning, rapine and murders of the imperial troops. Scarce a valuable within reach escaped these licensed thieves, scarce a woman escaped their lust; not a home but was broken up, not a family but was ruined. The elector of Brandenburg issued an edict calling on all persons to arrest marauders, or, failing ability to do this, to shoot them down. But the peasantry was helpless. What could an unarmed countryman do against prowling ruffians armed to the teeth?

In early August, under Christian William, the dispossessed administrator, who had secretly returned, Magdeburg rose in revolt against the imperial rule and declared in favor of a

Swedish alliance. The uprising was not cleverly managed, nor had Gustavus, unprepared for distant business, desired such early action ; and no sooner had Christian William taken the first step than he called on the Swedes to help him take the second. Gustavus sent him Colonel Falkenberg, with instructions to do all that was possible to put Magdeburg in a state of perfect defense, and hold it for the Protestant cause. The king was preparing to march to Mecklenburg ; but Magdeburg was another thing ; it was but one factor in his larger calculations, not the main objective of a movement. Nor was the road thither open to him. Just now the question of good winter-quarters was occupying his thoughts. To extend his possession of the coast, so as to gain a foothold on the Elbe and parley with Hamburg and Lübeck, was on his programme, but not yet reached. Magdeburg was important, but it was not the one important thing, and it was far removed. Christian William looked at the Swedish plan of campaign from the narrow standpoint of his own interest ; Gustavus kept the whole theatre of war in his eye.



Pikeman of Thirty Years' War.

XIV.

GUSTAVUS ATTACKS THE ENEMY. SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1630.

MECKLENBURG had been given to Wallenstein, and Gustavus proposed to reinstate the dukes, as well as reach out towards Lübeck and Hamburg, Magdeburg, Hesse-Cassel and Lauenburg. He left Horn on the Oder, returned to Stralsund, and headed a column on Rostock and Wismar. He captured Ribnitz, but as the enemy threatened his holdings south of Stralsund, he advanced no further, and returned to his "bastion." Tilly now replaced Wallenstein, whose arrogance had given general dissatisfaction, and hosts of the latter's disbanded men enlisted with the Swedes. The king returned to Stettin, whence he dispersed a large imperial force near Demmin, and shortly after visited the siege of Colberg, from which he had beaten back several relief parties. Though contemplating an advance to the Elbe, he deemed it wise to complete his bastion first, and not to close the year without some handsome stroke; he made careful preparations to attack Greifenhagen and Garz, fell suddenly on them, carried them by storm, and drove the imperialists headlong up the Oder towards Cüstrin. This was a marked success. The king now practically held the entire coast line of Pomerania, and out to East Prussia, and had a wedge firmly driven into Germany along the Oder. His standing for the coming year was good, if only some of the German princes would join him.

So soon as Gustavus had made his base secure, he contemplated a movement into Mecklenburg to restore his cousins, the dukes, whose territory had been given to Wallenstein for his services against northern Germany; to open up connection with the duke of Hesse-Cassel, who, so far, was the only German prince who had volunteered active aid, with the administrator of Magdeburg, who asked for assistance, and with the duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, who promised it. Lübeck and Hamburg were also on his programme; and while the route proposed was not direct, it was the only one he could

pursue without the permission of the electors to cross Brandenburg and Saxony. The king had been up to Wolgast and Stralsund, but had returned early in September.

The imperialists held Wismar and Rostock, towns which Gustavus was anxious to secure, as this route would enable him to provision himself for the winter and to keep the imperial forces from the coast near the lower Oder. Before moving towards Mecklenburg, Gustavus made a reconnoissance to ascertain whether he could push the enemy from Garz. But he found their camp so strong that for the moment he declined the attack. It looks as if it would have been wiser to dispose of the imperial general in his front before undertaking an advance apparently so eccentric as one towards Mecklenburg. But Gustavus saw that as Conti was bound to remain, like a mole, buried within his fortifications, it was safe to disregard him; he recognized the danger in the enemy's holding Rostock and Wismar, which ports were necessary to his scheme for controlling the shore of the Baltic so as to exclude an inimical or even neutral fleet; he believed that a handsome diversion elsewhere would aid eventual operations on the Oder; and he must carefully consider the matter of winter-quarters, for which purpose Mecklenburg was well adapted.

General Gustavus Horn had, in August, brought reinforcements from Finland and Livonia, and him the king left with a large part of the army in Stettin, giving him orders to act on the defensive, forward what reinforcements he could collect, and in case of being attacked by overwhelming odds to retire towards his chief. He might use his time in making a diversion on Greifswalde, which ought to be had before spring, so as to keep communications open between Stettin and Stralsund. Should the Garz army attempt an operation in force towards the king, Horn was to let the Greifswalde project go, and march to his assistance.

The king left Stettin by boat, September 4, with three thousand men, and reached Wolgast the next day. He expected to take over some troops from Teuffel and the Finlanders, and calculated that the "Hamburg" and "Lübeck" regiments, with some forces from Prussia, would give his column not far from nine thousand foot and four thousand horse. But he had pitched his expectations too high. Purposing to move by sea on Rostock, it not only turned out that there were not ships enough, but the reinforcements from Prussia were not at hand; there was a deal of sickness in camp, and supplies and money came in slowly. The enemy was growing stronger in Garz, and Teuffel was needed in Stettin. Worse still, apathy reigned in a population which should have risen *en masse* to welcome Gustavus; the Germans had seen their hope so constantly fail, they had been so woefully ground under the imperial heel, that they dared not afford aid and comfort to their new champion.



It was September 9 when Gustavus reached Stralsund. The troops followed six days later, and were embarked; but rough weather holding them aboard for nearly three weeks, about every sixth man was ill, and the cavalry well-nigh exhausted. Under stress of these adverse circumstances, Gustavus substituted a land invasion for the one by sea, and put his men and material ashore.

From Stralsund the column headed for Mecklenburg, the frontiers of which were stoutly held by Savelli. Passing Barth, the Recknitz was reached, where in the morass made by

the river near its mouth lay the village of Dammgarten, while on the further side of the river, in Mecklenburg, approachable by a ford from Dammgarten, was Ribnitz. The country had been wasted by the imperial forces; so much so that the king was not only called on in many places to distribute corn to the famishing peasantry, but to refrain from victualing in others. He paid in coin for all that the soldiers needed and could collect.

Dammgarten, though possessing a tower of some strength, was held but by ten men, who at once gave it up, and on September 25 General Banér marched in. In Ribnitz were one hundred and fifty foot and two hundred horse, and the ford was protected by a redoubt in the marsh, with a ditch twenty-five feet wide and fifteen feet deep, a palisaded wall, eighty men, and a number of guns. Two smaller redoubts flanked the main one. Expecting the fleet to co-operate in taking Rostock and Wismar, Gustavus had no siege-guns with him; bad weather still kept the ships at Stralsund, and only the light fieldpieces were on hand. To avoid this redoubt, Gustavus threw two pontoon bridges across the river near the mouth, and though the imperial garrison sought to disturb the work, on the 26th it was ready, and next day Gustavus appeared before Ribnitz.

The enemy's horse came out for a skirmish, but meeting a bold front they retired towards Rostock. The foot resisted for a short hour, when the gates were blown open by petards, the place entered, and the imperialists taken prisoners. The heavy guns having arrived, the garrison in the redoubt which had refused to surrender was battered out. A foothold in Mecklenburg was thus obtained, and the troops were given a short rest in Ribnitz.

Here the king learned that the imperial forces were assembling in the Demmin country, where Montecuculi — later so

distinguished — had arrived with a body of horse; and believing that they were about to follow him into Mecklenburg to head off his further advance, he ordered Horn to send him all the troops he could spare, keeping in Stettin and Anklam only what was needed for defense.

Meanwhile on October 2, with one thousand men, Gustavus set out to capture a small but strong fort near Wüstrow, on the inlet known as the Binnensee; next day the garrison surrendered, and the ground so far occupied was duly strengthened.

The imperialists had formerly got possession of Rostock by a ruse. It was guarded only by its citizens, and the imperial troops asked permission to march through the place to save an inconvenient circuit. Once in, they remained, and held the town for Wallenstein. It was a place of importance; this port and Wismar once secured by the Swedes, they would control the entire coast from Stralsund to Lübeck, on the friendship of which city Gustavus placed considerable reliance. Ribnitz was a sort of outwork to Rostock; but the capture of the latter place would consume time; the situation in the Demmin region in the centre of his line appeared to require the king's personal attention more than a siege on an extreme flank; and he renounced his present design upon Rostock and turned to other business.

While Gustavus was threatening Mecklenburg, the imperialists had not been idle. Conti had tried the strength of the Stettin works, but was driven back with a loss of three hundred men; and some slight exchanges occurred between foragers, with attempts on Damm and Gollnow, and on Buchholtz near Damm. To watch Gustavus' operations so as to join him if necessary, and to conduct the small war thus forced upon him, kept Horn busy enough.

Gustavus had a singularly fertile brain, and his correspondence details a variety of plans which from time to time he considered, generally rejecting all but that which was at the moment most available. Though the matter has no bearing on the manœuvres which now ensued, it is interesting to follow out the king's ideas. His general scheme before pushing the imperial army to battle — always his ultimate object — was to stimulate the activity of the friends of the cause, and to encourage the arming of the Protestant population all over the theatre of war. He hoped from available resources, the Netherlands, Prussia, Poland, Livonia, as well as Germany, to increase his aggregate force to seventy or eighty thousand men, not counting allies. With this strength he had considered a specific scheme of moving in five different armies forward from along the whole coast line, Colberg, Stralsund, Lübeck, the Weser and Bremen, in more or less concentric lines, upon the heart of Germany. This was an apparently dangerous division of forces, warrantable only on the assumption that some of these columns would be those of allies whose active aid he could not otherwise hope to obtain, and who would for the time being assist in a negative if not a positive way. In effect it was to be an operation on two lines: one through central Germany and one up the Oder, straight on Vienna.

This five-column plan is spread out in a letter to Oxenstiern from Ribnitz, dated October 8, 1630. Horn and Teuffel, says the king, should have forty-six thousand men, march up the Oder, holding Brandenburg and Silesia; the king with forty-two thousand, the "Royal Army," would base on Pomerania and Mecklenburg; the fourth should be a Magdeburg army of ten thousand men, whose task should be the Elbe country; the Hanse towns, led by the archbishop of Bremen, should coöperate with Hamilton and Leslie, both of whom were

expected to raise considerable forces. These columns, a hundred thousand and over strong, would, thought the king, be sure to compel a peace. This was a sanguine view of the case, and though it was based on a strength which Gustavus was fairly warranted in believing that he could raise during the coming winter, it was perhaps too rose-colored a scheme ; and to do Oxenstiern justice, he saw this aspect of the plan, and told the king that he would find his means unequal to it. The chancellor was, unquestionably, an able man, much more conservative than the king, and his best adviser. His weakness lay in his sometimes leaning towards a defensive policy, and with all his strong sense, he lacked the divine afflatus. His own plan, which in this same month he worked out with a great deal of care, was to garrison Pomerania with twelve thousand men ; to project a column of fourteen or fifteen thousand men along the Oder through Silesia, under Horn ; while the Royal Army should consist of over thirty thousand, and be manœuvred to meet the imperial forces on the Elbe.

The king in this instance gave heed to Oxenstiern's ideas, especially as the late harvest in Sweden had not been up to the usual mark, and taxes lay heavily on the people. His own plan had been but tentatively drawn up ; for, long before it could be inaugurated, there came about a marked change in the existing conditions, very much in his favor, and still he did not attempt to carry it out.

A congress in Ratisbon to devise means to put an end to the war in Germany had been sitting nearly six months, and it ended, in November, 1630, in the emperor's investing Count Tilly with supreme command in the place of Wallenstein, against whom the Catholic potentates had conceived a great prejudice, for his unmeasured assumption and the utter license of his troops. The result of this change was that a large part of the army, enlisted for service under Wallenstein's

personal command, was disbanded, and the total imperial forces were reduced to some seventy thousand men, of which the bulk were in southwestern Germany, or engaged in the war in Italy. Thus in the early part of the German campaign, the emperor was unable to meet Gustavus' invasion with sufficient forces. Considerable numbers of these disbanded men enlisted under Gustavus' banner; and it is as wonderful a thing to say of the king that he made good soldiers of men spoiled by Wallenstein's fearful indiscipline, as to tell of Hannibal that he made out of the riff-raff of southern Italy soldiers who could stand up against the legions of Marcellus and Nero. Thus reinforcements came from an unexpected quarter; and Falkenberg's men began to come forward from Holland. Had Gustavus intended a definite adherence to the five-column plan, he would have been in better shape to carry it out than in October he could have hoped to be.

It appears singular to us that upon the displacement of Wallenstein the disbanding of substantially all the imperial army should follow. But the method of raising troops at that day was peculiar. Wallenstein no doubt had, with each regimental commander, a personal contract under which the latter served and received pay for himself and his men; and this contract fell when Wallenstein ceased from command. Many who had been in the imperial service before may have remained as a nucleus of a fresh army; many may have been sent in small bodies to other armies; but most of the men were mustered out with their general, and were at liberty to enlist where they would. It was all one to them.

The chief complaint made by every member of the Congress of Ratisbon was the ill behavior of Wallenstein's forces, from whose depredations friends and foes alike had suffered; and after his dismissal, orders were issued to keep the men under severe restraint; but troops which have once enjoyed

a loose rein cannot be fully brought in hand ; and Germany was never freed from the worst horrors of war until her territory was occupied by Gustavus ; nor indeed after the king's death was humanity in war an element recognized by his successors, or if recognized, enforced.

At the time of Wallenstein's dismissal, it is said that Gustavus approached him through Count Thurn to negotiate for his services ; but this will be referred to later.

Gustavus definitively gave up his five-column scheme. He was not ready to launch out on so broad a manœuvre. Taught by the apathy of the Protestant princes, his caution came to the surface, as in his German campaigns it so often and so felicitously did ; he choked down the Vasa recklessness,—as Charles XII. was never able to do,—and concluded to narrow his operations to the completion of his bastion, to concentrate instead of parcelling out his forces, and for the nonce to operate on some point in the Tollense line. This looks like a marked descent from his larger scheme ; but it was just this caution, method, exactness, which Gustavus was to teach the world. His base was not yet perfectly secure, and he delayed bolder operations until he should have made it so. We shall see him in rapid action before many months. He selected Demmin as his objective, and left Banér with some three or four thousand troops to blockade the place, and to hold the territory between it and the Recknitz River, while he returned to Stettin with four thousand men. Shortly after, learning that six thousand troops under Savelli had marched to the relief of Demmin, he broke up thither with a force of four thousand men, met the imperialists in the vicinity of the place, engaged them, and, by the greater mobility of the Swedish infantry and its dashing courage, defeated and drove them back to Rostock with loss of their entire artillery and train and many standards.

Here again was a brilliant feat of arms, the details and the exact locality even of which are unknown. Records were ill kept in this era. Were it not that the bare facts are sufficiently vouched for by the Swedish dispatches and the imperial records, we should be tempted to set down some of these successes as mere paper-victories. But Gustavus was quite free from that particular weakness which induces a man to claim a victory or hide a defeat. His mind was too comprehensive to seek for such adventitious aid. It is we who lose by not knowing the details; the victor himself loses nothing.

Gustavus returned to Stettin. During his absence Schaumburg, the successor of Conti, had made a further useless attempt to take Stettin, and had then sent a force to release Colberg from the Swedish blockade. At the moment, this was one of the most important places along the coast. The king's initial plan was to extend his base so as to include the whole Baltic shore, much as Alexander deemed the whole east coast of the Mediterranean essential as a base from which to advance into Persia. The Swedes already held a goodly part of the shore line, and Colberg, a strong fortress, was indispensable to complete it. The operations so far had isolated the town, and cut it off from Garz; but so long as it was held by an imperial garrison, it threatened the left flank of the Swedish line, as well as communications with Oxenstiern in Prussia; and even Gustavus was not yet free from the prejudice of the day with regard to fortresses.

Colberg was held by Colonel Mörs, and blockaded by Colonel Sperreuter. On September 23 the imperialists at Garz sent five companies of cavalry to make their way into the place; but Horn heard of their presence, headed them off, and compelled them to return by a long circuit. The garrison feared its ability to hold out.

Kniphausen, who was now in charge of the Colberg region, expected to operate mainly with troops to come from Oxenstiern. Towards the end of October Horn ascertained from deserters and scouts that a marked stir in Garz indicated a movement in force towards Colberg. He strengthened Gollnow, and sent word to Kniphausen to hurry forward the oncoming Prussian troops to Belgard or Cörlin, and occupy the line of the Persante. Kniphausen was active. He made Schievelbein the rallying-point of all arriving troops, and threw several companies into it; but the Prussian troops were much delayed.

On November 7 Horn got news of the actual march of a heavy column from Garz in the direction of Colberg. Delaying a day lest the manœuvre should be a mere feint to lure him from Stettin, Horn marched by Gollnow and Greifenberg to Treptow. Instructed of his purpose, Kniphausen, still on the Persante, left a suitable force under Colonel Hepburn to hold this position, cautioned Sperreuter to stand firm, and contain the garrison of Colberg, and himself marched to Treptow, which he reached November 10. From here the two Swedish generals moved to Rossentin near Colberg to await the enemy.

The imperialists had made a big circuit to avoid detection, and on the night of November 10 their column reached Schievelbein. Here Colonel Munroe held head against their attack, and they swerved off towards Colberg. Keeping out his patrols, Horn was well advised of their movements, and they advanced until they found that Horn stood athwart their path. Discouraged, they turned to retire, but Horn followed and gave them battle. A heavy fog prevented the possibilities of good management, and after desultory fighting, Horn, who had accomplished his aim, fell back to the Persante, and the imperialists towards their base, their

attempt to relieve Colberg having proven a dismal failure. Lest in his absence his camp should be attacked, Horn then returned to Stettin by the direct road.

The movements of the Swedes in Mecklenburg and Pomerania had so far been parts of one great whole. From Ribnitz Gustavus was reaching out towards Lübeck and projecting an operation towards the Elbe. The duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, a small principality on the lower Elbe, was preparing to join him, while Magdeburg, further up the river, stood as an allied outpost in front of this right flank. As Gustavus progressed with his movement on Ribnitz, Magdeburg loomed up in his mind as a suitable point on the Elbe for him to occupy in force. But it was not to be. Christian William, the administrator, was unfortunately not the man to second Gustavus' broad plan, even in so far as his one city fitted into it; and Lauenburg proved too weak to accomplish his aim. After a short period of success the latter succumbed to Pappenheim in a battle at Ratzburg, — a failure that drew the fire of Lübeck, which had been recruiting for the king. These new factors in the problem made it doubtful whether Gustavus could accomplish any strategic good by pushing forward to the Elbe at the present moment. To entertain an army might be difficult, as the season was getting late, and the financial question was not an easy one. Troops and material arrived slowly from Prussia, and an advance meant to consume large forces for garrisons. The enemy had reinforced the troops in Mecklenburg, and to advance would open to attack the newly conquered bastion. Already somewhat reduced by labor and sickness, the army ought soon to be given its winter rest.

As he could place no reliance on German aid, Gustavus was convinced that he must concentrate his efforts. Yet his instinct as a soldier called on him to end the campaign by

some stroke worthy of his reputation. It was as much a matter of moral effect as of material gain that he was aiming to compass, to show that the Snow King had come to Germany on no child's errand. But how? By advancing towards the Elbe he could make no sensible gain, and not to win was of itself failure. On studying the entire situation, he determined to return to Stettin, to draw the enemy from Garz and beat him in the field, or to attack him where he stood. Kniphausen still held for the advance to the Elbe. Horn and Teuffel were of Gustavus' opinion, but they counseled speed, lest the enemy should retire to Frankfort and intrench his winter-quarters.

Gustavus had returned to Stralsund. Oxenstiern was ordered to forward cavalry as soon as possible; Kniphausen was drawn on for troops for Stettin; Banér was to complete the works near Ribnitz, garrison it, and then join Gustavus; the infantry to be sent via Wolgast to Horn; Gustavus himself, with the cavalry, would march to Stargard, be joined by Sperreuter and the Prussian cavalry, making a total of thirteen thousand five hundred foot and six thousand horse, and with these the king purposed to move on Garz.

All this was admirably planned. But Oxenstiern wrote that he could only send the Prussian troops by detachments, and Kniphausen reported that he could scarce spare a hundred men. For a moment Gustavus was uncertain what to do; then his courage rose to the occasion, and he determined to go on with the plan, be his force more or less.

It was at this time that he heard of the enemy's failure to relieve Colberg. On November 16 he reached Greifenberg, and here Horn, Kniphausen and Baudissin were ordered for consultation. As a result, Horn was instructed to remain near Colberg; Banér and Ake Tott were drawn in from Mecklenburg to reinforce him; Gustavus returned to Stettin.

On November 21 he reached the city, and heard sundry rumors of a renewed attempt on Colberg. He scarcely believed this probable, for the enemy, after the late experience, would be unapt to break up with a small force, and a large one would at this season have difficulty in victualing; but he notified Horn to instruct the population along the probable route to drive their cattle to a place of safety. The imperialists, however, were contemplating a movement, in the belief that the Swedes would not expect one. So soon as Gustavus satisfied himself of the fact, he ordered Horn from Greifenberg down to the line of the Ihna, to take up a position between Stargard and Gollnow and hold the fords, and to draw, if essential, from Banér's and Dargess' troops. On December 1, while Horn was carrying out his instructions, he received new ones from Gustavus, who had ascertained that the proposed movement was delayed or postponed, that only five or six thousand foot remained in Garz, and that, owing to scant forage, the cavalry had been cantoned in various villages on the east side. Here was an opportunity for a stroke. Gustavus could either collect his cavalry and fall smartly on the enemy's scattered horse; or he could call in from Horn all available forces, join them to his own, and with this column attack the depleted Garz intrenchments. He summoned Horn, Kniphausen and Baudissin to Gollnow for a conference.

Gustavus was one of the men who belies the old military saw that a council of war never fights. Having sought the opinion of his marshals and thus become familiar with all the facts, he himself decided, and always for a vigorous policy.

It is not usual to detail the to and fro manœuvres of troops under the orders and counter-orders given by the commanding general as the kaleidoscopic game changes under his eye; only the marches or attacks finally decided on are wont to be

mentioned, while the intermediate period, during which the commander is fencing to discover his enemy's weak guard, is ignored ; but it is interesting now and then to enter into even petty details ; for all operations, however large, are made up of these, and it is the general who gauges accurately the meaning of the information brought in by his scouts, and who then orders skillfully, that succeeds on the chessboard of war.

Gustavus was by no means certain of the outcome of the attack he proposed to deliver ; but to make provision for an unsuccessful result and then to put his whole soul into the work was natural to his character. He had determined that the campaign should not end until he had forced a battle on the enemy, but he recognized the dangers which might follow failure. Like all his utterances, his letter dated December 5, to John Casimir, commending Sweden and his own wife and daughter to his care in case of disaster, is affecting. And his instructions to the Swedish people were to the last degree explicit. When Tott and Banér were ordered away from Stralsund, Generals Sten Bjelke, Rynnig and Soop were left in joint command, — a curious division of authority which largely obtained all through the era of which we are treating. Eighteen hundred and fifty men were left in Stralsund, and Anklam, Wollin, Cammin, Ueckermünde, Barth and Ribnitz each had a garrison, — the total of garrisons in places already captured running up to ten thousand six hundred men. To these joint commanders Gustavus gave orders, in case of disaster, to look well to Stralsund, — so that it might be at all hazards kept safe for Sweden. Should they need it, they were at liberty to draw in some or all of the garrisons of adjoining towns ; but they were in no case to lose courage or to give up Stralsund. The command in Stettin, where forty-four hundred men were left in garrison, was given to Colonels Carl Banér and Leslie. Early in December the available troops

were got together ; Tott's and Banér's regiments were ordered in from west Pomerania, Horn's corps and other troops from east Pomerania. Some twenty-five hundred horse came from Prussia and, added to the force from Stettin, the king collected eight thousand foot and six thousand horse, ten siege-guns, each drawn by twenty-four horses, and a number of field-pieces. Part of the force was to go by land from Damm, where they rendezvoused, part by water on the fleet, which had been all along lying in the Oder at Stettin ; and after careful inspection, on December 24 the start was made, and Gustavus set out to drive the enemy from his intrenchments.

That the imperial forces in Garz were in a wretched plight from cold and hunger, and in a worse state of discipline, — actually in no condition at this season to withstand the Swedish army, — justified the selection by the king of this moment for moving upon them, though he had no entirely reliable evidence to go upon, but rather judged from his military experience and instincts. It was in truth so. Count Schaumberg, the new commander of the imperial forces on the Oder, gave to his chief, Tilly, the most distressing reports of the condition of the army, in which, said he, there were not over four thousand footmen fit for service. The cavalry was better, but half was dismounted and all inefficient. He begged for an inspector who should report the state of the forces turned over to him by Conti, and with which he was held to show results. It was the lack of victual which had driven him to send away the horse to the outlying districts, even so far as the Neumark. In the Swedish camp matters were on a better footing. The home troops were in good shape ; the newer recruits were getting into order ; all were warmly clad, fairly well fed, full of an excellent spirit, and in condition for any work. The difference between the old system and that introduced by Gustavus was pronounced.

Colonel di Capua held Greifenhagen with some thousand men; the rest lay in the camp at Garz. Schaumburg began already to think of retreat to Landsberg to defend the line

of the Warta. He harbored fears that both it and Frankfort might fall, and his retreat to Silesia be cut off, but he did not feel warranted in leaving his post without instructions from Tilly. He did not anticipate an immediate attack; and his position was good though his troops were not.



The Attack on Garz.

Greifenhagen lay on low ground between the Reglitz

and a line of hills which slope down towards it. These hills command the town, which had only a wall of no great strength, with a few towers but no flanking bastions, and a dry ditch protected by another light wall.

The route of the Swedes lay along both sides of the Oder, and the army was accompanied by the flotilla and a flying bridge, to keep up connection between the separated wings. Marching on the right bank, the Swedish van reached Greifenhagen late in the evening, and after a smart skirmish, drove the imperialists within walls. Don Capua had no idea that Gustavus with his entire army was upon him; he looked on

the body as a mere reconnoissance. The Swedes camped overnight in a wood near by. Next morning all joined in a solemn Christmas-day service, and the attack was begun. Some of the siege-guns were hauled up to the highest hill, not a musket-shot distant from the town, and, protected by an infantry detachment, opened fire. In a short while a breach was made, and the king in person headed the assaulting party. Twice the Swedes were driven back, but on the third attempt the imperialists gave ground, and Don Capua, who had behaved with gallantry, was forced to turn from the fierce onslaught. But Leslie lay in wait in the rear of the imperialists, on the Oder, aboard the boats, and by a heavy fire drove them back on the Swedish line of musketry. Thus hemmed in, the entire force surrendered. Gustavus' loss was small; that of the enemy was reported between one and two hundred. Startled from his fancied security, Schaumberg made up his mind to summary retreat, if possible towards west Pomerania to join the imperial forces on the Tollense, where, by a vigorous push, he might make the Swedes nervous as to their communications, and thus draw the fire of their advance up the Oder.

Next day Gustavus broke up early and marched along the right bank towards Marwitz, near by which a fort protected the bridge to Garz. This bridge-head had a deep wet ditch and was strongly held. The king anticipated resistance, and the army marched on the place in order of battle. But the garrison did not even wait their coming. So soon as the van of horse put in its appearance, they withdrew over the bridge, burned it, and took up a position in a work on the further side. Out of this they were driven by the Swedish artillery, and thence retired to Garz.

Schaumberg no longer delayed; he could not reach west Pomerania, for the Swedes on the left bank were upon him.

He burned the Oder bridge at Garz, threw his guns into the marsh, destroyed so far as he was able the public buildings, gates and defenses, as well as the victual he could not carry off, and marched hastily away to the south, putting the torch to every village on the route, and leaving scarce a spear of grass behind.

Cavalry under Baudissin was sent in pursuit, which captured much material, said to have included three hundred wagons full of plunder; and detachments were hurried on towards Cüstrin and Landsberg to cut the enemy off from the fords and bridges there. Following to Pyritz, Gustavus drove out the garrison, which fled headlong; and Schaumberg retired rapidly up the left bank to Frankfort, and marched part of his forces to Landsberg on the Warta, to hold the line of that important river. The Swedes followed them up, and in several rear-guard combats inflicted considerable loss upon them, badly cutting up four of the best imperial regiments. The king headed direct for Landsberg, and it was lucky for the town that he did not know that it was in bad case, with few troops, empty magazines, twelve guns, and only eight or nine hundred-weight of powder. Ignorant of the facts, Gustavus did not attack; moreover his men were weary, it was bitter cold, his own victual was getting short, and he feared imperial concentration on the line of the Warta, which would prevent his holding Landsberg, if taken. He retired to Königsberg in the Neumark, where he rested his troops, calling on Horn with the foot and Tott with the cavalry to follow up and complete the rout; while Leslie on the left bank should advance inland and seize Löcknitz, Prenzlau and the Uckermark. Patrols were set along the river as far up as Schwedt. To be ready for further operations, if these should be forced upon him, Gustavus called for all available troops from Oxenstiern and Horn.

Though the king's army had been much the better and the opposition had been weak, it cannot be denied that he had won a brilliant advantage. He had driven the enemy out of good intrenchments, at that day considered a distinguished feat of arms, and although the operations were neither bloody nor on a vast scale, they redounded greatly to his credit. All Germany rang with his praises ; in Vienna "they shook with fear."



"Advance Pikes ! "

XV.

WINTER-QUARTERS AT BÄRWALDE. JANUARY, 1631.

GUSTAVUS had as yet no idea of the petty jealousies of the German princes. He had every right to expect the elector of Brandenburg to stand by him. But George William felt more bound to the emperor than to his religion; he aimed at neutrality, but allowed the imperial troops what he denied the Swedes. Gustavus built a fortified camp at Bärwalde, and housed his troops. Here Richelieu made a treaty to pay him for keeping thirty-six thousand troops in Germany, all mutual friendly states to have due protection, and no violent upheavals to be made. Tilly was on the Weser. On hearing of the capture of Garz, he started towards the Oder, but shortly returned and undertook, with Pappenheim, the siege of Magdeburg. The Protestants held a convention in Leipsic, and though Gustavus was in Germany at the request of many of them, there was no mention of the king in their deliberations. Anxious to complete his base on the Oder before he moved to the Elbe, Gustavus sought to aid Magdeburg by threatening Frankfort, so as to draw Tilly away from there, and in February Tilly marched to the Oder. Some slight manœuvring took place, but no serious operations, except that Tilly compelled the Swedes to raise the siege of Landsberg. Gustavus determined to draw him from the Oder into the open country.

GUSTAVUS' trials were about to begin. The military problem was difficult enough; but as yet the king had no idea of the complex network of paltry prides and jealousies, of private grudges and selfish interests, in which he would now be caught, and which would seriously hamper his best efforts. It is wonderful that he had the courage to enter upon any campaign in Germany, after tasting the difficulties which from the start beset him; it is doubly wonderful that within two years he should have reduced to possession the whole land.

George William, the drowsy elector of Brandenburg, had repeatedly exchanged embassies with Gustavus, but not to offer assistance; his one aspiration was to save his dominions from invasion. Neutrality was his only thought; despite which he allowed the passage of Schaumberg's fleeing forces through his fortress of Cüstrin, — of itself the baldest breach of neutrality. Gustavus demanded equal passage. The elector was between the devil and the deep sea. He must offend either Gustavus or the emperor; and either was able to visit him with condign punishment. He began early in January with a declination to allow Gustavus to pass Cüstrin, on a number of trivial pretexts, mainly his duty to the empire; the king answered by demanding actual possession of the fortress, instead of free passage; the elector must not, said Gustavus, shield the imperialists and prate of neutrality. Though Gustavus was long-suffering, when he acted it was without fear, favor or affection; but it was difficult to say how far he might trench on the rights of Brandenburg, lest he should force George William into open enmity. He needed him as a friend; he must keep him at least neutral.

The imperialists had reassembled twelve thousand men in Frankfort, and as the elector persisted in denying the Swedes a passage through Cüstrin, Gustavus, unwilling to advance with this fortress and Landsberg in his rear, for the moment pocketed his wrath, and took up quarters at Schwedt, and at Bärwalde, on the right bank of the Oder, at which latter place he constructed an intrenched camp, and housed his main force. He repaired the Garz works in order to keep open his Oder line; blockaded Landsberg with four thousand men under Tott; and sent out detachments to clean Brandenburg of the isolated plundering bands of imperialists which were overrunning the country and harassing a friendly population. He would have been glad to push on and relieve Magdeburg

from Pappenheim's blockade ; but his Swedes needed rest ; it was winter ; his new recruits had to be got into shape ; and, above all, his base was not yet free from danger. Should he march to the Elbe, his line of operation would be open to interruption by the imperialists from Frankfort ; and indeed, in the present tone of the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, he could not venture to cross their territory.

Gustavus had good reason for self-gratulation. In six months the Swedes had advanced from the seacoast to the line of the Warta, leaving in the emperor's possession, within the line covered by the Trebel-Tollense-Ucker, only Demmin and Greifswalde, and east of the Oder only Colberg ; these places were blockaded by his forces, and Banér lay on the frontier of Mecklenburg with four thousand men.

It is true that Gustavus had secured so easy a triumph against no well-organized resistance. Conti had been distinctly unskillful ; and what with Wallenstein dismissed and his forces disbanding, with Tilly far off in the Weser country, seeking to gather Wallenstein's men into the fold of the League, though the aggregate of the enemy had been large, only isolated garrisons and weak divisions had been on hand to oppose him. He had encountered more political than military opposition. With the true soldier's ardor, he had hoped for a battle ; but not only had he met no real army in the field to outmanœuvre and beat ; it took many weary months to force Tilly to the point of risking his master's cause in a general engagement.

In the camp at Bärwalde Gustavus lay in the early weeks of 1631, busying himself with recruitment and discipline, to prepare his men for more vigorous measures in the spring, and with urging the Protestant princes to concerted action. He issued a proclamation to all who had fled from imperial cruelties to return, and many did so. Contributions on the

country were regularly levied and paid for. Billeted soldiers were forbidden to ask more than bed, the right to cook at the general fire, salt, and vinegar to correct the bad quality of the water of the plains.

To win the elector of Brandenburg's active help, Gustavus used his best endeavors, but this Protestant sovereign, and brother-in-law of the king, preferred an ignominious neutrality; and — more discreditable still — the head of the Lutherans in Germany, John George of Saxony, simply ignored Gustavus' advances. Such was the attitude of the men the king had come to aid. In George William's case it was hebetude; in John George's it was jealousy.

To counterbalance this, there was one real cause of congratulation. Richelieu plainly desired to coöperate with Gustavus. Former negotiations had failed, owing to certain formalities on which both parties could not agree. But on January 23, 1631, Gustavus and Louis XIII. concluded a five years' treaty, by which the king of Sweden agreed to maintain thirty thousand infantry and six thousand horse in Germany, against a payment of three hundred thousand livres (five livres equaled two rix dollars) for the past year's expenses, and a future annual subvention of a million livres, payable May 15 and November 15, in Paris or Amsterdam, at Gustavus' option.

The other terms of the treaty contemplated protection of mutual friends and of the Baltic, the freedom of commerce, and generally the restitution of the *status quo ante bellum*. In conquered territory Gustavus agreed to respect certain laws of the empire, and not to disturb the Catholic religion where he found it duly established. The treaty was to be open for any princes to join who desired to coöperate in the common cause. With Bavaria and the League neutrality or friendship should be maintained, if they would do their part.

Count Tilly, now in supreme command of the imperial forces, lay on the Weser awaiting reinforcements from Italy and recruits from the League. Though he knew how worthless were his lieutenants and troops on the Oder and the coast, he took no action to direct or relieve them. A slow, old-fashioned soldier, not able, if measured by the high standard, yet not without marked capacity in his way, Tilly was noted for never having lost a great battle. He had always waited for the advantage to be on his side before engaging; but he was far behind the times in dealing with such an antagonist as Gustavus. Count Pappenheim had repeatedly urged his chief to head off the Swedes in overrunning the land, but to no avail. Tilly would not move till he got ready.

Out of this inert mood he was rudely startled by the disaster to Schaumberg, who wrote that he had saved a bare four thousand foot and an equal number of horse; and that it would be lucky if he could hold Frankfort and Landsberg, for the king was aiming at the roads to Silesia, and his own men were down-hearted to the last degree. On receiving Schaumberg's first intelligence, Tilly had broken camp; on January 9 he was in Halberstadt; January 13, in Calbe. His lax habit had lost him Garz and Greifenhagen.

The Protestant princes, in the beginning of February, 1631, assembled in Leipsic at the invitation of the elector of Saxony. There were represented the houses of Saxony, Brandenburg and Hesse, and some smaller principalities, as well as all the free towns. This body was convened to devise measures for withstanding the imperial tyranny, but it actually accomplished nothing, and it is a marvelous fact that in their deliberations, which lasted two months, Gustavus was not even mentioned. The tone of the convention was given by the elector of Saxony, who still deemed it possible, by simple appeals to Ferdinand and without war, to bring back matters

to their original basis and to reconcile the Protestant and Catholic claims. The convention acted as if Germany was in a state of profound peace, instead of almost on the eve of political and social disruption. Except for what was said by William of Hesse, not a voice was raised which fairly represented the disturbance which prevailed. In answer to all the advances of Gustavus, only a timid outside intimation was conveyed to him that, under favorable conditions and on his own pledges to do and to refrain from doing all manner of uncertain things, the friendship and good-will of the Evangelical principalities might perhaps be extended to him. John George still believed Gustavus to be an unessential factor in the problem, and still hoped that he could sway obstinate, high-handed Ferdinand by meekly worded correspondence. For all the Protestant body paid any heed to him or his doings, Gustavus might as well have remained quietly in Sweden. Such were his German friends.

Meanwhile, the imperial forces had been winning some successes in the Elbe country. Christian William, in the late summer of 1630, had armed Magdeburg, Halberstadt and other neighboring towns, had driven the imperial forces from the region, and carried on an assiduous small war. But his success was short-lived. Pappenheim, with seventeen thousand men, having, as already narrated, surrounded the duke of Lauenburg and captured his army on the lower Elbe, returned and blockaded Magdeburg in September.

This was not the first attack on this proud Hanse city. In the summer of 1629 Wallenstein, engaged in enforcing the Edict of Restitution, had laid siege to it, but mindful of the failure at Stralsund and of his own reputation, had accepted a ransom of one hundred thousand dollars, and left in September. Magdeburg then patched up a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the other League towns,—Ham-

burg, Lübeck, Bremen, Brunswick and Hildesheim. In June, 1630, the ex-administrator got possession of the place, and made the treaty already mentioned with Gustavus in August, by which the king agreed to have a heed to the city in all its dangers, to defend it without cost, never to forsake it, or to conclude any peace in which it was not protected. No sooner was this treaty made than Pappenheim appeared before it, and opened his lines.

The fact that such a treaty was made, and the additional fact that Magdeburg was captured and sacked before Gustavus could reach it, have been made the text of many accusations against the Swedish king. It is a common allegation that before this disaster could occur, Gustavus was bound to march to the relief of the city. This is a charge easily made; but there were many considerations for the king to weigh. He had but half won his base on the sea or the Oder, and he might not lightly prejudice it. Until he could, beyond a peradventure, command the Oder from the line of the Warta north, and the entire territory back of the Trebel-Tollense line, he was scarcely justified in advancing inland. According to all reports from Magdeburg, and to all military probabilities, the city could hold out against Pappenheim indefinitely, and, if Tilly joined him, against both for two or three months. The king had small doubt that he could keep Tilly in the Oder country by threatening Frankfort, the loss of which would open the road through Silesia directly to the hereditary possessions of the emperor. He was in constant communication with Magdeburg, and thought he knew whereof he spoke, and his letters to Falkenberg show his feelings in the matter with perfect clearness. Despite all that may be said, it remains true that Gustavus did what was humanly possible to succor Magdeburg. He may not have foreseen all the difficulties in his path when he made the

treaty, but he was fairly justified in assuming that Magdeburg could resist a longer siege, and that it would not be (as it was) treacherously surrendered by the imperial party within its walls; he sent one of his best officers to take command, and money to raise troops; and he received credible information that Tilly was on the point of abandoning the siege, as he actually was on the eve of the storm. Still more to the point, Gustavus could hardly anticipate the unreasoning opposition of Brandenburg and Saxony; he had the best of reasons for believing that he would have forced the enemy to battle long before Magdeburg should weaken; and he was actually within a short march of the city when it was taken. It is not worth while, in view of Gustavus' life-work, to combat the statement that he deliberately abandoned Magdeburg to her fate. If any accusation be brought against him, it should be for miscalculation of what he could accomplish while Magdeburg held out. All this anticipates the narration of the facts, but it is well to bear the matter in mind, in order to appreciate the king's operations between the date of the treaty and the fall of Magdeburg.

In February, 1631, the main imperial army under Tilly finally made its appearance in Gustavus' front. The aged and rather inert generalissimo had been at fault in not sooner sustaining his forces on the Oder, but he was unused to the winter operations to which the Snow King's activity had forced him. After his ineffectual start for the Oder, he had been tempted to move to the assistance of Pappenheim at Magdeburg; but when he heard how hard pressed Schaumberg was, Tilly began to fear for Silesia, should the line of the Warta be lost; so he abandoned the Magdeburg scheme and crossed the Elbe at Dessau. Then via Treuenbrietzen and Saarmund, some twenty thousand strong, he marched on Frankfort, which he reached January 18, 1631. This gave the imperialists thirty-

four thousand men. Gustavus had succeeded in helping Magdeburg by drawing Tilly from its gates.

From Frankfort, leaving a garrison of five hundred of his best troops in the place, Tilly marched to Landsberg, and compelled the Swedes to raise the siege and fall back to the main camp at Bärwalde. The sturdy old warrior gave certain indications of a readiness to draw the king, who had but twenty-five thousand men and many of these detached, from his intrenched camp to a battle in the open; but he did not choose to assault the Bärwalde works, nor was a special offer of battle made. Gustavus was engrossed with the Mecklenburg problem. Until he should quite clear the imperialists out of the territory near the coast, he could not be satisfied of its security; and to sustain Magdeburg in her courageous defense, he must advance from a base which could not be threatened. The antagonism of Brandenburg and Saxony made this all the more true. There was another idea lurking in Gustavus' mind: that a threat towards the towns still held by the enemy in Mecklenburg would draw Tilly thither from the Frankfort region, and afford him an opportunity to return and capture this city and Landsberg out of hand. These strong places were essential to the operations he contemplated between the Elbe and the Oder, but he could scarcely hope to get hold of them so long as Tilly was within their walls. And by luring Tilly to follow him, he might so manœuvre as to get a chance of battle in the open, or of catching the imperial army at a disadvantage, while not affording the enemy an occasion to return to Magdeburg.



Swiss Pikehead. (15th Century.)

XVI.


GUSTAVUS AND TILLY MANŒUVRE. FEBRUARY TO APRIL, 1630.

WITH twelve thousand men Gustavus moved into the Demmin region. Tilly slowly followed on a southerly route. The king captured Demmin and several minor towns. Colberg shortly fell, and only Greifswalde held out within his bastion. He contemplated a movement on the Elbe, but Tilly showed signs of attacking his lines, and the king feared he might break through. Instead of so large a scheme, Tilly took Neu-Brandenburg, and, massacring the garrison, retired towards Magdeburg. Gustavus believed that a sharp threat on Frankfort would again draw Tilly away from this ally, and in March, with fourteen thousand men and a large force of guns, he advanced up the Oder. Cüstrin fell, and Frankfort was taken by storm, with a number of general officers. This was a brilliant exploit, and for his lesson in audacity modern war is indebted to the Swedish king. Advancing on Landsberg, the place surrendered. The bastion was thus pushed forward to the Warta, and the road to Vienna was open. Such a situation should have called Tilly away from Magdeburg. Had not Gustavus felt it his duty to relieve the city, he might have advanced directly on the emperor. Tilly did indeed start to the relief of Frankfort, but being too late, headed back to Magdeburg. The Swedish holding was now a semicircle from Mecklenburg to Prussia, with a chain of strong places all the way, Frankfort in the centre.

IN pursuance of his design to entice Tilly away from the Oder, Gustavus left Horn in a camp at Soldin, with six cavalry and six infantry regiments fronting towards the Warta, and under orders to hold the enemy to the Landsberg-Cüstrin line; not to risk an engagement, but to act defensively against superior forces; and to seize Frankfort and Landsberg if the opportunity offered. Horn's reserves would lie in Pyritz, Stargard and Gollnow, so as to protect the Oder, the Neumark and eastern Pomerania. Should the enemy

go into winter-quarters, Horn might attack Landsberg and Driesen, the two most important points on the line of the Warta-Netze.

On January 26 Gustavus himself set out with six cavalry and four infantry regiments, plus some Stettin battalions, in all twelve thousand men. Kniphausen, who commanded in the Stralsund region and was now besieging Greifswalde, was sent orders to be ready to join the king. Marching by way of Stettin, where he crossed the Oder, past Löcknitz, which he took, Pasewalk and Waldeck, Gustavus left a small garrison in Prenzlau. At Neu-Brandenburg the imperialists capitulated February 2, and were paroled. The small garrison of Treptow retired lest it should be taken prisoner, and



Clempenow was captured a day or two later. To hold these towns protected the proposed siege of Demmin. It was cold winter weather, but the possession of western Pomerania was too important to delay till spring.

Demmin, anciently a strong place, had been repaired by the imperialists. It was the apex of

the Peene-Trebel-Tollenze region. Savelli held it with seventeen hundred men, while in Loitz, near by, lay six hundred more, and fifteen hundred in Greifswalde. Demmin was easy to fortify, and art had been called to the aid of nature. It was surrounded by a bastioned earthwork with a wide wet ditch and glacis; and the vicinity was commanded by a field-work inclosing a strong tower, north of the town, on the left

bank of the Peene and surrounded by the morass made by the river. Tilly had told Savelli that he must hold the place at least fourteen days, as he had supplies and ammunition in abundance. That the marsh was frozen helped the besiegers somewhat. In addition to ordering Kniphausen to join him at Demmin with all his available foot and some siege-guns, the king had instructed Baudissin to march to Treptow with his cavalry; and with eight hundred musketeers he went forward to reconnoitre Demmin. Torstenson with the artillery was to follow to Clempenow.

The king saw that Loitz had first to be taken, for it stood like a detached work on the left bank of the Peene, and possessed a castle of some strength. This was accomplished, Savelli was cut off from Greifswalde, and the road from Stralsund was opened for Kniphausen, whom the king again admonished to bring his batteries.

Tilly met this march of Gustavus by leaving Schaumberg in the vicinity of Frankfort with eight thousand men, and starting himself with twenty thousand for Mecklenburg. Perturbed at the situation, he had delayed some time. If he left Frankfort, he feared that Horn would seize on Landsberg; if he stayed, that Gustavus would advance across the Havel on Magdeburg. Finally he chose the least dangerous course and set out early in February. He could break through Gustavus' lines at Prenzlau, Neu-Brandenburg, or some point on the Trebel-Recknitz, if he wanted to go to the relief of Greifswalde; or he could march straight to the Havel, if he proposed to attack Magdeburg. His course was plain. During the ensuing manœuvres Tilly was seeking to draw Gustavus away from Frankfort and the open road to Silesia, as well as to prevent his marching to the relief of Magdeburg; and Gustavus' aim was to keep Tilly from adding his army to the besieging forces at Magdeburg, and to take Frankfort and

Landsberg from him by a stratagem. On the direct road up the Oder the king had got possession of all the towns, so that Tilly was obliged to move his columns by a detour south of Berlin: via Beskow, Fürstenwalde, Mittenwalde, Saarmund, Brandenburg and Neu-Ruppin. This, to be sure, enabled him to cover the line of the Havel, which would head Gustavus off from Magdeburg; but he was seriously delayed on his march by the opposition of several towns.

The king learned of Tilly's march, from Horn, on February 10. Selecting Malchin as a good outpost to prevent interference with his operations against Demmin, he ordered Kniphausen and Baudissin thither; and meanwhile dispatched Captain Moltke with thirty-six horse to reconnoitre the place. This officer managed to make the enemy believe that the king was close by with the Demmin army, and seized the town, though the garrison was thrice the size of his own force. For a mere scouting party, this was a pretty operation, and opened the way for the approaching troops. On February 12 Gustavus marched from Loitz on Demmin, sending cavalry ahead to cut off Savelli from retreat. On the 13th he reached the work on the left bank, whose garrison of Landsknechte retired to the tower. Out of this they were driven by mining, and rather than be blown into the air they surrendered, the men enlisting under the Swedish colors. At the same time approaches were opened and pushed on the right bank against Demmin. In two days Savelli concluded he had better make terms. He was allowed to retire with the honors of war, conditioned on his army and himself not serving in Pomerania and Mecklenburg for three ensuing months. Having yielded up a place which could have offered a long resistance, Savelli withdrew to Neu-Ruppin. Much artillery and a large supply of corn and forage fell to the Swedes. Tilly found grievous fault with his

lieutenant; he would accept, and indeed there was, no excuse. He desired to make an example of Savelli; but this officer, who had friends at court, got off with a few months' arrest, and was later given higher employment. The capitulation of Demmin allowed free exit for all personal effects. Among these was the baggage of Quinti del Ponte, a deserter and traitor, who had made an attempt on the king's life, and in it the money he had received from his treachery. On being asked whether he would confiscate the stuff, Gustavus replied that it was included in the terms, and that he had no mind to take petty revenge on the man.

In view of the Swedish successes all along the line, the Pomeranian Estates were now persuaded to raise ten thousand foot and three thousand horse to garrison the land, a help which released an equal number of Swedes for the field. Gustavus had surely deserved this first assistance.

For the moment, and not anticipating much manœuvring on Tilly's part, the king appears to have deferred his designs on Frankfort in favor of putting his men for needed rest in winter-quarters. Behind his curtain of strong places, he designed to clean up his work by the capture of Colberg and Greifswalde, and perhaps of Rostock and Wismar, and with nothing in his rear, the more safely advance to the relief of Magdeburg, and approach Hamburg and Lübeck. The projected line of winter-quarters was to extend from the Oder to Stralsund: Banér in command of the right along the Trebel and Tollense; Kniphausen at Neu-Brandenburg in the centre; Teuffel and Baudissin on the left, along the upper Ucker; beyond the Oder, Horn. The strong places on the line were Ribnitz, Dammgarten, Tribsies, Demmin, Malchin, Clempenow, Treptow, Neu-Brandenburg, Prenzlau, Garz and Schwedt. East of the Oder the line would run parallel to the Warta-Netze. Near Wolgast were Kagg and Tott with

the reserve cavalry. The king personally went to Stettin to oversee the whole or to plan new operations. Opposite this Swedish line lay the imperialists, with an irregular front from Frankfort to Magdeburg, and outlying forces in the Rostock-Wismar country.

Not meaning to lie idle because he contemplated winter-quarters, Banér was instructed by the king to press the siege of Greifswalde from the south, but to have a heed lest the enemy should break through the line to relieve it. Tott was to help with his cavalry, and to lend a hand to Banér or Kniphausen, as needed. Now that he was quite cut off from the imperial army, Banér called on the commandant of Greifswalde to surrender, but Colonel Perusi refused terms and prepared for defense.

Gustavus had seriously considered a march up the Oder through Silesia; but the attitude of Brandenburg and Saxony held him back. Tilly's dread in this quarter was ill-founded; but the old-fashioned soldier justly feared some operation which he could not fathom, and chose the Ruppín country as a good place from which to attack any novel problem. In going to Stettin the king left his lieutenants with some distrust; but he had a right to believe that they could hold their own. Kniphausen was active in procuring information in his front, and late in February had come to the conclusion that Tilly was about to attack Prenzlau, so as to break through the line to relieve Greifswalde. Gustavus had the same notion, and cautioned the officers in command to be ready to concentrate to oppose any such attempt. Later indications were that Tilly was aiming at Neu-Brandenburg, and Kniphausen sent notice to Banér and Baudissin. Like information was received by the king, who sent word to Banér to sustain Kniphausen, as he could do without weakening his siege lines. On March 6 Banér reached Fried-

land, where he was to await the king's further orders ; Baudissin had broken up towards the same place ; and the king likewise prepared to move to Kniphausen's assistance.

The siege of Colberg had been going on continuously for months under Boëtius, and finally, on March 2, from lack of victual, Colonel Mörs surrendered, marched out with the honors of war, and was given free passage to Landsberg. The fall of Colberg made available the bulk of the garrisons of the surrounding places in the Neumark ; Leslie was left in command of what remained ; the surplus force was ordered to Stettin, and on March 7 Gustavus, thus reinforced, reached Pasewalk.

Meanwhile Tilly slowly advanced to Neu-Ruppin, found Savelli there with the Demmin garrison, and learned of the loss of Colberg. Thence he headed for Neu-Brandenburg.

Gustavus had sent word to Kniphausen to hold Neu-Brandenburg manfully (or, if he had to surrender, to make good terms), and he would within a few days either relieve him or undertake an operation to draw Tilly away. The fact was that Gustavus had begun to revert to his old plan of an attack on Frankfort. He did not believe that Tilly was merely aiming at Neu-Brandenburg. It scarcely seemed worth his while ; he concluded that the imperial general was concentrating for a dash on either Stettin or Greifswalde. The apex of the Stralsund-Greifswalde position is Demmin, and even should Neu-Brandenburg fall, it was no fatal loss, for the place could be got back later. It looks a little as if Tilly, angered at the loss of Colberg, was at this moment willing to come to battle with the king ; but Gustavus thought best to draw him away from his Mecklenburg lines by a diversion on Frankfort and Landsberg, convinced that he would follow. There was a greater gain here, and less danger in case of defeat. In pursuance of this plan, the

king ordered some of the troops east of the Oder to Krähnig, opposite Schwedt, and Torstenson and Carl Banér, with some artillery, bridge materials and victual, to a camp he had intrenched on the Oder between Schwedt and Vierraden. Purposing to call Banér to his own side, he left Horn in command of the forces behind the Peene, Trebel and Recknitz, with orders to cover Wolgast, Loitz and Demmin; to retire, if necessary, on Anklam and Stralsund; and in case Tilly should advance on Gustavus, to follow him up, leaving only a small force behind him.

The king miscalculated. Tilly paid no heed to his movements. He had indeed no deep design, but was looking for some small success. He was not active enough to be seduced away by able manœuvring. From Neu-Ruppin, on March 12, he reached Stargard, just south of Neu-Brandenburg. This latter was not a place which could be easily defended. Gustavus called it a "naked spot," and Kniphausen had not a single gun. Nor had he got the king's final orders; the messengers had been captured; and instead of capitulating honorably, the brave old man determined to hold on, and thrice refused Tilly's demand, replying that he would defend the town to the last man.

Tilly began a furious cannonade, and kept it up two days, breached the mean walls with his artillery, and stormed the town March 23. The resistance was heroic; the fighting of the Swedes surprised Tilly beyond measure. Quarter was neither asked nor given; four hundred imperialists fell; Tilly gave the town up to plunder, and annihilated the garrison. Every male was ruthlessly slaughtered, except Kniphausen and three other officers. Outrage of every kind ran riot. Nothing was spared, — as a species of revenge for the capture of Demmin and Colberg; but it was a sad contrast to the recent conduct of the Swedes under parallel conditions.

It did the imperialists no strategic good, for Tilly saw no advantage in advancing farther. He was not a man to be encouraged by success, nor had he any surplus enterprise to boast of.

Friedland is a bare twenty miles from Neu-Brandenburg. Why neither Banér nor Baudissin came to Kniphausen's aid is not explained. The error may have lain in the king's failure to guess Tilly's rather blind design, and in orders a record of which is not on hand.

When Horn ascertained the fall of Neu-Brandenburg, he withdrew the troops from Friedland, leaving only a garrison, broke down the bridge at Treptow, and retired to Demmin, to protect the approaches to Stralsund and Greifswalde by holding the fords of the Peene and Trebel. Tilly, on weighing the difficulty of marching on either Stralsund, Greifswalde or Anklam, and fearing that, by a sudden dash, Gustavus might seize the passage of the Havel, concluded to retire to Neu-Ruppin. When he did so, Horn returned to Friedland.

A small compensation for the Neu-Brandenburg disaster shortly occurred when the rhinegrave met a detachment of a thousand horse on its way from Rostock to the imperial army, and completely destroyed it.

Count Pappenheim had made to the elector of Bavaria many complaints of Tilly's dilatoriness, and about this time there came orders to Tilly to let everything lapse which interfered with the capture of Magdeburg. No doubt Tilly would have retired as it was, for without reason he became nervous about the Dessau bridge. He wanted to be near Leipsic, where the convention was being held; and as his position as representative of both the empire and the League subjected him to contradictory instructions, he chose an operation which should suit every one's ideas, — the siege of Magdeburg.


On Tilly's retiring from the Neu-Brandenburg holocaust, Gustavus imagined that he was aiming at Prenzlau, to march up the Ucker to the sea, interpose between Horn and himself, and deliver battle to one or other; he ordered Horn to march via Pasewalk to Löcknitz, so as to be able at any moment to join him, while Carl Banér was instructed to make secure the works of Schwedt. Gustavus thus prepared to fight in one body and with a good camp in his rear. But when he ascertained that Tilly had retired to Neu-Ruppin, he gave up his defensive attitude, and struck so as to draw Tilly away from his now manifest intention to return to Magdeburg. He believed that a direct threat on Frankfort would do this, and sent Horn back to the command of the Stralsund-Stettin country, with orders to push the siege of Greifswalde, and to send a body of horse to watch the east side of the Oder. If he captured Greifswalde, he could make a move on Rostock, or threaten Mecklenburg in some other quarter. Banér accompanied the king.

Just as the king was about to start, he heard that the imperialists from Landsberg had sent out a detachment and had captured Arnswalde. This moved him to speed. With fourteen thousand men and two hundred guns, on March 27, 1631, he broke up from Schwedt, headed his column along both Oder banks for Frankfort, the main force on the left bank, and the flotilla and flying-bridge in company. The right flank and rear of the army was protected by the camp at Schwedt, as well as by flanking detachments. Baudissin led the column with the cavalry; the king followed with foot and artillery. The horse scoured the country well to the west, and a detachment captured Oranienburg, to forestall a possible threat to the flank. On March 30 the column reached Wrietzen.

Cüstrin was of the first importance. Gustavus had an

intelligent observer here, received frequent information, and knew all about the place. The commandant, Colonel Kracht, was speedily convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and gave up the place on demand. Continuing the advance on April 1, the outlying posts and scouting parties of the imperialists were encountered. On the 2d the army was in front of Frankfort.

No sooner arrived than the king set about a siege. Some six thousand imperial troops were in the town, and a number of distinguished officers, Marshal Tiefenbach, Count Schaumberg, General Montecuculi and Colonel Sparre. They had determined on defense, and burned the suburbs.



Frankfort.

The Swedish army lay on the hills to await the fleet, and prepare material for the siege. Gustavus reconnoitred. On the first night trenches were opened, not without opposition. On April 3 three batteries were planted opposite the Guben gate, and three regiments posted opposite the Lebus gate. The fire from the batteries was effective, and a small breach was made. In the late afternoon a body of men was sent forward to capture the outworks, so as to drive the enemy within walls, or, as some authorities rather improbably state, an attack was begun by a junior Swedish officer on his own motion, and then followed up. However started, the Swedes advanced with exceptional gallantry, got through the ditch, clambered up the wall, tore down the palisades, and drove the imperialists helter-skelter from the town gates. But they did not stop here. Some musketeers planted ladders, reached the wall, and blew the gates down with petards. Nothing

could resist the fury of the soldiery. Every man met in arms was cut down ; seventeen hundred were killed, Count Schaumburg among them, and one thousand were captured, including many officers ; a large amount of stores was taken. The town was given up for three hours to plunder, in retaliation for the massacre at Neu-Brandenburg ; but no citizen's life was taken. A part of the garrison made efforts to escape ; many were drowned in the Oder. A small part, including two general officers, escaped towards Silesia ; individuals reached refuge even as far as Glogau.

This capture of a walled city with strong defenses and heavily garrisoned, containing a number of capable military men, without waiting for a perfect breach, was an exceptional venture, and earned the Swedes great credit. The news spread fast, and the king hoped that the victory would influence the German princes to join him.

The modern art of war is indebted to Gustavus Adolphus for more than one lesson in audacity. It was well that the world should learn that bold assaults are justifiable ; and in this the Swedish hero led the way. This capture of Frankfort, and especially the later crossing of the Lech and the assault on the Alte Veste, were object lessons of exceptional value. Not but what breaches had been stormed before Gustavus' time. It is not for ordinary boldness that he deserves credit ; but he should be awarded the highest encomium for doing those acts which in his era were condemned as foolhardy, and for showing the world that intelligent audacity is not of necessity rashness.

From Frankfort, on April 5, Gustavus with all the horse and three thousand foot advanced on Landsberg. The van of dragoons drove before it the Croats, of whom many still infested the country, and inflicted heavy loss on these savage marauders. Out of twelve hundred, not two hundred got

away. On April 7 the Swedes reached the vicinity of the town. Horn had been ordered to cross the river from Schwedt, and head for Landsberg, with all the force he could collect, to help shut in the town. He arrived the same day as the king.

Gustavus had supposed that Tilly would take some vigorous action to relieve Landsberg, and ordered Banér to break down the Cüstrin bridge, to finish a redoubt already commenced there and make it as strong as possible, and to hold Frankfort stoutly. This would head the imperial army off, as Tilly could not cross at Schwedt. Should he try Crossen, up river, Gustavus purposed to check him with his cavalry; should he go as far south as Glogau, Gustavus would pay no heed to him, as he hoped in that case to be through with Landsberg before the enemy could reach it.

Banér, with five regiments from Frankfort, joined the king April 15. On the same day operations were opened against Landsberg. The town lay in the valley, and possessed a castle, and an outlying fort, on whose possession depended the security of the castle. Gustavus directed his artillery against the fort, and placed guns so as to take it in reverse. After no great interchange of fire, and the repulse of a sortie, a demand was made; and, April 16, in pursuance of a short negotiation, the garrison of four thousand men surrendered, and received free exit on agreement not to serve for eight months. Crossen speedily followed. The Swedish left flank was thus abundantly secured, and the king drew in the bulk of his forces to Frankfort. The road to Silesia was open.

Now, had Gustavus, as is sometimes alleged, really been indifferent as to Magdeburg, would he not have chosen the plan long urged by Oxenstiern, and have himself advanced through Silesia on Vienna, instead as he did of intrusting

this section to Count Horn? Such an advance would have suited his paymaster, Richelieu; it would have struck at the heart of his enemy; he was justified by the neglect of the men he had come to help in looking solely to his own and Swedish interests; he would have had a walk-over to Vienna, and have possibly made a brilliant *coup*. That, instead of the alluring route, he chose to turn back towards the men who needed help, but who said no thanks for what he tendered, is sufficient proof that he was faithful to the cause he had undertaken beyond what can be said of most great captains.

Tilly had remained a long time inactive at Neu-Ruppin, and then started in the direction of Magdeburg. When he learned that Gustavus had moved against Frankfort, he also turned that way, sending word to the place that he was on the road to relieve it; but hearing at Brandenburg that he was too late, he sat down not far from Berlin to wait. He believed that Gustavus would either march on Silesia or back to Magdeburg, and he was unwilling to follow him to Silesia. His desire was to draw the king from the Oder towards the Elbe, so that he might engage battle with him on favorable terms; failing which, to capture Magdeburg, and make such an example of it as would frighten the Protestants into submission. But for some time he embraced no action. Not until Landsberg fell did he start for the Elbe.

The king sent word of his wonderful success to Magdeburg, promised succor within two months, and said that he based his calculations on the belief that the town could hold out easily at least so long.



XVII.

MAGDEBURG. SEPTEMBER, 1630, TO MAY, 1631.

MAGDEBURG had been well fortified by Falkenberg, whom Gustavus had sent thither. The Elbe bridge was protected by several forts, the walls made strong, and the city became a fortress. After taking Frankfort, as Tilly returned to Magdeburg to help Pappenheim, who had been there many months, Gustavus decided to march to its relief. But he was opposed by the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. The former forbade the Swedes to cross his territory, or to occupy the fortresses essential to the Swedish advance, until the king threatened force, when he reluctantly yielded; even the danger to Magdeburg would not induce the latter to permit a Swedish march across his land to its relief, though the imperialists had gone to and fro at will. As John George with forty thousand men held the balance of power, Gustavus might not provoke his enmity; and believing with reason that Magdeburg could hold out several weeks longer, he urged his negotiations for passage. Meanwhile, the siege was sharply pushed. Falkenberg had twenty-five hundred men, Tilly and Pappenheim thirty thousand, but the resistance was stubborn. Finally, Tilly, fearing the advent of the king, contemplated withdrawal; but during previous negotiations, when the garrison was off its guard because an imperial herald was within walls awaiting answer to Tilly's ultimatum, an assault, aided by the treachery of citizens, was made on May 20, the place was taken, given up to plunder, burned, and forty thousand souls perished. This holocaust was properly charged by Gustavus to John George.

IN the light of his recent success, Gustavus might contemplate an advance on the Elbe. His base was secure. There was no danger of interruption from Poland, and Silesia was open to him. Tilly gave up hope of regaining the Oder, but for a while he lay near Brandenburg, and sent parties out as far as Crossen. He threatened Berlin, but the citizens put the city in a state of defense, burned the suburbs, and flatly denied him victual; and on the fall of Landsberg he marched

towards Magdeburg, and crossed at Dessau. The Oder gone, he felt that he must hold the Elbe, and he was impelled to wreak on Magdeburg a vengeance for the loss of Frankfort. Tilly was still a slave to the old method, in which the deterrent virtue of cruelty was an article of faith. It is proven by modern investigation that the wanton slaughter and burning at Magdeburg were not by his command, but the fact remains that Tilly was a representative of the old school, one of whose tenets was that the sack of a city was a species of right to which the soldier had a claim. In this light he cannot be absolved from the barbarism exhibited in that unfortunate city.

Now was surely Gustavus' time to relieve Magdeburg, and he resolutely set about it. The military danger of such an advance was past, and the king's assurances of speedy succor were founded on this fact. But Gustavus had as yet no conception of the political difficulties which lay athwart his path, and the military and logistic difficulties were by no means all surmounted. Victual was hard to get; Pomerania was slow in filling her quota; remittances from home and abroad came in after tedious delays; the cavalry had run down by excess of the winter's hard work and deprivation so as to be appreciably below that of the enemy in effectiveness. So much was this the fact that the king was called on for the first time to punish depredations, and yet the troops — horse and foot alike — suffered at times almost to the verge of mutiny. "Many excuses, little support," complained the king.

But all this was of small account compared to the difficulty of bringing the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to a helpful attitude. Gustavus could not begin an unauthorized march through the territory of either, lest the prince concerned should fall upon his rear; and he was able to make

no impression upon them. They were not small potentates like Bogislav ; should Brandenburg and Saxony join hands to resist the king, his helpfulness to the cause of Protestantism was at an end. The business called for diplomacy, not force ; and George William had already been antagonized by the Cüstrin matter.

On April 21 the king himself was in Cüstrin, where he worked out his plans for the Magdeburg expedition. His next step must be to the fortress of Spandau, as a secondary base to secure his advance. Horn was left in command on the Oder, with headquarters in Cüstrin, and was to make up a new army from the recruits collected in Pomerania and arriving from Sweden. A garrison was placed in Landsberg, and a rendezvous was given for May 1, at Köpenick, to all troops destined for the army of the Elbe.

It was hard to argue George William out of his neutrality ; commissioners effected nothing ; a personal interview in Berlin proved of no avail. Until Gustavus, in a fit of righteous indignation, declared almost at the cannon's mouth that unless Cüstrin and Spandau were voluntarily yielded, he would occupy them by force, he made no headway. It was manifest that he must rely on possession, not promises. George William could expect no imperial aid ; he placed no reliance on Saxony ; he believed himself in Gustavus' military power ; he weakened, and finally came to terms. Control of both Cüstrin and Spandau was given to Gustavus until the Magdeburg incident should be closed ; but the vacillation of the man is no better shown than in the fact that George William wrote an apologetic letter to the emperor, excusing his action, and stating that he had caused as great a delay as possible. A pretty champion of his faith indeed !

No sooner in Spandau than, on May 8, Gustavus started for the Dessau bridge, in the hope that he would have less

trouble with the elector of Saxony. His back was scarcely turned when George William alleged fresh difficulties — mostly his duty to the empire — in delivering up full control of Spandau, where Gustavus had left but a small body of men. The opposition amounted to nothing, but was an additional source of worry. Compulsion alone was an argument with this shortsighted potentate, who, from a species of moral cowardice difficult to understand, still clung to his pretended neutrality. It was hard to rupture the old imperial tie, even for religion.

When Tilly finally retired from the Oder country, Gustavus intended promptly to follow him up; but the road open to the imperialists had been completely barred to him. Brandenburg once opened, he must reckon with Saxony; and John George would not allow him to cross his fords at Wittenberg or Dessau. The only other road was via Brandenburg and Möckern, through a country which had been so completely devastated that it gave an ill promise to the Swedish commissariat, which was at ebb-tide; and moreover the bridge at Magdeburg was already in the hands of the besiegers. He could not well advance to the aid of Magdeburg from any point lower down the Elbe; for the bridges were scarce, or had been destroyed; the boats had all been seized by the enemy; the river was wide; he had no pontoon-train, and to secure means of crossing would consume much time; the vicinity he must occupy had been devastated, so as to be unfit to sustain operations; and wherever he should attempt to cross, it must be in the face of a superior enemy.

Every avenue to his objective seemed closed; and while anxious to relieve his faithful ally, Gustavus could scarcely be held — as a matter of good faith or a matter of common sense — to compromise his whole military scheme, built up

with endless care and caution, by so moving as to endanger his communications, magazines and *points d'appui*, to risk an uprising of Brandenburg and Saxony in his rear.

His difficulties can scarcely be overestimated. Most Protestant princes still looked at him as a second Christian of Denmark, who, at the proper time, might sell their cause to save himself ; they not only refused his advances, but declined to raise troops for the common cause. The electors of Brandenburg and Saxony could not have done less for him had they been open enemies. In truth they would have proven a simpler factor in the problem had they met him sword in hand.

Gustavus represented to John George with the utmost frankness the condition of Magdeburg, as also his own and Tilly's relative strength, and by correspondence and embassies, begged this head of the German Protestants for aid in his perilous venture. The elector would scarcely deign to answer ; and answers, when they came, were argumentative solely. The diplomatic interchanges are interesting, but they do not come within our province. That John George forbade a march through his territory suffices to explain Gustavus' long delay in carrying out his promise to stand by the city of Magdeburg in its distress. Tilly outnumbered him ; the elector of Saxony, with an army of forty thousand men, held the balance of power ; the elector of Brandenburg in his rear was not to be relied upon, — and to be brief, Gustavus was not a Charles XII. Had he been so, he might have relieved Magdeburg — perhaps — while the dull-witted electors were gaping at his boldness ; but he would not have been of the stuff to save Protestantism in Germany. Happily for us, he was better balanced, and would not risk Sweden and the future of the faith on a hair-brained advance, however brilliant. He felt constrained to remain on the Havel, along

which he advanced as far as he might, until he could overcome the inertia of the Saxon elector.

Putting aside politics — in this case John George with his forty thousand men — the military problem could be readily solved. Three or four stout marches by way of Dessau, the destruction there of Tilly's force, the building of a bridge-head to preserve his line, and the summary attack of the enemy besieging Magdeburg were among the possibilities. But if we assume that Gustavus' duty was merely a military one, and that he was bound to disregard all political complications, we can scarcely imagine his pushing far into the tangled network before him. All great soldiers have succeeded because they made politics subserve their military scheme; and so did the Swedish monarch. We may imagine the bold and rapid advance which some historians have told us it was his duty to make, to redeem his pledge to Magdeburg; we may picture its success; but we shall have created a paper campaign, and a paper hero, we shall not have depicted the Gustavus who saved the Reformation in Germany, and who was the father of modern war. Gustavus was not great because he was either cautious or bold; he was great because he knew when to be cautious and when to be bold. We shall see him bold enough by and by.

To return to Magdeburg. Colonel Falkenberg had been sent by Gustavus to take charge of its defense in the fall of 1630, and had entered the city October 19. He found the situation far from bad. The enemy had less than six thousand men, was merely observing the city, and Falkenberg felt confident that he could hold the place for many months. He was warmly welcomed, and his influence was at once felt. He took full command, — the administrator retaining only his body-guard and a sort of advisory control, — and began recruiting outside and repairing the works within.

The Elbe at Magdeburg has a number of islands close together. The bridge over the river utilized these, and a bridge-head stood on the right bank. Perceiving that the enemy, by attacking the islands from up river, could cut off the bridge, Falkenberg built a big work at the south end of the most important one, and for the several sections of the bridge redoubts. To strengthen the bridge-head on the right bank, a work called "Trutzkaiser" was erected on the Mühlberg, a hill near by which commanded it. Two heavy works



Magdeburg.

were built on the south of the town, one on the water's edge, and one in the outer corner; a number of bastions were constructed to strengthen the city wall, and the Sudenburg suburb was protected by a strong redoubt. On the west the two gates were strengthened by two horn-works and a crown-work. The north side, where the Neustadt lay, possessed a round bastion on a point surrounded by a dry arm of the Elbe. The gate here was fortified with two towers, and the suburb was itself intrenched. Work was vigorously pushed, and by the end of the year the citizens could truly claim that Magdeburg was a fortress. Falkenberg had shown energy and intelligence. But Magdeburg had a weak spot within walls. Christian William, the town council, the military

under Falkenberg, the common folk, and a strong party of disaffected Catholics—each group of a different mind—furnished abundant means for disagreement and promise of treachery.

Tilly paid small heed to Magdeburg. Between Gustavus and that scornful city, he scarcely knew which way to turn; and yet its capture would have been almost the hardest blow he could deal the Swedes. Pappenheim understood this well. For months correspondence ran between the imperial army and the Magdeburg council, and efforts were made to bring the city back to the empire. But Falkenberg never permitted it to waver in its fealty to Gustavus, though the imperialists numbered some of the most influential citizens. He was not infrequently put to it to reconcile conflicting interests; but though he could not accomplish the moral task, he mastered the material one, and during the winter of 1630–31, he labored to make the surrounding defenses stronger, and at designing new ones. On the right bank, whence Gustavus was expected, were erected the “Trutz-Pappenheim” furthest to the east, and the “Trutz-Tilly” nearer the town; and upstream a large work, the “Magdeburg Succor.” A line of heavy intrenchments arose along the right bank, and Falkenberg had twenty-five hundred men, plus citizen-militia, to man them.

In November Tilly had proposed to besiege the city, but contented himself with leaving Pappenheim to blockade it while he turned towards Gustavus. He left his lieutenant with ten thousand men, but at times drew on this number for other service. Pappenheim was a hot-headed officer, ill adapted to so slow a process as this blockade; to storm the city was more in his style; and he fretted under the task. Count Wolf von Mansfeld had a small army near by, but lent no assistance, a fact which irritated Pappenheim still more.

Finally, toward the beginning of April, Tilly was moved by Pappenheim's entreaties to permit him to take active measures; and the gallant lieutenant needed no second order. Falkenberg could not pretend to hold his long *enceinte* with his limited number of men. He might have been wise sooner to withdraw into the city. The defiant "Trutz-Pappenheim" was selected as a beginning, and after equally gallant assault and resistance, this redoubt, with the "Magdeburg Succor" and the "Trutz-Tilly," fell on April 9. On the morrow two more works on the right bank succumbed to Pappenheim's impetuous energy and heavy excess of forces; while Mansfeld did a more moderate share in taking the three Buckau redoubts. The Magdeburgers lost all their outlying works and fully five hundred men. Some ten days later Tilly arrived. The joint forces before the town amounted to twenty-five thousand men, plus a detachment of nearly five thousand more at the Dessau bridge. This was fearful odds for Falkenberg's small garrison, now reduced to little more than two thousand soldiers. He had felt able to hold his works against Pappenheim, but now he had twelve times his force to face.

Shortly after the fall of Frankfort, Tilly had received orders to march to the protection of the emperor's hereditary lands, which would be threatened by the capture of that city. To do this was impossible. To divide forces would be to insure the failure of both detachments; and the emperor had troops in Silesia, as it was. Tilly served both the League and the empire; and a council of war decided to capture Magdeburg as a first step.

The imperialists were now able to attack the works at the bridge-head and on the islands. The garrisons defended themselves nobly, even according to Pappenheim's high estimate, but eventually, about April 30, Falkenberg deemed it

best to draw them in, and the bridge and islands were lost. The citizens began to despair, and Gustavus seemed as far off as months ago.

News came from time to time from the Swedish army, and its successes faintly cheered the weary waiters ; but the negotiations with Brandenburg and Saxony were to the last degree disheartening. Falkenberg and the council wrote repeatedly to the king, representing the growing scarcity of victual and powder, the intention of the enemy to control the Elbe by a bridge at Schönebeck, eight miles up river, the almost mutinous condition of the people, the unhelpfulness of the administrator ; and prayed for speedy succor — “or we are lost.” But Gustavus was powerless ; the two electors barred his way.

There may have been men in the world's history who would have braved even these conditions, who would have frayed a path across Brandenburg and Saxony in the teeth of any opposition, and have marched to the relief of Magdeburg without regard to what lay behind them. But there have also been gigantic failures in the world's history from just such impetuosity. No one can accuse Gustavus of lack of personal boldness. Of all great captains he is most like Alexander in his reckless disregard of danger, and even the Macedonian could show no more wounds. His moral force — his capacity to face responsibility — was as marked. But what Gustavus did for the art of war sprang less from the exuberance of his courage, less from that species of moral bravery which impels a man to take abnormal risks, than it did from his exceptional power of calculating correctly by the existing conditions what course would most certainly tend to the eventual success of the whole scheme. He had not the gambler's instinct so strongly as Napoleon. Had he let loose the reins of his gallantry, he would never have grown to be

the champion of Protestantism ; no one can tell what might have become of the cause of Reform in Germany. Such a Gustavus certainly could not have saved it.

Falkenberg now leveled the suburbs to protect the town. On May 4 the inhabitants of the Sudenberg retired within the walls, and this suburb was burned ; and when Pappenheim moved to the Neustadt, this too was fired. When all outlying garrisons were drawn in, there were not quite twenty-two hundred and fifty men, horse and foot. Pappenheim began regular approaches in the ruins of the Neustadt.

Fearing that Gustavus would come to its relief before he had reduced it, Tilly opened negotiations with the town early in May. He wrote to the mayor and council, to the administrator, to Falkenberg. But the advances were refused and messages again sent to Gustavus, praying hard for immediate succor. The council, however, offered to leave the whole matter to the joint decision of the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, and the Hanse towns ; they held their messengers ready to depart upon this errand, so soon as Tilly should send a safe-conduct ; and of all this he received clear notice.

Tilly was puzzled what to do. He heard of Gustavus' successive advances to Köpenick, Berlin, Spandau, Potsdam. He learned that negotiations were going on with John George, as well as George William, and he feared their early success. He was apprehensive lest the Saxon army should appear at Dessau. He must get possession of Magdeburg speedily, or else retire, baffled, as Wallenstein had done at Stralsund. He deemed himself in bad case, when he really had no cause to fear, for he had a larger force than Gustavus, unless Saxony should join the king. On the first appearance of Swedish cavalry near Zerbst, Tilly destroyed the Dessau bridge.

While using his most persuasive measures against the town, the work in the trenches went on. The bombardment was

opened on May 17, and was kept up three days. Under cover of it, the approaches in the Neustadt, in the Sudenberg and on the island progressed. Pappenheim, in the Neustadt, got to the very margin of the ditch, and fairly seamed the Neustadt with trenches. He sapped the counterscarp and pushed a covered gallery over the ditch, while the defenders were kept off the walls by a heavy fire. Breaches were operated; the biggest of the towers fell; indefatigable Pappenheim pushed five approaches to the *fausse-braye* of the new bastion, tore out the palisades, and laid several hundred ladders. He worked on the other side of this bastion as well, making it a key-point for his proposed assault. The defenses of the town were also weakened on the west and on the river fronts.

The defenders opposed this work with equal energy. Fires from the enemy's hot balls were kept down by systematic measures. The besieged countermined, and patched up the works as fast as these were disturbed; but from want of powder they could not maintain a steady fire.

On May 18 Tilly again dispatched a herald into the town. During the two weeks since the proposal to arbitrate, he had neither refused it nor sent a safe-conduct; and now, on the score of time, he declined to allow the submission of the case. He practically demanded unconditioned surrender, or threatened to storm the town. The approach of the Swedes, of which Tilly now hourly expected to hear, spurred his determination to adopt any course, right or wrong, to get possession of the city.

The council was convened, and the citizens were called together on May 19 to frame an answer. It was determined to treat with Tilly. Falkenberg protested, and asked for a meeting with the council, to be held at 4 A. M. on the 20th.

On the afternoon of the 19th the fire of the imperialists ceased, and they could be seen, from the town, moving the

siege-guns to the rear. The townspeople began to hope that Gustavus was nearing, and Tilly was in fact on the point of giving up the siege, lest he should be interrupted by the "Snow King." He still hoped that at the last moment the town would accept his ultimatum, and he called a council of war to determine what to do. At this council it was suggested that an assault, delivered at an early morning hour, had succeeded elsewhere and might succeed here, and this suggestion Tilly eagerly grasped at. He determined to storm the breaches at daylight next day.

Through the disaffected Catholics Tilly knew all that was going on in the town. They kept him posted as to the strength of the guard at various points, the hours of relief, the means of defense, the want of powder; and there is not wanting evidence that messages were thrown from the walls on the morning of the 20th, before sunrise, to the effect that now was the very time.


Whatever the other facts, it is beyond dispute that while the council was sitting in debate on Tilly's ultimatum, while the imperial herald was still within the walls of Magdeburg awaiting the council's answer, the army of Tilly was ordered forward to the walls. It is beyond dispute that the generalissimo had given every indication to the town that he was still negotiating and would await a final answer, and yet he sent Pappenheim to storm the works. This treachery is on a par with that of Cæsar against the Usipetes and Tencheri.

At daylight some of the guard had left the walls, prompted thereto by the knowledge that the ultimatum was being discussed, and the belief that there was nothing for the moment to fear. The officers of rank were all at the council. Matters were more lax than usual. At 7 A. M., after quiet preparation, Pappenheim assaulted at two points: the round bas-

tion near the Elbe, where a party of Croats was sent forward, and the bastion which he had so vigorously approached, where he in person led the party. The Croats easily forced their way in. Pappenheim found only a few sentries on hand and the watch surrounding the chaplain at morning prayers ; and he pushed his party over the walls with scarce a semblance of opposition. He was having things all his own way, when Falkenberg appeared, hastily summoned from the council chamber, and met him with what men he could instantly collect. For a brief moment Falkenberg was able to check both the Croats and Pappenheim ; but he soon fell. Pappenheim was receiving constant accessions to his force, and in less than an hour there remained nothing to resist him. Mansfeld was slow in storming ; but when Pappenheim had effected his entrance, he too forced his way into the town.

The city was given over to plunder. The horrors of the scene have been all too often dwelt on. There perished forty thousand souls. Treachery was followed by its fellow, massacre.

It will always remain doubtful how Magdeburg was burned. It is charged to Tilly unjustly ; Pappenheim, Falkenberg, the citizens, the imperial troops, have each in turn been accused of deliberately destroying the beautiful city. The event left Magdeburg a pile of ashes surrounding the cathedral, which alone escaped.



Swiss Sword. (15th Century.)

XVIII.

GUSTAVUS ADVANCES TO THE ELBE. JUNE AND JULY, 1631.

THE capture of Magdeburg meant retreat for Gustavus, lest Brandenburg and Saxony should side with the emperor and endanger his bastion. He fell back to the Havel, and here awaited Tilly. But the Walloon had won fame enough; he essayed no forward movement; reinforcements were coming up from Italy, which he desired to draw in before attacking Gustavus; and he was shortly ordered to move on Hesse-Cassel and Saxony, to compel their submission to the imperial dictates. Pappenheim remained in the Magdeburg country. Hesse-Cassel prepared for resistance; the landgrave and the duke of Saxe-Weimar were stanch allies of Gustavus. Seeing that Tilly did not advance on him, Gustavus strengthened the Havel line, and compelled George William to yield up Spandau for the war. Shortly Greifswalde, the last town within the bastion, fell; Mecklenburg was overrun, and the dukes reinstated. Gustavus, now secure at all points, extended his right flank to the Elbe, to draw Tilly from Hesse-Cassel; crossed the river, and intrenched a camp at Werben. Tilly did in fact come up, joined Pappenheim and moved towards the king. The latter fell on his advanced cavalry-parties and cut them up. Incensed, Tilly marched on Werben and attacked the camp; but, severely punished, he retired.

AT the downfall of the proud Lutheran city, the Catholics rejoiced with cruel taunts; many Protestants were disheartened, many cowed by her awful fate. Who knew where next the imperial lightning might strike? No one was seer enough to foretell a deliverer in the Swedish monarch. The only man in Germany who gauged his value was Wallenstein.

The capture of Magdeburg meant retreat for Gustavus. Had he reached the place in time to drive off Tilly, Brandenburg and Saxony might have joined his cause; now they

were more likely to be enemies who might cut him off from the sea. He must force Brandenburg to his will without delay; Saxony must wait. As some were inclined to blame the king for forsaking Magdeburg, he issued a manifesto, couched in no equivocal terms, putting the blame on John George, where it properly belonged, for his obstructive measures; and, quite out of patience with the time-serving of the Protestants, prepared to retire.

He was fortunate in one thing. Had Tilly followed him up, sustained by Saxony, the Swedes might have been crowded back to the coast. But Tilly sat down to enjoy his success, and never dreamed of an advance. He deemed Gustavus' entire venture at an end, as a less well-poised leader's might have been, as Christian's had been. Pappenheim chafed under this restraint; but he was young and ardent, and he was not the commander-in-chief.

Having for the moment no inducement to advance to the Elbe, and uncertain as to Tilly's manœuvres, Gustavus again assumed the line of the Oder as a *point d'appui*. He dispatched orders to Horn to rebuild the Oder bridge at Schaumberg, so that the Swedish army might retire on it if driven back; and Frankfort was to be fortified to the highest degree by chief engineer Porticus. These precautions were wise, but, as matters eventuated, they were not needed.

There was no doubt in Gustavus' mind that the enemy would now seize the opportunity which victory had given him, and be prepared to meet him. The Swedish line was open to attack from Silesia, and this was to be guarded against on the line of the Oder-Warta. It was open to attack from Dessau, and this could be met by holding the line of the Spree-Havel. An imperial attack from Mecklenburg was improbable on account of the promised restoration of its dukes; and if Greifswalde were once secured, Pome-

rania was tolerably safe. This left a long but good defensive line, and from it Gustavus could debouch towards the Elbe, if the enemy did not break down his defense. By pivoting on Frankfort he could swing forward his right, and by securing a strong place on the Elbe, his new base would be more firmly held than ever. Its front would cover much territory, but it would be protected by such places as Stettin and Frankfort on the left, and Hamburg and Lübeck on the right; while in the centre Gustavus would fortify a strong line on the Havel. Hamilton was shortly expected in the Weser with a goodly force, and this would add Bremen to the cause and extend the line to the North Sea.

The command of the important centre was given to Banér early in July. He had three brigades: Teuffel's at Brandenburg and Rathenow; Hepburn's at Potsdam; a third was divided between Bernau and the Bützow country, which latter place was a defile in the network of lakes in this part of Mecklenburg. Headquarters were at Fehrbellin.

The left was intrusted to Horn. He had a bare fifteen hundred men, and news came that the imperialists in Silesia, encouraged by the Magdeburg success, would soon move down the Oder. The outpost at Crossen occasionally had touch with the enemy, and in May, as suggested by Pappenheim, a number of regiments assembled in the Glogau country, and threatened Crossen and Züllichau. To meet this threat, Gustavus ordered Horn to strengthen Crossen, to recruit up his garrisons in the Neumark, and particularly to hold the bridges at Frankfort, Cüstrin and Schaumburg. He was to turn Arenswalde, Bärwalde and Königsberg into strong places to retire on. If Crossen was attacked, Gustavus assured Horn that he would hurry to his relief with troops from the Havel and Spree.

Happily for the cause, the imperialists lacked earnestness.

They had stomach for their plundering; they had none for serious war. Horn had time to carry out his orders; the imperialists played with the business. They took Kotbus; Horn captured Grüneberg; and soon after Gustavus advanced him to Crossen, where he erected a strongly intrenched camp.

On the whole, the horror of Magdeburg enraged rather than discouraged the Protestants; and despite the threats of the emperor they continued to equip troops, though without joint action. Hesse-Cassel and Saxe-Weimar were among the most active; while the elector of Saxony used his large army to preserve his neutrality.

It was at Stettin that Gustavus received an embassy from Russia, tendering good-will and an auxiliary corps. The king declined the troops, but received the minister with pleasure, and sent back friendly thanks to the czar.

Tilly's conduct after his victory at Magdeburg was not that of a great soldier. He lamely explained, in a letter of May 26 to the elector of Bavaria, that until he knew which way Gustavus had retired, he was unable to pursue him, and must remain *in situ*; that it would take some time to raze the walls, fill up the ditch, and see to victualing Magdeburg; that the enemy had seized all the defiles in Brandenburg; that this electorate was so destitute of provision that no army could move through it; and, as victual was growing scarce, he suggested a march against Hesse-Cassel and Thuringia, where was abundance. This he wrote, while Gustavus stood on the Havel, anxious as to the enemy's advance from a military standpoint; actually dreading its political effect on George William; fearing that he might lose his initiative, mistrusting some combination that might drive him back to the sea. How Tilly could imagine that he might absent himself from the theatre of active operations without opening the way to farther Swedish advance, it is hard to see. Curiously,

Pappenheim, who usually had the happy trick of seeking the enemy, rather favored the plan of Tilly ; but he was not the man to dally in its execution, if adopted.

In view of the generalissimo's representations and the continued arming of the Protestants, the emperor did order Tilly to take measures to compel the minor powers to cease warlike preparations, as being inconsistent with their fealty ; but the old general was hard to get started. He remained in Magdeburg till the beginning of June ; and wrote to Maximilian that with the Swedes and Saxons joining hands, which he expected daily, and with Hesse-Cassel arming in his rear, he feared to be surrounded and his army compromised.

Tilly was a queer compound of courage and the want of it. No man possessed more personal gallantry, as he had demonstrated on a hundred fields ; but he lacked that larger intellectual and moral force which enables one to gauge danger and to accept responsibility. He was a noble battle-field fighter ; but he suffered from strategic myopia. Finally the old man took courage, left five thousand foot and seven hundred horse in Magdeburg, under Mansfeld, and Pappenheim near by with a small army, and at the head of seventeen thousand five hundred foot, seven thousand horse and twenty-eight guns, broke up towards Hesse-Cassel. On the way the imperial troops devastated the country with fire and sword, and committed untold atrocities. To swell their numbers the League furnished nine thousand foot and two thousand horse ; the Netherlands, four Spanish regiments ; in Silesia were ten thousand men ; from Italy twenty-five thousand were started north under Aldringer and Fürstenberg. The latter came up very slowly ; some of the columns took a year to reach the Elbe from Mantua, being delayed in Swabia and Franconia by their orders to compel the Leipsic Conven-

tion states to submit to the emperor and disarm. Matters looked serious for Hesse-Cassel; but for all the dangers menacing him, the gallant landgrave ceased not from his work.

William of Hesse-Cassel was young, but a man of action. So early as August, 1630, he had offered his assistance to Gustavus, averring that he could not bring much, but that his two fortresses, Cassel and Ziegenhain, should be shut to the imperialists and open to him. Gustavus concluded a treaty with him; and urged him to combine with the states of Weimar, Culmbach and Würtemberg, and the free towns of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Merseburg and Strasburg, which between them could readily arm ten thousand men. The landgrave did his best, but the interference of the imperialists prevented him, and Duke Bernard of Weimar, who worked with him, from accomplishing much. At the Leipsic Convention, these two were almost the only ones who spoke for the Swedes. Under the Leipsic agreement, they armed, as it was understood, for defense, but really proposing to aid Gustavus and to seek his aid. As Tilly approached, the landgrave mobilized his men, beset the defiles and roads, strengthened his fortresses, and peremptorily refused Tilly's demands for contribution. Fortunately for the cause, the elector of Saxony, though still claiming neutrality, was angered by the menaces of Tilly, and determined to resist to the uttermost any inroads on his territory by either party.

Gustavus kept strictly to his agreement with Brandenburg, and after some tedious negotiations succeeding the fall of Magdeburg, on June 9 surrendered Spandau, which had been turned over to him only until the fate of that city should be decided.

If we look at the mere military question, Gustavus was not justified in his anxiety; but a study of the entire situation, political and military, shows us that the antagonism of

Saxony and the unreliability of Brandenburg placed the king in a questionable case. To surrender Spandau meant to give up the line of the Havel, as well as touch with the Elbe; and if the elector should demand back Cüstrin, Stettin itself would not be safe. Gustavus felt that he was justified in any course to prevent such a catastrophe. He told George William that if he so chose he would leave him to fight the imperial army single-handed. This was in reality the last thing the time-serving elector dared face. He would have been happy to leave Spandau and Cüstrin in Swedish hands as the price of support, but, as was his habit, he delayed and talked, while Gustavus, along the Havel, awaited Tilly's advance. Had it not been for abandoning Hesse-Cassel and Weimar, he would have gladly returned to the Oder.

Gustavus had complied with his obligation; but, sick of the fast and loose conduct of George William, he made up his mind to cut the knot of the difficulty; and some days after the surrender of Spandau, he marched on Berlin, and at the mouth of his cannon, supported by his army in line of battle, forced the elector to a fresh treaty, by which the Swedes should retain Spandau for good; have constant passage through Cüstrin, or indeed occupy it with their troops; and the elector should pay the Swedes thirty thousand thalers a month. The trifling of George William was thus brought to an end; he concluded to come to an amicable understanding, and the treaty was subscribed amid festivities.

The king concentrated near Brandenburg some twelve thousand men, and while awaiting events, secured his position by taking and strengthening neighboring towns on the Elbe and Havel. Greifswalde in his rear was the last outstanding fortress in Pomerania. Early in June a stray party of imperialists, perhaps on a reconnoissance, appeared before Malchin, and led Gustavus to believe that an attack on Stralsund or

the relief of Greifswalde was in contemplation. He ordered General Åke Tott, one of his best officers, to collect all available troops in Loitz on June 20, where he intended to meet him; but unable to leave Brandenburg, he intrusted the entire conduct of the affair to Tott, who, with twenty-two hundred men, marched on Greifswalde, and on the night of June 22-23 opened his trenches. On the 23d a sortie was repelled and a bombardment begun. This was followed by the appearance of a herald, and on June 25 the imperialists marched out. The commandant, Perusi, had been killed, or the matter would have been less easy. For this brilliant success Tott was made field-marshal, and ordered to advance against Rostock and Wismar, to open the road to Lübeck. To have an eye to the situation, Gustavus shortly after went on to Greifswalde; but finding that Tott was abreast of the business, he returned to Spandau July 2.

With a suitable van of cavalry, the new field-marshal moved into Mecklenburg, spread all over the country, took Bützow and Schwan, drove the imperialists before him, and blockaded Rostock. A detachment marched south from Malchin, and seized Mirow and Plau. The dukes were in Lübeck, waiting with a small army, and in connection with them, though Güstrow and Schwerin held out till midsummer, Tott reduced all Mecklenburg except Rostock, Wismar and Dömitz. Many men from the garrisons thus taken preferred to enlist in the Swedish service to being paroled or held as prisoners. On July 5 the dukes were formally reinstated in their rights; but they showed small gratitude; they acted in a selfish and shortsighted manner, and every pound of bread for the troops which had reinstated them had to be wrung from their unwilling grasp.

Banér, whom Gustavus had left on the Havel, with instructions to occupy all the strong places on that river, to strengthen

the works of Spandau and Brandenburg, and to build a redoubt at Potsdam, took Havelberg by storm on June 22, and strongly garrisoned it. Gustavus could now see his way clear to a campaign on the Elbe; with Pomerania, Mecklenburg and Brandenburg under his control, he practically commanded all the country to the north of that river; and Tilly was otherwise occupied. The scene had changed.

After what seemed to many his decisive victory at Magdeburg, Tilly, under his instructions to enforce the Edict of Restitution, to compel the disarmament of the German princes, or to incorporate their troops in his own army, moved via Aschersleben June 9, Oldisleben and Mühlhausen June 16-26, and captured Gotha, Eisenach and Weimar, while Erfurt bought itself off by a payment of money. He sent out detachments right and left, demanding that the imperialists be admitted into the fortresses; that the landgrave should disband his army, furnish the empire five regiments, give over Cassel and Ziegenhain to imperial garrisons, and pay the contributions which he should assess. Assembling his forces at Cassel, William firmly refused. Tilly wavered. The landgrave had six thousand or more men, recruits to be sure, but still soldiers, in his fortresses, and the victor of Magdeburg was loth to attack them. Age was encroaching on his energy; but his presence none the less put Hesse-Cassel in a perilous case.

About this time some eight thousand men from Sweden were arriving in Stettin. Of these, four thousand were brought to the main force on the Havel, and four thousand were sent to Tott, who was to join the king with old troops to an equal number. At the same time seven thousand English troops, under Marquis Hamilton, landed in the mouth of the Peene, instead of in the Weser, as expected. These regiments were sent to Horn on the Oder, and he was ordered to

leave a total of four thousand new men on that line, and prepare to join the king with the balance. Gustavus aimed at having service-hardened men at the front. Hamilton's troops are said not to have been of the best quality ; before the end of the campaign they ran down to fifteen hundred men by disease and desertion, and were in a sad state of discipline.

Heartily tired of the timidity and unhelpfulness of the Protestant princes, the king now saw himself by his own efforts in possession of the bastion on the south of the Baltic which he had originally aimed to possess for the safety of Sweden ; and the idea began to impress itself upon him that if his brothers in the faith cared so little for his help, he might hold this bastion, whose walls would be the lines of the Oder-Warta, Spree-Havel and Elbe, and stand in a purely defensive attitude against the emperor. Both the lack of funds and the questionable tendencies of Denmark made this course seem not unadvisable ; but to complete the work, Gustavus must plant his foot firmly on the Elbe, and to this he now addressed himself. The question of the defensive might wait.

Arrived in Spandau, he determined to push at once for the Elbe, not only to complete his bastion, but to draw Tilly away from Hesse-Cassel. Heading seven thousand foot and three thousand horse, he moved from Brandenburg out towards Burg. He imagined that he might tempt Pappenheim from Magdeburg across the river, and engage him ; but failing this, he headed downstream, to Jerichow, which he reached July 8. Pappenheim had an outpost at Tangermünde, opposite, and was at the moment there. On July 9 the king again moved upstream, to lead him to believe that he was aiming for Magdeburg, and Pappenheim marched up to anticipate him. Like Cæsar on the Elaver, Gustavus immediately marched back to Jerichow, put a few hundred men across

on boats, captured Tangermünde and its castle July 10, as well as Stendal and Arneburg, collected all the boats up and down river and built a bridge, on which he crossed his army, and took up a strongly fortified camp near the town of Werben, opposite the confluence of the Havel and the Elbe. Utilizing the embankments as works, he built a fort on the right bank to protect his bridge, which he moved up from Tangermünde, and threw up another fort at the mouth of the Havel. Havelberg had already been taken, and Gusta-



The Werben Camp.

vus' position on the Elbe was made reasonably secure. Pappenheim retired to Halberstadt.

The garrisons of these places were captured, and the men sent in a body to headquarters. As the king came out to inspect them, they fell on their knees to beg for mercy. "Get up," said the king, "I am no god for you to fall down before." Then he added, "You have all acted like brigands and deserve the gallows; but I will make you a present of your lives."

Though he would have liked to march on Magdeburg, Gustavus contented himself with what he had got. His feeling for the offensive was damped by the conduct of the men he had expected to find frank and faithful allies. He held Brandenburg in the leash, but Saxony was not to be moved, and he was at a loss to explain Tilly's queer lack of enterprise. Gustavus could get no money; victualing was so difficult that on one or two occasions the population had cause to

complain of excesses by the troops ; there was a vast deal of sickness. The weeks in Werben during July and August, 1631, were perhaps the monarch's most disheartening period.


One of his objects—to draw the enemy away from his allies—had been accomplished by the march to Werben. Pappenheim, single-handed, felt unequal to the task of facing Gustavus, and called Tilly to his aid. His chief threw up his half-hearted attack on Hesse-Cassel, left a portion of his troops on its borders, and hurried back to the Elbe. Despite his victory he had lost two months and accomplished nothing, while Gustavus had greatly bettered his position. Joining Pappenheim, Tilly, with twenty-seven thousand men, took position at Wolmirstädt below Magdeburg, and on July 27 threw out three regiments of cavalry towards Werben to reconnoitre. Gustavus was ready to meet him in earnest. To help protect the Havel line, he ordered Horn to leave suitable garrisons in Frankfort, Landsberg and Crossen, and some cavalry to scout the Oder-Warta, and to march with all his available force to Fürstenwalde, detaching meanwhile a thousand musketeers to Brandenburg. Tott was to send an equal number.

The king had not exceeding sixteen thousand men, but he took advantage of the isolation of Tilly's cavalry party. From Arneburg, twelve miles up the river, where he had concentrated his own cavalry, he marched, August 1, to Bellin-gen, and sent out patrols, and later an intelligent staff-officer to reconnoitre. The latter brought in some prisoners and information as to the enemy's whereabouts, acting on which the king advanced at nightfall halfway to Burgstall. Here he divided his force, which was about four thousand strong, into three columns. The first, under the rhinegrave, was to attack Burgstall; the second, under Baudissin, was to fall on Angern; the king with the third would advance between

the two others on Rheindorf. The columns were set in motion.

The rhinegrave captured Burgstall, cut down or dispersed the imperial regiment there stationed, and took its baggage. At Angern the attack was equally successful, the enemy losing three hundred killed and many prisoners. When the king reached Rheindorf, he found Tilly's men, who had caught the alarm, drawn up in line. Though he had with him but three hundred horse, he fell with fury upon the imperial regiment, which offered no worthy resistance, and cut it to pieces; part escaped in the darkness, but all the baggage was taken. In the fray Gustavus, with his usual recklessness, rode into the midst of the enemy, was surrounded, and but for the fidelity and courage of Captain Harold Stake, would have lost his life. After this brilliant foray the party retired to Bellingen, and to Werben the next day, stationing the cavalry at Stendal. This capital stroke decidedly raised the morale of the men, while the imperialists felt the blow to a greater degree than the loss warranted.

To make up for this defeat, which he appeared to resent keenly, Tilly, leaving Wolmirstädt with fifteen thousand foot and seven thousand horse, moved on August 6 to the camp at Werben, drew up in battle order, and cannonaded the works with sixteen heavy guns, sharply but ineffectively. He was doubtful about assault, as no practicable breach had



Burgstall Operation.

been made, until he was given to understand by what he supposed were disaffected soldiers in Gustavus' service, that at a given time next day the Swedish guns would be spiked at a particular part of the line. Relying upon this information, which he had no means of verifying, he sent his men to the assault August 7. But the Swedish guns — as always — were in good hands; Tilly's onslaught, though delivered with the old soldier's wonted *élan* and in massed columns, was met by so murderous a fire that its onset was checked; while the cavalry under Baudissin at the opportune moment debouched from a side gate, and galloping in on the Walloon's flank, completed his discomfiture with extremely heavy losses.

In this cavalry charge young Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar distinguished himself and attracted the monarch's eye. While Gustavus' reckless exposure of his person in battle was often without justification, his example none the less produced a wonderful effect on the officers of the army. Where the king exhibited such a spirit, how should any man lack bravery? The result of Gustavus' gallantry was markedly for good, — indefensible as it was, and sad as its results proved in the succeeding year.

Seeing no gain from remaining in Gustavus' front, Tilly retired to Tangermünde August 9. He had incurred a loss of six thousand killed and wounded within a few days, plus a great number of desertions. Thence, hearing that on August 7 Horn had arrived at Rathenow with nine thousand men, he hastily retired to Wolmirstädt, lest he should be taken in flank. The imperial general thus left under a cloud the vicinity where so long he had triumphed. The two captains had measured swords, and unconquered Tilly had given up the field without a victory.

As Tilly might be about to cross the Elbe, to pierce the Havel line, Gustavus prepared a bridge over the Dosse, so as

readily to retire to its defense, and ordered Banér to dam and flood the river. But Tilly did not venture any forward movement.

The king had consumed a year in securing his bastion on the southern shore of the Baltic. At times his conduct had seemed to savor of over-caution; but when we consider that he landed in Germany with but thirteen thousand men; that he had received no assistance from the folk he had come to aid; that he was opposed by superior numbers, the sum total of the year shows up splendidly, and his caution had been worth any amount of recklessness. His base was now assured, and the time for action had come. We shall see how nobly he improved it.




Horse and Equipments used by Gustavus at Lützen. (Stockholm Museum.)

XIX.

TILLY INVADES HESSE-CASSEL AND SAXONY. AUGUST, 1631.

THE south German Protestants had all submitted to the imperial decrees ; it remained to force the north German principalities into line. Gustavus left the Werben camp well garrisoned, and assumed position on the Havel. Tilly marched on Hesse-Cassel, where the landgrave and Bernard held head to him, and then against Saxony, with orders to disarm it. Marking his progress with fire and sword, he reached Leipsic and gave his ultimatum. The elector was in sad case, but he had brought his troubles on his own head. After a few days' resistance, Tilly captured Leipsic, and sat down to await reinforcements. Meanwhile Gustavus advanced to the Elbe, anticipating what must follow. Driven to desperation, John George made a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the king, and Gustavus crossed the Elbe and marched to join the Saxon army, which was put at his entire disposal. A council of war determined on attack, and the two armies advanced towards Leipsic. Gustavus, with his line of small brigades and shallow formation, armed with handy muskets, and aided by quick-firing cannon, was to measure himself against the heavy battles of renowned Tilly. It was activity against bulk. Tilly lay with his back to Leipsic, facing north ; Gustavus was advancing southerly.

FOR many months the imperial troops under Fürstenberg, Aldringer and Fugger had been marching up from Italy, had moved into Swabia and Franconia, and by untold outrage compelled the Protestant princes who were acting under the Leipsic Convention, to submit to the emperor, to enlist under the imperial banners the troops raised for their own defense, and to pay heavy penalties. These officers had orders to reinforce Tilly, and their head of column had already crossed the Main. Tilly remained at Wolmirstädt, which was a central point between Brandenburg, Saxony and Hesse-



Elbe-Main Country.

Cassel, and enabled him to watch them all. His troops were badly off as to health and victual, and quite wanting in camp discipline, though in battle, be it said to their credit, Tilly's men always behaved well, as their chief commanded nobly.

While the king was awaiting events, Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel came to Werben, definitely to cast in his fortunes with the Swedes; and a treaty offensive and defensive was made, in which Weimar was included. Ten thousand men could be raised by these states; and it was agreed that the Swedes should protect the new allies, who would open their fortresses to Gustavus and close them to the emperor. The landgrave did not feel that Gustavus had failed in his obligations to Magdeburg, and shortly went back to watch his territory.

For his gallantry displayed in Tilly's attack on Werben, Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar had been made colonel of Gustavus' body-guard cavalry regiment. With the landgrave the king sent back two of his best battalions as a nucleus for drill and discipline, and it was arranged that Bernard should take command of the Hessian contingent, as the landgrave had much confidence in his military skill. Then, in mid-August, leaving in the Werben camp, under Baudissin and Teuffel, a force sufficient to defend it, with eighteen thousand troops the king moved by his left, back of the Havel, and took post at Havelberg, Brandenburg and Rathenow, in a position to concentrate and move on any point. He considered the Havel, under the circumstances, a better rendezvous than Werben. Each detachment had orders to act on the defensive if attacked, utilizing the near-by strong places, until the king came up to its assistance. Gustavus had materially gained since the disaster at Magdeburg, but he was still compelled to wait on Saxony, whose action he believed the enemy under the positive orders of the emperor would shortly force; or

should Tilly advance, by confining him to the devastated strip between the Havel and the Elbe, the king hoped to drive him back on Saxony, and thus oblige the elector the quicker to decide whose cause he would embrace. Meanwhile, as Tilly moved on his new errand, Gustavus advanced nearer the Saxon border, to be ready to help John George whenever the elector should be ready to help himself. The imperialists played into his hands.

Tilly had definite orders to bring the north German princes back to their fealty, as those of south Germany had been, — by the sword. From Tangermünde he had notified the Hessians that they must choose between landgrave and emperor, and the loyal Hessians gave a noble reply. With but five thousand men under his command, Bernard threw down the gauntlet. He captured Fritzlar at the end of August, while the duke of Hersfeld laid Fulda under contribution. This was bold conduct in face of the approach of the Italian troops, eager to do by Hesse-Cassel as they had done by the south German states. But the danger to Hesse and Weimar settled itself. Tilly reached Eisleben August 28; and from here, under his new instructions, he ordered Aldringer with his seven thousand men, and Fürstenberg with his twenty thousand, to join him for an attack on Saxony. Tiefenbach from Silesia was to demonstrate on the Saxon rear, while Fugger was sent against Hesse-Cassel.

The reason of this change of plan was that the emperor felt that it was time to compel Saxony to disarm and submit to his authority. He had already made some demands in May and July, after a long correspondence dating back to 1630, and he now proposed to show that his demands must be met. It was for this purpose that Ferdinand ordered Tilly to move on John George and enforce the Edict of Restitution.

Between them the imperial generals had thirty-four thou-


sand men, and Aldringer had got as far as Jena. Tilly's troops moved towards Leipsic with the usual barbarous devastation, — two hundred burning villages lay in his wake, — and reached Halle September 4, and Merseburg next day. They finally went into camp between the two places, and roving about, plundered the entire neighborhood of Merseburg, Naumburg and Zeitz. Here Tilly declared himself. He demanded that John George should quarter and feed the imperial army, disband his new levies, serve under his (Tilly's) orders with a suitable contingent, formally recognize the emperor, and disavow any and all connection with the Swedish business.

John George was in pitiable case; but sympathy for him would be wasted. Saxony was torn by three parties, the Swedish, the imperial and the neutral. Between his ties to the emperor, his Lutheranism, and his desire to erect in Germany a Third Party which should grow to be strong enough to control both the emperor and the emperor's enemies, he knew not which way to turn. And yet fire and sword were at his gates. He was at this moment under the control of Count Arnim, who was a Brandenburger and a Lutheran, had been Wallenstein's lieutenant at Stralsund, had served with Koniecpolski against Gustavus in Poland, and had now become Saxon generalissimo. The Third Party notion was as much Arnim's pet idea as the *Corpus Evangelicorum*, or union of the Protestant powers, was Gustavus'.

In all his negotiations with John George, the king had shown himself frank and aboveboard in his desire to subserve the cause of religion in Germany. He was even now ready to leave the cause with John George and retire to Sweden, providing his rights and those of his fatherland were fitly recognized. He had done everything to persuade the elector to joint efforts, but John George could not bring him-

self to an alliance with Sweden until the last ray of hope was gone of reconciling the two religions under the empire.

Nearing Leipsic, Tilly, on September 8, demanded a supply of victual from this city; but the citizens were bold in their reply. Unless their master, the elector, consented, they would have no dealings with Tilly. The imperial general appeared before the gates, devastated the entire region, and again demanded quarters and rations. Again refused, he moved on the town, camped near Möckern, and threatened Leipsic with utter destruction unless it surrendered. More



Leipsic and Breitenfeld.

bold than discreet, the citizens replied as before. Tilly opened trenches, planted a heavy battery of siege-guns and mortars at Pfaßendorf, and intrenched the heights at Entritsch to bar the road from Düben, by which the Swedes might come. The citizens burned the suburbs, manned the walls, and replied with some effect to Tilly's fire, which began

September 14. After nearly a day's bombardment Tilly again demanded surrender, and threatened the city with the fate of Magdeburg in case the gates were not forthwith opened.

The three messengers sent by the elector had been captured; Leipsic did not know how near relief was; and further resistance being mere madness, Tilly's ultimatum was accepted September 16. Four hundred thousand florins were paid, the small garrison marched out with the honors of war, and Tilly occupied the town. Scarcely within walls, Tilly received news of the approach of the allies. He at once marched to the north of the city, and drew up in battle order on the hills opposite Podelwitz and Göbschelwitz, and with Leipsic in his rear. He would have been glad to wait for Aldringer and Fugger, but reinforcements were to be denied him.

The plundering and devastation of the imperial army had embittered the elector, whose obstinate clinging to his impossible neutrality was now reaping its reward, and finally prevailed on him to declare against the empire. Not counting garrisons, he had some eighteen thousand men assembled in Torgau to prevent Tilly's reaching Dresden.

Gustavus had advanced to Wittenberg on September 2, with five thousand cavalry. Banér and Teuffel followed, while to Tott was committed the duty of holding the bastion, should matters turn out badly. Horn was to form a new army, on the nucleus of the Havel troops, from a promised Brandenburg contingent, some Swedish cavalry to arrive, the Scotch battalions, and the men of Hamilton and Leslie; and to be ready, if ordered, to move on Silesia.

The Swedish army, on September 3, had reached Coswig and Wittenberg. John George having succumbed, Brandenburg and Saxony, from whatever motives, were arrayed on the

Swedish side, and Gustavus saw daylight before him. An alliance offensive and defensive was made at Coswig, September 10, by which the elector agreed to give the Swedish army a month's pay, furnish it with rations, and admit it to his most important cities. All defiles were to be open to Gustavus and closed to the imperialists; the conduct of military affairs was to be left to Gustavus, and no peace was to be concluded without him. The king agreed to drive the imperialists from Saxony, and stand by John George to the last. Had Brandenburg and Saxony joined him a year before, what might not have been accomplished! Hereupon, instant orders were given to break up, all available forces were called in to the colors, Horn was instructed to join the king, and the army crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg and headed for Düben on the Mulde, the rendezvous with the Saxons.

The "order of battle" in which they passed the bridge is interesting. On September 9 a cavalry detachment of five hundred men had crossed and been spread out as a curtain to cover the bridge; and on September 12 Quartermaster-General Bouillon, with three hundred cavalry and a small wagon-train, joined them. The army itself began to cross September 13. First marched a vanguard of two thousand foot, a detachment of cavalry, and twelve guns drawn by teams of eleven to thirty-one horses; ordnance and munition wagons came next, carts loaded with cannon-balls, nine regimental pieces with their munition wagons, all followed by four blue and white cornets. His majesty of Sweden in person followed, under special escort of two cavalry cornets, with black and gold pennants, his battle-charger led behind him; and then several other cornets, blue and red, white, orange, yellow, red, blue, green. Behind these filed four royal six-horse canopy coaches and two royal baggage wagons, and again cavalry cornets, green, blue and red. Then fol-

lowed the infantry regiments with their picces and powder and ball carts, the baggage wagons and pack-horses; and then the bulk of the cavalry with all its baggage. Last filed the general wagon-column under escort of horse and foot.

The army halted at Kernberg towards evening, and next day, September 14, it reached Düben.

From Torgau the elector reached the vicinity of Düben September 15. Gustavus rode over to the Saxon army, warmly greeted the elector, and narrowly inspected the troops, which were drawn up in parade order. He estimated the six regiments each of horse and foot at twenty thousand men, though they are elsewhere given at sixteen thousand. A joint inspection of the Swedish army followed. There were twenty thousand foot and seventy-five hundred horse in line.

At a council of war immediately succeeding these ceremonials, Gustavus advised a series of manœuvres to tire out the imperial army and seek to place it at a disadvantage before a general battle. He spoke of his ability to do this as superior to Tilly's, and suggested the distress Brandenburg and Saxony would be in in case of a defeat. For himself, he said, he could retire beyond seas, for which purpose he had a good base to embark from and a fleet. Curiously, John George the procrastinator now urged immediate battle. He was anxious to save Saxony from the plundering to which it was being subjected, was unwilling to subsist two armies during the suggested manœuvres, and had great confidence in the Swedish capacity for fighting. Gustavus was not loth to deliver battle, and it was determined to march without delay to the relief of Leipsic. On the 16th the allied army marched from Düben to Wolkau.

“In the early twilight of the 6th (16th N. S.) we passed through Düben and reached the hamlet of Wolkau, one and

a half (German) miles from Leipsic, near evening," writes the king, from whose letters or dispatches comes a good bit of information; "and here we rested over night. On the 7th (17th), in the gray of the morning, I ordered the bugles to sound the march, and as between us and Leipsic there were no woods, but a vast plain, I deployed the army into battle order and marched towards that city. After an hour and a half's march, we saw the enemy's vanguard with artillery on a hill in our front, and behind it the bulk of his army."

It is not possible accurately to gauge the numbers of the two armies. Apparently good authorities differ, and even the Swedish records are at variance with regard to the Saxons. On the day of the battle the Swedes, according to the official list, had twenty-six thousand eight hundred men in line, viz.: nineteen thousand one hundred foot, and seven thousand seven hundred horse. The joint forces may have been forty-five thousand men. Neither can the strength of Tilly's army be justly given, but it no doubt fell a good deal short of forty thousand men.

Until Frederick the Great astonished Europe with his grand-tactics, there are but few battles of modern times which exhibit novelty in manœuvre. Armies met in a formal way, drew up in parallel order, advanced on each other, and there ensued a hand to hand conflict much wanting in the element of calculation or the utilization of favorable conditions; whoever stood the hammering or staved off demoralization the longer won.

The battle of Breitenfeld was a good sample of retrieving, by quick decision and action, an impending disaster, of utilizing an opportunity offered, of true battle-captain's work. It was not noteworthy for any special exhibition of what we now call grand-tactics, for it was not fought as it was intended it should be; but it was essentially noteworthy as being the first

great engagement in which the modern tactics of mobility, of which Gustavus Adolphus was the originator and exponent, were opposed to the Middle Ages tactics of weight; in which the new Swedish was opposed to the old Spanish method. In this sense the contest was as interesting as the matching of phalanx against legion.

The Spanish tactics, as already explained, consisted in marshaling heavy bodies — battalia or battles — of troops in such masses that their mere advance should be irresistible, and that they should break a charge of cavalry upon them as the cliff breaks up the waves. The line was set up with foot in heavy squares in the centre, and horse in heavy columns on the wings, and after the fire of the artillery and the charge of the squares had shaken the enemy, the duty of the horse was to ride him down. The infantry battalia were wont to consist of fifty files ten deep, of which mass the bulk was mere pushing, not fighting force; and on the four corners stood groups of musketeers, two or three deep; while other musketeers were put out as skirmishers to protect the flanks of the battalia. Such was the Spanish battalion; it was an oblong fortress with bastions at the corners, and surrounded by outworks.


In these huge masses of human brawn the weapons were equally cumbersome. The pike was long and heavy, of use only to keep an opponent at a distance, not to demolish him by stroke of arm; and the old musket, requiring ninety-nine "times and motions" to handle, and a crutch to lean it on to fire, was as slow and ineffective as the artillery. Nor was the cavalry much less lumbering. Like a child with a new toy, it had fallen in love with its firearms, had come to discard its shock-tactics, and had learned to rely on repeated salvos of its carbines or pistols. These salvos were delivered from near at hand, and the squadrons lost the momentum of the

full gallop charge from a distance. It was really mounted infantry, one regiment differing from another only in weight of armor or weapons. No doubt all this had a defensive value; but set it going at any pace, and it would fall apart by its own weight.

What Gustavus had been introducing and practicing his troops to use, ever since he ascended the throne, was a gun which could be rapidly fired, and a formation in which men could readily manœuvre. The Swedes had now next to no armor to hamper their movements; their musket was so light as to need no crutch, and its wheel-lock was vastly better than the match-lock of the imperialists. In addition to this, Gustavus' artillery was immeasurably superior, and the regimental pieces could actually follow the regiments.

Moreover, instead of these large bodies, which were intended to act together and be mutually dependent, the Swedes had a line made up of smaller battle groups, each of which was independent and self-sustaining. Gustavus had the habit not of collecting all his horse in a mass on each flank, but of alternating bodies of horse and foot in parts of the line itself. To soldiers brought up under the modern system, this formation seems odd enough, but it well suited the fire of that day, as it had suited at times the ancient tactics; bodies of cavalry need no longer dash uselessly against the battles, but the horse and foot were able to support each other in an advance. When the musketeers had broken the enemy by their fire, the horse pushed out and charged him. In retreat they worked equally well; the musketeers protected the horse, and the horse prevented the broken foot from being ridden down. In the centre of the line the foot was not always mixed with horse; but the units were smaller. The full Swedish brigade is stated at one thousand two hundred and twenty-four men, and was made up of either one strong or two or three weak

regiments. It was a sort of wedge of one body of pikemen backed by two others, and in the intervals and on the flanks bodies of musketeers who might break out, deploy to fire, and again retire into the brigade. At Breitenfeld the brigades stood in three lines. The sketch of Lord Reay was not the common order of the Swedish brigade formation, though it



Brigade and Half-brigade.
Lord Reay's sketch.

may have applied to foreign bodies in Swedish service. Perhaps the difference exists in the use of the words "half-brigade" for what others called "brigade." The leading half-brigade of Lord Reay's diagram corresponds to what is

usually referred to as a brigade; the rear half-brigade does not.

As already explained, the line had been reduced to files three deep for firing in battle, though supposed to be six deep in fact; the first rank knelt and the other two stood. This gave much more effective fire and reduced casualties. Fire was delivered by platoon or by rank, and each rank having fired had but two others to pass to go to the rear and load. In the imperial army it might have nine ranks to pass.

What Gustavus gained in men by his shallow formation, he utilized by carefully marshaling his second line; and what his first line lost in weight was made up by a second line or by reserves. It must not be supposed that the Swedish line lacked strength. It had nearly as many men, over six to the lineal metre of front, as the imperialists. Its organization gave it both power and elasticity. The two armies differed as a rigid cast-iron bar differs from an elastic steel sword-blade. The latter has life which the other lacks.

We shall see how these two systems worked in the first general engagement where they fairly and squarely met.

XX.

BREITENFELD. SEPTEMBER 17, 1631.

THE Leipsic plain is wide and flat, with here and there a rolling hillock good for artillery. Tilly had an admirable line, and a splendid array of veterans. He had never lost a great battle, and his men were eager to fight. The Swedes were not handsome, but the stuff was there. The Saxons were a bespangled lot, but they did not know what fighting meant. Tilly stood in a line of seventeen great battles, with Pappenheim and Fürstenberg on the flanks, and with his guns admirably posted. Early astir, the Swedes marched towards the enemy with cheer. Brushing away Tilly's outposts, they came into line with the Saxons on their left. In the Swedish wings horse was mixed with the foot in alternate small detachments; the right wing under Banér was principally horse; the king led the centre, mostly of foot; Horn on the left, with horse and foot. Each regiment had its guns, and the reserve artillery under Torstenson was on the left centre. The Saxon formation is not known. The battle opened with artillery, and restless Pappenheim rode out, unordered, to break the Swedish right; but Banér met him manfully, and drove him off in flight. Next, Fürstenberg charged in on the Saxons, and sent them flying to the rear. Tilly had viewed these unauthorized advances in dismay; but the flight of the Saxons uncovered Gustavus' flank; he prepared to strike him there, and wheeled in upon him. Gustavus was ready. Forming a crotchet of his left, he reinforced Horn, and then, heading the cavalry of the right, he rode down the late line of battle, captured Tilly's guns, and turned them on the enemy. The centre swung round so as to prolong Horn's new line, and Torstenson's guns took Tilly's squares in flank. The battle was won; but brave Tilly with his Walloons held firm until fairly torn to shreds. Then, thrice wounded, the old hero was borne off the field by his beaten troops *d'élite*. The victory was complete. Activity had proved superior to weight.

THE original intention of Tilly had been to operate defensively behind the Elster and Saale until his belated lieutenants should arrive, but Pappenheim had been hotly urging on his chief the necessity of at once quelling the spirit of the

Protestants by beating them in battle, as he had no doubt unconquered Tilly could do. Few of the generals sustained the chief in waiting for reinforcements, and Tilly listened to the plea of his young and ardent officers. The events around Leipsic brought the armies together, and after the capture of the city, Tilly sat down with his back to it to await the onmarch of the new allies.

The plain north of Leipsic is admirably adapted for the evolutions of an army. It stretches for miles in either direction with but slight accentuation, and what slopes do exist are as if created for the play of artillery. Tilly had previously sent out and intrenched some heights at Entritsch so as to hold the road from Düben, and had selected for his line the elevation facing Podelwitz and Göbschelwitz athwart the allied advance; his batteries, protected in a slight way by earthworks, lay near the turnpike.

While the Swedes and Saxons, in the gray of the morning of September 17, 1631, were preparing to cross the Loberbach in their advance on Leipsic, Tilly led his brilliant column to these same heights and out beyond; and some time before the arrival of the allies, had drawn up his long array, with Breitenfeld to the rear of his left, a mile or so away, and Seehausen behind his right. The sun and wind were both at his back, a feature much in his favor.

In contrast to the rough and rusty Swedes, Tilly commanded a splendid-looking set of veterans. His army numbered men who had followed him for years, and knew that he had never yet been conquered in a battle. Prominent among these were his Walloons, at the head of whom he took his stand on his white battle-charger, which was known to every man in line. As the rugged old veteran of seventy-two, passed along, shouts of "Father Tilly!" rang from battalion to battalion. There was no feeling of uncertainty

in the imperial army. That full-throated cheer presaged success.

As variously computed, Tilly had from thirty-two to forty thousand men, of which a quarter was cavalry. He drew up the infantry in seventeen great battalia, of fifteen hundred to two thousand men each, in the centre, and ranged the horse in similar masses of about one thousand men, ten deep, on the flanks. Pappenheim with his famous black cuirassiers was on the left, Fürstenberg, who had personally come up, was on the right, with the cavalry just back from Italy, under Isolani, in first line. Tilly is credited with but twenty-six guns. This was the number reported as captured by the Swedes, but it seems as if there must have been more. His guns were difficult to handle, but he would scarcely meet his new antagonist without an effort to place in line batteries more nearly equal to the Swedish, whose effectiveness he must well know. His heavy guns were placed between the right wing and the centre; his light guns in front of the centre.

It has been asserted on the generally plausible ground of the custom of the day, that Tilly's army was drawn up in two lines. But all old pictures of the battle show but one line, and Tilly covered so great a stretch of front that, with his deep battalia, he had scarce enough men to form a regular second line. Only the Italian author Gualdo speaks of two lines; other accounts mention no second one. However disposed, the imperial line was longer than the allied, considerably overlapping the Swedish. Tilly had many times won success by wheeling in on the enemy's flank, and he may have hoped to do so here. Not prolific of novelties in tactics, he based his faith on the time-tried manœuvre. His men bound white kerchiefs in their hats, and the watchword was "Jesu-Maria!"

With a small column of cavalry, Pappenheim had been sent forward to arrest the allied advance at the little stream Loberbach, if perchance some advantage might be had of them.

At early daylight the Swedes had fallen into line, and advanced in battle order across the even plain from Wolkau, towards Leipsic. After an hour and a half's march they ran across the enemy's van, and then caught sight of the imperial array on the slopes where it had taken up its stand. To cross the Loberbach, the armies were compelled to ploy into column, and here they encountered the skirmishers of Pappenheim; but they threw them back, and crossed at the several fords.

The Swedes held the right and centre; the Saxons the left; but the two armies fought as separate organizations. There is no record of the Saxon formation; the Swedish may be of interest. The Saxons lay on the east of the Düben road; the Swedes on the west.

The Swedish centre had in first line four brigades of foot under Generals Winkel, Carl Hall, Teuffel and Åke Oxenstiern; in reserve to the first line the cavalry regiment of Ortenburg, and the Scottish infantry under Monroe and Ramsey. In second line the centre had three brigades, of which one Scotch under General Hepburn, and two German under Generals Vitzthum and Thurn. Behind this stood the reserve cavalry under Schafmann and Kochtitzky.

At the head of the right wing, which was mostly cavalry, stood Field-Marshal Banér, second in command. In first line were the East Gothland, Småland, West Gothland, and two Finland regiments under Tott; and the Wunsch and Stålhandske regiments, the best of their kind. Between each two of the small cavalry divisions there was stationed a body of two hundred musketeers. In reserve was the Rhinegrave

regiment. In second line stood the cavalry regiments of Sperreuter, Damitz, and the Courland and Livonia regiments.


Field-Marshal Horn commanded the left wing. In first line stood the cavalry regiments of Baudissin, Calenbach and Horn, interspersed with the bodies of two hundred musketeers already mentioned. There was no reserve to this first line. In second line came Courville's and Hall's cavalry regiments. Between each two cavalry divisions was the same body of two hundred musketeers.

The regimental pieces were in front of the regiments; what we might call the reserve artillery was massed in front of the left centre under Torstenson.

On the left of Horn came the Saxons, destined by their utter lack of discipline, not to say cowardice, to aid in winning the battle.

The whole Swedish army wore hopeful green branches in their headgear, and the pass-word was "God with us!" Gustavus, who, despite his growing bulkiness, was always a noble figure, addressed the troops amid great enthusiasm. He wore but his common buff coat, and a gray hat with a green feather. Armor he had long ago discarded as uncomfortable; for the Danzig bullet still lay in his shoulder, and he was irritated by the weight of the cuirass. He sought but the protection of the Almighty.

The Saxon army was freshly equipped, and looked well. The imperialists wore gold and silver ornamented clothes, — the plunder of an hundred towns, — and from their headgear nodded fine plumes. Their horses were big showy Germans; the Swedish horses were small and gaunt. Compared to the other soldiers on this field, the Swedish peasant made a slender show; but the stuff was in him, as his fine friends and foes alike found out and long remembered.



The Armies in Line.

So soon as they came within range, the imperial artillery began playing on the allies, and their marshaling took place under constant fire; but when the Swedish guns could be got up, they were put in battery, and replied three shots for one. The advance and deployment of the allied line had taken till nearly noon, and for two hours and a half after that time, there was no exchange except a cannonade, which indeed went on during the whole day.

Pappenheim's splendid cuirassiers had returned from the Loberbach and had taken place in line. All were now awaiting some incident to call for an opening attack; the imperialists expected the allies to advance, and Gustavus was making sure that all was ready, to give the signal call.

Pappenheim was growing restless. He was bold and impatient. Having stood the Swedish artillery fire for a number of hours, he could contain himself no longer. Gathering his five thousand horse in hand, and without awaiting orders from his chief, he thundered down upon Banér, who held the Swedish right, galloping in on him at the head of the best cavalry division then in arms. Tilly recognized his lieutenant's mistake before he had ridden a hundred yards. "They have robbed me of my honor and my glory!" he cried, throwing up his arms in despair.

In order to place his line where the disadvantage of dust would not be so great—the wind was southwest and the plain parched from a long drouth—Gustavus had, after crossing the Loberbach, moved well to his right, to establish his position.

The idea of Pappenheim was that he could edge to the left enough to outflank the Swedes, and then, by a half right wheel, push in and destroy their flank. He did not know Banér. He forgot, too, that his advance would separate him from the main body of the army at a time when he

might be sadly needed. His action was in every sense to blame.

Not only was Pappenheim's advance an error, what was worse, it failed.

The Swedish formation and excellent behavior easily withstood the shock. The "commanded musketeers" — as the small bodies interspersed with the cavalry were called — received the cuirassiers with withering salvos, and between shots the Finns and Goths charged out on the horsemen with a gallantry which cheered the whole right flank. Banér at once understood the purpose of the brave but over-impetuous Pappenheim; and when the imperial commander turned from the Swedish front, and rode around its flank, he was met before he was ready by a stiff counter-charge from one of the cavalry regiments in reserve behind the first line. Not discouraged, though checked, Pappenheim renewed and renewed his charges. Seven times did he rally his men, and dash down upon the Swedish front and flank; but the musketeers — fit prototype of Fritz's Prussian foot — stood their ground as steadily in the hand to hand conflict as if they had been on parade, and the Swedish cavalry, though lighter by far, wavered not from their doughty resistance. The Holstein infantry regiment, which was sent by Tilly to Pappenheim's support, was cut to pieces, and the duke fell at the head of his men. No impression whatever had been created by Pappenheim's advance; and even this *preux chevalier* was eventually thrown back, decimated and unnerved, was followed sharply by Banér and driven off the field. The wreck fled towards Halle, and Gustavus discreetly recalled the pursuers to the line.

It must be remembered that the cavalry charge of that day was not delivered at a gallop. The troops rather rode at a trot, and at a convenient distance halted to use their

firearms. So long as there was a volley left, they did not draw their swords. It was not a question of solid impact; cavalry was not then the "arm of the moment;" it fought like infantry on horseback, and the footman's "push of pike" was much more common than the horseman's cold steel, so long as the enemy showed a front. When he lost steadiness, came the cavalryman's chance; he could slash up broken infantry if he could not break it.

On the allied left the result was different indeed. The charge of the imperial cavalry, under Fürstenberg and Isolani, could not long be held back after Pappenheim had started on his gallant but mistaken ride; the squadrons drove forward, straight upon the Saxon array. Nor did they meet a line of Swedish veterans; except for some efforts by the horse and artillery, they crushed in the Saxon formation the moment they reached it; and the loss of a few gunners, the unseating of a few officers, was enough to send the bespangled battalions of John George to the right-about. The elector was seized with an equal terror; he and his body-guard turned and spurred away to Eilenburg. In a short half hour the imperial cavalry of the right had driven the whole Saxon contingent — nearly half the army — from the field; having done which, it prepared to turn in upon the now naked left flank of the king of Sweden.

The Swedish train behind the army caught the infection from the flying Saxons, and made its way to the rear, in much disorder. As non-combatants they were mostly hired Germans, on whose stanchness no reliance could be placed.

The battle had begun without the orders of Father Tilly; it was running its course without any interference by him; it was going quite against his wishes. But at this juncture, from his position in the centre, he was quick to see that the Saxon flight had opened a chance by which he might repair

the errors already made, and win the day. The Swedish left was open; and Tilly's centre of irresistible Spanish battalia not only overlapped it, but he now outnumbered the king at least three to two. Moreover Tilly was compelled to act, for the fire from Torstenson's quick-served guns was growing deadlier every minute. He gave the order to advance in the wake of Fürstenberg, and, in the belief that the king would not separate his left from his centre, obliqued to the right, so as to get well beyond Gustavus' left. The direction of his movement was to the east of the Düben road; and be it said for the credit of Tilly's manœuvring capacity, that a part of his heavy line of battalia was able to march obliquely to the right, make a partial wheel to the left, and still advance in serried ranks against the position where, when it started out over two hours before, had stood the Swedish naked flank; while Fürstenberg rode further to the north, to come down upon its rear.

But Gustavus was alive to the danger, and Horn could manœuvre twice as fast as the best of Tilly's battles. Under Gustavus' instructions Horn smartly wheeled his wing to the left, threw out detachments to hold the ditches of the Düben road, and was ready to meet the imperial general long before he reached the spot; while the king, hastily drawing Vitzthum's and Hepburn's brigades from the second line of the centre, threw them in to sustain the new line on the left. The fight here was thus established on a safe basis, and despite their heroic charges the Swedes drove the imperial cavalry back, and were ready to attack the battalia when they should put in their appearance.

Now came the moment for Gustavus and his mobile line, and the king grasped it in a twinkling. Riding back to the right, he gave hurried orders to Banér, and heading the West Gothland horse down along the front of the Swedish

line, he sent them charging at a furious gallop in on the flank of Tilly's battles. Here it was cold steel; not a volley was fired, but the squadrons dashed straight at the enemy with the momentum of a *pas de charge*. Gustavus himself waited but to seize the Smålanders, East Gothlanders and Finns, — four regiments, — and followed hard along, bearing to the right up the slope where still stood the imperial guns. These were heavy and hard to move, and the king and his



Battle of Breitenfeld. (2d Phase.)

horsemen swept over them wholesale, captured them in a trice, sabred the gunners where they stood, and in a few minutes turned the battery against the flank of Tilly's line, now standing at bay where the brave old soldier had hoped to turn the tide. Never, in modern days, had the chances of battle been improved by so rapid, so masterly, so bold a manœuvre.

The temporary promise of success of the imperial right, and the failure of its left, had thus given a new and curious direction to the line of battle. The Swedish left stood almost at right angles to where it had first been marshaled, with Tilly, in more or less irregular order from his unwonted manœuvre, facing it. The king had captured Tilly's original position, and was not only pounding the imperialists with their own cannon-balls, but Torstenson had swung round his reserve artillery, which had stood in front of the Swedish centre, and was pouring the contents of his munition wagons, on a line parallel to the late Swedish front, into the huge,

defiant squares. Gustavus now made a general wheel to the left by his centre and right, so as to prolong the new front of Horn. He had already, by capturing the imperial batteries, cut the enemy off from Leipsic, but the battle was still to be won, and there was a fierce and prolonged hand to hand fight along the Düben road. With all the artillery in his hands and all the cavalry now left upon the field, it could, however, end but one way. It was solely a question of how complete the victory should be; of what losses the imperialists would stand before their resistance was turned into flight; of how tough Father Tilly was.

Tilly's veterans fought in a way to preserve their own fame and their general's reputation. Standing at bay with the Swedish array on two sides of them, torn by the fire of their own and the enemy's guns; with their cavalry in distant flight, no reserves to aid, no hope of anything but destruction, the battles of Tilly stuck manfully to their task. Gaps were torn in their ranks to no purpose. There they stood, partly from gallant love of their rough old chief, partly from the sheer inertia of their massed formation, — as the ranks of Porus had stood at the Hydaspes, as the Russian hollow square would stand at Kunersdorf. Finally, towards nightfall, the stampede began. Once begun, it spread fast, and shortly, save a small body of braves who surrounded Tilly, the infantry battalia melted into a mass of fugitives. There was no organization left. Pappenheim's famous horsemen had hours ago been broken, and with Fürstenberg's had fled; and Tilly's battles crumbled before the activity of the Swedish onslaught.

The Saxon guns were recaptured by the Swedes. The imperial army lost seven thousand killed, six thousand wounded and captured, all its artillery, ninety flags and the whole train. The rest of the army fled in every direction,

mostly towards Halle, whither, thrice wounded and scarcely escaping capture, Tilly also made his way, and from thence to Halberstadt. Here he joined Pappenheim, collected what he could of his forces, and retired to the line of the Weser.

It is related that, so soon as the battle was fairly won, Gustavus dismounted, kneeled on the blood-stained field, and offered up thanks to the Giver of Victory, while all near by him joined earnestly in his pious act. With Gustavus such sincerity was inbred, — like the unspoken battle prayers of Stonewall Jackson.

The king, whose loss had not exceeded twenty-one hundred killed and wounded, left the Saxon contingent to capture Leipsic, and followed up the retreating imperialists. With his usual push he himself headed a body of fifteen hundred horse, and at Merseburg, on September 19, overtook a considerable detachment, beat it, and captured three thousand prisoners. He occupied Halle, September 21, but did not pursue beyond the Saale, for he wished to be secure in his foothold in Saxony before he moved decisively into western or southern Germany. The imperial garrison in Leipsic surrendered September 23, and the Saxons returned to Torgau.

After lying some time in the Halberstadt region, Tilly moved to the Weser, where he recovered his strength rapidly. "Whose house doth burn, Must soldier turn" was true, and he found plenty of recruits.

Breitenfeld, the first great battle of the modern era, is peculiar in more than one way. Counting out the Saxons, who were but a source of weakness, the king was heavily outnumbered, and was attacked successively and in force on both flanks, in a manner which on more than one occasion has proved fatal to an army. Attempted flank attacks some-

times open gaps in the line which delivers them, and result in more harm to it than gain made against the enemy. In this case, the flank attacks, while not lacking in direction and vigor, were met with great constancy; and Pappenheim's being delivered without orders, took the control of the battle out of the hands of the general in command. The situation which led up to Tilly's overthrow was none of his making, though Pappenheim afterwards complained of not being supported in his first charge, and it was Tilly's putting all his strength into the manœuvre on the naked Swedish left flank which practically broke up his line. This would not have happened had Tilly been faced by a line of slow-moving battles; and few generals, in any era, would have neglected so apparently good an opening. It was the Swedish mobility, led by Gustavus' splendid vigor, and his true *coup d'œil* to seize the moment and order the manœuvre needed, which won the battle, rather than Tilly's errors which lost it. Against a heavy line like his own the imperial general would doubtless have been victorious, despite the error of Pappenheim.

Gustavus was at once recognized as the Protestant Hero. Those who had looked askance at him, who had likened him to Christian of Denmark, were now vociferous in his praise; those who had feared to join his standard by word or deed, lest heavy retribution should await them in case of failure, now openly declared for him. All Germany was overrun with pamphlets to laud him, with pictures and medals of Gustavus the Great. For once the Catholic press and pamphleteers were silenced. Their defeat had been too overwhelming. Nothing could be said to excuse it.

The spirit of the Swedes was as much heightened by this victory as the king had gained in glory. The enlistment of prisoners and the gathering up of garrisons swelled the ranks

of the Protestant allies. A new army assembled on the lower Elbe; Tott besieged Rostock, while Landgrave William and Duke Bernard held Fugger in check, cleaned Hesse-Cassel of imperial troops, and made enterprising raids into adjoining Catholic territory.



GUSTAVE ADOLPHE, ROI DE SUÈDE.

(Point par Michiel Van Mierevelt et gravé par W. J. Delft, 1633.)

XXI.

TOWARDS THE MAIN. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1631.

IN fourteen months Gustavus had not only securely established his bastion, but at Breitenfeld had quite changed the aspect of the cause; all laggards now crowded around him with offers of help. Tilly retired behind the Weser; the Catholics saw in the Snow King a dangerous opponent; and the Protestant prospects were flattering. Even Wallenstein aspired to serve the king, but Gustavus mistrusted him. With Saxony and Brandenburg as allies, Gustavus moved confidently to the Erfurt country, through Thuringia to the Main, and to the bishoprics dubbed the Priest's Alley, leaving John George to command an operation towards Silesia. Many thought the king should march direct on Vienna; but it was method, not temerity, which distinguished Gustavus, and he preferred not to prejudice what was already won. Tilly was watched by a minor column, and the king pushed on to the Main. He used his interior lines; every strip gained was carefully guarded; treaties were made with the lands he crossed, and with the free cities, such as Nürnberg. The Main was reached early in October, Würzburg and its castle taken, contributions levied, and the Jesuits banished. Tilly meanwhile raised a new army, marched to Aschaffenburg, joined the duke of Lorraine, and began to operate timorously in the region south of the Main, with near forty thousand men.

ONLY fourteen months had elapsed since Gustavus had landed in Germany, but by his far-seeing, cautious and well-digested plans, crowned by the decisive victory of Breitenfeld, he had completely changed the prospects of the Protestants. He had secured a firm footing in northern Germany, where he held all but a few of the strong places down to Saxony, and had isolated these. His communications with Sweden were secured by the control of the sea, and he had practically established his long-coveted *Dominium Maris Baltici*. After many and vexatious delays he

had concluded treaties with Brandenburg, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel and Weimar, and was strengthened by accessions of troops, tendered and promised from many other quarters. On landing, the horizon was dark and unpromising; the sky had now cleared, and the sun of success blazed forth to cheer the hearts of all.

As Gustavus had gained in moral weight, so his army had gained in aplomb and confidence. His operations had at times appeared slow and cautious, but they had been sure, and, what is better, were justified by the results. He had met with but one serious failure, — Magdeburg, — and this was chargeable to the elector of Saxony. Breitenfeld had placed him on the most prominent pedestal in Europe. The Catholics no longer looked *de haut en bas* on the "Snow King." He was a redoubtable opponent as well as the Protestant Hero, — the "Lion of the North and Bulwark of the Faith." The imperialists had lost in spirit and organization all that the Swedes had gained. Their retreat to the Weser opened the heart of the emperor's possessions to the king's thrust, with but a trivial force in the way. The emperor's authority had received from his "new little enemy" an almost fatal blow, and the Protestants of north and west Germany, who, cowed into submission, had feared to welcome the uncertainty of Swedish aid, now rose, and with hearty good-will enlisted under Gustavus' standards. These fourteen months had distinctly shifted the moral superiority from the Catholic to the Protestant party. Gustavus had risen beyond being king of Sweden. He was now the leader of the attack in a great German war, in which the task he had undertaken was to establish beyond future question the equality of religions all over the land. But the work was not yet in a condition to leave to others. Gustavus had put his hand to the plow, and might not look back. It required the same

wise and vigorous action in the future, to complete the structure which had been so well built in the past.

Tilly's lamentable failure to withstand the Swedish advance began again to draw attention to Wallenstein, who had been nursing his wrath in a species of court in his Bohemian castles, or nursing his gout in Karlsbad. The terror which had been engendered by Gustavus' successes on the Oder now sank into insignificance before the terror inspired by the battle of Breitenfeld. The walls of cities hundreds of miles distant from the scene of action were kept manned; Bohemian forests were laid low to block the roads upon which it was feared that the king might advance; in Prague they equipped a new army; in the Ingolstadt churches they prayed to be "delivered from the devil and the Swedes, the Finns and the Lapps." Vienna was said to be "dumb with fright;" the emperor was so nearly at the end of his wits, say some questionable chroniclers, that he sought means of bringing about peace, and even contemplated flight to Gratz. Universal terror pointed the world to Wallenstein. Only he could inspire confidence; the popular sentiment was in his favor, in the army and outside.

It is a curious fact that of the noted soldiers of the Thirty Years' War, only Pappenheim was a German, and while Pappenheim was a bold and able lieutenant, he was killed before he rose to higher command. Gustavus was a Swede; Wallenstein was a Czech; Tilly a Walloon; Turenne a Frenchman; of the minor generals, the only German who won repute was Bernard of Weimar, and he forfeited his all at Nördlingen.

Oddly, Wallenstein had been looking in another direction, — towards his old antagonist, Gustavus. Approaches are said to have been made to him about these days by England; they certainly were by the Swedish monarch, and these

Wallenstein had not thrust aside, though he openly denied them. Tilly heard the rumor of such negotiations and taxed the Czech with it; but Wallenstein reassured him. In the same way Gustavus sought to influence Arnim, so as to reach Saxony. He was not above any honorable means to accomplish his end, and Wallenstein was in no man's employ. Nor would it have made any odds if he had been. Like the rest he was a mercenary, even if a great one. Still more important to the fortunes of Germany, Wallenstein stood in correspondence with Arnim. It was in keeping with the spirit of the times that these secret negotiations should go on. Save Gustavus, scarce a potentate in Europe had a disinterested servant. The great Bohemian, unlike most of his contemporaries, was not hide-bound by religion. He had broader aims, and would have welcomed an era of tolerance, in which he could strive for a German empire, under the Hapsburgs, to be upheld by himself as military chief. In another sense Gustavus had equal aspirations, but not for the German crown.

His dismissal from command had hit Wallenstein hard. In the summer of 1631 he undoubtedly stood ready to enter into an alliance with Gustavus, and to serve the Protestant cause, to revenge his wrongs on Ferdinand. Gustavus was almost on the point of intrusting him with an army, but it is doubtful if, in the Swedish service, Wallenstein would have proved a success. Then came the battle of Breitenfeld; and the emperor began once more to look towards his ancient general. But Wallenstein was disinclined to listen, and for a while it appeared as if the three strongest men in Europe — Gustavus, Richelieu, and Wallenstein — were to form an anti-Hapsburg triumvirate.

Now that Gustavus had shown his strength, the Anhalt princes joined the cause. They made a treaty at Halle to

pay three thousand rix dollars a month, to build forts and bridges as directed by the king and at their own cost, to hold their strong places and defiles for the Swedes while denying passage to the emperor, and generally to act under Gustavus' direction, in exchange for the protection afforded by the alliance.

As when Magdeburg was crying aloud for succor, there was again more than one road open to Gustavus. He must choose his plan. Should he move against west Germany and the beaten army of Tilly, who was now basing himself on the Catholic princes of the Rhine; should he march through the Thuringian forest on Franconia and the "Priest's Alley;" or should he move southeastward, on the emperor's hereditary possessions? At a council of war held at Halle shortly after the victory, the elector of Saxony and William of Weimar were present. John George had recovered from the disgrace of his own and his army's flight from the battlefield, for Gustavus had treated him, as he could well afford to do, with an easy touch. After the battle the king had sent to congratulate him on the victory, and to thank him for having suggested an immediate movement on the enemy, — and dull John George was as far from appreciating the touch of satire in the facts as Gustavus was from intending any slur. At this council Oxenstiern and many others advised a march on Vienna. Count Horn made a strong military plea for it. A summary operation, they thought, against the emperor in his capital would bring him to a peace which would set all the questions of Europe at rest. There were few forces — perhaps ten thousand men under Tiefenbach in Silesia, and less in Bohemia under Maradas — to oppose such a march, and the elector of Saxony promised to care for the southwest. That the sentiment was strongly in favor of such a project is shown by the fact that,

twenty years afterwards, Oxenstiern reiterated his opinion before the senate in Stockholm that such a march would have been the wisest one to make. The chancellor could be venturesome on occasion.

But though not slow to see the advantages suggested, the plan did not meet with the king's idea of a systematic method of carrying on the campaign; nor, be it said to his honor, did it chime with the pledges he had given his Protestant friends. So far results had come, not from the boldness, but the caution of his operations. What he had won and held was by intelligently securing each step as he progressed, and by doing nothing which had not its place in the general plan. Still, as was his wont, the king weighed carefully all the *pros* and *cons*, and listened patiently to every suggestion.

Small confidence could be felt in the ability of the Saxon army, beaten so easily at Breitenfeld, to do satisfactory work against imperial forces in the Main country, if Ferdinand should order a concentration there. John George, and especially Arnim, would be glad to control the south German territory; for John George had political and financial schemes to push there, and Arnim his Third Party business; none of which appealed to Gustavus' common sense. The king preferred personally to undertake south Germany, while the Saxons should sustain a force of twelve thousand Swedes, and a Bohemian army to be placed under Wallenstein's command (should he be won over), and the latter with this force might push on to Vienna. Moreover, Gustavus never quite lost his anxiety as to his communications, for he reposed no faith in the constancy of John George or George William, and could still conceive the possibility, even if remote, of Saxony and Brandenburg rising behind him, should he be too far distant. A single check in a movement on Vienna by his

main force would be surely fatal. He knew the iron will of Ferdinand, and did not believe that even the sack of his capital would bring him to terms. The emperor had already been tried in this matter, — and Vienna at that day was not the capital which it now is. Like the Madrid of the eighteenth century, it might be taken by an enemy a dozen times without affecting the war. Ferdinand might retire to the south and involve Gustavus in an extremely dangerous stern chase. Nor was a march on Vienna the best way to compel the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution. Nothing but Gustavus' presence could stay Tilly from visiting on any of the Protestant cities the fate of Magdeburg. The king must consider the work to be done before winter, and decide where he might best dispose his troops. Along the Main lay the rich Catholic bishoprics, — and here he could not only victual his men, but repair the wrongs of his brother Protestants. How much more negotiation was needful to induce the Protestant princes to work together was uncertain. Breitenfeld had changed people's faces, but the king had not forgotten his long struggle with Brandenburg and Saxony, and he believed that a single failure would renew the doubtful attitude of most of his present supporters.

The king's immediate idea was that he would personally move to the Erfurt country for winter-quarters, and govern his further operations from there. Not that he would disperse his men, but he would accumulate magazines, and make his own headquarters here, while the troops lay in Thuringia, with Hesse, Weimar and Saxony near by; and from here he would move on the Franconian bishoprics, compel contributions, recruit up an army for a brilliant campaign in 1632, and utilize the winter to consolidate his conquests, and to bring his allies to work in unison and furnish men and money as well as smiles and promises. Tilly must

be considered; but the king deemed it sufficient to secure his own right by defensive means against him and the Rhineland princes, and his proposal to occupy, free and arm southwestern Germany would cut Tilly off from Bavaria and the emperor; while, if successful, it would win as firm a footing in western Germany as he already had in northern. All parties agreed that it was not worth while to follow Tilly to the Weser. Such an advance with his main force would be taking the king away from his general direction, which should lead to southern Germany and towards the emperor. Though he must not be overlooked, operations against Tilly need not be conducted by the main force; a part of the allied armies, while protecting the king's flank, could prevent the imperialists gaining dangerous headway.

The march on Vienna was given over. Gustavus preferred to operate from his interior lines against all his enemies at the same time. With his main force he would move through Thuringia and Franconia to Swabia, to rouse southern Germany into activity, and gain a vantage-ground from which to attack Bavaria. When he should have secured the whole region from the lower Oder to the middle and upper Rhine, he could operate against Bavaria and Austria from the west. Meanwhile the Saxon, and perhaps Wallenstein's, campaign against Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia would secure the king's left in his advance, and keep up the semblance of an operation against Vienna; and the army of Hesse-Cassel and Weimar would operate against Tilly, prevent his venturing into western Germany, and secure the king's right. No doubt this plan was the wisest, though it did not suit all the Swedish generals, as it certainly did not satisfy the king's paymaster, Richelieu. But this far-seeing statesman did not withdraw his financial support.

The plan thus finally adopted by Gustavus has been much criticised by soldiers. Folard likens his declination to march on Vienna to that of Hannibal, who failed to march on Rome after the overwhelming victory of Cannæ. The comparison — though not so intended — is an apt one. Both Gustavus and Hannibal were right in their action.

Lossau gives a better set of reasons. Tilly, he argues, was beaten, but he should, with Fugger and Aldringer, have been followed up and annihilated. For this purpose, eight to ten thousand men under Horn or Banér sufficed; and when the work was accomplished, the corps could rejoin the main army. The elector of Saxony could easily manage the problem of the south German states with a small force, — there being no great opposition there, and could lend Gustavus a large part of his forces for a march on Vienna, which there was at the moment no organized army to oppose. Through Bohemia and Moravia the Swedish army could be easily victualed, and such a march might have made the subsequent raising of Wallenstein's army impossible. In the event, he says, Gustavus was compelled to operate on the Danube under much less favorable conditions. On the Baltic, in Saxony, in Bohemia, in Westphalia, in Hesse, in Thuringia, in Franconia, everything went well for Gustavus; ill for the emperor. Ferdinand had but fifty thousand men; he had lost more than half Germany; Hungary was threatened; Bavaria was unreliable; the Protestants of Upper and Lower Austria were in revolt. What better time for Gustavus to push home than the present?

All this is fair and proper criticism. But, prior to Gustavus' advent in Germany, there had been, in the history of the Christian era, many bold operations, and there had been no methodical ones. It was method that Gustavus was to teach in war, not alone boldness. This last quality is

common, when taken by itself; combined with discretion it is rare. As Alexander would not advance into the heart of Persia until he had acquired as a base the entire eastern Mediterranean coast; as Hannibal declined after both Trasimene and Cannæ to march on Rome; as Cæsar, after crossing the Rubicon, took all the towns on the Adriatic before he would march to the capital, so Gustavus now decided to make sure of what he had, and to risk nothing for a questionable gain. In the purely military aspect, he was right; taking the political factors into account, doubly so.

In pursuance of this general scheme—which was far-sighted, reckoned on all the political and military factors, paid due heed to the demands of his Protestant allies, and had a basis of broad but to the world novel military judgment—the Swedish monarch set to work. Banér was ordered to leave a garrison in Landsberg, to deliver up possession of Frankfort and Crossen to the elector of Brandenburg, to take command of the Saxon army when it should be in condition for the field, to draw in the Havel and Werben garrisons, and to assume a strong position near Calbe on the Elbe, building forts at Rosenberg and Dessau, the mouths of the Saale and the Mulde. He was to send a cavalry force to take Halberstadt, and to aim at capturing Magdeburg; in fact, Banér was to clear the western skirts of the bastion of all imperialists and then to watch it.

Tott, who lay on the lower Elbe, with the same end in view was instructed to seek helpful alliances in the Brunswick-Lüneburg-Lauenburg territory, and with the free cities of Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg. He was to besiege Rostock, and capture the outstanding towns in the Bremen region. All recruits to arrive from England, Scotland and the Netherlands—and they were a large body—were to land in the Weser and join Tott.

Oxenstiern was instructed to order sundry Prussian garrisons to Pomerania, from which most of the seasoned troops had been drawn. He had already reported in person to the king, who was glad to have him near at hand as an adviser.

Starting on September 27 from Halle, the king, with twenty-six thousand men, headed for Thuringia, by way of Querfurt. He was not sure that he could push beyond this section before winter.


On October 2 Erfurt, one of the chief cities of the elector of Mainz, primate of Catholic Germany, was seized by a clever stratagem of Duke William, and after much discussion agreed to serve the cause, and was strongly garrisoned. Here a final treaty was made with the four brothers of the house of Saxe-Weimar.

The operations of the year had brought about a change in the strategic position. In securing his bastion on the Baltic, Gustavus had a base which called for a front of operations running east and west, from say Landsberg to Werben. He now found himself backing on the Elbe and Saale. His rear was protected by the Frankfort-Crossen line, and no enemy was near it except Tiefenbach in Silesia. Along the Elbe-Saale he lay practically facing west, with the centre point of operations at Erfurt, and groups of forces on his right extending down the Elbe. These groups, under Tott and Banér, on completing their work would join Landgrave William in the Saale region; while the Royal Army would push through the Thuringian Forest to the Werra, and on through Franconia to the Main. This advance would help the forces on the Oder by driving back the enemy, as well as aid the Saxons in their advance through Silesia and Bohemia. But until the imperial allies along the Rhine, with the Spanish Netherlands at their back, could be neutralized, Gustavus could not safely extend his base so as to project a line of advance on the heart of the empire.

At Erfurt the forces controlled by Gustavus and expected to be raised were substantially as follows: The Royal Army numbered eighteen thousand foot, six hundred dragoons and seventy-five hundred cavalry, which it was purposed to increase by eleven thousand foot and seventy-five hundred horse. Banér had four thousand men in the field and thirty-five hundred in garrison, which were to be increased by six thousand and twenty-six hundred respectively. Tott had five thousand five hundred Swedes and eight thousand Mecklenburgers, plus ten thousand eight hundred in garrison; all to be increased by six thousand Dutch troops, five thousand recruits, eight thousand in new regiments and thirty-five hundred Swedish cavalry. Hesse-Cassel had ten thousand men, to be increased by seven thousand; and Weimar was to raise eleven thousand five hundred. Thus the seventy thousand men already under the colors, it was hoped, would be nearly doubled. These calculations were well borne out by the promise.

As Bernard preferred to serve immediately under the king, Gustavus left the reigning duke, William of Weimar, in command of the Thuringian territory, to recruit for the above contingents, and gave him as a nucleus twenty-six hundred foot and four hundred horse.

How far Gustavus planned his advance from Erfurt cannot be said; but he sent embassies to Bayreuth and to Nürnberg to pave the way. He took no step in the dark. The army advanced through the Thüringerwald range in two columns: one via Gotha and Meiningen, one under the king in person via Arnstadt (October 7), Ilmenau and Schleusingen (October 8), where headquarters were established. The two columns reunited at the fortress of Königshofen, the key to the bishopric of Würzburg, which succumbed only to Torstenson's heavy guns, and was left with a strong garrison.



The Main Country.

The next place essential to clear the country between the Saale and the Main was Schweinfurt, which surrendered, and received a sure commandant with a suitable garrison. Gustavus was greeted by the laity as the harbinger of freedom, but there was a great flight of priests and friars. He issued a proclamation covering all kinds and conditions of

men. He had come, he said, to protect the Protestants from further injustice; but all, whatever their faith, who obeyed the law, would be protected from injury. Arrived October 13 at Würzburg, the capital of Franconia, whose prince-bishop had fled, the town capitulated October 15; but the garrison and chief inhabitants retired with their valuables to the castle of Marienburg, on the further bank, where they deemed themselves quite beyond reach.

This castle lies on a high rock, perpendicular on the water side, but approachable from the land. The gate was protected by a deep ditch, with a half-moon outwork; there were no other defenses. The bridge over the Main had been broken down, but this was repaired; Colonel Ramsay was sent over it, and Colonel Leslie put across in boats, each with a detachment, under a heavy fire, by which they suffered considerably. The place refused terms, and the Swedes opened lines and erected batteries. After the destruction of one of the towers, on October 18, about 5 A. M., the castle was stormed by several regiments, led by Colonels Lillie and Burt. Though stoutly defended, the party gained the half-moon with ladders, and drove out the garrison, pursuing which through the drawbridge, let down for the fugitives, the Swedes pushed on, blew down the gate, and captured the place. Immense booty was taken, as Marienburg was the strongest place on the Main, and had been made a storehouse for valuables; a vast amount of ordnance-stores was got; and the bishop's valuable library was sent to Upsala University. Würzburg was mulcted eighty thousand rix dollars, and town and castle were strengthened and suitably held. All Jesuit property was confiscated, but no person was injured. The Jesuit was, according to Gustavus, *hostis humani generis*, and was treated accordingly. Protestant worship was restored.

At Würzburg was made a treaty between the king and the Franconian Circle; the duke of Lüneburg came with offers to raise some regiments; and an embassy from Württemberg arrived. With Nürnberg, after long negotiations and delays, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded October 21, and the city raised a garrison of three thousand foot and two hundred and fifty horse, and strengthened its defenses. Similar treaties were made with Anspach and Bayreuth. At the same time a demand was made on the bishop-electors of Cologne, Mainz and Trier to acknowledge Gustavus' authority; to pay forty thousand rix dollars a month; to furnish provisions; to open forts and defiles to the Swedes, and to deny these to the emperor; and to give Protestants full religious equality with Catholics. Recruiting had good results. Franconia was rich; it had suffered little from the war; and its joining the cause was a marked gain. Business kept Gustavus in Würzburg a month.

The progress of the Swedes began to excite terror all through Catholic Germany; some of the princes were content to accept the situation, some fled, some showed a bold front. The bishop of Bamberg, to gain time, entered into feigned negotiations with Gustavus, who decided to press on to the Rhine, and wished to avoid a present expedition up the Main; by which ruse the bishop managed to hold his possessions until Tilly later came to the rescue. He cleverly baffled the king, — as a rule a difficult matter.

After his defeat at Breitenfeld, as already narrated, Tilly had made his way north, with the relics of his army, a mere disorganized mob, of which barely half were armed. On September 20 he reached Halberstadt, where Pappenheim joined him; thence he marched to Hildesheim, crossed the Weser at Corvey near Hörter, and drew in the Cologne troops on September 23. Hearing that Gustavus had headed

south to Thuringia, after a while he himself turned towards Hesse. Early in October, at Fritzlar, Aldringer, who from Jena had retired via Erfurt, and Fugger joined him, giving Tilly eighteen thousand foot, and half as much cavalry.

Seeing that Gustavus still continued onward to the Main, Tilly moved in the same direction by way of Fulda and Aschaffenburg, so as to move around the head of the Swedish advance, cross the Main, and work south of the king, to regain possession of Würzburg. He had in view to join to his own forces the thirteen thousand men of the shifty duke of Lorraine, who had made a treaty with the emperor, had crossed the Rhine in September at Worms, and was moving on Aschaffenburg. But the duke did not escape disaster. As it happened, Gustavus had gone down the Main, reconnoitring. On November 2, not many miles from Würzburg, he ran across the enemy's van of four thousand men. Sending back for Baudissin's body of four thousand horse and two thousand musketeers, he fell on the enemy's camp not far from Bischofsheim and dispersed the entire body. The duke retired, with the relics, on his main body, managed to join Tilly in Miltenburg, and the joint forces amounted to some thirty-eight thousand men. Gustavus learned of Tilly's movements at Würzburg. He understood that he was aiming on either Würzburg, Schweinfurt, or Bamberg; but though he cared little for him so long as Nürnberg could take care of herself, he was careful to protect his allied cities and to close all available defiles.

When Tilly marched away from the Weser and towards Franconia, Landgrave William and Duke Bernard put in some good work. The latter gave a hearty blow to Fugger; and the landgrave fell on Vacha, took a big convoy intended for Tilly at Corbach, and captured Münden and Höxter. These outside operations cannot be detailed.

XXII.

MAINZ. NOVEMBER, 1631.

LEAVING Tilly, Pappenheim returned to the Weser; Tilly was ordered by Maximilian to protect Bavaria, and sat down at Windsheim. Gustavus moved down river to secure his hold on the Main and the Rhine before turning toward the Danube. Taking all the cities on the way, he reached Frankfort November 16. He had thirty-two thousand men. Mainz, which had a Spanish garrison, resisted; and Gustavus marched up the Rhine, crossed, and attacked the city from the left bank. While so engaged, he heard that Tilly was besieging Nürnberg, and at once started with a column of twenty-six thousand men towards his ally; but at Frankfort he learned that Tilly had failed before the place, which had resisted all his threats. Returning to Mainz, Gustavus took the place December 22, and quartered his army there. During this period Pappenheim was operating against Gustavus' lieutenants on the Weser, showing ability, but accomplishing no substantial result. On retiring from Nürnberg, Tilly took up quarters in the Nördlingen country. The official list of Gustavus' troops and allies at this time shows eighty thousand men under the colors, with an equal number to be raised during the winter, — a marked contrast to the thirteen thousand men who landed near Stralsund a year and a half before.

WITH Fugger and Aldringer Tilly had marched from Miltenburg and taken Rothemburg and Windsheim, had devastated Franconia where he crossed it, and reached Anspach November 20. Gustavus had not succeeded in cutting him off from Bavaria. He had separated from Pappenheim, who, unable to agree with his chief, preferred to march back to Westphalia, a territory some one must defend for the emperor. It is asserted that Tilly intended to bring on another general engagement at an early date. This is perhaps doubtful; for though Tilly never lacked courage, he lacked enterprise of a certain stamp, and had scarcely yet

forgotten Breitenfeld. When he reached the Tauber, he had recovered his base and could choose a safe defensive, or a march to the Main to seek his adversary. He did not do the latter; for, whatever his intentions, his master, Maximilian, nervously fearing for his borders, ordered him to stop at covering Bavaria, and not to undertake operations which might lead to battle. Tilly took up positions with twelve thousand men at Donauwörth and Guntzenhausen, sent an equal number to the Upper Palatinate, and began to recruit. From annoyance at his orders, he was tempted to lay down the command, but was dissuaded by his immediate officers and Maximilian's personal request. He sent a detachment to seize on Wertheim, but without success, for the king, who was watching his operations, laid an ambuscade for the detachment and severely handled it; and immediately after made a descent on four imperial regiments at Creglingen, and all but destroyed them. Shortly receiving fourteen thousand men of reinforcement from Alsatia, the Lower Palatinate and Würtemberg, and emboldened by his numbers, Tilly advanced columns to Rothemburg, Windsheim and Ochsenfurt, and took up a position at Windsheim, the king being for the moment sick in Würzburg.

Considering the total defeat of Tilly not many weeks back, he had shown commendable energy in coming to the protection of his master's territory, and in making even partial attacks on the new allies of Sweden. But the timidity of the elector had prevented the veteran from utilizing his numerical, if not actual, superiority at the points attacked; and it had enabled the Swedes, without opposition, to plant themselves firmly on the Main. That Tilly could have prevented the seizure of the Main is improbable, but he might have made it difficult.

Holding Thuringia and Franconia, the king did not for the

moment care to move on Tilly; the possession of the Main down to the Rhine seemed more important; and Tilly, by moving to the upper Main, had yielded up all power to defend the lower. Leaving Horn with five thousand foot and two thousand horse to hold the Würzburg bishopric, and to complete the subjection of Franconia, the king started down the Main November 9, with eighteen thousand men, intending to gain control of or neutralize the bishoprics of Mainz, Trier and Cologne, the other Catholic Rhine princes and the Spanish troops, to relieve the Palatinate, and to take advantage of the richness of the country to add to his material strength before moving against southern Germany, Bavaria and Austria. His general scheme, as we have seen, was built on procuring large accessions of troops.

Whatever historians may say of Gustavus' declination to march on Vienna after the victory of Breitenfeld, they cannot complain that he was not thorough in what he undertook to do in lieu thereof; and the event proves his own plan the wiser. While one cannot prove that a march on Vienna would not have brought Ferdinand to his knees, it remains certain that, had Gustavus undertaken this course, the world would have remained the poorer by many lessons in methodical war.

The task he was now undertaking was not difficult, for the Catholic princes were unable to offer much opposition, and the garrisons along the Main were weak. Before leaving Würzburg, he sent out Colonel Hubald, with twenty-two hundred dragoons and cuirassiers, to capture Hanau, which this officer did by storm on November 10; Gelnhausen, Friedburg and Höchst surrendered, and on November 17 Rothenfels did the like. As the enemy was at Rothemburg, the king personally headed a detachment and fully garrisoned Schweinfurt; and a strong body was left in Würzburg.

The bulk of the Royal Army marched down on the left bank of the Main, a smaller body on the right bank. The baggage, artillery and supplies were floated down on boats between the troops. A large number of the towns were found ready to join the Swedish cause, Wertheim on the 20th, Miltenburg on the 21st, Aschaffenburg on the 22d, Steinheim on the 25th, and Offenbach on the 26th. Frankfort, after some delay, concluded to swell this number on the 28th. The garrisons, as a rule, entered the Swedish service.


At Frankfort a mild treaty was made with Hesse Darmstadt, which until now had held aloof; that principality reserved all its powers, but gave up, until the war should be ended, the fortress of Rüsselsheim, which, standing between Mainz and Frankfort, was of marked importance.

On November 28, through Frankfort, Gustavus marched to Höchst, Königstein, Flörsheim and Kostheim; and at Höchst there joined him fourteen thousand men from Hesse-Cassel, under Landgrave William, which, as Tilly had moved away from the Weser, were no longer needed there. This gave Gustavus thirty-two thousand men, with which he sat down on the right bank of the Rhine, astride the Main, the bulk of the force threatening Mainz.

This great city possessed a powerful bridge-head in the fortified town of Kastel on the right bank of the Rhine; two thousand Spanish troops under Count Silva which formed the garrison of Mainz vowed they would die to the last man sooner than give up the place; and on being asked by the elector if he had enough troops, Silva replied that he had enough to whip three kings of Sweden. The citizens made some advances, but Gustavus recalled to their mind their hitherto stubborn refusals to treat, and declined any but surrender without terms. The elector prepared for defense; he drove piles in the Main at its mouth, sank ships, and clogged

up the river with stones; having done which he lost heart, left Silva to protect his capital, and fled with the bishop of Worms to Cologne. The garrison ill-treated the citizens and prepared for a stout resistance.

The king did not deem it possible to take Mainz from the right bank, and it was difficult to cross the river below the city in order to besiege it, though Bernard had taken the Mouse Tower and Ehrenfels near Bingen. There was a



Mainz.

bridge of boats at Höchst; numerous boats fitted with guns and breastworks lay in the river, and Gustavus began to isolate Mainz. He seized the custom-house buildings opposite Bingen, and Walluf, and levied on the country contributions of forty-five thousand rix dollars a month. He sent out detachments to the Lahn, and took Limburg and other places, with much booty. Having meanwhile reduced the right bank as far up as the Neckar, he was preparing to

cross above, when news reached him that Tilly was besieging Nürnberg.

This was a surprise. Gustavus postponed his designs against Mainz; left things as they were, and started December 9, determined to relieve Nürnberg by a battle. He had with him seventeen thousand foot and nine thousand horse of the Swedish, Hesse-Cassel and Weimar troops. While his columns were defiling through Frankfort, he made a definitive treaty with that city; and learning at the same time that Tilly had given up the siege of Nürnberg and retired to the Danube, he again returned to the Rhine.

This raid persuaded the king that Tilly might push in on his communications, and he made dispositions accordingly. Horn's corps was strengthened by drafts on Teuffel and on Nürnberg, with headquarters at Windsheim, so as to sustain at need either the king or Saxony; Duke William was ordered to push his army from Thuringia forward towards Schweinfurt, lest Horn should be suddenly detached. Thus Horn and the Weimar armies were made a link between, or a reserve to the king or the elector of Saxony.

While strictly maintaining his kingly dignity, Gustavus was easily approached by all. One day, in Frankfort, a priest was discovered in the anteroom with a concealed dagger; it was currently reported that a band of Jesuits had bound themselves with an oath to take his life; and bets were laid in Augsburg that Gustavus would not live six months. Much of this may have been idle talk, but when Gustavus was urged to keep a body-guard about him, he is said to have replied: "Then you would have me disregard the protection of God?" His very contempt of death was in some respects a safeguard. About this time are recorded some utterances of the king concerning his mission in Germany and his duty to Protestantism. One day at table with

the king of Bohemia, the landgrave of Darmstadt and many other princes, the king said: "Believe me, I love a comfortable life as well as any man, and I have no desire to die an early death. The emperor would readily make a separate peace with me to get me to return to Sweden. But I dare not leave so many innocent people subject to his revenge. Were it not for this, I would soon get me gone."

On his return Gustavus went seriously at the Mainz problem. He left the landgrave to blockade the city from the right bank, — the Rhinegau, — and to occupy the country up and down on either side the Main; he himself passed over to the south side, and on December 10 made a demonstration towards Heidelberg. On December 13, from Gernsheim, he turned quickly down river to a point opposite Oppenheim where was a redoubt held by Spanish troops. These refused to surrender; but having undertaken a piece of work, Gustavus was not easily arrested. Despite the opposition of the Spanish cavalry on both banks, on the night of December 16–17 he put three hundred men in boats across the Rhine, built a bridge near Gernsheim, probably at one of the bends where his guns could protect the operation, crossed in the succeeding two days, December 17 and 18, with all his troops, took Oppenheim, stormed the castle, advanced towards and blockaded Mainz, and cut the city off from the Rhine up and down, as well as from the Main. The isolated redoubt on the right bank surrendered. In a reconnoissance here, the king by his reckless pushing out to the front, not properly accompanied, was again all but captured. His disregard of danger was a growing evil. No wonder he eventually fell a victim to it.

On December 22, after two days' siege, Count Silva, despite his heroic protests to do or die, surrendered Mainz, and the troops were allowed the honors of war. Most of

them entered the king's service. It was a question whether this capture of Mainz was not an act of war against Spain, which Gustavus would have preferred to avoid, as his quarrel was one against the Austrian Hapsburgs. But Silva had received orders to be helpful to Mainz against Sweden, and Spain was already in the Baltic at Wismar. No war had been declared or was considered to exist, and yet acts of war had been committed by both parties. Gustavus was ready for what must come, and the ministry and estates sustained him. A contribution of eighty thousand rix dollars was levied on Mainz; one of forty-one thousand rix dollars on the Jesuits, and another of forty thousand on the Catholic priests. These were hard terms, for the Spaniards had already plundered the town; but the money was paid.

The king quartered his foot in Mainz, the horse in the surrounding country. He put the city in a state of excellent defense, surrounded it with works, built a strong redoubt on the Jacobsberg, replaced the bridge of boats across the Rhine to Kastel and made a new one to Kostheim, fortified the confluence of the Main and Rhine by a strong fortress, "Gustavburg," on the left Main bank, gave the left bank of the Rhine in charge of Duke Bernard, established his winter-quarters and his court in the city, and moved for the moment to Frankfort, where he was made happy by the queen joining him. The elector of Mainz soon after broke off his connection with the emperor. About this time, also, the duke of Lorraine withdrew his forces, much weakened by sickness and desertion, from Tilly's army, and hurried home to defend his territory, threatened by France on one side and the Swedes on the other. His army was soon disbanded by active contact with the French, who took Trier, Coblenz and Hermannstein (now Ehrenbreitstein), and he too forswore his fealty to the emperor.

The Spanish troops were lying on the Moselle, and from Mainz Gustavus organized an army to operate against them. Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig, in command of its vanguard, defeated at Creuznach a body of Spaniards with a loss of seven hundred killed, and later captured a number of places near by. It is asserted that Gustavus contemplated a march to the Netherlands to give the Spaniards the *coup de grace*; but Tilly was too threatening a factor, and the Dutch promised to keep the Spanish army busy. Whatever his project, he did not in fact move far from the Mainz country; nor did it prove essential, for in the course of January and February, 1632, under the instances of Duke Bernard, all the Catholic princes of the Rhine, as far as the Netherlands, pledged themselves to neutrality; Worms, Speyer and Mannheim did the like; the Spanish troops were forced to withdraw to the Netherlands, and the Protestant allies securely occupied both banks of the middle Rhine, Alsatia, the Lower Palatinate, Cologne, and other principalities.

When Tilly marched from the Weser to Swabia, he left in the region between the Elbe, the sea and the Weser but a small body of troops to sustain the Catholic garrisons. The most important imperial towns were Magdeburg, Rosstock, Wismar, and Dömitz. Pappenheim, who, it will be remembered, had parted with Tilly in the Anspach region, and returned to Westphalia, had collected some eight thousand men, and, in November, 1631, raised the siege of Madgeburg, which an equal force of Swedes under Banér had just brought to the point of surrender. Banér retired into his strong position at Calbe, and Pappenheim shortly evacuated Magdeburg, burned the Elbe bridge and moved against Lüneburg. He soon found himself surrounded by the superior forces of Tott, Hamilton, Banér, and the bishop of Bremen, and a considerable accession of men raised for

Banér in Thuringia; he was compelled to retire behind the Weser, into the lower Rhenish Provinces, against which the duke of Hesse-Cassel continued to operate from the south, in such a manner as distinctly to aid Lüneburg, the lower Saxon Circle and Bremen by his diversions. Then Magdeburg, Dömitz, Rostock, Wismar and other towns were successively captured by Tott and the Protestant allies.

All this was not, however, accomplished without some difficulty; for Pappenheim operated with boldness and skill, prevented the allies from joining forces, compelled Tott to give up the siege of Stade, and when, in consequence of Banér and Duke William joining in his front, he was constrained to retire to Westphalia, he sat down near Cassel and held himself until he was ordered to join Wallenstein in Saxony. After he left, Baudissin and Lüneburg had freer play; the lower Elbe and the Weser region were quite cleared of the emperor's troops, and Banér, after taking Magdeburg, was able to move with a considerable part of his force by way of Thuringia and Franconia to join Gustavus, as Duke William, after taking Göttingen and Duderstadt, also did. But this is anticipating events; and there is no space to devote to the details of these minor operations. Their object and result were to conserve the bastion which the king had erected with so much time and skill.

When Gustavus marched down the Main, Tilly, though much superior in force, still undertook no operations against Horn, whom the king had left with eight to ten thousand men to hold the upper river, — a fact largely due to the contrary orders and pusillanimity of the elector of Bavaria. He contented himself with devastating the region between Windsheim and Anspach; and on November 28 he marched from Anspach, via Schwabach, on Nürnberg, demanded money and rations, and threatened to lay siege to the place. The

citizens manned the walls, and even sent out the newly levied troops to skirmish with the enemy. Tilly threatened the city with the fate of Magdeburg, unless it complied with his demands; but the threat was idle and the siege short-lived. Tilly's army suffered from a want of provisions; the elector feared that he would get cut off from Bavaria, and ordered him back; a portion of his forces was already detached to Bohemia; a Protestant officer in the emperor's service proved traitor, and brought about an explosion in the ammunition depot of Tilly's artillery park; everything seemed to conspire against him, and, on December 4, he withdrew to Nördlingen, and quartered his troops on the left bank of the Danube, from the borders of Bohemia to the upper Neckar and Würtemberg. It was to meet this threat of Tilly's on Nürnberg that Gustavus had so suddenly left Mainz.

Instead of making his winter-quarters in Erfurt, Gustavus had advanced to the Rhine and Main, had conquered a large territory, and could choose his winter-quarters where he would. A year before, he had wintered at Bärwalde in the midst of privation and danger, with disappointment and uncertainty staring him in the face; now, he could winter in the golden city of the Rhine, in the enjoyment of plenty, and with the approbation of all Germany. Booty was immense; the arsenals of Würzburg supplied quantities of munition and clothing; victual was abundant; and the poor Swedish peasant reveled in Franconian wheat and wine. He had never dreamed of such luxury; he ate and drank to his heart's content. A Capua was more to be feared than a Valley Forge.

There is in the Swedish archives an official list, giving the troops at this time under Gustavus' command, and indicating what was needed to bring the companies and regiments up to full strength.

In the Army of the Rhine, under the king's command, there were with the colors 113 companies of foot, viz. : the Royal regiment of 12 companies ; Hogendorf, 12 ; Winkel, 12 ; Banér, 8 ; Wallenstein, 8 ; Vitzthum, 8 ; Hepburn, 12 ; Lunsdel, 8 ; Munroe, 8 ; Ruthven, 8 ; Ramsay, 8 ; Hamilton, 8. Total, 10,521 men, plus 3,000 of Hamilton's recruits. To bring these up to normal strength of 150 men per company, there were to be raised 6,521 men. And a further increase of 18,000 men was contemplated, viz. : 40 companies of 3,000 men of Hamilton's recruits ; 80 companies of 150 men each, to be recruited by von Solms, Isenburg and Nassau, and by Hubald and Hörnig. The cavalry had in line 83 companies, viz. : Smålanders, 8 companies ; West Goths, 8 ; Finns, 8 ; Duke Bernard, 8 ; the rhinegrave, 12 ; Tott, 12 ; Ussler, 10 ; Callenbach, 8 ; Livonians, 5 ; Courlanders, 4. Total, 5,300 men, to be recruited up to normal of 9,175 men. To these were to be added 20 companies, with 2,500 men ; to be raised by von Solms, John of Hesse, and Taupadel. The present total was 18,821 men. The grand total would thus be 46,717 men.

In the Franconian Army, under Horn, were 63 companies of foot, viz. : Axel Lillie, 8 companies ; Oxenstiern, 8 ; Erich Hand, 8 ; Hård, 8 ; von Thurn, 8 ; von Reike, 12 ; Wallenstein, 8 ; Dragoons, 3. Total, 5,161 men, to be increased by 12,844 men, by recruits from von Solms, Margrave Hans George, Truchsetz, Mussfeld, Canoski and Hastfehr. The cavalry had 36 companies, viz. : Baudissin, 12 ; Koehitzki, 8 ; Witzleben, 8 ; Sperreuter, 4 ; East Goths, 4 ; and 600 recruits under Hastfehr. Total, 3,119 men, to be increased by 8,531 men, by recruits from Duke Ernest, von Solms, the margrave of Brandenburg, the duke of Weimar, von Dundorp, von Hoffenhült and Truchsetz. The present for duty were 8,280 men. The grand total was to be 29,655 men.

The landgrave of Hesse had 6 regiments of foot, with 6,000 men, to be raised to 7,200 ; 32 companies of cavalry, with 2,000 men, to be raised to 4,000. He proposed to raise 6 new regiments of 7,200 men. Present total, 8,000 men. Proposed total, 18,400 men.

The Mecklenburg corps had 56 companies of 3,900 men, to be raised to 11,100 men.

The Lower Saxon Army, under Tott, had 136 companies of 12,000 foot ; 8 companies of 1,000 horse. To be raised, 7,850 men. Present total, 13,000 men. Proposed total, 20,850 men.

The Magdeburg Army, under Banér, had 194 companies, with 10,437 men, to be raised to 30,821 men ; 69 companies cavalry, with

1,800 men, to be raised to 8,375 men. Total present, 12,237 men. Proposed total, 39,196 men.

The Weimar Corps, under Duke William, had 5 regiments of 3,000 men, to be raised to 6,000 ; and 20 companies of 1,000 horse, to be raised to 2,500. Present total, 4,000 ; proposed total, 8,500.

Garrison troops were 10,416 men, to be increased to 13,150. In Erfurt were 2,545 men, to be increased to 4,825.

In addition to these new German troops, Gustavus expected in the spring of 1632 from Sweden, 48 companies of foot, of 7,200 men, and 12 companies of cavalry, of 1,500 men.

The grand total, then, which Gustavus had under the colors at the end of 1631 was 63,700 foot and 16,000 cavalry ; and this he had good reason to hope, for the campaign of 1632, to increase up to 153,000 foot and 43,500 horse. Such an army had never yet been seen in Germany.



Landsknecht. (16th Century.)

XXIII.

TO THE DANUBE. DECEMBER, 1631, TO APRIL, 1632.

At Mainz Gustavus held his winter's court, — the most prominent monarch in Europe. At this time he could have claimed the crown of Germany; that he did not shows the purity of his ambition. Everything looked smiling; and yet everything hinged on the king's life. All Europe was agog at his wonderful accomplishments, but the graybeards shook their heads, and wondered whether Germany was to be made subservient to Sweden. Still, on the surface, all went well; the Protestants were in the ascendant both in a political and military sense, while the emperor was crowded to the wall. In 1632, however, the theatre was too extended. There were too many places to hold, too many new regions to reduce; the king rarely had under his personal command as large an army as he should. At Mainz he had over one hundred thousand men, but these were in eight several parcels, all apparently essential: Mainz, Würzburg, Hesse, Saxony, Magdeburg, Mecklenburg, lower Saxony and garrisons. During the late winter Horn and Tilly did some manœuvring on the upper Main. Gustavus came to Horn's assistance, and Tilly moved back to the Danube. The king followed, crossed the Danube at Donauwörth, and Tilly intrenched himself behind the Lech at Rain, to protect Bavaria.

It was a splendid court rather than the rude winter-quarters of a campaigning army which was seen at Mainz in the winter of 1631–32; and ambassadors from every European power paid their respects to the victorious monarch. Negotiations consumed the days and weeks. Treaties were made with the duke of Brunswick and the city; a new one with Mecklenburg and formal ones with Lübeck, Lüneburg and Bremen. Negotiations were pursued with Würtemberg, Ulm and Strasburg. Gustavus was the centre-point, the observed of all observers, the most powerful of the kings of the earth, the most brilliant individual of the times. And

yet the Swedish standing was uncertain; everything hinged on Gustavus and his purposes; and what he could accomplish hinged on his own life, for there was no one to succeed him in his peculiar work. Gustavus recognized this fact without arrogance. He might have claimed, and without contest have been allowed, the crown of a new kingdom of Germany; all he asked was a German Protestant Confederation — a *Corpus Evangelicorum* — under himself as chief. This desire might have taken formal shape, had the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony been like the other allies; but they remained intractable, the one from hebetude, the other from envy.

The whole of Europe was still at odds and evens. The dictates of religion were buried under the selfish personal or political motives which governed every monarch. England was shifty; Charles I. promised nothing, and his promises, if made, would be worthless. He was, in fact, plotting with the emperor, and would do anything to secure the restoration of Frederick to the Palatinate. Maximilian was for a while in league with Richelieu, who was eager to secure neutrality for the Catholic League while humiliating the House of Hapsburg. He sought to compass some agreement between the League and Gustavus; but this was difficult; and finally, when he accepted Gustavus' conditions to allow the League a neutrality which should reduce its army to twelve thousand men and tie it hand and foot, Maximilian in anger threw over Richelieu, and thereafter clave to the emperor. Denmark was jealous of Swedish successes; but her recent punishment forbade her to act. The Netherlands followed their loadstone, gold. Spain was or was not at war with Gustavus, as either saw fit to construe the situation. Poland was bitter as gall, but impotent. Russia was friendly. Brandenburg was inert. Ferdinand kept on his

way with his usual directness. Richelieu and Gustavus were equally anti-Hapsburg, but from different standpoints. And finally John George of Saxony, ruled by Arnim, leaned first to Gustavus, then to Ferdinand. His great foible was jealousy of the king; his worst defect was an ancient and unreasoning sense of fealty to the empire; his main aim was a Third Party in Germany, which, under his lead, should dominate both the emperor and the king; and he alternately corresponded with Gustavus and with Wallenstein. Faithful to neither because faithless to himself, he was destined to be the means of wrecking his own cause, and of visiting the horrors of war on his own dominions. And yet John George believed that he was honesty personified, and in a certain sense he was so; but he had dropped so far behind the times that he could neither gauge the German situation, nor appreciate what kind of honesty the times demanded.

Our attention is constantly drawn to the transformation which had taken place since the king had come upon the scene. The situation forces itself upon us. When Gustavus landed with his thirteen thousand men, the Protestant cause was on the wane, the party utterly discouraged, and the emperor everywhere successful. Now Gustavus had nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men in garrison and in the field. Recruiting was active. All the Protestant princes were in league with the Swedes. France was sustaining the cause by means which neutralized the Catholic princes on the Rhine, and the rest were dominated by the conditions surrounding them. The Swedes were on the borders of Bavaria, cutting the emperor from the Rhine bishoprics, — Cologne and Trier, — and were about to invade his dominions, while his “buffer-state,” Bavaria, was made unreliable by the abject fear of the elector for his possessions. Ferdinand had sent to Poland for troops, but these were refused

on the plea of a threat from Russia, — perhaps fostered by Gustavus. Pope Urban refused Ferdinand countenance, alleging the war to be not for Catholicism, but for Hapsburg aggrandizement. From Spain he could hope nothing, for she was busy in the Netherlands. Upper Austria was in readiness for revolt. Turkey was threatening to invade Lower Austria. Switzerland favored the Protestants. And still worse, the emperor had but eighty thousand men, of which sixty thousand, ill-cared for and in bad heart, lay on the left bank of the Danube, from Swabia to Moravia, striving to protect the inheritance of the emperor from further inroads, and the rest in garrisons or detachments in Silesia, lower Saxony, Westphalia, on the Elbe, Weser and Rhine, where they scarcely held their own. He was recruiting in all directions, but to small effect. And more than all, the moral superiority had gone over to the side of the Protestants. This astonishing change was entirely due to Gustavus' methodical handiwork.

There had been a suggestion, hard to be traced to its source, that peace could be had on terms indefinitely stated, but these were not such that Ferdinand could accept them. It was sheer inability to help himself that induced him again to turn to Wallenstein, the idea of employing whom Gustavus had given up for fear that he could not be trusted.

The casual observer might be led to say that all these results sprang directly from the victory of Breitenfeld; that had Gustavus beaten the enemy in a great battle at an earlier day, his standing would have been as good and much time saved. But a careful survey of the king's problem, and of the results as he worked them out, will convince the student that the solid gain Gustavus had made came more from his careful method than from his splendid victory. A

Breitenfeld in 1630 would not have taught him the true inwardness of the German situation. He would have leaned more heavily on German support; he would have taken too favorable a view of the helpfulness of his allies, and he might have undertaken operations which would have resulted in his overthrow. Had he pushed for an early victory, won it, and utilized it for an advance into Germany without his carefully established base, not only would he not have been the great exponent of methodical war, but he would scarcely have redeemed the Protestant cause. Gustavus belongs to the six Great Captains because of his careful method and his boldness combined; if either quality won him more than the other, it was his scrupulous care in doing well whatever he undertook to do.

But brilliant as Gustavus' standing was, splendid as had been his achievements, the conditions existing in the German political structure promised no certainty of continuing welfare; and these conditions reacted on the military problem vastly more than they would in a war of conquest. In 1632 there was altogether too extended a theatre of operations; such, in fact, as to forbid one leadership. Gustavus' operations in Franconia and Bavaria had small influence on those of his lieutenants; but the outside operations were of no great moment, except in so far as they weakened the Royal Army. What interest there is centres in the work of the king and of his great opponent, Wallenstein.

There is nowhere a crisp statement of Gustavus' plan for the campaign of 1632; nor anything to show that he formulated a definite one, beyond the general scheme of moving down the Danube and occupying the lands on its either bank. In no other war was the influence of petty states on the general military scheme so prominent; no other great captain waging an offensive war was ever compelled to weigh so

many and inconsiderable questions. Had Gustavus come as a conqueror, — the rôle of all other great captains, save Frederick, — he might have brushed aside these smaller requirements, and have dealt solely with the larger factors; but he came as a liberator, to restore and not take away, to build up and not tear down; and every one of the petty principalities had to be considered as a sovereign nation. The contrast between his patience with the German princes and Napoleon's brusque method of dealing with them is marked. It is all the more astonishing that, in the short twenty-eight months Gustavus enacted his part on the European stage, he accomplished so vast a result.

From a military point of view, his forces were in detachments altogether too small. While Gustavus was at Mainz, his active roll of over one hundred thousand men was in eight armies: eighteen thousand under his own command; twenty thousand under Horn on the Main; thirteen thousand under Banér in Magdeburg; Tott moving from Mecklenburg to lower Saxony had thirteen thousand; the Saxons had twenty thousand; William of Hesse, eight thousand; the duke of Mecklenburg, four thousand; and in various garrisons fifteen to twenty thousand more. Every one of these armies was essential where it stood; and yet it seemed as if none of them could stand alone, and the year 1632 shows us Gustavus striding from place to place to help first this detachment and then that, arresting a necessary manœuvre here to save an irretrievable loss yonder; a condition due to the lamentable division of Germany into petty sovereignties. Still, despite his difficulties, the king accomplished a year's work perhaps unequalled in all military history; and, as no other great captain was happy enough to do, he sealed the deed of conserved Protestantism which, unrequited, he gave to his German brethren, with his life's blood.

When, towards the close of 1631, Tilly had withdrawn from before Nürnberg, Horn gathered what forces he could readily spare from other work and marched from Rothemburg along the Tauber to Mergentheim, and thence to the Neckar, took Heilbronn and Wimpfen, and drove Tilly's troops in that region back to the Danube. Having cleaned Swabia of Catholic troops, he was ordered by Gustavus to Windsheim, to recruit, for part of his army had been detached to Magdeburg, where Pappenheim was confronting Banér. Horn's quota was fourteen thousand men; but he did not reach it, being hindered by a two weeks' truce between Gustavus and the League pending certain negotiations. At its expiration Horn turned towards Franconia, where he threw back a force of a thousand foot and horse coming from Forstheim, and after occupying Hochstädt by surrender, captured Bamberg and sat down there.

This was an open town without defenses. At the end of February Tilly advanced against it from his winter-quarters in Nördlingen. Horn made preparations to hold out, as he expected reinforcements from lower Saxony, and built long lines of works around the town. But his new troops were not yet in hand. Tilly had at least twenty thousand men, thrice his force, and coming from Nördlingen, had assembled at Neumarkt and thence advanced. Horn had not got Bamberg in order for defense, when the enemy's van put in its appearance. One of his cavalry regiments was, against orders, drawn into action, was beaten, and in falling back, demoralized a newly recruited infantry battalion. The panic spread, the troops abandoned the works and fled over the bridge on the Regnitz into the town, with the enemy at their heels. Horn headed a regiment of foot and one of horse, drove the enemy back over the river, and held him until the bridge could be broken down; and he saved his

artillery and baggage. But he deemed it prudent to retire to Eltman, down the Main, and then collecting his army at Hassfurt (where in a cavalry combat he won a handsome success), he marched to Schweinfurt, and later took up a position at Würzburg. Gustavus blamed Horn for this affair, which he said unduly encouraged the enemy. Tilly retook Bamberg, and went on to Hassfurt to attack Horn, but the Swede had already retired with all his impedimenta, and had marched on to join Gustavus at Geldersheim. Tilly ceased his pursuit to besiege Schweinfurt, where, after intrenching the town, Horn had left a garrison of three regiments.

Early in 1632 Gustavus seems to have made a plan to base on Mainz, march up the Rhine into the Palatinate, take Heidelberg, move thence into Würtemberg, and follow down the Danube from its headwaters into Bavaria. His lieutenants had captured Braunsfels on the Lahn, Bobenhausen, Kirchberg and Bacharach, and had just taken Creuznach by storm, all of which tended to keep the Spaniards from too great activity in Alsatia, and he was about ready to start, when he heard of Tilly's advance on Horn. He at once changed his plan to a march up the Main, to join Horn, hoping between them to drive Tilly beyond the Danube and to follow him into Bavaria.

Duke Bernard was left under Oxenstiern in Alsatia, to hold head against the Spaniards. But the two did not agree; and Gustavus soon called Bernard to his own side. He committed to the landgrave the duty of keeping watch of the elector of Cologne and other Rhenish princes; he left Tott to act against Pappenheim on the Weser with the troops of the lower Saxon Circle, and Banér on the Elbe; and now, secure in every step he had so far taken, he started from Höchst, March 15, with twenty thousand men, through

Frankfort and Steinheim to Aschaffenburg, and across to Lohr, where he rested March 18. He had written to Nürnberg and Schweinfurt not to lose heart at the fall of Bamberg, but to persevere in the good cause. He joined Horn near Schweinfurt, and concentrated the bulk of his troops at Kitzingen, March 21-24. His avowed purpose was to bring Tilly's army to battle, for Wallenstein was again afoot, and the king would like to disable Tilly before the imperial forces could concentrate. He was working to this end when he heard what turned out to be the false news that Tilly had marched towards the Upper Palatinate.

On this the king resolved to leave three thousand men to act as an outpost to Franconia, and head for the Danube, instead of following Tilly away from the more essential work in Swabia. He ordered in Banér and William of Weimar, and with forty-five thousand men set out via Windsheim (March 26-28) and Fürth (March 30) towards Nürnberg, on the way to the Danube. The fact that Tilly had not moved did not now affect his plan.

Up to the 24th Tilly had lain in the Bamberg country, but on the king's approach he declined to again tempt his fortune in a battle, gathered all the forces under his command, and withdrew up the Regnitz by way of Forstheim and Erlangen. The king's smart advance had prevented Tilly from detaching any forces against Oxenstiern on the Rhine. Both armies were apparently aiming for Nürnberg, but Tilly concluded to pass by the city, and marched through Neumarkt to Ingolstadt. Here he crossed the Danube, proceeded upstream, and sat down near the fortress of Rain, behind the Lech.

Maximilian had conceived the notion that Gustavus would prefer battle with Tilly to an invasion of Bavaria, and had ordered his generalissimo to withdraw towards Bohemia or

Austria, and manœuvre to join Wallenstein's new imperial army. He hoped thus to draw Gustavus from Bavaria. But his war council strongly opposed leaving the entrance to Bavaria open; and Tilly was withdrawn to the Danube, and his army so placed as to prevent Gustavus' inroad. As the Swedish king would probably aim for Swabia, the Lech would be a strong line on which to defend the land. It was this lack of purpose in the elector which had given rise to the rumor Gustavus had heard, and it was the later decision which had shaped Tilly's march. Under such contradictory orders, no wonder that Tilly was unequal to a situation with which at his best he was scarcely abreast.

At this time Gustavus would have been glad to enter into a bond of neutrality with Maximilian, and rather expected an embassy to treat of peace; but the elector was yet too sure of his ground to make advances. He placed great reliance on what Wallenstein would accomplish when once he took the field, and felt reasonably confident of the future.

Gustavus, accompanied by Frederick of the Palatinate and other notables, entered Nürnberg in state, March 31, and was received by the population with enthusiasm. But he could not delay; his movements were decided by the retreat of the enemy. Having inspected the defenses, he turned to follow Tilly, moved via Schwabach and Monheim, and reached Donauwörth April 5. Here he bombarded and captured the works on the Schellenberg in front of the town, forced the two thousand infantry there to a precipitate flight across the Danube with a loss of five hundred men, took Donauwörth, restored its works, and rebuilt the bridge which the enemy had tried to destroy. Horn was sent along the left bank with a suitable force, to occupy Ulm, which had already agreed to an alliance, and take other fords and places on the way. This duty Horn accomplished in good

style, collecting much provision and material. Hochstädt was garrisoned by two thousand foot and eight hundred horse; Dillingen, Lauingen, Grundelfingen, Guntzburg were all friendly; Lichtenau, Pappenheim and Wülzburg were taken by Sperreuter. The duke of Würtemberg declared against the emperor, and raised eight thousand men for the cause.

Tilly made no pretense to oppose all this. He had, since Breitenfeld, lost much of his desire to cross swords with the Swedes, and his present orders were limited to the defense of Bavaria.



Statue of Gustavus Adolphus in Stockholm.

XXIV.

THE CROSSING OF THE LECH. APRIL 15, 1632.

HAVING crossed the Danube, Gustavus was on the left bank of the Lech. Tilly held an apparently inexpugnable position on the other side; but a reconnoissance satisfied the king that the position could be forced. Such a thing was unheard of; but Gustavus did unheard-of things. Establishing a heavy battery on the river bank, under cover of its fire and of the smoke of burning straw, he sent over a party to build a bridge-head, threw a pontoon bridge, and crossed his men. The imperialists met the crossing in force, but the king pushed on and drove them out of Rain. Tilly was mortally wounded. From Rain the king moved up the Lech to take Augsburg, and then marched on Ingolstadt. Maximilian retired to Ratisbon; the king crossed the Danube and laid siege to Ingolstadt. Wallenstein, again in command of the imperial armies, was threatening Saxony; Gustavus marched on Munich, to draw him from thence. In Swabia he seized the principal towns, and was fast reducing the country, when Wallenstein's inroad into Saxony constrained him to move north. Worse than the military threat was that, through Arnim, Wallenstein was tampering with the elector, and thus sapping Gustavus' communications.

CROSSING the Danube at Donauwörth, the king found himself on the left bank of the Lech, behind which, intrenched north of Rain, lay Tilly and the elector, who here came up to direct his generalissimo's operations. At a council of war, it had been decided that Tilly's army was too much lacking in morale to face Gustavus offensively, and that it should act strictly on the defensive until Wallenstein, who was again afoot, could come up, or at least send reinforcements. In their front was the Lech, and in their rear the small river Ach; the right flank leaned on the Danube; the left was protected by Rain. Redoubts had been built along the low-lying river front and joined by intrenchments; and


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heavy guns in suitable batteries stood at intervals. The fords of the Lech, up to Augsburg, and this city also, were held by Tilly; the bridges had been destroyed and the towns occupied.

If he so chose, the king might turn Tilly out of his position at Rain by crossing the Lech above him, or he might coop him up in a corner where he could not victual and thus force him out to fight; but this would take time, and after a careful reconnoissance, he assured himself of the actual weakness of the enemy's apparently impregnable position. Both banks were a low, marshy plain, which to-day has been drained by canaling the Lech; then the marsh lay between the Catholic position and the river. Higher land lay further away from the banks. The bulk of Tilly's army was in a woody defile back of the low ground, waiting for Wallenstein's arrival. Gustavus chose a third course. He had concentrated his forces at Nordheim, ready for any operation. He believed that the proper time had come for a bold stroke. From the fact that his whole campaign thus far had been cautious and systematic, neglecting no point from which trouble might arise, it will not do to assume that Gustavus lacked audacity. He was by nature overbold, and he now determined to impose on the enemy by crossing the river in their teeth, and attacking them in the intrenchments behind which they believed themselves invulnerable. The moral advantage to be gained by such a blow he esteemed would more than compensate for the loss, or danger of failure. At the council of war preceding the attack, when Horn brought up all the questionable conditions of the case, — and they were many and grave, — Gustavus replied, in the words of Alexander at the Granicus: "What, have we crossed a sea and so many big rivers, to be stopped now by a mere brook?" The attack was decided on.

On April 13, at early dawn, Gustavus made a reconnoissance close to the enemy's works. Coming near an imperial outpost on the other side, the king shouted across to the sentry: "Good morning, mein Herr! Where is old Tilly?" "Thank you, Herr, Tilly is in quarters in Rain," replied the man, and then asked: "Comrade, where is the king?" "Oh, he's in his quarters too!" replied Gustavus. "Why, you don't say the king gives you quarters?" "Oh, yes, indeed; come over to us and you shall have fine quarters!" laughed Gustavus as he rode away, merry over the adventure.

Preparations had been speedily begun, a battery of seventy-two guns was erected on the left bank where it was higher than the right, and where was a bend in the stream with convex-



Crossing of the Lech.

ity toward the Swedes; and under cover of a constant fire, directed by the king in person, a bridge was thrown in the bend in such a way that the artillery and musketeers on the banks could protect it; and when it was nearly done, there was set over a party of three hundred Finns, who were concealed by burning damp straw to produce thick smoke, and

to each of whom was promised ten rix dollars in case of success. In the night of April 14–15 the boat-bridge was completed and a bridge-head of earthworks thrown up. The king led the infantry across, and sent some of the cavalry upstream to ford the river just above the enemy's position, while the rest with the artillery filed across the bridge April 16.

Tilly and the elector strove to interrupt these proceedings. They issued from their camp with selected troops, which they concealed in a wood on their left, opposite the Swedish bridge-head, and made from this cover a number of attacks on the Swedes, at the same time opening fire from all the guns which could be brought to bear on the bridge or the advancing enemy. But the cross fire of the Swedish batteries inflicted much greater loss on them. The troops in the wood were driven out in confusion, and the Swedish infantry more than held its own, while the cavalry made a demonstration upon their flank. The engagement was of no mean proportions; the Swedish cavalry threw back the imperial horse which was sent in successive columns against them, and the infantry was put in to quite an extent; but the affair was in the main an artillery duel. Tilly had his thigh shattered by a cannon-ball, of which wound, though Gustavus sent him his body-surgeon, the grim old soldier died two weeks later, and Aldringer, who succeeded him, was wounded in the head. From twelve hundred to two thousand men were killed or wounded on the Swedish side; the imperial casualties are stated at four thousand men.

At the loss of their leaders—the elector being held of small account as a soldier—the imperial troops lost heart, and took refuge in their intrenched camp. The king made no assault, owing to oncoming darkness, ignorance of the work, and the exhaustion of his men, but remained on the

battle-field. He had gained his object. The imperial army had lost morale and organization, and his own had gained in equal measure. Though the enemy should have been able to hold the works, which were strong, against the attack which would have been made next day, the elector retired during the night to Neuburg and thence to Ingolstadt, where he took up a position surrounding the fortress and intrenched.

Gustavus has been criticised for not following the enemy sharply and seeking to beat him in at least a rear-guard fight; for their retreat was made in much disorder; but so to take advantage of a victory had not yet been recognized as a maxim of war. Practically, until Napoleon's day, there was no pursuit. Indeed, vigorously to pursue is almost the rarest feat of any victorious general. It has not been over frequently seen since Napoleon's day. Nor may a captain be fairly criticised from the standpoint of the art of a later day. He must be tried by the standard of the art as he found it and left it. But it would seem that even if Gustavus did not tactically pursue the enemy after the victory on the Lech, he might have been wise to follow him up as a strategic operation. He could have sent part of his forces to Augsburg under Banér or Horn, and have himself sought to inflict a fresh defeat on Maximilian before he could recover from his late demoralization, or be joined by Wallenstein. But the king had his own way of doing things; he now repeated the procedure which had succeeded so well in Pomerania and the Franconian country, and began to occupy the newly taken territory in a systematic manner.

He crossed the Lech, April 17, with the remainder of his cavalry and the infantry, took Rain, seized all the towns along the right bank of the river to Augsburg, and ordered Torstenson and the heavy guns up the left bank to Ober-

hausen; and, to collect victual and contributions from all the tributary towns, he sent out a detachment into the Neuburg country. Augsburg, though a free city, was held in subjection by the imperial garrison. There was a bridge across the Lech, but this had been smeared with pitch, preparatory to setting it on fire. Gustavus moved up the right bank, camped at Lechhausen, and threw his pontoon bridges across the stream.

The triangle Ulm-Augsburg-Donauwörth was exceptionally strong. Had Gustavus desired it as a defensive "*sedem belli*," as he calls it, he could have held it against large odds. But defense was the last thing to think of. Swabia occupied, he proposed to move down the Danube, and on April 20 he entered Augsburg, which made some opposition to his demands, took its oath of fealty and promise of contribution, left Lechhausen April 26, and headed down the river Paar towards Ingolstadt, the strongest fortress in Bavaria.

Horn was in advance with the cavalry. The main column got to Aichach on the 26th, to Schrobenhausen the 27th, and to within eight miles of the river opposite Ingolstadt on the 28th. In reconnoitring, Gustavus found the enemy on the north bank, with a strong bridge-head on the south to protect the stone bridge leading across the Danube from Ingolstadt. Alongside of this stone bridge the enemy had thrown a pontoon bridge, and built a redoubt as its bridge-head. At daylight on the 29th an attack was made on this redoubt, but the Swedes were driven back with a loss of twenty killed. The troops were put into camp opposite Ingolstadt.

Early on April 30 Gustavus made a second reconnoissance, and riding too near the works, had his horse shot under him. A cannon-ball passed just behind the calf of

his leg and went through the horse, which fell. Without any expression of astonishment Gustavus extricated himself, mounted another horse and went on with his work. Shortly after, one of the princes of Baden was killed near him by a cannon-ball, and when Gustavus returned to camp, these events were made the subject of discussion between him and his generals at dinner. Among other things Gustavus said: "I take God and my conscience to witness, as well as all the tribulation I am undergoing and shall undergo, that I have left my kingdom and all I deem of value, solely for the security of my fatherland, to put an end to the fearful religious tyranny which exists, to replace in their rights and freedom the Evangelical princes and estates of Germany, and to win for us all a permanent peace." He concluded his conversation by referring lightly to his danger: "Whoso lives for honor must know how to die for the universal good," he said.

More curious than the military situation was the political status. The elector of Bavaria had formerly refused Gustavus' offers of neutrality; now he was flying from the king and appealing for aid to Wallenstein, whose fall he had been chiefly instrumental in causing not many months ago; and it was he who now desired an accommodation. He made propositions for a truce and subsequent peace, but the king refused these as the elector had refused his own. He had no confidence in Maximilian, and believed, as was the fact, that he desired a truce merely to wait for Wallenstein.

It is thought by some critics that Gustavus should have embraced his present opportunity of cutting the elector off from Bohemia and Austria; but it was no easy task. After Tilly's death Maximilian lost his head, and on May 2 forsook Ingolstadt, which, from the nature of the case, had not been yet blockaded. He had lost confidence in his

army, as his army had in him, and was eager for Wallenstein, to have some strong soul to lean on. He withdrew unhindered by Neustadt, where he crossed the river, to Ratisbon, which, though a free city, he occupied by stratagem, and thus secured his communications with Bohemia.

So soon as Gustavus saw that the garrison was being withdrawn from the bridge-head redoubt, he stormed it, crossed the Danube, sat down to besiege Ingolstadt, and sent Horn on to ascertain the enemy's movements. Horn followed to Neustadt, found that the Bavarian army had headed to Ratisbon, scoured the country thoroughly, and sent detachments as far as its gates.

While opening the siege of Ingolstadt, the king heard that Wallenstein had left part of his army to worry the elector of Saxony, and was advancing on Bavaria with twenty thousand men. It was important to save Saxony from imperial badgering or influence, for comparatively little of either might induce John George to make his peace with the emperor; and Arnim, who practically controlled him, was really in league with Wallenstein. Gustavus deemed it wise to make matters so threatening in Bavaria as not only to rouse Maximilian to follow and fight him, but to entice Wallenstein away from Saxony. He raised the siege of Ingolstadt May 4, — he had but just begun the work, — left a corps of observation at its gates, and marched into the interior of Bavaria. Horn was recalled, and reached Wollenzach May 5, took Landshut two days later, and levied ten thousand rix dollars contribution. Mosburg fell May 6, and Freising surrendered and paid its tribute.

As Gustavus advanced on Munich, he heard that Wallenstein showed no sign of following him. He had miscalculated: the Czech was the more intent on Saxony. For a moment the king thought he would move to the aid of this,

his most important ally. He prepared to leave Banér in Bavaria, to send Horn to help Oxenstiern against the Spaniards in the Rhine-Main country, and himself to march to succor John George. While so engaged, he heard fresh news, — that Wallenstein proposed to join the elector of Bavaria with his whole force. This made it imperative that Gustavus should not parcel out his own army, but keep well concentrated. He reverted to his first view and moved on Munich. The capital was taken without difficulty, a contribution of forty thousand rix dollars was levied, and there was found great store of material and guns, of which latter one hundred and nineteen buried ones were dug up. Gustavus remained here three weeks.

The cities received the Swedes without great difficulty, but the population of the country districts of Bavaria and Swabia remained hostile, and kept up a constant small war. Soldiers who were caught singly or away from their companies were visited with mayhem, or death by torture, and many hundred soldiers thus perished. Prayers in the Bavarian churches were said to run: "God save us from our country's enemy, the Swedish devil." Gustavus took no revenge for this conduct, but levied contributions only. To Munich he said: "I could inflict on you the penalties of Magdeburg, — but fear not, my word is worth more than your capitulation papers."

Gustavus' troops in Swabia had captured Nördlingen, Landsberg, Füssen, Memmingen, Kempten, Leutkirch and other places. But the holding was insecure. The peasantry rose and killed the Swedish garrisons in some of these towns, and a few imperial officers headed the rising, which finally reached ten thousand men. Colonel Taupadel was unable to handle the business, and Colonel Ruthven from Ulm tried his hand with equal unsuccess. Towards the end of May,

Ulm was threatened by Ossa with detachments of troops raised for Wallenstein. Gustavus left Banér in Munich, and started for Ulm, via Memmingen. Here he heard to his great distress that the Saxons were treating with Wallenstein, and that the latter had taken Prague. He had paid too little heed to the growth in strength of the great Czech and to his operations in Bohemia; and yet he could not have arrested Wallenstein's movements without the coöperation of the Saxon army, whose theatre was to have been Bohemia, but which had as miserably failed in its action as the elector had in his promises.

To go back some months: two imperial generals, Tiefenbach and Götz, with ten thousand men, had pushed their way, in October, 1631, from Silesia into Lusatia and Brandenburg, had, as usual, devastated their route, and had sent parties out as far as Berlin and Dresden. Their career was happily of no long duration. Ferdinand had made up his mind that a policy of excoriation towards Saxony was not a paying one, and to try a milder experiment, recalled these raiders. After they had left, there moved, in accordance with Gustavus' general scheme, from Torgau and Frankfort on the Oder into Bohemia and Silesia, a force of Saxons under Arnim, of Swedes from the Elbe under Banér, and of English under Hamilton, numbering from twenty to twenty-five thousand men. In Bohemia they received help from the population, and no great imperial force offered resistance. On November 10 they took Budin and Prague, where they beat the enemy in a smart combat, thrust the imperialists back from Nimburg on Tabor, and in December captured Eger and Pilsen. The emperor was constrained to call to the business Marshal Gallas, who had just come up from Italy; but this officer was slow. Everything was redolent of success. Bohemia was friendly; impe-

rial opposition scarcely existed; the Protestants of Austria were gaining heart for action; the Transylvanian prince Rakoezi fell upon Hungary and penetrated as far as Austria, — an admirable diversion. But the Saxon elector, apparently on the eve of success, began to listen to the wily councils of Arnim, who was in correspondence with Wallenstein, and instead of pushing on towards Moravia and into Austria, to second Gustavus' manœuvres, returned to Dresden, sat him down, and considered whether he could not make satisfactory terms with the emperor and save himself from so big a military budget. It was at this time that Wallenstein reappeared on the scene in person. This trickery separated the English and Swedish brigades from the Saxons; they retired from the undertaking, while the Saxons under Arnim remained in Bohemia to conduct a petty war and to plunder the land.

The new set of conditions centring about Wallenstein induced Gustavus to return to Ingolstadt with his main force. William of Weimar was left with a corps in Bavaria, on the right bank of the Danube, and Horn with a corps was to occupy the upper Rhine and Swabia. Recruiting for the Swedes went on even as far as Switzerland.

Meanwhile the Rhine was a scene of conflict in which Swedes, French, Spanish and Germans all bore a hand. A French army had appeared in Lorraine to chastise its duke for joining Tilly a year before, and, isolated, he was glad to return to his fealty on any terms. When Gustavus left the Main, he gave the control of the left bank of the Rhine into French hands; for it was better that Richelieu should have control here than to let the section lapse into the hands of the Spaniards or Austrians.

Oxenstiern had orders to respect the French holdings, little as Gustavus liked the attitude of Richelieu; and the

operations of the prince of Orange came to the chancellor's aid. But meanwhile the imperialists and Spaniards were not idle. Generals Ossa, Fürstenburg and Montecuculi gave trouble; and Count Embden moved up the Rhine capturing sundry places. At Speyer a Swedish colonel capitulated, but the place was later evacuated by the imperialists. Pappenheim moved from the Weser on the Rhine country. On the other hand Horn, who had been ordered to the Rhine from the confines of Bavaria, took Lahneck, Stolzenfels and Coblenz in July.

These Hapsburg successes again induced the French, despite their strained relations with Sweden, to work against the common enemy; and what they did west of the Rhine had the effect of making the work on the east bank the lighter for Oxenstiern and Horn.

Then came the king's orders, of which more anon, to march to his support in Nürnberg. Oxenstiern left Horn to conduct the Moselle campaign, and prepared to send all available troops to the main army.

To the forces of the duke of Würtemberg, who had declared against the emperor and raised eight thousand men, Gustavus added some Alsatian regiments and some of Oxenstiern's old troops, and this army, under Horn, reduced Baden-Durlach, and made a handsome campaign in Alsatia.

The details of these operations cannot be given. They were merely the policing of the outside of the arena, within whose bounds the giants struggled for the mastery.



Match-lock. (16th Century.)

XXV.

THE REAPPEARANCE OF WALLENSTEIN. JANUARY TO JUNE, 1632.

DESPITE Gustavus' open-handed dealing, many princes of Europe did not trust him. Unselfish devotion to any cause was too rare to make the king's honorable conduct seem real. Too great success had the same effect as too great disaster; suspicion was as bad as abject fear. When Ferdinand found himself so hard beset he returned to Wallenstein, the only soldier who might stem the engulfing tide. The great Czech, still smarting from his deposition in 1630, would make none but his own terms; and these were practically the emperor's transfer of all his powers on the theatre of war. Thus equipped, Wallenstein soon raised an army, and assembling it in Bohemia, attacked the Swedes in their weakest point by tampering with Saxony. John George, jealous of Gustavus' playing first rôle in Germany, clung to his Third Party to offset Gustavus' *Corpus Evangelicorum*; Brandenburg was uncertain; France was fearful of too much Swedish influence; other powers held aloof. When Wallenstein entered Saxony, John George called for aid, and leaving Banér to continue his work in Bavaria, the king started north with eighteen thousand men. He was anxious to interpose between Wallenstein and Maximilian, who was marching to join the new commander-in-chief, but was two days late. Wallenstein lay at Eger. Gustavus was unable to fathom his design so as to determine his own action; but, having ordered reinforcements from all his lieutenants, he finally moved to Nürnberg, and put the place in a state of defense. Works were erected all round it, and here Gustavus awaited his opponent. Instead of smartly attacking the king near Eger with his threefold larger force, Wallenstein slowly followed, reaching Nürnberg the end of June.

THE success won by Gustavus Adolphus had not been without its disadvantages. As his brothers in the faith had looked on him with distrust when he first landed in Germany, so now both the Protestant and Catholic extremists began to fear that the astonishing victories he had won might lead the king to extend his empire over Germany.

Self-control and honest purpose were not the common attributes of the rulers of that day; and however frank and consistent Gustavus had been, few people but fancied that there was something back of his generous, outspoken conduct which they could not fathom, but none the less dreaded. In addition to this the Catholics harbored an especial fear for their religion. They knew that the Lutherans had been hardly dealt with. When would their own turn come? France, too, had begun to see a danger in Swedish victories; Richelieu wanted an agent, if not a tool; he had no use for a master, and he was already half inclined to enter the lists to put a limit to Gustavus' career of triumph. He would surely do so, should it reach a stage dangerous to Europe or to France. Richelieu was able to understand Gustavus if any one could, but he acted on the theory of distrusting every one until he proved himself honest; of not trusting too far either honest man or rogue.

It was true from the other standpoint that Gustavus had reached the highest pinnacle of fame and material success, and that the emperor had correspondingly lost. Ferdinand's case at the end of 1631 was desperate. He had not only been beaten in the game of war, but he seemed to have forfeited all his friends. He had turned to England, France, the Italian princes, the pope, and could get help from none. Even the pope was an out and out Gustavus man. Ferdinand had tried to make peace with the elector of Saxony, but Wallenstein, who was smarting from his dismissal, had Arnim under his thumb, and Arnim swayed John George. His position had grown worse and worse. From the Baltic to the boundary of France and to the foothills of Switzerland, the Swedish king had carved his victorious path, and now stood in absolute control. France was threatening Trier, whose elector had been forced into neutrality.

The elector of Mainz, the bishops of Bamberg and Würzburg had fled. The elector of Saxony had overrun Bohemia. The duke of Lorraine had been disarmed. The Protestants were everywhere under arms, and there was revolution in the Ems country. Bavaria was unreliable. The Spaniards had been beaten out of the Lower Palatinate. The Turks threatened. The Swiss had all but joined Gustavus. Ferdinand was not himself capable of commanding his armies. What could he do? Wallenstein against him was too dangerous. He must win him back or succumb. Under these circumstances, towards the close of 1631 the emperor turned to the Bohemian, who alone seemed able to save him from a further downward course.

We have seen how Wallenstein had been sowing by all waters; how near he had come to entering into the service of Gustavus; how he had sought means, by negotiations with his enemies, of paying back Ferdinand in his own coin. Now that he was needed, Wallenstein was not to be had on any but the most humiliating terms. He took rather than was given the command. The imperial treasury was empty; Ferdinand was at the very end of his resources, material and moral; and he stood out against no conditions to buy back the only soldier in Germany capable of matching the Swedish hero. Before Wallenstein would consent to enter the lists again, the emperor formally agreed to leave to him the exclusive military power over all imperial possessions; the civil power over all imperial territory in the possession of the enemy, including the right to confiscate lands; the absolute right to dictate operations; and in all cases of reward and punishment the emperor's action was to require Wallenstein's consent. Ferdinand agreed to stay personally away from the army, and to keep it furnished with provision, money and material. In addition to this Wallenstein

was to have free entry into all imperial lands, to be reinstated in the duchy of Mecklenburg, and at the expiration of the war, of whose event he had no manner of doubt, to be rewarded by one of the imperial hereditary dukedoms. He received, in January, 1632, a provisional appointment to supreme command for three months; in April it was made permanent.

Such a contract with a subject was as degrading as it was unusual; and it of necessity meant that, when his usefulness should have past, Wallenstein would be put out of harm's way by fair means or foul. There could be no other outcome to it. Wallenstein, in assuming command, practically put a term to his own career, however brilliant it might meanwhile be.

The promise to victual the new army was a mere farce. Ferdinand had no money, and both he and Wallenstein knew that the forces must live by plunder. Even the Magdeburg wolves were tame compared to the wild beasts of Wallenstein's new divisions. Never, perhaps, have so many brutes under one standard disgraced the name of soldier, in every act except the mere common virtue of courage. On appointment, Wallenstein at once began to recruit, in the Netherlands, Poland, Austria, Silesia, Moravia, Croatia, the Tyrol, — everywhere. It was not long before his reputation, his riches, his generosity, brought about him forty thousand men. These he assembled near Znaim in Moravia, twenty-five miles north of Vienna.

This activity soon changed the political conditions in favor of Ferdinand. Wallenstein was a real power as well as an able soldier, and his apparent reconciliation with the emperor brightened the Catholic horizon beyond anything since the horror of Magdeburg. The situation, already colored by jealousy of Gustavus, seemed to shift as by the

turning of a kaleidoscope. France was an uncertain ally. Brandenburg and Saxony could not be counted on: John George had already invited George William to join in an anti-Swedish alliance. Gustavus' friends in Germany feared the result of the reconciliation. These circumstances tended to put an end to the king's bold offensive, inclined him to greater caution than he had exhibited since Breitenfeld, warned him to hold fast to the position he had conquered in Bavaria and Swabia, on the upper Danube, on the Main, and the Rhenish country, rather than press farther on into the bowels of the land.

The most uncertain element was Saxony. John George was born to keep his friends and his enemies in equal perplexity. On the very eve of destruction, he had thrown himself into the arms of Gustavus, and the king had treated him with exceptional generosity, — a fact of which he now seemed oblivious. Under the suasion of Arnim, his every effort was to rid himself of Swedish influence. He could not bear to have Gustavus enact the first rôle in Protestant Germany. John George had long imagined that Gustavus could be bought off by money; he now believed that an accession of territory would do it. He forgot his own solemn compact of the days of sore distress; he could not appreciate the danger Sweden was running in this war on German soil. He claimed support from Gustavus; he forswore in the same breath the fealty he had pledged to the man who had saved Saxony from fire and sword. Gustavus foresaw the vacillation of John George; and he did his best to prevent it. He ceased not in his negotiations; he kept a diplomatic agent at the elector's elbow; he wearied not in urging John George to hold fast to the right, and he promised rescue from Wallenstein, even as he had delivered him from Tilly. But an evil star reigned over the court of Dresden.

Maximilian, fearful of Wallenstein's revenge for his share in the latter's dismissal, begged the emperor to forbid his entering Bavaria; but Ferdinand's voice had no weight with the new generalissimo. Wallenstein's desire to rescue Bohemia from the Saxons, to break their treaty with Gustavus, to weaken the king's communications with his base, and to draw him out of south Germany, was more potent; it constrained the Czech to march to Bohemia rather than Bavaria. This he did in February, 1632, and without a pretense of opposition, the Saxons fled from Wallenstein's army on its first appearance.

For many months Wallenstein had been tampering with Arnim, who practically controlled John George. The Czech now represented that he was anxious to keep peace with Saxony; he showed the emperor's formal authority, and assured the elector that the Edict of Restitution should be annulled in his dominions. He pretended that his warlike advance was but a matter of form, lest the Jesuits should suspect his design; but that he was ready at any time to conclude an alliance with John George, who might also persuade Brandenburg to join the compact. The elector was disposed to an accord, if it would save his land; but he was slow in making up his mind. Meanwhile Wallenstein took Prague on May 18, and drove the Saxons back to their own borders.

By this time the king had moved into Bavaria, and Maximilian again appealed to the emperor, now praying for Wallenstein's aid, and agreeing to serve under his command. Placated by this concession, Wallenstein left ten thousand men under Maradas to protect Bohemia, and marched with his army to Eger. From here he made an inroad into Saxony, plundering and burning as he advanced. He wished to show John George the sort of thing he might

expect in case he delayed too long. Then, hearing that Maximilian was seeking a junction with him, Wallenstein returned to Eger, and thence advanced to Tirschenreut, to receive the elector, and to gain the advantage which the Bavarian army would lend him.

John George had eighteen thousand foot and eight thousand horse. This was a large body to throw from one to the other side. He lay at Leitmeritz, and a march for Gustavus from Munich thither was far from easy. Properly employed, there was enough of an army to defend Saxony, while to leave the Danube at this moment looked like a sacrifice of what had been so far accomplished. Gustavus ceased not his negotiations, and urged, in lieu of every other matter, his *Corpus Evangelicorum*. But no appeal to John George weighed against what this shortsighted potentate deemed for the present advantage of Saxony.

When Gustavus at Memmingen learned of the fall of Prague, he also heard of a raid on Munich by Colonel Craatz, who had been sent by the elector to spy out the disaster to the land, and who, finding his way barred, sat down to besiege Weissemburg. The king had at once determined to march north. He returned to Munich at the head of a small body of horse, and gathering all the news he could, marched to Donauwörth, which he reached June 12. Here he called in Banér with troops from Munich, and some regiments from Memmingen. He was too late to save Weissemburg, which had capitulated June 7; but as the articles of capitulation were broken, he wrote to Maximilian demanding Craatz's punishment, or he would visit the breach of faith on Munich.

Of the first importance was to sustain John George, as a political and military necessity. The king sent William of Weimar to Magdeburg to collect all the available troops and

march to Saxony, where he would himself join him, and wrote the elector that he should rely on him for victual to the daily amount of sixteen thousand pounds of bread, eight thousand pounds of beef and sixteen thousand "measures" of beer, at the places mentioned on the itinerary, viz.: the 15th of June, Aschersleben; 16th, Eisleben and Friedsburg; 17th, Halle; 18th, Skeuditz; 19th, Leipsic; 20th, Würzen; 21st, Oschatz; 22d, Meissen; 23, Dresden. As matters eventuated, these supplies were never sent.

His mind once made up to march north and interpose between Wallenstein and the Bavarians, Gustavus left ten thousand men under Banér in Bavaria, and Bernard at Memmingen, with orders to keep the enemy out of Swabia and Bavaria by every practicable means, paying especial heed to Augsburg; and started June 14 from Donauwörth, with ten thousand foot and eight thousand horse, in pursuit of Maximilian. On June 16 he was at Schwabach; on the 18th at Fürth.

During the spring of 1632 Gustavus had not kept sufficiently concentrated. He cannot well be held to have foreseen the turn affairs were to take, but it is scarcely to his credit to be forced to move against two armies numbering at least sixty thousand men, with only eighteen thousand of all arms, and no reinforcements within many days' march. If the monarch is subject to criticism at any time during his German campaigns, it is at this moment, and for this lapse. Where were the one hundred and fifty thousand men with which he was to open the campaign of 1632? The rôle of pacificator, protector, had induced him to spread them all over the theatre of war. His desire to rescue his Protestant friends led him to prejudice his military standing.

The immediate task was to interpose between Maximilian and Wallenstein: nothing more helpful could be done for

John George. It was June 20 that Gustavus learned that Maximilian had left garrisons in Ingolstadt and Ratisbon and was marching by way of Amberg, and that Wallenstein had started from the Eger country to meet him. There was just one chance. If he could reach Weiden first, he might still head off and beat Maximilian before Wallenstein came up. He could reckon on both of these generals being slow. On June 21 he left Fürth via Lauf, and on the 22d was at Hersbruck, with van at Sulzbach, which the Bavarians had reached June 17. On June 25 the army was at Vilseck, where it could threaten the road leading from Amberg to Weiden, over which the Bavarians must pass to join Wallenstein. But despite good calculation and good marching, Gustavus was just too late. He learned at Vilseck that, the day before, the Bavarian van had met Wallenstein's van at Weiden.

Now comes what some historians have characterized as a curious phase in Gustavus' character. Throughout his campaigns he had shown caution as remarkable as Cæsar's; but he had exhibited a boldness and a power of taking and holding the initiative which were as wonderful as Alexander's. All Europe looked with open eyes at this Lion of the North, who in two short years had marched from the seacoast well up the Oder, to the Elbe, to the Main, to the Rhine, to far beyond the Danube, — even to the confines of the Alps; who so covered his ground as to hold against all opposition the territory he traversed; who had not only beaten the best armies of the empire and the League, but had reduced Ferdinand to the very verge of ruin. Here he stood, still with the initiative in his hand, and though with small numbers, yet with troops flushed with success, and able to compass the almost impossible. What would he do? For some days Gustavus hesitated; he shifted plans contin-

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ually, and for the first time appeared to forfeit his initiative. He had never done this before, except when Saxony stood between him and Magdeburg; and there had then been a more than valid excuse. To be sure, he was hampered by want of troops; he must wait for reinforcements, and was necessarily reduced to a rôle of extreme caution; but he was slower to decide than we have been wont to see him. His first idea was that Wallenstein and Maximilian purposed to overrun Saxony; and in lieu of marching the Royal Army to the aid of the elector, he bethought him to return to the Danube, lay siege to Ingolstadt, and seek to draw the enemy away from Saxony by a smart diversion on the hereditary possessions of Ferdinand. Again, he thought that should the enemy actually enter Saxony, he would march to Dresden with his own column, sustained by the Rhine and Thuringian armies. Again, he planned to march via Coburg, draw in the Lüneburg and Hesse forces, and head for Meissen. Again, after a couple of days, as the enemy still remained at Eger, Gustavus imagined they might be aiming for Franconia, or perhaps for Bavaria, and he would stand where he was and wait developments. He called in Duke William and the duke of Lüneburg by rapid marches, via Coburg to the Bamberg country, while Landgrave William should remain as a check to Pappenheim. But Hersbruck, where he now lay, lacked victual, and was a bad point for a rendezvous, and if Gustavus was to give up offensive action, it was evident that he must retire.

Should he move to the Main — the natural rendezvous? That would be to give up Bavaria, and especially Nürnberg, which was not to be thought of. Finally, Gustavus settled on Nürnberg for concentration, as the place where he was nearest to all the points demanding his attention.

This apparent indecision has been much discussed, and by

some critics has been held up against the king. It does not appear to need much notice, except because it has already provoked it. Gustavus with his small force had merely been mentally alert, while his bulky opponents, Wallenstein and Maximilian, had inertly lain in quarters, waiting for the king to decamp. The fact is that Gustavus had a hyperactive mind; we have seen evidences of it before. He was continually conjuring up some new idea as to what the enemy might do, and framing schemes to counteract it. He was, so to speak, constantly casting an anchor to windward. He wrote much to Sweden, or to Oxenstiern, or to some intimate; he was free in stating his plans to his correspondents; and this amplitude of resources looks like indecision, when it was a mere discussion of hypothetical cases. Gustavus did not, like Cæsar, write commentaries at the close of his campaign, in which he could state motives which accorded with the event; he wrote as and when he thought, in the midst of the utter uncertainty of events, and he voiced his every idea. The apparent indecision was a mere habit of thinking aloud. What great captain who always voiced his thoughts would escape the charge of indecision? We judge the captain Alexander from the records of his friends; Hannibal from the story of his enemies; Cæsar from what he himself penned after the achievement; Frederick from his silent deeds alone; and we are but even now finding what the real Napoleon was, from the memoirs of his contemporaries. What we know of Gustavus is largely drawn from his own letters written at the moment. Let us be slow to criticise.

Consistency is a jewel, no doubt; but a man who is honest with himself, and who keeps up with the events of stirring times, cannot always be consistent. What seems true to-day may prove false to-morrow; the wise step of the morning

may be a fatal one at sundown. As events chase each other onward, no one can long remain of the same mind. In a certain sense consistency is narrowness, and in this sense the great Swede was broad; he took no pains to conceal a change of purpose when he made it.

The forces Gustavus reckoned on concentrating by mid-June at Hersbruck, or in the Nürnberg region, were:—

	Foot.	Horse.
Royal Army, now numbering	9,000	6,500
Duke of Weimar, from the Saale	4,000	1,500
Oxenstiern, from the Rhine	4,000	1,500
Duke of Lüneburg, from the Weser . . .	2,000	1,500
Landgrave of Hesse, from Cologne . . .	2,000	1,500
Baudissin, from lower Saxony	3,000	2,000
Total	24,000	14,500

In addition to which Saxony was to furnish 6,000 foot, 4,000 horse.

Grand total, 30,000 foot, 18,500 horse. Later, Bernard from Swabia and Banér from Bavaria were ordered to Nürnberg.

When Gustavus definitely ascertained that his operation to hinder the enemy's junction had failed, and comprehended that Wallenstein might now operate on his communications with north Germany, he all the more stood firmly for Nürnberg. He had visited the place June 19, when the army was at Fürth, had inspected the walls and works, and discussed peace and the *Corpus Evangelicorum* with the council. To protect this city, to lure Wallenstein from Saxony, and to act on the defensive until he could recruit his forces, was now his manifest rôle.


A strong sense of fidelity was mixed with the king's decision to march to Nürnberg: he could not desert the city he had agreed to stand or fall by. There was no *force majeure* as there was at Magdeburg. He had no choice. Nürnberg was at that time the cross-roads of the great routes between

Saxony and the Main, the upper Rhine and the Danube countries. The city was Gustavus' choicest ally, and held not only a Swedish and friendly garrison, but a large supply of victual and material of war.

Despite these advantages, Nürnberg was not his best place. From a military standpoint, Mainz or Würzburg was preferable. At Mainz the king was more strongly posted; at Würzburg, with Oxenstiern in the Palatinate, and Bernard in Swabia, he would have been at the apex of a strong triangle; and the only outside enemy was Pappenheim on the Weser, and he was neutralized by Tott. Maximilian would not have moved far from Bavaria, and of Wallenstein Gustavus had no fear, so soon as he backed up against his reserves. Once defeat Wallenstein, and Ferdinand would be hopeless. This was the purely military aspect, but the moral fact remained that he might not desert Nürnberg. Moreover the king was unwilling to leave south Germany, lest he should create an unfortunate impression, lose the fruits of his hard-won successes, and prejudice his new-made allies. The alternative of battle remained; but he could not now advance on Wallenstein, having no more than a third his force. For Wallenstein numbered more than sixty thousand men, and rumor ran that Pappenheim was on the march to join him.

Quite apart from the military situation, Gustavus was ready to make a universal peace, if it included the *Corpus Evangelicorum*. This project he had submitted to John George some time since; he now again did so to Nürnberg, and it was made a subject of careful consideration as to means and terms. Gustavus could certainly have made peace with Ferdinand, and have kept for himself Mecklenburg and Pomerania. But what then became of the *Corpus Evangelicorum*, for which he had sacrificed so much?

Gustavus had sent ahead his engineer, Hans Olaf, to examine the defenses of Nürnberg. Arrived there June 29, he inspected the works in person, and gave directions where to build new intrenchments. He made requisition on Nürnberg for fourteen thousand pounds of bread a day; the balance he expected to get from Franconia. Returning to Hersbruck, he started with the army on July 1. The foot



Nürnberg.

marched direct; the horse via Altdorf; on July 3 the army arrived at Nürnberg, and with the aid of the citizens, Gustavus began to surround the town with a cordon of redoubts.


Nürnberg is irregularly oval in shape from northeast to southwest, and the Pegnitz runs through it from east to west. The walls were good, and the citizens had already done much to strengthen them. Gustavus planned a new set of outer works, according to the most approved Swedish

theory; soldiers and citizens were alike told off in fatigue parties; all worked with a will, and in fourteen days the task was done. These works, destined to contain the Swedish army, were strongest on south and west, for Gustavus rightly conjectured that Wallenstein, if he followed him, as was hardly to be questioned, would camp on the hills at the foot of which the Rednitz ran, and which lay on the southwest of, and four miles from, the town across the plain. The moat was twelve feet wide and eight feet deep, and the line was strengthened by a great number of minor works. A new redoubt was built at the entrance of the river Pegnitz into the city, and one at its outlet, and a ravelin and a horn-work were constructed between the Spittler and the Lady Gates on the south of the town. A line of earthworks extended around the entire place, from the market village of Wöhrd on the east to the Judenbühl on the north, and round to the Pegnitz at St. John's. On the other side of the Pegnitz were two extensive redoubts, at the "White Lead Garden" and the Gostenhof, connected by suitable works and ditches, and in front of the Gostenhof redoubt were several outworks and half-moons. South of the city gates was meadow land, which was protected by extra strong works, one between Steinbühl and Schweinau, another between Steinbühl and the city; and on the Rötenbach road, on the edge of the wood, there was a strong redoubt, and still another on the Altdorf road. The works, broadly speaking, formed a big bow on the north of the city from the outlet of the Pegnitz to its inlet. On the south there were two bows, one from the Pegnitz inlet and one from its outlet, both ending at the main gates. On these works Gustavus mounted some three hundred guns of all sizes, the captured Bavarian and Swabian guns among them.

The good spirits and the determination of the Nürnber-

gers to stand by Gustavus were marked. All citizens from eighteen to fifty years old were put under arms. The elderly men undertook guard duty in the town and on the town walls. For the outworks, there were made up of the enrolled young men twenty-four bodies of from eighty-one to one hundred and fourteen men, each known by a red and white flag, and on a blue square in the upper corner a golden letter of the alphabet. The militia was about three thousand strong, plus two regiments of recruits, one being of three thousand, one of eighteen hundred men. Thus from the Nürnbergers Gustavus had eight thousand foot and three hundred horse.

The Swedish troops outside the city were at first well supplied with rations; but these soon rose in price, and some excesses were complained of. These breaches of discipline were treated summarily, by hanging the common soldiers, and making the officers pay heavy damages. There was, no doubt, cause of complaint; but the Swedes were angels compared to the fiends in Wallenstein's army. The king ordered the population to bring into the town all the provisions of the adjoining country. The several armies or reinforcements had already been ordered to head towards Nürnberg. The king pushed out a part of the cavalry to Neumarkt to reconnoitre. This party was, however, driven in, and Wallenstein moved with more than sixty thousand men to Nürnberg, reaching the place early in July.



Arquebus. (16th Century.)


XXVI.

NÜRNBERG. JULY AND AUGUST, 1632.

IF Gustavus is taxable with ill management for being in Wallenstein's front with but a third his force, his activity made up for lack of numbers. Wallenstein erected a vast camp four miles from Nürnberg, and strengthened it by every means known to the military art; but he showed no symptom of attack. He was more than cautious. Gustavus waited for his reinforcements. There were sixty thousand men in the imperial camp, one hundred and twenty thousand souls in Nürnberg, and supplies soon ran short. Nothing but small war was waged. Gustavus captured a convoy, and Wallenstein took some adjoining towns. In the crowded city sickness supervened. In this starving-match neither side could claim an advantage. Gustavus was not certain that Wallenstein might not decamp and march toward Franconia or the north, and so ordered his arriving reinforcements as to head off either movement. Finally, in mid-August, Oxenstiern arrived. By every rule of warfare Wallenstein should have attacked Oxenstiern or Gustavus before the junction; but he did neither. Gustavus marched out, ready for battle, but there was no stir in the imperial camp, and he met his lieutenant at Bruck.

IF caution as a general may be said to have been one of the solid merits of Gustavus, so may it be called one of the glaring defects of Wallenstein. Though outnumbering his opponent three to one, the imperial general remained at Eger until Gustavus withdrew from his front. Having argued out his course for this campaign, he had concluded to play a waiting game. Wallenstein had not the instinct of battle which inspired Gustavus: against an enemy whom he had contemptuously threatened to drive from before him with a rod, and whom he ought to have crushed in the first engagement, he deliberately declined to undertake the offensive. So soon as the Swedish army left his front, he followed on sev-

eral roads via Tirschenreut, Weiden, Amberg and Sulzbach, which place he left July 5 for Lauterhofen. In this town Gustavus had left a detachment under Taupadel, who, out with a regiment of dragoons and some squadrons of cuirassiers on a reconnoissance, learned that the enemy's artillery, covered by four thousand men, was in Neumarkt. More brave than discreet, Taupadel sallied forth to attack Neumarkt, ran across the enemy, was lured into an ambush, and on July 6 was all but annihilated. The king heard of his



The Rival Camps.

dilemma and sought to cut him out, but the harm was done before he could come up.

On July 10, at Neumarkt, the Bavarian and imperial armies were completely merged. As to their strength, authorities vary between sixty and eighty thousand men. Next day Roth and Schwabach were seized, and the upper Rednitz was occupied. Marching out with his cavalry by way of Fürth, Gustavus carefully observed his opponent, and drew up in line at Cadolzburg, in a position whose flanks were secure.

Far too weak for battle, he yet invited attack, which Wallenstein declined. "There has been enough fighting; I will show them another method," said the Czech.

Gustavus' road to Donauwörth was now cut off. After a two days' rest, the enemy advanced to Stein, and here and at Zirndorf they intrenched a camp some four miles from Nürnberg, which in three days, by employing large details, was completed. It stretched from Stein to Fürth along the left bank of the Rednitz; it had a circumference of a dozen miles, and was cut in halves by the little stream Bibert, which empties into the Rednitz. Over the Bibert, within the lines, were a wagon bridge and a foot bridge. The east and north sides of the camp were the more strongly intrenched. The south and larger half contained the villages of Kreutles and Altenburg, and was well fortified at its southeast extremity. Opposite Gerbersdorf the trees were cut down, and redoubts built along the Rednitz. A strong square redoubt lay on the southwest corner. The smaller north half, around Zirndorf, was the strongest part of the camp; it leaned on wooded hills, and was especially well defended on the east side, where it had three redoubts, with a fourth one in front and opposite Dambach. Three strong batteries were established at the most northerly point of the *enceinte*, and the heights were made as safe as art could do it. In the wood at the northern extremity, on the Burgstall, a hill two hundred and fifty feet above the Rednitz, lay a ruined castle, called the Alte Veste, with a lodge near by; and these were peculiarly strengthened, being surrounded by palisades and ditches; heavy guns were mounted, and through the woods slashings were cut for their fire. Further to the west lay one more strong, square fort. The rest of the camp had only a single wall and ditch.

The Swedes had sought to interfere with these operations,

but had, whenever a small party ventured out and crossed the Rednitz, been thrust back ; and when Gustavus, at the head of a big division of horse, filed out one day, in the hope of luring the enemy from his defenses, he was unable to induce a single regiment to come forth. Wallenstein's new method manifestly excluded fighting, unless he was forced into it.

Despite his vast superiority of numbers, and though the elector urged an attack, lest his land should be entirely eaten out, the imperial commander refrained from a vigorous policy against the king, fancying that he could blockade him in Nürnberg and compel him by hunger to submit to a peace. He had already cut him off from Swabia and Bavaria, and he harbored great faith in this Fabian policy. The conception of the plan cannot be said to do credit to Wallenstein's intelligence or energy ; but the execution was consistent and thorough. The method was weak, but Wallenstein was well adapted to the task. He was brought to it, moreover, by the fact that the king's fortified camp was exceptionally strong, and that, according to the ideas of the times, it was unwise to attack intrenchments even with overwhelming forces. It was Wallenstein's habit not to fight unless all the conditions were beyond question in his favor, — or he had to. He had conceived a different opinion of the ability of the Snow King from what he originally held, and was unwilling to operate against him by any but the very safest system. No really great man ever more markedly lacked the fighting instinct ; and that Wallenstein was a great man — a great soldier — is not to be questioned. Again, Wallenstein estimated the provision of the allies to be much more limited than it really was ; and it is alleged that, being a devout believer in astrology, he had had it foretold him that Gustavus' fortune would last only till toward the close of the current year. For some

months the king had shown a willingness to conclude peace, on terms which should protect both Sweden and the German Protestants, a fact which Wallenstein misconstrued. He was far from understanding the firm character of the monarch, and the impossibility of compelling him to a peace which he would feel to be harmful to his allies or to Sweden, or in the slightest degree derogatory to his own dignity. Gustavus better understood Wallenstein. He knew him to be an ambitious man and an able soldier; but he did not credit him with being a great general. As Wallenstein had originally erred in underrating Gustavus, so Gustavus now erred — but in a lesser degree — in underrating Wallenstein, for the Bohemian had a marvelous power of biding his time, and a conception of strategy leagued to politics beyond that of any man of his day, — save only the king. That the quality of Wallenstein's troops was not high Gustavus knew, while his own, though few, were of the very best. He believed that, despite his small force, he could hold his own until his reinforcements arrived, and, as he was habituated to do, he put his trust in Providence, and relied upon his army and his own genius.

Wallenstein was surrounded by his old officers, Gallas and Aldringer, Hölke, Sparre and Piccolomini among them; but it cannot be said that his men were of the best. There was not the leaven in the imperial army which the rugged, honest Swede made in the body commanded by Gustavus, although this, too, had its questionable elements. But Wallenstein's position was strategically and tactically a strong one. It commanded the road from Nürnberg to the Main and the middle Rhine country, as well as those to Bavaria and Swabia; it was, in the light of those days, in the light of almost any day, inexpugnable; and the Czech was strong on the defensive, and believed that he was so placed as to

await events longer than his enemy. Detachments of restless Croats were sent out to the north, south and even east of Nürnberg, to seize and keep the roads the more effectually, and with orders to hold the Swedes to their defenses and prevent their foraging.

In this situation the rival armies lay for weeks, waging only a small war, in which the Swedes were generally successful. The most important of these operations was an attack of Wallenstein's, July 15, on a part of the Swedish defenses erroneously pointed out to him as a vulnerable spot, which, not driven home, failed with a loss of three hundred men ; but on August 6 the imperialists captured the fortress of Lichtenau, by which they could threaten the king's communications with Würtemberg. To offset this, Gustavus sent out Taupadel, with three regiments of dragoons and cuirassiers, to capture a train of a thousand wagons of victual which was on the way to Wallenstein's camp from Bavaria, and on August 9 Taupadel escalated Freistadt and captured the convoy. On his way back he met Gustavus, who had gone out to sustain him with three thousand men. Wallenstein had dispatched a force to intercept Taupadel, but its commander, Sparre, was not fortunate. He had four squadrons of cavalry, twenty companies of Croats and five hundred foot. The king attacked him with his customary fury, riding into the midst of the combat, in which he lost a number of his escort, but after a short, sharp fight he corraled the whole force. Sparre was himself taken prisoner. The officers engaged were rewarded with gold medals, and each man was given a rix dollar.

The opposing forces remained inactive. Gustavus waited far beyond his calculation for his reinforcements ; and it was fortunate that Wallenstein was unwilling to attack, and preferred the slower process of starvation. So far-seeing had

the king's preparations been that for some weeks there was no scarcity of food in the city and camp beyond what is common in any beleaguered place. There was, however, lack of forage for the beasts, and many died. Wallenstein's Croats were the more able foragers, and soon had better mounts to keep up the work. Foreseeing want of bread, should the imperial general persist in his policy, Gustavus offered to make peace if Nürnberg so elected, but the city bravely stood to its guns. Actual hunger first appeared in Nürnberg; then in the Swedish camp; last in Wallenstein's. This general's severity and natural lack of feeling stood him in good stead in holding down his men.

It did not take long to reduce both armies to a pitiable condition. There were one hundred and thirty-eight bakers in Nürnberg, but they could not bake bread fast enough to fill the hungry mouths of citizens, soldiers and numerous refugees. All told, there were one hundred and twenty-five thousand souls; the companion of hunger, disease, by and by set in, and ere long deaths grew beyond the capacity to bury. Corpses lay in the streets; the graveyard and the pauper's ditch were filled; lack of forage had killed half the horses, and the stench of decaying carcasses and unburied bodies bred a pestilence. Under circumstances like these, order could not always be preserved; it was a wonder that it was preserved so well. In the imperial camp matters were not much better; hunger and disease claimed an almost equal number of victims.

This sitting down to starve each other out seems an unwarranted method of conducting war, as well as a costly one; but it was with good reason that Gustavus remained quiet, for he could neither desert Nürnberg nor strike until he could gather his forces. Whatever the king's excuse, there was no good reason for Wallenstein's failure to bring about

active work before Gustavus could be reinforced. Those who claim for the Bohemian an ability beyond his contemporaries are called on to explain this singular want of enterprise, as well as other lapses in the Nürnberg campaign.

Gustavus had not been, and still was not, certain as to what Wallenstein's movements would be. When at Nürnberg he heard of his march on Schwabach, he imagined that his purpose might be to march to the Rhine or to Würzburg, or to interpose between Oxenstiern and himself. This would be a serious matter, and Gustavus altered his former orders to his lieutenants. He instructed Oxenstiern to march to Würzburg, and to keep in touch with the enemy, hold the Main, and prevent Wallenstein from getting victual from that region. Banér he ordered to leave Ulm and Augsburg strongly garrisoned, and to join Oxenstiern at Würzburg. Loth to give up his hold on either the Main or the Danube, the king's idea was to keep a line of strong places between these rivers, along the Tauber and the Wörmitz, — Mergentheim, Rothemburg, Dinkelsbühl, Nördlingen, — to head off Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine. The position at Nürnberg would cut him off from the Bamberg and Culmbach country, and compel him to victual from Bavaria or the eaten-out Upper Palatinate, and perhaps to retire from want of food, as Wallenstein was seeking to make him do.

Swabia proved a weak link. Banér and Bernard had at first done well, and had extended their holdings, but General Craatz, sustained by the Catholic population, had then forced them back to Augsburg; had taken Friedberg, Landsberg and Füssen, and had even entered into secret dealings with Augsburg. Banér found that neither he nor Bernard could leave the country until Craatz was definitely beaten.

On July 30 Bernard was at Füssen, Banér in Dietfurt. Oxenstiern had reached Würzburg July 23 with seven thou-

sand men, — none too soon, as Wallenstein's light cavalry was overrunning the region; and the landgrave joined the chancellor with four thousand more on the 28th. Duke William, who was marching on Saxony, on receiving his new orders, headed for the Main, and on the 27th was at Hildburghausen, where he received a reinforcement of four foot and two horse regiments from Saxony. From the news received from Banér and Bernard, Oxenstiern made up his mind that it was not possible to carry out the king's orders. He could not hold the line from Würzburg to Donauwörth with his own troops alone. In view of the approach of the landgrave, of Duke William and the Saxons, he adopted a plan of his own, viz.: to hold the strong places on the Main, leave a free corps to manœuvre in the region, and to march with the rest up river to the Bamberg territory. Duke William from Schweinfurt, which he had reached, was to meet him near Hassfurt, and between them they would use up Holeke, who was assembling in the vicinity. Should Holeke retire from Bamberg, they would follow him up, beat him, and be ready to join Gustavus at Nürnberg when desired. The chancellor began to execute this scheme July 31, and did actually drive back the enemy towards Bamberg, and recapture Hassfurt.

This change Gustavus did not approve. He still desired to keep Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine, or from victualing on the Main country, as he imagined he might. He preferred a concentration near Rothemburg, with an advance on Anspach or Lichtenau, from whence Oxenstiern could either join Gustavus or push the enemy. The advantage of this plan was the control of a rich country for victualing. Holeke could be disregarded; for with the strong places in the Bamberg country held by the Swedes, he could accomplish no permanent harm. Gustavus' plan would keep Wal-

lenstein away from Swabia, which Oxenstiern's plan would not ; and if the game was to be famine, the king was anxious to confine him to a limited area. Still Gustavus, who reposed the greatest confidence in his chancellor, wrote him to act as appeared most advantageous ; but urged him to keep the main intention in view, to get together the troops, keep up communications with Nürnberg, and not to be drawn into battle before joining the king. This Oxenstiern did. Duke William joined him August 16 at Kitzingen ; and all Swabian forces which could possibly be spared marched towards him, Ruthven being left to hold the land.

Banér had lately been successful in that region. He had recaptured Friedburg and Landsberg, and pushed Craatz out of the country. On August 7 he reached Nördlingen in obedience to Oxenstiern's call, awaited Bernard from Öttingen, and August 15 both stood at Kitzingen.

To reach Gustavus, three roads were open to the new army : to move direct towards the enemy and intrench in his front ; or via Anspach to the south of him ; or to Windsheim or Neustadt on the Aisch, then down to the Aurach at Emskirchen, and the Rednitz at Bruck, and thus pass to the north of him. Gustavus preferred the last because, once at Bruck, the enemy could not hinder the junction ; but he wisely left the decision to Oxenstiern, bidding him not to call the enemy down upon himself. In case of attack he must hold himself at least a day, the king would come to his relief, and between them they would give the enemy a beating. These preliminary instructions were rendered nugatory by Wallenstein's remaining inert, but they were much in the king's style ; and so soon as he concluded that Wallenstein would venture nothing, he bade Oxenstiern hurry forward his troops.

The chancellor broke up from Kitzingen August 17 ; on the 19th he was at Windsheim, and rested two days. Receiv-


ing Gustavus' orders to march direct to Bruck, after a day of prayer on the 22d, — rather an odd delay under existing orders, — he moved to Neustadt the 23d, and on to Bruck, where he found that Gustavus had built a bridge across the Rednitz. Wallenstein could now no longer prevent the junction, if he wished to do so. The king's small army of twenty thousand men had been reinforced by Oxenstiern's thirteen thousand, the landgrave's four thousand, the duke's six thousand, and five thousand Saxons, to more than double its strength.

By every rule of the art, even in that day, Wallenstein should have taken steps to prevent these reinforcements from reaching the king. That he would do so was anticipated and provided for in Gustavus' movements; that he did not was made a matter of sneering criticism in the Swedish camp. Gustavus now welcomed a general engagement as an outlet to a situation which every day and every additional mouth rendered more critical. But Wallenstein kept close to his lines, and it is distinctly to his discredit to have done so. His conduct has been called Fabian, but the phrase is not a happy one. Fabius had no troops which could encounter Hannibal's. He refused to fight, because there was no gain in fighting. Hannibal had shown the Romans all too often that he could beat them under any conditions in the field; Fabius chose a policy of small war, of cutting Hannibal's communications, of fighting detached forces; and, having chosen it, he carried it out, and so worked as seriously to hamper the Carthaginians. But Wallenstein had a huge overweight of men, not, to be sure, the equals of the Swedish veterans, but troops which had been under his command for six to eight months, largely composed of mercenaries who were old soldiers, and men who shortly at Lützen showed that they could fight; he had always boasted that he was in every mili-

tary respect Gustavus' superior; his one chance of annihilating the Snow King, at whom he had jeered for years, was in delivering battle while Gustavus had but a fraction of his force, and in then turning on his lieutenants; and to do this he had had abundant opportunity, gallantly offered him by the battle-eager Swede. But Wallenstein did nothing. Fabius in his own way was active; Wallenstein was lethargy itself.

The utmost that can be said for him was that he lacked confidence in his troops; but he was not occupying a position where he could better them. If he desired opportunity for organization and discipline, he had ill chosen time and place. Deliberately to starve any army is a poor way of preparing it for battle. After this criticism, however, it is but justice to say that to the plan which Wallenstein had with premeditation adopted, he clung with perfect consistency. The plan itself ranks him low as a general; the execution of the plan was masterly.

Having heard that Oxenstiern had reached Bruck, the king, with part of his forces, moved out to meet him, fully prepared for attack in case Wallenstein should interfere with his manœuvre. But there was not even a show of it, and the king and his lieutenant safely joined hands.



Swords. (16th Century.)

XXVII.

THE ASSAULT ON THE ALTE VESTE. SEPTEMBER, 1632.

ADDITIONAL forces consumed more food. Starvation was depleting both armies. Gustavus sought battle. On August 31 he drew up in order along the Rednitz to invite Wallenstein out, but the Czech would not stir. Next day Gustavus bombarded his camp, but with no better result. The king was bound to have the matter out. He could fight, but not bear his men's distress. On September 2 he captured Fürth. To effect a lodgment here, the strongest point, would command the enemy's entire camp; to force an entrance elsewhere would not do so. On September 3 the king assaulted the Alte Veste. He had calculated to get artillery up the hill to force his way in, but no guns could be hauled up; the Swedes had but their muskets, pikes and brave hearts to break down defenses manned by cannon and equal numbers. For a whole day and night, and next morning, they stood to their work like heroes, at a loss of perhaps four thousand men; but in vain; Gustavus retired baffled. Still he nearly succeeded, and he deserves credit for showing the world that good infantry may attack stout works heavily manned, with the hope of carrying them. The Swedes were beaten, but not demoralized. Wallenstein took no advantage of his victory. The armies remained two more weeks on the spot. On September 17 the king sent Wallenstein a formal challenge to come out to battle, and drew up on the 18th to meet him. But the Czech did not budge. Disheartened, Gustavus moved towards Würzburg. Three days later Wallenstein decamped and marched to Forstheim.

THE concentration of his forces gave Gustavus nearly fifty thousand men; but it ran up the number to be fed, including Nürnberg, to thrice as many. The situation grew critical. There was little food left, and no forage within twenty miles; the whole vicinity had been eaten up. Disease and hunger made big gaps in the Swedish ranks, and yet more among the citizens. Matters were not better in Wallenstein's camp. Fugger had arrived from Bavaria with eight thousand men,

and though Wallenstein sent Holcke with six thousand to Saxony, he still had over forty-five thousand men in camp. Here were two hundred thousand mouths crying for bread. The exhaustion of the country, the small war waged by the Swedes, and the capture of his great convoy brought grave distress to the imperialists. At Eger, Wallenstein had had sixty thousand men. Sundry detachments and depletion from want of victual had run down this force by a good quarter. The number is given in the Swedish archives as thirty-six thousand men; but there is some error in the estimate. Both Swedish camps — Bruck and Nürnberg — had, say letters of that day, to be rationed from Nürnberg. This is hard to understand: convoys might have come from the Main country. However this may be, the king's present equality of forces, and the bald fact that he could not long hold starvation aloof, induced him to move on the enemy. To beat or force him back from Nürnberg was the only outlet, and he sought to entice Wallenstein from his intrenchments.

It was on Tuesday, August 31, that out of both the camps the Swedish army debouched for battle. The lines about Nürnberg were occupied by the militia, and a camp guard was left at Bruck. The forces united in Kleinreut, and went into battle order opposite the imperial camp along the Rednitz, with three heavy batteries suitably posted.

Here was a challenge to tempt any soldier. But Wallenstein raised not a finger. A mere artillery fire, not even a severe one, was all he condescended to. A couple of small bodies issued from the gates, and advanced to skirmishing contact, but on being pressed by the Swedes, retired quickly within walls. In one of these skirmishes Banér was unfortunately wounded. Remaining in position, the Swedes threw up intrenchments for the batteries during the night; and the next day bombarded the enemy's camp. But on account of

its vast area the fire was ineffective, and the reply was weak.

As Wallenstein's camp lay close to the edge of the Rednitz, an attack upon it by fording the river was hardly advisable, lest the men, disarranged by crossing in the teeth of the enemy, should be unable to resist a stout sally. But the matter must be brought to a head. The king lacked the patience of Wallenstein. Whatever we may say of the want of audacity of the imperial general (and he was the very opposite of Napoleon's "*De l'audace, encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace!*"), we cannot deny him the ability to hold in hand a large body of the most insubordinate elements during a period of the utmost distress; or the persistency to carry through his plan without swerving, however tempted by his enemy to the arbitrament of battle. This is no small honor.

During the night of September 1-2, Gustavus, intent on battle, broke up from camp, captured Fürth, crossed the Rednitz, and, opposite Wallenstein's fortifications, encamped close to the enemy, so disposed that the cavalry should attack on his right, where was the weakest part of the wall, while the foot, under his own command, should assault on the left.

Why Gustavus chose this, the strongest place in Wallenstein's line, is not certain; but he accurately gauged it as the key of the position, from which, once taken, he would dominate the camp. If he ruptured the wall at any other point, he would not succeed in the same measure as if he forced an entrance on the north, where on the Burgstall lay the Alte Veste. From no other point could he use his artillery to such advantage; from no other point could he be so sure of his victory. The front along the Rednitz had been condemned; the side furthest from the city was too distant as a tactical point; to gain a foothold on the south end gave

but promise of a half success. Be his reasons as they may, he chose this place, not doubting that his guns could be got up to aid in the attack.

All day long on the 2d Gustavus was busy fortifying the new camp and making approaches to the formidable lines. While so engaged he received word from scouts and some prisoners that Wallenstein was on the point of retiring, and would leave a strong rear-guard behind in the trenches. The work was hurried on, and the Swedish approaches were got close to the camp-ditch. The news proved to be false; Wallenstein was in truth moving, but it was only a change of quarters, from the north end further down the camp, to clear the ground for the coming attack; but Gustavus stood to his decision for an assault next day.

On Friday, September 3, 1632, somewhat before 10 A. M., the Swedish foot, who had stuck green boughs in their hats as a token of good cheer, were launched against the heights crowned by the Alte Veste. The hill was steep and rugged; with great effort only could a few light guns be hauled up by hand and got into position; most of them remained behind. It was, on the Swedish side, entirely an infantry battle. Practically the artillery accomplished nothing, and while the horse aided what it could, it had to fight dismounted and not as cavalry. The Swedes advanced with the utmost enthusiasm and confidence. Had they not defeated better troops than these at Breitenfeld? What were intrenchments to them, every man of whom had stormed breaches time and again? The fire grew deadly. Aldringer, who commanded at this point, was sharply reinforced by Wallenstein with six infantry regiments, on whose heels came speeding almost all the rest of the army. Gustavus was omnipresent, leading on his men, putting in regiments here and companies there, and laboring hard to get guns up the slope. This was all-impor-

tant. The enemy afterwards confessed that a good battery at the Alte Veste would have driven them out of camp. The Swedes acted the part of men. Despite the grape and canister from the imperial cannon, of which there were over a hundred in line, and the volleys of musketry from the walls, so constant as to make one continuous roar, they held their own with utter contempt of death. Many imperial officers fell, Fugger among the number. The Swedes fared no better: scores of superior officers were killed; every one was in the thick of it. Torstenson was captured; Bernard's horse was shot under him; the king's boot-sole was shot away. The general officers were doing their full duty. The troops were freely put in, and from time to time seemed to have success just within their grasp. To meet one desperate advance, Wallenstein launched one of his best cavalry regiments, the Kronberg, at the Swedish line, but Stålhandske's Finns thrust it back decimated.

Thrice the gallant Swedish foot captured the Burgstall; thrice were they hustled out with grievous loss. A new line followed each one that lost ground. No troops ever showed better heart, but the Alte Veste could not be held if taken. They took, however, under gallant Bernard, a height facing the castle, and had they been able to get guns up there, they could have pounded the castle to pieces, and raked Wallenstein's camp. Scandinavian grit well seconded a Viking's courage. For twelve mortal hours the bloody work went on, — as Wallenstein expressed it in a letter to the emperor, "*caldissimamente*," — but the Swedes had made no real gain. All agree that the fighting was hot, — the Swedes said hotter than Breitenfeld; the imperialists, hotter than the battle of the White Hill.

At dusk a slow rain began to fall, which made the roads and slopes too slippery to leave any hope of success. Had

the fight been continued two hours more, said prisoners, the imperialists would have run out of ammunition and been compelled to retire. But Gustavus called a halt. The Swedes held their ground through the night, and the firing between the lines never ceased. Early next morning the king tried the chances of one more sally from the woods which he held, but to no effect. Wallenstein saw his advantage, and redoubled the force of his counter attack. By 10 A. M. he pushed the Swedes out of the wood they had all along held, down the slope and back to Fürth. The battle had lasted twenty-four hours. Many dead and wounded were left upon the field. The Swedish loss is variously given at from two thousand to four thousand killed and wounded. There is no official list. Wallenstein lost half as many as the Swedes.

In this first battle between Wallenstein and Gustavus, to the Swede belonged the honor, to the Czech the victory. But not to win here was to lose; and the king had not won.

Though it had been the only means left to the king to break the deadlock, it was none the less true that the assault had failed, and with a heavy loss. Like all similar unsuccessful assaults, like Fredericksburg, Kenesaw, Cold Harbor, in our civil war, Gustavus' attack on the Alte Veste has been denounced as reckless and out of place. But for all that, it was a distinct gain to the modern art of war; and as a first attempt to compass what was then deemed impossible, should be exempt from the blame which may sometimes be visited on other failures. It had at that day been usual to operate a breach in the wall of a fortress, and then to launch a column perhaps many times greater in numbers than the entire garrison of the place to storm it, but no such assault was attempted unless the breach was practicable. It had been considered impossible to storm a fortified camp, not because the walls could not be breached, but because the

defenders were presumably as numerous as the attacking force. And yet it was essential that attacks on such positions should find their place in war. Without them, the modern art could not be developed. Some brave soul was called on to prove that such an attack was feasible, and therefore justifiable; Gustavus' very failure demonstrated this; that his men were not disheartened by the failure, they shortly proved by their gallantry at Lützen; and since the introduction of firearms, the king deserves credit for first showing the world the ability of good infantry to attack and hold themselves in front of strong intrenchments manned by equal numbers and mounted by plenty of artillery. His great successor, Frederick, made it plain that what Gustavus attempted was achievable; and the heroic effort of the king and his gallant Swedes to force their way into the Alte Veste was as distinct a step forward in the art of war as it was a splendid exploit. Defeat is not always a disgrace or loss; nor is victory always a gain or glory. Had the attack on the Alte Veste succeeded, it would have won unstinted praise.

Gustavus understood his failure; with a vigorous commander in his front, he would be running a grave risk; with Wallenstein he was, barring loss of men, no whit worse off. In a letter to the Nürnberg council he explained the reason of his assault, acknowledged his failure, and asked care for the wounded and continued issues of bread, as well as six or seven thousand workmen to finish his intrenchments near Fürth. He was determined not to leave Nürnberg so long as there was any hope of success.

Gustavus had, since his negotiations with Wallenstein in the fall of 1631, made several further attempts to influence the imperial general. In the spring of 1632 he is said to have approached him, and he did so again when first in Nürnberg. But at this time Wallenstein was in negotiation

with John George, and would listen to no advances, though Gustavus is said to have offered to help him to the Bohemian crown. In July there were renewed evidences of Wallenstein's willingness to work toward a peace; and now Gustavus sent Colonel Sparre, recently captured, to Wallenstein, with overtures for the exchange of prisoners and incidentally to treat of peace. Exchanges were effected, but Wallenstein referred the other question to Vienna, where it was so long delayed that it was practically dropped.

Gustavus worked uninterruptedly on the Fürth intrenchments, which he prolonged from the Rednitz above the village with a northerly sweep to the rear, a distance of over two miles. So long as there was any chance, he still hoped for success. Rations had grown so short that the men got bread but once in three or four days; no forage could be had within a day's march. Yet the Swedes had open communications to Kitzingen and Würzburg, while Wallenstein had not even the road to Neumarkt. It was reported September 9 that he could not hold himself over three days more. For all that, Wallenstein did not budge. He sat sullenly in place. It was a game of patience.

The rival armies — starving though they were — remained on the spot two weeks after the battle, the Swedes alone carrying on a small war, while Wallenstein forbade replies to their attacks. Hunger was now at its height, and was perhaps the worse in the imperial camp. Contemporary writers state the loss of each army to have been twenty thousand men in the two and a half months they lay near Nürnberg. This number, in the Swedish army at least, is exaggerated. In the city ten thousand people are said to have died. The cattle all perished, and the vicinity was transformed into a desert.

It was evident to the king that no further advantage could

be gained by remaining at Nürnberg. He could neither entice nor force Wallenstein out to battle; he could not capture his camp. He determined to cut the knot; either to reëstablish himself upon his direct communications with north Germany, or else to go on with his operations in Swabia, basing on the Mainz-Würzburg country. He was too high-strung to play longer at this game. He had tried assault; he had offered battle; he had sought negotiation. All had failed. Wallenstein was the colder-blooded, and, in such a contest, the stronger. Nürnberg was left well supplied with men, — eight regiments of foot, numbering forty-four hundred men, and three hundred horse, under brave old Kniphausen; while Oxenstiern was to remain in the city to represent the king.

Having done this, Gustavus sent Wallenstein, on September 17, a formal challenge to come out to battle on the next day; at the appointed hour he drew up the entire army and marched past the imperial camp, stopping on the way to cannonade it. But Wallenstein would not be tempted; he did not even answer the defiance.

There is a touch of pathetic gallantry in Gustavus' act, which appeals to the heart of every man who has ever felt the intoxication of battle; there is a touch of sullen grandeur in the refusal of the challenge by the proud Czech, who would not be moved by any taunt. The veteran salutes with a thrill of enthusiasm the *manes* of the noble Swede; he cannot reverence the memory of his foeman.

Failing in every effort to obtain an advantage over Wallenstein, Gustavus concluded to leave the field; he broke camp and marched unchallenged past Wallenstein's intrenchments towards Würzburg. His first camp was at Langenzenn; the next at Weinsheim; he then marched to Neustadt, whence he started September 23 for Windsheim. The army

with detachments had shrunk to about twenty-four thousand men.

Here occurred a curious episode. An embassy from Tary reached the king, to see the Wonder of the North, and to congratulate him on his splendid achievements. The time was less appropriate than after Breitenfeld or Rain.


Wallenstein, who had watched this proceeding without apparent interest, now waited until the 22d, when Gustavus had reached Neustadt. As there was no further danger of an ambush, after burning his camp and the inclosed hamlets, and leaving a vast number of sick and wounded behind and a quantity of baggage, he also broke up, and passing almost under the walls of Nürnberg, moved, September 23, through Fürth and Bruck to Forseheim, burning all the villages near Nürnberg. The indignant garrison sallied out, and inflicted considerable loss on Wallenstein's rear-guard.

The imperial general had won, — won by standing famine three days longer than the Swedes, and by refusing every offer of battle. What he had won it is difficult to say. He had come to Nürnberg to capture the city; he had followed Gustavus presumably to beat him in battle. But he had conducted solely a campaign of depletion. Each army had lost thrice the lives a battle would have consumed; no substantial advantage had been gained except by Gustavus in the safety of Nürnberg. Each leader again took to manœuvring. Arrived in Forseheim, Wallenstein also could muster a bare twenty-four thousand men.

The reasons Wallenstein gave the emperor for not following up Gustavus in what he was pleased to call his retreat after a lost battle were that he could not quickly collect, nor did he wish to tire out, his cavalry, which was dispersed about the country to forage; that Gustavus held all the passes and could head him off at every point; and that he preferred not

to risk the gain he had already made. Gustavus had no excuses to offer. "I attacked the enemy's intrenchments and was beaten back," said he; "but could I have had him in the open field, I would have shown another result." He proved his words good at Lützen.

Statesmen may differ as to who had shown himself the greater man; but the fame of the captain may safely be left with the soldiers of all generations.



Gustavus Adolphus.

From bust modeled in 1632, at Augsburg (considered the best portrait of the king at the time of his death).

XXVIII.

SPARRING. SEPTEMBER, 1632.

AFTER the breaking of the Nürnberg deadlock, Gustavus imagined that Wallenstein would head for Saxony to resume operations; and he sought to so manœuvre as to tempt him away. The Saxon army under Arnim, with some Swedes, was in Silesia, where it had pushed the enemy well up the Oder. In September Wallenstein's lieutenants invaded Saxony from south and east, and devastated the region. But uncertain what Wallenstein would do, Gustavus marched back to Swabia and resumed his operations, hoping that a threat to move down the Danube would forestall the Saxon campaign. An insurrection in Upper Austria offered an opening, and Gustavus believed that John George could hold head for a while against Wallenstein. Oxenstiern strongly favored this plan; but Gustavus eventually chose to reduce Swabia. While proceeding with this work he ascertained that Wallenstein, paying no heed to the Danube, was steadily marching on Saxony, the one weak spot in the Swedish armor. This he must meet. Meanwhile the operations on the Weser and near Gustavus' bastion were progressing, on the whole in favor of the Swedes, though Pappenheim had been active and intelligent; but finally the bulk of all these forces was ordered to Saxony, where the great struggle promised to occur. The instability of John George had again resulted in bringing war within his own borders.

WALLENSTEIN advanced to Bamberg, took it, sent detachments to the most important neighboring towns, and detailed Gallas with a small corps towards Saxony. His intention was clear. He would now compel John George to bend to the imperial will, as he was on the point of doing when interrupted by the presence of Gustavus at Weiden and by his march to Nürnberg.

When Wallenstein followed Gustavus to Nürnberg the king had utilized some of the Saxon troops, thus become

available, while the bulk under Arnim, with the Pomeranian and Brandenburg armies, held Lusatia and Silesia.

Shortly after Saxony had sent some regiments to Gustavus — thus convincing him of John George's loyalty — Holcke had marched from the Nürnberg country on that state, and by the beginning of September, devastating unmercifully, he reached the vicinity of Dresden. In the beginning of October Gallas joined him near Freiburg, which they took as well as Meissen. Here the Saxons defended the river, and the imperialists marched on Oschatz, keeping up their devastations in a manner as systematic as it was fiendish. The result of John George's vacillation was to make his country again the battle-field. Had he heartily joined with his brother Protestants, Saxony would have been spared most of the ills she suffered at the hands of the emperor's armies.

On September 26, at Windsheim, the king ascertained Wallenstein's retirement from Nürnberg, but he learned none of the details, nor whether the elector had separated from him. If, by his hesitation opposite Wallenstein at Eger, the king had prejudiced his initiative, here was a chance to regain it; but he had barely sufficient information on which to act. He might leave a part of his forces in Thuringia, to be ready to march to the aid of Saxony if threatened; with the rest, resume the conquest of Swabia, and from there push down the Danube on the emperor's hereditary possessions. Or he might send a slender column to Swabia, and march with the bulk of his force against Wallenstein, who, he already guessed, was bound for Saxony. Frederick or Napoleon would have done the latter; but Gustavus reasoned otherwise; he could not desert his friends along the Danube. Battle-eager as he was, his feeling for method in what he did was the stronger instinct.

Gustavus had learned that Wallenstein would not necessa-

rily follow his lead, — the Czech cared not for the devastation of Bavaria or Austria, provided he personally suffered not, — and by marching down the Danube, it was not certain that the imperial commander would be induced to give up his own designs. It might mean to leave Saxony to her fate, should he go far from the Main. Still, he believed that John George would have force enough, with his own army and a small Swedish contingent, to hold head against Wallenstein, who during the approaching winter season would not be exceptionally active, and he began work on a broader scheme. A rebellion of the peasantry had long been brewing in the Austrian provinces, where Protestantism had been put down with much cruelty; and it was still a question whether a march down the Danube to their aid might not give the imperialists enough to think about at home to prevent Wallenstein from pushing his offensive. These provinces were already on the verge of an uprising, and had sent messages begging for aid, which Gustavus had indeed promised. He proposed to leave, out of his royal army, five thousand foot and two thousand horse on the Main, and to head seven thousand foot and forty-three hundred horse on the foray named.

Oxenstiern, though far more cautious than the king, was warmly in favor of the plan, as he had been, after Breitenfeld, of a march on Vienna. He believed that Wallenstein and Maximilian could not refrain from flying to the succor of these threatened lands, from which they drew their supply of recruits, and which should be protected at any sacrifice.

Gustavus finally declined the plan, and curiously chose instead an operation towards the Lake of Constance, in order to reduce the country at the headwaters of the Rhine and Danube. This does not strike the modern soldier as a wise manœuvre, though it was much in Gustavus' style, whose

general scheme always included the possession of all lands from the point of entrance to some natural boundary. Postponing the Danube matter, he left Bernard in command of eight thousand men in the Schweinfurt country to watch the imperial army, prevent a raid into Franconia, and in case it started towards Saxony, to move north and protect John George. Ruthven, with ten thousand men, was left on the Danube and Lech to control Bavaria. Baudissin, with the Rhine and Hesse troops, continued to watch Pappenheim along the Weser. Duke George of Lüneburg was to guard Brunswick and the lower Saxon Circle. Oxenstiern was sent from Nürnberg to lower Saxony to administer that territory, which had fallen into bad repair.

On the way back to Windsheim from Nürnberg, whither he had gone to discuss plans with Oxenstiern, Gustavus inspected the wrecked imperial camp, where so many of his men had bravely sacrificed themselves; and on October 1 he broke up from Windsheim and marched south by way of Dinkelsbühl, Nördlingen and Donauwörth (October 3, 4 and 5), where he crossed the Danube to the relief of Rain, which the Bavarians were besieging. On arrival, he found that the Swedish commander, Colonel Mitschefal, had surrendered the place the day before, with the Swedish army right at hand. Of this act of cowardice Gustavus made an example: Mitschefal was tried and executed. The king made preparations to recapture Rain, for its possession by the enemy cut him off from Augsburg. He marched up the Lech, across at Biberbach, and down to Rain. The capitulation of the town brushed away what the king would have felt was a threat to the communications between Bavaria, Swabia and the Main.

Ready to continue his march towards the Lake of Constance, Gustavus heard from Oxenstiern that Wallenstein

had marched to Bamberg, and from Baudissin that Pappenheim was threatening Hesse. He delayed action for further news. Should Wallenstein move on Bernard and join Pappenheim, he instructed Bernard to hold the fords of the Main and withdraw to Rothemburg or Nördlingen, where Gustavus would meet him and move promptly on the enemy. Should Pappenheim march on Franconia, Bernard was to stay on the Main and throw him back. Should Wallenstein move on Saxony, there was at this season not much danger to anticipate, providing John George remained true to his compact. Should Wallenstein seek to winter in Franconia, Gustavus would continue on to the uplands. He was again pushing his initiative; Wallenstein's campaign so far had only checked the Swedish programme; in reality nothing had been lost. The summer's operations had interrupted, not discontinued, Gustavus' general plan. He still hoped to draw Wallenstein south and get at him in the open; or at least to sever Maximilian from him, and reduce to the lowest point his capacity to harm Saxony.

Meanwhile Horn, on the Rhine, had captured Coblenz, Strasburg and other places, and had driven the Spanish and Lorraine forces out of Germany. The king instructed him to clean the Lower Palatinate, while the rhinegrave drove the imperialists out of Alsatia. Benfeld, Schlettstadt, Türkheim, Colmar were occupied, Frankenthal captured, and Heidelberg blockaded. In the bastion country, Pappenheim and Tott were equally matched, but the Swedes had got possession of the Bremen archbishopric.

Wallenstein paid no heed to Gustavus' operations. He remained for a while near Bamberg, quartered his troops for their needed rest over a large area, collected food, and levied contributions to pay his troops. Bernard prevented his taking Schweinfurt, and beset the passes of the Thüringerwald to

keep him from Erfurt. Wallenstein finally broke up, marched on and took Coburg, — Taupadel held out in the fort, — purposing to move through the Forest to attack Saxony from the west. But hearing that Bernard from Schweinfurt, by a march on Hildburghausen and Schleusingen, was threatening his flank, and unwilling to encounter even his small force, he changed his plan, marched by way of Cronach and Hof, on October 20 reached Plauen, and at Altenburg joined Gallas and Hولة. At Coburg Maximilian withdrew his eight thousand men, leaving Wallenstein sixteen thousand, and, glad to quit the haughty duke of Friedland, returned to save his possessions. At Ratisbon he was joined by six thousand troops raised by the Spaniards in Italy.

Ordering Pappenheim to join him in Franconia or Saxony, Wallenstein from Altenburg advanced on Leipsic. While Gustavus was hoping to draw him away from John George, the Czech had remorselessly marched on this ally. In strategic manœuvring and persistency of purpose, Gustavus had met his match.

A page may well be devoted to the operations on the Weser.

Since his separation from Tilly, Pappenheim had been conducting an active campaign in Westphalia and the lower Saxon Circle. Early in 1632 Mansfeld had been besieged in Magdeburg by Banér, and was on the point of capitulation when Pappenheim suddenly appeared, and by a *coup de main* relieved him. Gustavus, then in the Main region, debated a march to the assistance of Banér, but it was quite too late. Banér joined Duke William in January, and Pappenheim retired across the Weser. When the king called these forces to the south, Pappenheim recrossed the Weser and fell on the corps of Kagg, who alone was left behind, and pushed him back to Hildesheim. Landgrave William was compelled to retire to Cassel.

In January Tott had finally captured Wismar, had crossed the Elbe at Dömitz, and had sat down to besiege Stade at its mouth. Tott had formerly done efficient work, but he now appeared to lose his energy. He needed the immediate control of the king. Repeatedly instructed to join Kagg and the landgrave, on one pretense or other he neglected to do so, and remained in the Bremen territory, the government of which drifted into the worst condition. Kagg's command sank into an equally low state, and frequent serious complaints reached the king's ears. Ready to utilize the situation, Pappenheim marched against Tott, who continued lazily to blockade Stade.

To replace Tott Gustavus sent Baudissin, who, less strong than Pappenheim, at all events went to work; and his first attempt was to hem his enemy in the Bremen peninsula, and cut him off from the Weser. Pappenheim was skillful enough to disconcert this plan, and while Baudissin joined Duke George in June at Hildesheim, Pappenheim prevented the landgrave from meeting his allies by a threat to his territory. From Hesse Pappenheim moved towards Hildesheim, and July 8 captured the Moritzburg, but withdrew without battle and across the Weser and Rhine to Maestricht, heedless of the orders of Maximilian to march on Nürnberg, where he was much needed.

Gustavus equally needed Duke George at Nürnberg, but for fear of Pappenheim he only drew some troops from him, and left him to sustain Baudissin. The latter, in August, marched across the Weser with eight thousand men into Westphalia, to hold head against Pappenheim's forces left there under Gronfeld, and Duke George undertook the siege of Wolfenbüttel. Both were succeeding well when Pappenheim reappeared on the scene, forced Baudissin back, slightly defeated him at Brakel, and crossed the Weser at Höxter, in

the teeth of the Swede, who retired to Hesse. He then captured Hildesheim, October 9, and thus had open to him the whole country as far as the Elbe.

This was the moment when Maradas was threatening and Holcke and Gallas were invading Saxony, and Wallenstein was at Coburg. John George called on Lüneburg to come to his aid; and already in retreat before Pappenheim, he made haste to do so, marching towards Wittenburg and Torgau.

The situation in Germany had undergone a remarkable change during the past year. The Swedish bastion, from Danzig to Hamburg, remained substantially the same. The line of the Warta was still held, with Frankfort as an advanced work, and outposts in Silesia. The entire country between the Elbe and the Weser was practically in the hands of the Protestants; for though Pappenheim, while manœuvring on the Weser, had kept that region in constant turmoil, now that he had moved to Saxony, Baudissin, utilizing his absence, overran Berg and Cologne, and, capturing almost all the cities, again compelled the bishop elector of Cologne to neutrality. Thuringia and the entire Main country were firmly held by the Swedes. Horn, as we have seen, had conquered Alsatia, and driven the Spaniards from the Lower Palatinate. Würtemberg and Swabia were occupied by the Swedes, and there was only Maximilian—a weak opponent—in the way of the march of a strong and well-led column down the Danube to Vienna.

But there was a weak spot in the king of Sweden's harness, and Wallenstein had thrust straight at it. Saxony was the one uncertain element, and though formally in alliance with Gustavus, and bound to him by every tie of gratitude and honor, now, at the critical moment,—when to keep faith meant certain Protestant success, to break faith meant almost as cer-

tain failure, — the elector violated all his pledges. The emperor had failed in the policy of conciliation, which Wallenstein had so dubiously carried out with fair words coupled to fire and sword, and it had been concluded between them to resume the old system of coercion. Moving in June from Silesia into Lusatia, Maradas had as usual destroyed in the most cold-blooded manner every hamlet along the route. Arnim marched to meet this threat, a corps of Swedes from the Oder joined him, and the imperial army retired to the upper Oder, and from there back to the borders of Hungary, leaving the Saxons to reconquer and hold all Silesia. But while Arnim was thus winning an apparent success, he was at a distance, and the two other columns of imperialists sent by Wallenstein under Gallas and Holcke moved into Saxony and took possession of the whole electorate west of the Elbe. This should have drawn the Saxon army back from Silesia, but it did not. Saxon indecision was again, as at Breitenfeld, the cause of a vast change in the Swedish plan of campaign, and her soil became, as it was but just it should, the theatre of conflict.



A Burgundian.
(15th Century.)

XXIX.

BACK TO SAXONY. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1632.

THE struggle for initiative between Gustavus and Wallenstein had been about even. The king had drawn Wallenstein from Saxony to Nürnberg, but Wallenstein had now resumed his work there, ordering Pappenheim to join him. Nearing Leipsic with threats to level it unless surrendered, he took it, and sat down to await events and ravage the land. The uncertain attitude of Saxony and Brandenburg, and the questionable bearing of the greater powers with regard to further Swedish conquests, warned the king to look well to his bastion. Anxiety as to what John George might do, despite his treaty, determined him to march to Saxony. Leaving a sufficient force in Swabia and on the Main, he headed for Erfurt, joined Bernard November 2, thence pushed on, and November 9 crossed the Saale, whose fords he had been wise enough to seize. Writing to the elector to send him what troops he could, he reconnoitred in his front at Naumburg. Arnim would not return from Silesia, and the elector sent Gustavus no assistance. Wallenstein was uncertain what to do. Not believing that Gustavus would attack him, he dispersed his forces, sending Pappenheim to Halle; but when he saw that the king meant to fight, he quickly ordered him back. Gustavus would have liked to join the Saxons before engaging, but aware that Pappenheim was away, he decided on battle as he was.

FOR some months there had been a measuring of moral strength between Gustavus and Wallenstein, and so far there had been no great advantage on the side of either, though from a military aspect distinctly greater ability and character had been exhibited by the king. Wallenstein's threat to Saxony had drawn Gustavus away from work he had undertaken in Bavaria; Gustavus' threat on Eger and his taking position at Nürnberg had drawn Wallenstein from work he had begun in Saxony. In the operations around Nürnberg, the initiative had all come from Gustavus, as it

had prior to his leaving Munich; Wallenstein had constantly declined the gage of battle. It was Gustavus' movement which broke up the deadlock, though he had failed in his assault on the Alte Veste. Then Gustavus resumed the lead; but Wallenstein, with a persistency which does him vast credit, paid no heed to the king's threat against the Austrian possessions, leisurely marched on Saxony, and resumed his efforts to drive John George back into the imperial fold. His movement was designed to draw the king away from the Danube by seriously threatening his communications. It was a question as to who should yield to the other; and in this case Wallenstein's utter disregard of misfortune which did not personally affect himself stood him in good stead; while Gustavus' loyalty to Saxony weakened his strategic purpose. There is no denying Wallenstein the title of a great man; nor can large military ability be gainsaid him, despite his utter lack of the true soldier's audacity. He is the only general Gustavus ever met who was a foeman worthy of his steel, who on more than one occasion compelled the Swede to change his own manœuvres to follow those of his opponent. This was largely due to the complex political conditions enlacing the Swedish problem, while the Czech was practically untrammelled; but it was in part due to Wallenstein's strong character and indisputable if unadventurous military skill. A touch of the divine spark would have made Wallenstein truly great; and were not so many vices and so much human suffering to be laid at his door, he would almost stand unsurpassed in the history of his times.

Wallenstein's general plan was not to surround Saxony, but to concentrate his forces so as to meet Gustavus, who, about the end of October, he learned was already on the march towards him. From Coburg he ordered Pappenheim to march on Leipsic or Merseburg, and to seize Torgau or

some other Elbe crossing; and, impatient at his slowness, reprimanded him for conducting war on his own score instead of obeying orders. But Wallenstein was in error. Pappenheim had grasped the necessity of joining his chief, and was already aiming for Erfurt via Mühlhausen and Langensalza; and when he heard that Gustavus had reached Erfurt, he turned aside past Buttstädt towards Merseburg, there crossed the Saale and reported. The imperial armies went into camp at Weissenfels.

With threats like those of Tilly a year before, Wallenstein marched against Leipsic, and was met by a similar refusal. The commandant of the Pleissenburg, or inner fortress, was on two successive days called on to surrender, but he gallantly refused. Early on October 31 Hölke advanced on the city, captured the suburbs despite a heavy fire, and began to bombard it. A third demand was refused, as was a fourth, which threatened not to leave man or dog alive in the place. Then Wallenstein opened his batteries. The town, well aware that it could not make a prolonged resistance, finally gave in, and received favorable conditions; and two days later the Pleissenburg did the like.

Wallenstein's light troops now raided the entire country between the Saale and the Elbe, and even beyond. Neustadt, Kahla and Saalfeld were taken; the peasantry sought refuge wherever they could,—in Erfurt, Wittenberg and Magdeburg. Torgau, Weissenfels, Merseburg, Naumburg, surrendered; Halle was occupied, but the fortress held out.

Gustavus had learned that Wallenstein had left Bamberg, and was marching north towards Coburg. Oxenstiern was anxious to have him disregard this manœuvre, and continue his own scheme. The king and the chancellor both believed that the forces in and about Saxony sufficed for her to hold her own; that Wallenstein would not quietly permit the

devastation of the emperor's hereditary possessions; that, having once drawn Wallenstein away from Saxony, it could be done again by vigorous measures on the Danube. If the Main and Saxon armies held the fortresses, — such as Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Dresden, Frankfort, Würzburg and Schweinfurt, — and stood on a strict defensive, Wallenstein would be able to do no permanent damage to the cause; he would probably not conduct larger operations; while Gustavus could all but destroy Bavaria and the entire Danube country. If Saxony suffered, it would be her own fault.

This was sound military reasoning; it had been Gustavus' own idea; but he had promised John George to come to his assistance at just such a juncture as this. He had striven to save Magdeburg; he had saved Nürnberg; should he do less for Saxony? Moreover, he feared for his bastion; he knew that Wallenstein was his equal in persistent manœuvring, if not in battle; and, what was worse, the European powers were beginning to look on Gustavus' cause as the losing one. His star was, they feared, declining.

The latter was an element of the utmost gravity. The Netherlands had never been warmly interested in the Swedes, — commercial relations forbade it; should a peace be made by the king with Spain, their position would be still less friendly. France stood in a questionable attitude, despite Gustavus' help in securing for Louis the control of the left bank of the Rhine, and the payment of the subsidies agreed on at Bärwalde stood in danger. Denmark had never been frank in her peaceful declarations, and, now that she had lost control of the Baltic, was ripe for any anti-Swedish plot; indeed, rumors came that such negotiations were on foot. England ought surely to be Gustavus' ally; but relations with her were strained, and all attempts to patch up a reasonable treaty had failed. Frederick had not yet been

restored to the Palatinate, though Gustavus certainly intended that he should be, and this was a further cause for English grumbling. The brilliant successes of Gustavus where all others had failed had begun by provoking universal jealousy, and had been followed by apprehension of his downfall and of what might prove to be its result. These puzzling political conditions weighed sorely on Gustavus, and it was they rather than the military situation which led him to his action. With the aid of his old allies, or at least their ingenuous neutrality, he felt himself quite abreast of the situation. But with less than this, he was too good a soldier to risk what he had won at so vast a cost. His letters at this time show what he considered his problem to be.

His first duty was to put Saxony beyond question on such a basis as once more to be the outwork of his Baltic bastion. He had not quite lost hope of personally controlling Wallenstein; failing which, he had faith that he could beat him in battle. Alive with this feeling, he left Pfalzgraf Christian with four brigades and three thousand cavalry, to contain Maximilian, so that he might not again join Wallenstein; put necessary garrisons along the Danube, — Donauwörth, Rain, Augsburg and other places, — and on October 18 started for Erfurt. He ordered Duke William and Baudissin thither with all their troops and at all hazards. Bernard was to join him on the march; should Maximilian have passed Nürnberg on his way south, he purposed to take along Kniphausen too.

Passing Donauwörth, the column reached Nördlingen October 20, and Rothemburg (via Dinkelsbühl) October 27. On the 22d, with an escort of seven hundred cavalry, Gustavus went ahead to Nürnberg, to consult with Oxenstiern. The chancellor was to remain in south Germany, with headquarters in Ulm, and, as a general scheme, was to convene all the

through Kösen defile to Naumburg, which he took. In the presence of the enemy the army was ployed into battle columns and the country suitably patrolled. The enemy's light troops fell back along the Saale, and on November 8 Kösen was occupied in force, which, unless held, might compel the army to make a long detour to cross the Saale. In that day, the defile was of great importance. To-day, the country has many roads.

At early morning on November 9 Gustavus crossed the Saale at the Altenburg ford with the Swedish cavalry; the foot crossed at Kösen. At noon the whole army passed Naumburg, and occupying a camp in front of the Jacob's gate, proceeded to throw up works. The king's intention was to do here what he had done at Nürnberg: intrench a camp, wait for the Saxon army, and then force battle on Wallenstein.

Constantly in touch with John George, Gustavus had uninterruptedly advised him of the situation; he had too much at stake in the loyalty of Saxony to neglect these negotiations; and he had kept the elector well posted as to what troops would be in his vicinity and ready to lend a hand in case of attack. On starting north, he begged John George to draw his troops together so as to join the Swedish army; to occupy all defiles and strong places with large detachments; to cut off victual from Wallenstein; and not to be frightened by the reputed strength of the enemy, whose actual strength had been depleted numerically and morally. From Arnstadt he wrote again, asking for at least three thousand horse to be sent to Naumburg. From Naumburg he conjured the elector to send all available forces to the Saale, first of all those of Duke George; to hurry forward the cavalry, and let the foot, artillery and baggage come by the safest road, — perhaps via Mansfeld. There was no time to bring troops

from afar ; the immediate work must be done with those at hand ; though, indeed, Arnim should be ordered in from Silesia. A small cavalry force, said the king, should be sent to Wittenberg and scout out towards Halle to clear the country. He urged John George to rouse the entire population, and order the peasantry to carry on a small war against the invaders. He had come to save Saxony ; but Saxony must put her own shoulder to the wheel. He himself was waiting only to learn the enemy's whereabouts and intentions. Above all he urged an immediate junction of the Saxon with the Swedish army.

Duke George was sent orders to break up from Torgau and Wittenberg, and to join the king as quickly as possible with the cavalry.

Arnim, despite orders to return, was prolonging his stay in Silesia, while the imperialists had concentrated in the Leipsic region. He finally in person visited Dresden, November 5, but still foolishly urged that the place for the Saxon army was Silesia ; and after making a flimsy inspection of the Lüneburg troops, he again left, insisting that he could at best spare a couple of regiments for Saxony. And he managed to convince the elector that he was right.

John George was conducting a political, not a military campaign. He again took to petty discussions of trivial points, while the enemy was within his dominions, and was prevented from desolating them by the sole presence of Gustavus. With every desire, he said, of sending troops, the bulk of the army was in Silesia, and that on hand was essential to protect the fortresses and the crossings of the Elbe. To exhibit his good-will, however, he would send two regiments, a force of about fifteen hundred cavalry, which should join Duke George and with him march to the Swedish army. John George had by solemn treaty agreed to give Gustavus the control of his

entire army; the king had forsaken his own plans on the Danube to fly to the aid of his ally, and now John George offered him a paltry fifteen hundred men! Even this force came too late.

By November 14 Gustavus had substantially ascertained the situation of the imperialists. There were but two of his trusted generals with him, Bernard and old Kniphausen, in which latter officer, brave though not always lucky, Gustavus reposed much confidence. As was natural, Bernard advised fighting, — and this was the mood of the king. Kniphausen advised waiting for the Saxon and Lüneburg reinforcements, the weight of which advice Gustavus recognized. But to delay for these meant to permit Wallenstein to collect his own forces, which Gustavus learned were much scattered. Before the Saxons, Hessians and Lüneburgers could arrive, Pappenheim would be back, said the king, and his desire was to fight before this took place. The enemy was never so weak as when unexpectedly attacked, and Wallenstein seemed to be undecided what to do. “I, your king and leader, will go ahead and show every one the path of honor.” Gustavus decided to advance on the morrow and fight.

Wallenstein had taken measures to have his outlying armies join him. Aldringer had been ordered away from Maximilian; Gallas had been called in, but the imperial commander did not anticipate an immediate challenge. It was suggested by Pappenheim to make a raid on Erfurt, but as Bernard had already joined the king, this was a useless operation. The generalissimo sent detachments to Naumburg, hoping to be able to occupy the defile at Kösen, and the passages of the Saale, but these detachments came too late; Gustavus had anticipated him.

While Gustavus was straining every nerve for battle, Wallenstein acted with indecision. He called a council of

war. This light-headed body advised against an attack on the Swedish camp as dangerous; counseled going into winter-quarters, which they alleged would oblige the king to do the same; to send a corps to Westphalia and the Rhine against Baudissin, to prevent the inroads and growth in importance of the Protestants in that section; and to quarter over a limited area so as easily to concentrate. This lamentable counsel Wallenstein was weak enough to accept. There is perhaps no better measure of the two men than the manner in which Gustavus dominated his council of war and decided for attack, and the manner in which Wallenstein listened to the trivial decision of his. Yet both commanders were equal autocrats, and, in a certain sense, of equal strength.

In pursuance of the advice of the imperial council, Pappenheim was kept till some other troops came to hand, and was then sent to Halle, with orders to hold this town, or if advisable, to send a couple of regiments to Cologne, and free it from the threat of Count Berg, whom Baudissin had dispatched thither. Leaving a garrison under Colloredo in the castle of Weissenfels, and sending detachments southerly towards Altenburg and Zwickau to observe the Swedes and keep the Saxons from joining them, Wallenstein retired, November 14, with his entire force towards Merseburg, to take up quarters between the Saale and the Flossgraben, so as to be near both Halle and Leipsic. He smelled not the battle afar off.

Wallenstein's strategic situation was remarkably good; he had blundered into it unawares; if he recognized he did not utilize it. His army lay in the midst of the three allied bodies: the Swedes at Naumburg; the Saxons at Torgau; and the force from the lower Saxon Circle with the Brunswick-Lüneburgers, who were marching from Wittenberg up the Elbe. Taken together, these forces exceeded Wallen-

stein's, but singly he was largely superior to any one of them. Here was his chance to fall on and destroy either of the three, before they should concentrate. He might take the Swedish army first, as the most dangerous, or he might lop off the Wittenberg column and by so much reduce his enemy's strength. No doubt the Saxons intrenched at Torgau and Gustavus in camp at Naumburg were better able to hold their own, even against odds. But Wallenstein's laxness now appeared as marked as his former persistency. He was at best not inclined to do battle, when he could accomplish his end by any other means. He harbored a dread of the king, despite his success at the Alte Veste; and he again adopted the strictly defensive rôle.

On the other hand, the decisiveness and energy of Gustavus grew as he advanced. The speed with which he had marched from Bavaria — Donauwörth to Naumburg in eighteen days — had enabled him to anticipate Wallenstein at the crossing of the Saale, as well as to prevent him from imposing on the fears of the elector. Determined to come at once to battle, the king was about to march on Grimma, via Pegau, to unite with the Saxons; but when he heard, November 15, of Wallenstein's retrograde movement on Merseburg, he followed him instead, giving up his original intention of intrenching a camp at Naumburg. He would wait, he thought, until he had concentrated his forces and advanced somewhat farther.

Divining the king's intention, when Colloredo, from the castle of Weissenfels, saw the heads of the Swedish columns and fired the three guns agreed on as a signal, Wallenstein called a new council of war, and under its advice again undertook to bar the road to Leipsic to the Swedes, and thus prevent the junction with the Saxons which he believed Gustavus was aiming to make. He ordered Pappenheim, who was besieging the Moritzburg at Halle, to return, to drop everything else,

and hurry back by forced marches, — a thing he should have done without waiting for the council. “Let nothing prevent your being with me early to-morrow (November 16) with all your forces,” wrote the general, anxious not to fight without his fiery lieutenant to uphold his hands. In consequence of this manœuvre, Wallenstein found the bulk of his army at Lützen on the 15th, and from here he sent out parties to scour the country. In his front were the fords of the Rippach, held by Isolani’s Croat cavalry outposts. As Gustavus advanced to Rippach and Poserna, he met these detachments, which disputed the passage; but they were brushed aside, and late on November 15 the Swedes crossed the stream. Gustavus spent some hours in reconnoitring the ground in his front.

It is a question whether the line of the Rippach itself would not have been a stronger defensive line for the imperialists. But Wallenstein had given his cavalry no clear instructions to hold the passage, nor had he arranged to sustain the outposts with any vigor, and the latter withdrew on the approach of the Swedes. Darkness prevented pursuit. Between the Rippach, the Saale and Lützen — the exact spot is not known — the Swedes lay on their arms in line of battle.

It is impossible to do more than guess at the force of the two armies which were to wrestle for the mastery on the morrow. For the Swedes the data vary between fifteen and thirty thousand men. It is only certain that Gustavus’ army was much weaker than Wallenstein’s. It may have numbered eighteen thousand men; while the imperialists can scarcely have had less than twenty-five thousand; and this number was to be reinforced by fully eight thousand more, whenever Pappenheim should come up.

Once set on battle, Gustavus took no account of the disparity of numbers. He knew that it was Wallenstein’s strong

intrenchments, and not lack of Swedish stomach, which had lost him the fight at the Alte Veste; and he advanced with entire confidence in himself and in them. Late at night on the 15th the general officers assembled round the traveling-coach in which the king spent the night, to receive instructions for the morrow. Some spoke of the enemy's superior strength, but Gustavus plainly gave his own views, and ended by saying that he could no longer endure to be within reach of Wallenstein and not move on him sword in hand. He burned to show him what he and his Swedes could do in the open field. This answered every objection; and all present crowded around to assure the king of their fidelity even unto death. This interview is a prototype of the famous speech of grim old Frederick to his generals on the eve of Leuthen.



Gustavus Praying before Lützen.
(From Braun's Historical Painting.)


XXX.

LÜTZEN. NOVEMBER 16, 1632.

WALLENSTEIN must hold Leipsic to prevent the junction of Swedes and Saxons; and the Merseburg turnpike for Pappenheim. He advanced to Lützen and established himself, facing southerly along the causeway, whose ditches made a line of works in which Wallenstein hoped to duplicate the battle of the Alte Veste. On reconnoitring, Gustavus planned to turn the enemy's left by a sharp attack and cut him off from Leipsic; not to be driven from his ground was victory enough for Wallenstein. The imperial left leaned on the Flossgraben, the right on Lützen, and in its front and in front of the right centre were two big batteries. The foot stood in four great battles in the centre, the cavalry on the wings; the ditches were lined with musketeers. Solidity was the theory of the imperial line. Gustavus drew up parallel to the enemy in his lighter order. In the wings was horse, mixed with foot, and cavalry was in reserve. The centre was of foot, with a heavy battery in front; and regimental pieces stood all along the line. Bernard was on the left; Knipphausen in the centre; the king led the right, where was to be the bulk of the fighting. After a cannonade, the Swedes attacked. The resistance was hearty, but the Swedish right forced its way across the causeway and pushed in the imperial left. The left was equally happy; and the centre crossed the causeway and began to swing in on Wallenstein's battles. But taken in flank by a column of horse, the Swedish centre fell back in some confusion. The king heard of the disaster to his centre; and heading some cavalry regiments, he galloped towards the place from whence they had fallen back. It was foggy, and, far ahead of his men, he ran into a stray party of imperial cavalry and was killed. About this time Pappenheim came on the field, and drove back the advanced Swedish right by a superb charge in which he also lost his life. The king's death maddened the Swedes. Bernard and Knipphausen reestablished the Swedish line; and the Northlanders swept everything before them, and revenged their dead hero in a holocaust of blood. Wallenstein retreated to Bohemia; part of his army fled to Leipsic, part to Merseburg. He is said to have lost ten thousand men.

No engagement of modern times has a greater mass of conflicting records than the battle of Lützen. From the vari-

ous statements you may sketch out a dozen different theories of the manner in which it was lost and won. It was, however, in the main a simple battle in parallel order, fought out with extraordinary obstinacy, and one whose phases were only those which may always occur in such an action, as the several parts of each line roll forward and back, in response to rein-



Battle of Lützen.

forcements brought up, or to gallant attacks made or repulsed. The principal facts are clear; but such interesting ones as the hour at which Pappenheim came upon the field, or the periods in the battle at which Gustavus and Pappenheim were killed, or indeed which was killed first, are wrapped in contradictory statement. There are indeed many different stories of the manner of Gustavus' death.

The plain of Lützen is low and flat. Cutting it substan-

tially from southwest to northeast runs the turnpike which leads through Lützen village from Weissenfels to Leipsic. This was Wallenstein's proper line of retreat, for he could not well give up Leipsic, if he was to stand between John George at Dresden and Gustavus at Naumburg; and he needed it for winter-quarters as well. The road here lies like a causeway above the plain; some of the old maps show it straight, others with a marked curve between Lützen and the Flossgraben, — as it may then have had; but the matter is unessential: all details cannot possibly be reconciled. On either side of the road are deep ditches, generally containing water; but though apparently at the time of the battle they were dry, they were such still as to make an excellent line of field-works; and these ditches Wallenstein ordered to be well dug out during the night, and lined them with a strong force of musketeers. Running north and south a trifle less than two miles to the east of Lützen was the Flossgraben, a dull stream meandering down towards Zeitz, and not so deep but that both cavalry and infantry could wade it. The causeway ditch could likewise be crossed by both arms; but it was none the less a serious obstacle, much in favor of the imperialists, who intended to fight on the defensive, as they had at the Alte Veste.

Wallenstein drew up his army back of the causeway and facing southeast, with the right flank behind and leaning on the village of Lützen, which he had set afire to prevent the Swedes from attempting to drive his forces out; and with the left flank leaning on the Flossgraben and somewhat refused, say some authorities. If the road was not straight, the imperial line may have conformed to its direction and thus have had a wing thrown back. It is probable that he had a small flying wing out beyond the Flossgraben; certainly the ubiquitous Croats must have pushed to the other

side, to put their harassing tactics to better use than they could do in the line of battle.

Along Wallenstein's front, then, ran the causeway, which stood up noticeably above the surrounding plain; and to the eye of the imperial general it seemed to yield a good chance of duplicating the victory of last August, if he could hold his men equally well to their task. To retain it and throw back the Swedish attack meant to keep Leipsic and to hold his route towards Merseburg and Halle, where lay part of his troops, and from which he was anxiously expecting the return of Pappenheim, — his stanchest lieutenant. Not to be driven from the causeway was victory enough for Wallenstein, just as the defense of the Alte Veste was in his eyes a notable feat of arms. He did not gauge victory from the standpoint of the great captain.

Not far back of the causeway, in front of the imperial right wing, was posted a battery of heavy guns, and another was in front of the right centre. The former stood on a slight rise just north of Lützen, in the midst of windmills. The number of guns has been, like that of the forces engaged, very variously stated. The greater part of the infantry was in the centre in four great battalia, set up in the Spanish style, and arrayed substantially as they had been at Breitenfeld. Much discussion has been indulged in to show that the imperial general had his army set up in three lines, and there exists a plan in Wallenstein's own hand for such a disposition. Be this as it may, the battle does not appear to have depended on there being any given number of lines. The imperial forces were drawn up in an order in which solidity played the main part, and it was Wallenstein's purpose to fight a strictly defensive battle, holding the causeway from Lützen to the Flossgraben as his line of works.

A portion of the infantry was posted in the windmills and

in the gardens which surround the village of Lützen. The imperial cavalry composed the wings of the army, the left under Hölke and Piccolomini, though it was hoped that Pappenheim would arrive in season to command the left wing. It is said that, in imitation of Gustavus' tactics, foot was interspersed with horse in the imperial right, under Colloredo; and they could well have been put to use behind the many garden walls.

Wallenstein himself remained with the centre, and was carried in a litter, as his gout prevented his mounting a horse.

The advance of the Swedes from Naumburg was such that they were marching directly upon the flank of the imperial army. It would seem as if Wallenstein's better line would have been across the turnpike, not along it, — perhaps, as suggested, behind the Rippach, — so as to enable Pappenheim to fall in on his right when he should arrive. Frederick would have sharply punished the great Czech for such a tactical blunder; but, like Alexander at Arbela, Gustavus declined to "steal a victory," and drew up for a parallel battle. Unless the king's idea of marching on Pegau and Grimma to join the Saxons, coupled to the knowledge that Wallenstein lay in and about Lützen, had led him to camp the day before somewhat to the south of the village, it is hard to see why he should not have used his opportunity for a flank attack. But battle-tactics was as yet a simple affair; Gustavus had done enough for the art of war in teaching armies mobility; he cannot be held to complete the science to which he contributed so much. Perhaps the best explanation is that the king desired to drive the enemy away from Leipsic and not towards it; or, in case of defeat, to retire towards the Saxons on the Elbe.

In two columns corresponding to the two lines of battle he proposed to fight in, Gustavus advanced, and drew up in line

at a distance of less than a mile from, and parallel to, the enemy. We know his formation better than Wallenstein's. Four half brigades were posted in the centre of each line. Count Brahe was in command of those in the first line; Kniphausen of those in the second line. The right and left wings of the second line of the centre, under Kniphausen, were composed of horse. In reserve was cavalry under Colonel Ohm, in rear of Kniphausen. In front of the infantry centre there was one battery (some authorities say two) of twenty-six heavy guns; and near forty light regimental pieces stood in front of the musketeers who sustained the horse. On both wings of the first line were squadrons of horse, each two separated by detachments of foot. In the wings of the second line there was only cavalry. Lützen lay in front of the Swedish left wing, and the right lay on the Flossgraben. No doubt a Swedish flying wing was placed or later got beyond this waterway. Bernard commanded the left wing, and the king, with Stålhandske and his Finns as a body guard, the right. The baggage was near Meuchen, behind the Flossgraben.

Gustavus rarely slept much in the presence of the enemy, but he passed the night in his traveling-coach with Bernard and Kniphausen. The drums were beaten long before daylight, and the Swedish army bestirred itself. Prayers were said by the chaplains, and "Eine Feste Burg" and one of Gustavus' own hymns were sung as the men fell in.

Gustavus rode his brown charger and wore no armor. Bernard and Kniphausen begged him to wear cuirass and helmet. But a cuirass irritated his old shoulder-wound, and he refused. His battle-speech to his men was short and to the point, and he rode ahead with "Forward in God's name! Jesu! Jesu!" on his lips.

The object Gustavus aimed at was to cut Wallenstein off

from Leipsic, so as to recapture the place and unite with John George. His tactics then was to pivot on his own left, which faced Lützen, and to drive the imperial left and centre away from the causeway. To this he addressed himself.

Though the troops had stood to arms at daylight, it was ten o'clock before they reached contact with the enemy. This delay was largely due to the fog which blanketed the plain, but it is an interesting thing for those of us who have seen an army on the march deploy from marching column into line, and win a pitched battle with high percentage of casualties in three or four hours, to note the length of time the formal marshaling of an army took prior to the day of that restless tactician, Frederick. Once aligned, the Swedes opened a heavy artillery duel, which lasted a full hour, and under its cover they advanced near the turnpike and stood ready for hand to hand work.

When he deemed that his artillery had made a sufficient impression, the king personally led forward his right wing of horse and foot, and gallantly charged on the causeway. He was received by a heavy fire; but after a sharp and prolonged tussle, the king drove the imperial musketeers from the ditches on both sides of the causeway, crossed this obstacle, and made a successful attack on the enemy's left wing beyond, driving the Croats off in the wildest flight. So stanch had their advance been that the imperial baggage park was threatened, and was summarily transferred from the left to the rear of the right, where lay the heavy batteries.

The king gave orders to pay small heed to the Croats, but at all hazards to break the ranks of the cuirassiers. These fine troops under Piccolomini fought like the black devils they were, and their intrepid commander was repeatedly wounded; but despite their bravery, they were forced back by the tremendous successive impacts of the squadrons

headed by the king. Meanwhile the cavalry of the Swedish left wing was all but equally fortunate against the horse on the imperial right. And not to be behindhand, the infantry in the centre had advanced, driven the musketeers pell-mell out of their ditches, crossed the causeway, and taken the imperial battery opposite the centre. The initial gain had been sharp and marked all along the line.

But the success was short-lived. After crossing the causeway, the foot brigades wheeled somewhat to the left to take the imperial centre in flank, a manœuvre which exposed their own; and before they could make an impression which was effectual on the battles of Wallenstein, several of the imperial cavalry regiments of the left centre and left, which had somewhat retired, were again massed, and bore down on the victorious Swedes like a torrent. Thus taken crisply in flank and in the face of a superior force, the gallant brigades failed to hold their own, and after a stout struggle were driven back and lost the battery they had taken. They had fought stanchly. In one regiment every captain was shot down. The Yellow cavalry and the Blues had successively advanced to the rescue, but only to be thrown back in disorder. The line was wavering. A disaster might result. The loss was as sudden as the gain had been, and the infantry was retiring across the causeway. Word of this state of affairs was sent to Gustavus, who was still driving the enemy on the right, and who believed that the whole line had kept its initial advance. As at the *Alte Veste*, Wallenstein had no ambition to fight a battle offensive. If he could hold the turnpike, the victory, so far as he needed it, would be won. And now that the Swedish central attack had failed, and his men had reoccupied the causeway ditches, he did not push them out to accentuate his gain, but held them in their place. A few squadrons alone galloped out beyond the imperial front.

While the king was reëstablishing order in his right wing, somewhat unsettled by its hard-earned advance, and was preparing for a second blow, he learned of the retreat of his centre. His fears were aroused for the success of the day, and he at once headed the Småland cavalry regiment, and with his usual impetuosity galloped over to the aid of his hard-pressed infantry. The king was heavy, but he rode good stock and fast. In his over-eagerness, and followed only by three companions, he galloped far ahead of his column, and in the fog which was again coming down upon the field, aimed for the place, slightly back of the causeway, where he expected to find his infantry, but from which the brigades had just now fallen back; here, between the lines, a stray party of imperial cuirassiers rode down upon him by simple accident, unaware of who it was. The king was shot in the bridle-arm; and, his horse swerving towards his own line, he received a bullet through the body. He fell from his horse with his last and mortal wound.

There was at the time a species of lull in the battle, caused by the falling back of the Swedish centre and the momentary pause of the right. As the imperialists had no idea of advancing beyond the causeway, there was a wide open space in their front, and it was during this lull and between the causeway and his own front that Gustavus fell. His death was announced to the army by his charger galloping riderless back to the Swedish lines, covered with blood, and his appearance excited the men to a frenzy of revenge.

Some time after midday Count Pappenheim appeared on the field from Halle, leading his van of cavalry. He had come with his best troops at a double-quick. Eagerly inquiring where Gustavus fought, — his death was not yet known to the enemy, — with a column composed of eight cavalry regiments, which he quickly assembled, he fell sharply on the

Swedish right wing and forced it back, practically regaining the ground their initial advance had won. Centre and right were weakening before the imperial attack ; but the Swedish left held its own in and about Lützen, and Wallenstein's lack of push saved the Swedes harmless from disaster. At this juncture, or somewhat later, gallant Pappenheim was killed, and his regiments, lacking his fiery leadership, hesitated and fell back ; the Swedish right could once more gather for a blow.

On learning of the king's death, Bernard, who was on the Swedish left, immediately took command, and replaced the king on the right. Kniphausen led the centre. Count Brahe replaced Bernard on the left, where the cavalry had already sharply and successfully attacked the causeway, Lützen and the enemy's right wing. Re-forming the ranks in the intervals of quiet, which only Torstenson's guns now interrupted, Bernard ordered an advance all along the line, though the day was fast wearing away. The Swedes again pressed forward, this time screwed up to the highest pitch. Between the darkness and the fog, manœuvring had become impossible. It was a mere brute push for mastery. Piccolomini took Pappenheim's place, and led several regiments up to resist the renewed attack of the Swedish horse on the imperial left. The rival lines clashed, mixed, and rolled to and fro in a frantic death-struggle. In their first charge the Swedes carried everything before them. They recovered the body of the king, and again drove the imperialists far beyond the causeway. But some time after 4 P. M. the rest of Pappenheim's cavalry came up, and, maddened by the news of their splendid leader's death, they drove home a charge on the Swedish line which gained the lost ground, and once more pushed the assailants back across the causeway. No man could presage victory.

But gallant Bernard of Weimar would hear of no retreat, though even brave old Kniphausen is said to have suggested it. Torstenson's guns were still able; the line could be again patched up, and every Swedish heart was nerved to avenge the king. One more effort was made for the *manes* of the dead hero, and the charge was given with the vigor of loving despair. The decimated ranks of the Northlanders closed up shoulder to shoulder, the first and second lines were merged into one, and forward they went in the foggy dusk, with a will which even they had never shown before. Nothing could resist their tremendous onset. On right, centre, left, everywhere and without a gap, the Swedes carried all before them. The imperial army was torn into shreds and swept far back of the causeway, where so many brave men had that day bitten the dust. At this moment some ammunition chests in rear of the imperial line exploded, which multiplied the confusion in the enemy's ranks. Darkness had descended on the field; but the Swedes remained there to mourn their beloved king, while the imperial forces sought refuge from the fearful slaughter and retired out of range.


Lützen has been called a drawn battle. It was unequivocally a Swedish victory. The imperialists lost all their artillery, a number of standards, and, it is said, ten or twelve thousand men in killed, wounded and prisoners. Part of the force fled to Merseburg, part to Leipsic. That Wallenstein could reach Leipsic is cited as proof that the battle was drawn. But this was rather the usual want of pursuit. The Swedes slept on the field, and next day returned leisurely to Weissenfels, to weep for their dead lord.

Quite unaware that any future historian would find ground to state that the battle was drawn, Wallenstein retreated with the relics of his army to Bohemia. The loss of the Swedes

has been called numerically equal to that of the enemy. Especially was it greater in the loss of its king and captain.

The dispositions of the Swedes and the vigor of their repeated attacks had been eminently praiseworthy. Wallenstein showed indecision in fighting a defensive battle; but no criticism can be passed on the manner of his fighting. It was a battle-royal in every sense, nobly fought out by each side.

The Swedes had destroyed the last army of the emperor. At the opening of the year Ferdinand had been at the end of his resources, when Wallenstein came to his aid; and the great Czech had now been utterly defeated. We know what Gustavus had already accomplished; he stood on the threshold of the imperial hereditary possessions, with every land from the Rhine and the Alps to the Baltic and the Vistula subject to his control, and firmly held. Had he outlived the battle of Lützen, can we doubt that he would have dictated peace on his own terms in Vienna? And would it not have been a peace promising more durable results than if he had reached Vienna after his initial victory at Breitenfeld? His wisdom was fully proven; but a higher power had disposed of his life.



Musket Battle-axe. (16th Century.)

XXXI.

THE MAN AND SOLDIER.

GUSTAVUS was tall, strong and handsome, royal in bearing, condescending in manner, with noble features, golden hair and a clear blue eye. In intellect and scholarship he had no superiors; he was an eloquent speaker, and wrote hymns which are sung to-day all over Sweden. His dignity never left him; but though intimate with few, he was approachable by all. Of a sensitive nature, he was in youth quick of word, but he learned self-control and patience. Earnest piety was a constant guide, impelling him to justice and good deeds. His ambition was pure. In strength of will he was unchanging; he consulted all, but himself decided. No captain ever bore him with more splendid courage; Alexander had no more wounds; he went to danger as to a feast. Splendid in reward, he was just but summary in punishment. A hard worker, he was doubly busy in the field, trusting no man's eyes but his own, nor leaving work to others which he might do himself. He can scarcely be said to have been aided by Fortune. In dealing with his half-hearted allies, Gustavus exhibited the patience of Hannibal, the persuasiveness of Cæsar. He taught the modern soldier many lessons: method according to one well-considered plan; careful accumulation of supplies; activity in marches and manœuvres; rapidity of fire; the value of taking and holding key-points; the necessity of a sure base and communications; the security which resides in discipline; the fact that well-timed audacity is not foolhardiness. In winning his bastion, Gustavus showed caution backed by vigor; in defeating Tilly and overrunning the Main country, boldness, rapidity and rare skill; on the Lech and at the Alte Veste, magnificent contempt of danger and difficulty; at Nürnberg, admirable constancy; and at Lützen he sealed his honorable purpose with his blood. More than all this, he taught the world that war may be conducted on civilized lines. Had he lived, he would have dictated religious peace in Germany; as it was, he won it. He is properly called the Father of the Modern Art of War.

It is a curious fact, and much to be regretted, that we know so little about the Hero of the Thirty Years' War. We are told endless facts about Frederick and Napoleon; we know much less about Gustavus.

Gustavus Adolphus was of tall and powerful frame ; he had a royal bearing, great dignity, coupled to suavity, and a noble carriage ; but he was inclined, in the last few years of his life, to corpulence. This condition, however, so little interfered with his virility that his fondness for physical exertion led him into danger as to a feast. His hair and beard were golden yellow ; he had large light blue eyes, very expressive, eager and luminous, with a soft and kindly, yet proud look. His forehead was lofty and his nose strongly Roman. His daughter, Queen Christina, wrote of him as a very handsome man ; he was certainly kingly in his demeanor, as is testified by all his contemporaries. Earnest and liberal in all he did, no one who came near him but felt the influence of his character.

To an uncommon breadth of intellect Gustavus joined the well-poised knowledge of the apt scholar and the iron will of the true soldier. Once convinced that he was right, nothing could bar the execution of his project. He was of a quick, sensitive — one might say touchy — habit, coupled, as is rare, to a deep feeling for right, truth and religion. His quick temper was but superficial ; at heart he was kindly, charitable and patient. His piety was honest, outwardly and inwardly, and impelled him to fair dealing and uprightness. Religion was never a cloak. He read daily and at length in his Bible, and prayed as openly and unreservedly as he spoke. He was fond of reading, well acquainted with the classics, and studied keenly the works of Hugo Grotius. He once, however, said that had Grotius himself been a commanding general, he would have seen that many of his precepts could not be carried out.

Gustavus spoke eloquently, and wrote easily and with a certain directness which in itself is the best style for a clear thinker. His hymns are still sung among the country folk

of Sweden with the fervor in which the people shrines his memory.

Condescending, kind and generous, Gustavus was often splendid in his rewards for bravery and merit. When, in his youth, the later Field-Marshal Åke Tott performed some act of signal gallantry, the king thanked him before the whole forces paraded under arms, ennobled him on the spot, and with his own hands hung his sword upon him. But Gustavus was equally summary and severe. Once, on complaint being made of marauding by Swedish soldiers, the king assembled all his officers and severely held them to task; then, going into the camp and seeing a stolen cow in front of the tent of a petty officer, he seized the man by the hair and handed him over to the executioner. "Come here, my son," said he; "better that I punish thee, than that God, for thy sin, visit vengeance on me and the whole army."

While singularly quick tempered, Gustavus was eager to undo a wrong he might commit. "I bear my subjects' errors with patience," he said, "but they too must put up with my quick speech." He condescended often, at times too much, but no one was ever known to take advantage of his affability. Every one in his presence felt the subtle influence of greatness; his meed was the hearty respect of all who approached him.

Intimate with few men, and these only his leading generals or the princes he happened to be cast with, Gustavus was much attached to his chancellor, Axel Oxenstiern, and relied markedly on his judgment. Only Oxenstiern was privileged to speak plainly to the king. "You are too cold in all things, and hamper me too much," once said the monarch. "True," replied the chancellor, "but did I not now and then throw cold water on the fire, your Majesty had long since burned up." It was chiefly at dinner, which at that day was eaten

before noon, that the king talked, and discussion then was ample.

This always busy monarch was especially busy in the field. Like Napoleon in his early years, he saw throughout life everything with his own eye; he would not rely on others, and always rode with the van of the army. His eagerness to know what was in his front many times put him in peril of his life; but he never overlooked an advantage of ground, nor was late in giving an order to meet the requirements of the occasion. In the cabinet he was strong and suggestive, the prime mover in every scheme; and though he constantly held councils of war, they never failed to fight.

He studied to know his opponents. He gauged Pappenheim high; Tilly was "brave, but nothing but an old corporal;" Wallenstein he underrated, partly because he disliked his pomp and egotism, and feared his loyalty. And yet he did him ample justice. Gustavus himself was too great to harbor petty jealousy of greatness in others. What he admired in Pappenheim was that which he himself so notably possessed, — a quick decision and fiery execution.

Sensitive to a degree with regard to his royal name and dignity, Gustavus hated adulation. Just prior to Lützen, when, in passing through Naumburg, the people prostrated themselves, he remarked with a protest: "Our cause stands well, but I fear God will punish me for the folly of this people."

Except Alexander, no great captain showed the true love of battle as it burned in the breast of Gustavus Adolphus. Such was his own contempt of death, that his army could not but fight. When the king was ready at any moment to lay down his life for victory, how should not the rank and file sustain him? With such a leader, a defeat like Tilly's at Breitenfeld, or Wallenstein's at Lützen, was not possible.

Nor was his courage a mere physical quality; his moral and intellectual courage equaled it. Hannibal's march into Italy was but one grade bolder than Gustavus' into Germany; Cæsar's attack at Zela was no more reckless, if less matured, than Gustavus' at the Lech.

The military student may read the records of war for seventeen centuries succeeding the death of Cæsar, without finding in its conduct any mark of that art and purpose which the great Roman, as well as Alexander and Hannibal, so constantly exhibited. Abundant courage, abundant intelligence, abundant opportunity will be found, but no broad, clean-cut method. When, however, the student turns to the page which narrates the operations of the Swedish king, he once again recognizes the hand of the master. The same method which has delighted him in the annals of the Macedonian, the Carthaginian and the Roman is apparent; the broad, firm ideal and never swerving moral force of which those captains were such brilliant examples may be seen; and from now on, thanks to the impress made on the art, he will find generals of the second rank who intelligently carry forward what Gustavus Adolphus rescued from the oblivion of so many centuries.

The operations of Gustavus in the Thirty Years' War are divisible into three epochs. From his appearance in Germany to his passing of the Elbe, his conduct of affairs was marked by great caution. It must be borne in mind that Gustavus had, barring the technical skill of the day, no military teaching except that which came from his study of the deeds of the ancients, and no guide except his own genius. War, up to his day and in his day, had been unmethodical and purposeless. This first epoch was of fourteen months' duration, and was consumed in securing a foothold in Pomerania, Mecklenburg and Brandenburg, in so careful and methodical a

manner as to stand out in contrast to any other campaign of this era. Every circumstance was against him. He had but slender means to oppose the emperor's apparently unlimited resources. He came upon the scene at a time when the cause he had embraced was a wreck. The Protestant princes whom he sought to help, at whose request he had undertaken the gigantic task, in lieu of flocking to his standard, looked on him with suspicion, and afforded him small countenance. Yet he lost not courage. With a clear aim in view, he pressed steadily on, and reached his end gradually, step by step. He bent every effort to secure the coöperation of the men who so coldly scanned his work. He exhibited patience akin to Hannibal's, persuasiveness like to Cæsar's, boldness equal to Alexander's. He captured fortresses at the key-points and held them: rarely was a strong place wrested from the Swedish grasp. He accumulated supplies where he could be sure of keeping them: but once during his German campaign — at Nürnberg — was he out of victual. He firmly secured his communications with the base he thus carefully established and with Sweden, and never manœuvred so as to lose them. He gradually overcame the shortsighted policy of his brother Protestants, and strengthened himself with allies and fresh accessions of recruits. He acted, not as the leaders of armies for many centuries had acted, as if the population of the countries they traversed were mere brute beasts, mere producers of food for the great and their hirelings, but with a spirit of kindliness and Christian charity which won over all the populations to his side. He kept troops under a discipline which was the marvel of its day, supplied their wants by legitimate means, paid them regularly, and allowed no marauding or plunder. The few instances in which the Swedes were convicted of crimes which were then the daily accompaniment of the profession of arms were summarily punished. Gusta-

vus understood how to avoid battle with an enemy who was too strong to beat ; how to lead him away from the key-points of the theatre of operations, so as to secure them himself ; how to operate energetically against an enemy who was his equal or his inferior in strength ; how to employ the tactical ability of his troops ; how to infuse into his men his own enthusiasm on the battle-field ; how to utilize a victory to a greater extent than any of his predecessors of the Middle Ages or of his own era, and how to heighten and maintain the morale of his troops in victory and defeat alike. The only failure of Gustavus' first epoch was his inability to save Magdeburg from the hands of Tilly. This was due not to his failure to advance to her rescue, but to a natural miscalculation of her powers of resistance, of Tilly's perseverance, and to the perverse refusal of the Saxon elector to allow the Swedes a passage over his territory.

Then came the second epoch. So soon as, by his cautious and intelligent conduct, the king had set himself firmly in place between the sea, the Oder and the Elbe, had protected his flanks and rear from all probability of danger, and had persuaded the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to join his standard, in other words had established his bastion, he at once altered his method of operation. When the enemy would stand he assumed the offensive, crossed the Elbe, attacked him at Breitenfeld, added immensely to his strength and morale by beating him, and, leaving a portion of his troops to operate with the allies and to protect his flanks and communications, he advanced rapidly into the very heart of Germany. In three weeks, he had established himself firmly on the Main, in Franconia and Thuringia ; in ten days after, he had advanced down the Main to the Rhine, taking all the strong places on the way ; in three months more, he had laid his hands on the whole middle Rhine country ; and in two

and a half months from this last period, he had crossed the Danube, beaten the enemy at the Lech by one of the boldest operations undertaken since the Christian era, and had occupied almost all Bavaria. Thus in eight months, from September, 1631, to June, 1632, he had traversed and held a much larger territory than he had previously gained in fourteen, and had become the most powerful of the monarchs of Europe. He put to use the boldest and most decisive operations, and yet never failed in the method and caution which were his guide; by his skill, courage and intelligence he established himself as firmly in southern Germany as he had previously done in northern. A glance at the territory he covered,—from the north shores of the Baltic to the foothills of the Alps,—and a comparison of it with that conquered by any other captain of modern times, and the measure of the few months during which he was actively a combatant in the Thirty Years' War, will satisfy the most exacting admirer of the past masters in the military art; and this especially so, if we remember the political entanglements in which the king was caught, the fact that he came to save and not to conquer, and that statesmanship often dictated his manœuvres rather than his clear grasp of the strategic situation.

Gustavus was now at the height of his reputation and success; the eyes of all Europe were upon him, and he was ready to attack Austria from the west. Here begins the third epoch of his operations. At this juncture the policy of France changed; she feared that Gustavus would aspire to a political prominence which would unsettle the balance of power in Europe; his allies began to suspect him of aspiring to the crown of Germany; and Wallenstein, the only soldier in Germany who was in any sense worthy to be matched against the king, raised a large army, and by marching on Saxony threatened the Swedish communications with the Baltic, estab-

lished with so much care and skill. The whole situation changed. Gustavus was no longer so secure as he had been when his allies were whole-hearted, and his policy suddenly changed back to the cautious one he had early shown. Of the first importance in all his operations, whether offensive or defensive, particularly so as he was now apt to be thrown on his own resources, were his communications with the Main and the Rhine, and with his bastion in north Germany. Second to this was the protection of allied Nürnberg, to which city he had promised succor, should she be attacked. By taking position at Nürnberg, he accomplished all these ends, for he drew Wallenstein away from Saxony, and kept him away from the Main and Rhine. At Nürnberg, so long as his forces remained largely inferior to Wallenstein's, Gustavus acted on the defensive, indulging only in small war; but when, by his lieutenants coming up, the Swedish army grew to equal Wallenstein's, Gustavus again went over to an offensive startling in its boldness.

It cannot be denied that, while Wallenstein was in the field, Gustavus gave over part of his initiative to the Bohemian as he had never done before. But this was in a great measure owing to the political difficulties by which he was beset. Had the elector of Saxony been the firm and loyal ally to Gustavus that Gustavus was to him; had the king not been compelled to look sharply for treason in his rear, it is doubtful whether he would have yielded any part of his initiative, even to his great opponent.

When his offensive at Nürnberg failed and his provision quite gave out, Gustavus retired, not at once to Bavaria, but to the Main, to make sure of his communications there; and so soon as it appeared that Wallenstein had no immediate thought of disturbing these, leaving a lieutenant to observe him, Gustavus again took up his old thread and returned to

Bavaria to complete his conquest of Swabia and Würtemberg. Then, for the second time, Wallenstein, by moving on Saxony, coupled to the weak attitude of the elector, threatened, and now more seriously, the king's communications with the Baltic, and compelled him again to resort to quick and decisive operations. His march to Saxony and his attack on the enemy at Lützen were rapid, bold and skillful.

His life's striving here closed in a glorious death ; but the work the great king accomplished in little over two years in Germany was so vast, so solid and so intelligently planned, that it remains scarcely doubtful that, had he lived, he would have dictated to entire Germany the terms upon which the religious faith of all men should be held and practiced.

The student of Gustavus' life will notice in these several epochs a peculiarly intelligent adaptation of his work to the existing conditions. From his landing at Rügen to his passage of the Elbe, there was a cautious but by no means indecisive policy, to be largely ascribed to the unexpected coldness of the German Protestants ; to the ungrateful laxness of his cousins, the dukes of Mecklenburg ; to the brainless hebetude of the elector of Brandenburg ; to the unintelligent yearning for neutrality of the elector of Saxony. The problem was one of politics, not war. From the crossing of the Elbe to the starving-match at Nürnberg, the student will see exceptional activity and courage, in no wise lacking intelligent, methodical caution. From the break-up at Nürnberg to Gustavus' death upon the field at Lützen, he will recognize an alternation as the circumstances dictated, from the cautious manœuvring of the first epoch to the intrepid energy of the second.

From Cæsar's time on, Gustavus was the first who firmly and intellectually carried through a campaign on one well-considered, fully digested, broad, and far-seeing plan, and

who swerved therefrom only for the time being to meet conditions which could not be foreseen from the beginning ; whose grasp was such that, whatever the conduct of the enemy, he was never compelled to abandon, but at most to vary, his plan ; and whose work was done against an enemy at most times much his superior, and among friends whose half-hearted loyalty made them more dangerous than the foe.

Gustavus was in the habit of assembling his generals in council. The advice of his most trusted lieutenants was often opposed to what he did ; but they could not see as far as he did. Not even Oxenstiern's crisp judgment was equal to the king's. And a council of war under Gustavus never deterred the king from pushing home. He listened patiently to all his generals ; but he decided the action himself. It was he who maintained the consistency of his course through good and evil fortune alike. Each variation had its definite object, which attained, the general plan was at once resumed. In all Gustavus did there was a certain intelligent sequence and interdependence of movements that produced a perfectly systematic whole, in which the unity of plan was never disturbed. And with this broad plan there always went hand in hand a careful execution of detail upon which depended the success of the whole. His occupation remained firm ; his victualing was sufficient to his needs ; his movements accomplished what he sought to attain. Even when, as before Nürnberg, or before Lützen, he was driven to change his operation lest his allies in north Germany should play him false, it was only to defer, not to abandon, his own project.

In pursuance of his cautious policy Gustavus neglected no step of his advance. He left behind him no important fortress or city without observing, blockading or besieging it ; he held the passages of all important rivers in his path by erecting suitable bridge-heads, or by occupying necessary

towns which controlled them ; he kept upon his line of operations suitable detachments, often armies, or met threats in force upon them by a prompt movement of his main force upon the enemy. He so managed the division of his armies as not to decrease his own strength, nor to lose the ability to concentrate at least as rapidly as the enemy ; he used his allies for the work they could best perform ; he kept the main offensive in his own hands, generally so ordering that his lieutenants should act on the defensive, unless they outnumbered the enemy, and then he urged them to all due vigor ; while he himself always undertook the part which entailed the greatest labor, and called for the most courage and intelligence.


Noteworthy as was Gustavus' caution, his vigor of execution when he undertook a fighting offensive was as remarkable. His caution was not the caution of Wallenstein, who fought shy of battle, and fed his men by devastating the land of foe and friend ; it was the caution which watched his base and line of communications, his victual, his munition and his allies ; while his decisiveness lay in his intelligent choice between sharp movement upon the enemy with his whole force when the conditions were favorable to a battle, or when the moral superiority of the troops would allow, and the policy of seizing important provinces and cities, and of utilizing the resources of the country and of allies so as to increase the circle of his operations. His caution was such that, by every step he advanced into the heart of Germany, he weakened the enemy by just so much. Wallenstein left the land he crossed useless to the enemy because he had pillaged it as he went ; Gustavus spared the country he traversed, but he held it by enlisting the population in his favor, and by careful military occupation. The simple recital of his marches and manœuvres shows their value.

The secret of Gustavus' successes lay, not in the element of luck, for luck may be said on the whole to have run against him rather than in his favor, — not against him as it ran against the Carthaginian, but certainly not in his favor as it ran in Cæsar's, — the secret lay in his broad and intelligent general plan, in his adherence to the work as he had originally cut it out, and in his suiting his bold operations or cautious manœuvres to the circumstances as they existed or arose. As with Alexander, Hannibal and Cæsar, it was the man himself whose very brain and soul were put into his work; and this man possessed all those qualities of head and heart which produce results in war whenever they coexist with that other factor, opportunity. Equally great as monarch and as soldier, he united in his one person the art of both. His nation and his army were devoted to him as history has rarely shown devotion. His motives were perhaps the highest and purest which have ever inspired any of the great captains; his pursuit of them was steadfast and noble, open-handed and above-board, courageous and discreet. In weighing his intelligence, sound judgment, strong will, perseverance, hardihood and carefulness, he is properly put in the rank of the six great captains, — three of ancient, three of modern days. If we look further and gauge the results of what he did, if we view the purposeless and barbarous nature of war as it was conducted up to his day; if we weigh the influence which his short two years' campaign had upon all modern war, we may indeed in a moral sense, and in a sense making toward civilization, place Gustavus Adolphus yet higher. His pointing out the importance of key-points — at that time generally fortresses — in holding a country; the value of feeding an army by careful accumulation of supplies, instead of by ravaging every territory traversed; the use of a carefully drawn plan of operations, extending over the whole ground to be covered;

and the propriety of waging war in a more Christian and civilized spirit, marks the first step towards the modern system. Gustavus Adolphus has fairly earned the title of Father of the Modern Art of War, and must be acknowledged as the captain of all others who re-created methodical, systematic, intellectual war, and who taught the world that there could exist such a thing as civilized warfare.

After his death his lieutenants endeavored to carry out his system; but there was no one, not even Oxenstiern, who was equal to the task. They retained something of what he gave them; in many things they slid back into the old ruts; and war again assumed the aspect of gigantic raids.

Among his enemies, during the remainder of the Thirty Years' War, history shows nothing but inhumanity, over which it is well to draw a veil.



Fusee Arrows.

XXXII.

NÖRDLINGEN. 1633-1634.

THE death of Gustavus altered the entire aspect of German affairs. There was no longer a centre point, for Oxenstiern was not a monarch; but he and Richelieu kept on with the work which Gustavus had so well builded. Many of the powers stepped out of the Swedish programme, but the war went on. Bernard next year was to operate down the Danube; a Saxon-Swedish force was to manœuvre in Silesia; a third army in Westphalia. The Weser army succeeded well; Bernard and Banér, along the Danube, advanced as far as Upper Austria; Horn kept the imperialists out of Swabia. The Silesian force advanced against Wallenstein, who prudently retired to a fortified camp, while his lieutenants invaded Saxony. He then moved on the Oder; but his conduct was weak; and later returning to Bohemia, he was assassinated in February, 1634. Archduke Ferdinand took command of the imperial force, captured Ratisbon and Donauwörth, and sat down before Nördlingen. Bernard and Horn went to its relief, but attacking the archduke without proper concentration, they frittered away their strength, and were disastrously defeated, with the loss of the bulk of their army, and all their material. Men who made a mark as lieutenants of Gustavus found that there is more to war than they had understood.

THE death of Gustavus Adolphus completely changed the current of affairs in Germany. Its first effect was a practical rupture of all the treaties which bound the Protestant princes to the Swedish cause. The majority of them shortly began to make approaches leading to reconciliation to the empire. Richelieu was the only man who saw that now more than ever was it essential to uphold the balance of power against the Hapsburgs. It was he who stepped in and induced the Swedes to continue the war. Oxenstiern was the natural successor of Gustavus in the control of both the military and political issues; he agreed with the French min-

ister, and despite her exhaustion, Sweden went on, hoping to gain, in the end, the object for which Gustavus had fought, as far at least as Swedish security was concerned. The treaty with Russia was renewed; Poland agreed to a continuance of the existing truce; and the entire resources and confidence of the Swedish nation were given to the great chancellor. But even Oxenstiern was not a Gustavus. The German princes, who had been ready to follow the lead of the splendid king, were unwilling to subordinate themselves to a mere prime minister; and Richelieu had much ado in prevailing on them to so act as not to forfeit the gain already made. In one way or other, however, they were fairly well committed to the cause; and for two years the work and method of Gustavus went on under Oxenstiern,—so far at least as was possible without the presence of the man and king himself.

The strategic plan contemplated three lines of operation. Bernard, with the bulk of the Swedish army, was to move into south Germany, pick up the troops left there by Gustavus, and then, basing on the Main, work down the valley of the Danube. Part of the Swedish army, with the Saxon and Brandenburg contingents, was to operate in Bohemia and Silesia. Another part, with the troops of the Hessian and lower Saxon Circle, was to hold Westphalia and protect north Germany. The winter succeeding Lützen was consumed in preparing for the execution of the comprehensive plan.

But Ferdinand was not idle. The fortune of war had rid him of his arch-enemy, and he foresaw greater advantages from a continuance of the struggle than from any peace which could be made with Richelieu at the council-board. To be sure, the army of Wallenstein was almost broken up, and had to be recruited anew; but the Bavarian forces were

intact, and had been considerably increased by accessions from Lorraine and from Spanish troops. Few things go further to disprove the standing which has been claimed for Wallenstein as the best captain of his era than the secondary rôle he now played, after the only man who was called his equal had been removed by the accident of battle.

In the spring of 1633 the allies began operations more vigorously than the imperialists. In the Weser country they beat the forces of Merode and Gronfeld, and captured many fortresses. On the Danube, Bernard joined Banér, who had been forced out of Bavaria; and while Horn drove the imperialists out of Swabia into Switzerland and besieged Constance, Bernard pushed the emperor's army down the river, took Ratisbon before Gallas, whom Wallenstein at once dispatched from Bohemia to its succor, could arrive on the spot, and then crossed the Isar and moved on Upper Austria.

Meanwhile Aldringer, whose duty it was to contain Horn, marched into the Tyrol, where he joined a heavy body of Spanish troops and pushed his way through Swabia on Alsatia, hoping both to neutralize Horn and to entice Bernard away from his Danube conquests. Horn followed, after drawing in what reinforcements he could; and Aldringer found his scheme so unpromising of success that he retired.

To offset these gains, the Catholic armies had the upper hand in Silesia and Saxony. The allies, early in the year, marched through Lusatia into Silesia and overran that province. Wallenstein met this operation by moving from Bohemia into Silesia, where he took up a fortified camp at Münsterberg, from which, despite very great superiority in force, he retired on the approach of the allies. This defensive policy on Wallenstein's part is difficult to understand, and redounds little to his credit. Meanwhile Holeke and Pic-

colomini invaded Saxony; the former took Leipsic, the latter threatened Dresden. Arnim hurried back to defend the electorate, leaving Thurn with but twenty-five hundred men in Silesia. This was Wallenstein's opportunity, for he had forty thousand men. He moved on Thurn, beat him, and marched down the Oder, captured Frankfort and Landsberg, and even raided beyond the Warta. But the imperial general's operations essentially lacked vigor, even with nothing to oppose him; and he finally yielded to the entreaties of the emperor and returned to Bohemia, from whence he marched on Bavaria to hold head against Bernard. His approach of the Upper Palatinate did indeed force Bernard to retire; but Wallenstein went into winter-quarters, owing to the late season, ready to march on Saxony or back to Bavaria in the spring. The great Czech's career was, however, summarily cut short. His peculiar character and faithlessness had made him too many enemies among the rich and powerful, from Ferdinand down. He was assassinated in February, 1634, in the fortress of Eger.

At the beginning of the spring of 1634 Bernard again advanced on Upper Austria. The imperial army was now wholly at the disposition of the emperor; and his son, the Archduke Ferdinand, was placed in command, with Gallas as his second. This force marched on Ratisbon, joined the duke of Lorraine, who with the Bavarian army was besieging the place, captured it on the 26th of July, and marched up the left bank of the river. Bernard retired to Augsburg, gathered in Horn's troops, and took post at Lauingen. The archduke moved to Donauwörth, and taking it August 16, marched on and laid siege to Nördlingen.

Meanwhile Banér and Arnim had advanced into Bohemia, but had been beaten at Prague on the 28th of June, and had returned to Saxony.

Nördlingen called on Bernard for assistance. The duke, with Horn, had sixteen thousand foot and ten thousand horse, but the archduke and Gallas had thirty-five thousand men or over. Bernard desired to await the rhinegrave, but the situation of the town had become desperate ; it had withstood one assault, but could not much longer hold out. He decided on attacking the imperial army.

The archduke was carrying on the siege from the south only ; but a reinforcement that Bernard managed to send the garrison did not hinder the operations, which were pressed vigorously. Horn advised taking up a strong position and trying to cut off the besiegers from victual ; but Bernard was for a battle, and he was sustained by a majority of the higher officers. He still felt the enthusiasm of Lützen. It was, however, with great surprise that, on the 5th of September, the imperial commander saw the army of the allies, which had lain back in the hills on the road to Ulm, appear and offer battle.

The plain of Nördlingen is bounded on the southwest and south, at a distance of three or four miles from the city, by a chain of hills, which rise from three hundred to six hundred feet. Nearer the town, across the road to Ulm, are other hills, perhaps one hundred feet high, and between the two runs a small brook, the Goldbach or Forellenbach. It was here that the archduke undertook to defend his siege operations from interruption by the allies. On the approach of the latter, he left only five thousand men in the lines, and advanced to meet Bernard with the rest. He was able to anticipate them, and as the vanguard filed out from the higher hills, the imperial cavalry fell upon it and drove it back. It was essential for Bernard to gain full possession of the debouches from these hills, and this he accomplished. He was anxious, before the enemy could do so, to seize the

lower chain of hills, as these were practically the key to the battle-field; and he sent out a brigade of infantry with a battery to get a foothold there, while he himself deployed his army in the valley along the Goldbach. But the day was far gone, and as the allied artillery was not able to get a satisfactory position, the duke deferred the attack till the morrow.

The archduke spent the night fortifying the hills he had secured, and in placing batteries to advantage. He occupied



Battle of Nördlingen.

a line from Schmähingen to Hohlheim. On the heights of Aalburg on his left he expended special care, and placed there his best troops, the Spanish foot. The cavalry of the left wing lay behind works in two lines; the German foot held the right with a good part of the cavalry. There were, all told, seventeen thousand foot and thirteen thousand horse.

At daybreak of September 6 the allies broke out from their position in two columns, the right under Horn, the left under Bernard. Horn was to attack near Schmähingen, Bernard near Ederheim and along the Ulm road. The duke had

no difficulty in seizing the rest of the higher hills, which only the imperial van had occupied. The imperialists contented themselves with bombarding the hills so occupied from their batteries opposite. Horn's cavalry, meanwhile, by a circuit, had got around the Aalburg position and attacked it in flank, while the foot had deployed in front of the imperial works and had advanced to the assault. But the cavalry was driven back on the infantry line, and though the Swedes, with their ancient gallantry, captured the first line of intrenchments and some of the guns, they paused, and after holding themselves some time, were thrust out with loss; a few of the most severely punished regiments turned to flee, and gradually the whole line fell back in confusion. The imperial cavalry of the left now sallied out against them; an unlucky explosion in some ammunition wagons tended to increase the difficulty, and in a short while the entire Swedish column was drifting back, sharply followed by the archduke's cavalry squadrons. Were these the same Swedes who stood twenty-four hours in front of the Alte Veste, who time and again thrust Wallenstein's best troops out of their defenses at the Lützen causeway? Where was that bold spirit, that endurance under trial, which Gustavus had breathed into their ranks?

This failure of the allied right made a bad impression upon the centre and left. Their work ceased to show that energy which commands success. Bernard sent some regiments to the aid of Horn, and committed the grave error of detailing a considerable part of his troops towards Nördlingen to seek communication with the garrison, at a moment when he should have concentrated all his forces for a decisive blow on some one spot to stave off the impending disaster. There was but one outcome to such conduct. The division sent on this absurd errand was attacked and cut up by the imperialists, and the archduke at once assumed the offensive.

Horn, during this time, had reassembled his scattered regiments, and was ready to advance anew ; but the Spaniards had taken all the positions he had vacated, and he was unable to recapture one of them. The reinforcement which Bernard had sent to him lost its way, and began operations on its own account. There was a lack of common purpose in the allied army. The imperial artillery was so effectively served that Horn, after a six hours' battle, was fain to withdraw. On the allied left matters were no better ; and after much creditable fighting, so ill-directed as to be useless, this wing too gave way in confusion, and fled down the Ulm turnpike. Horn's cavalry had decamped ; his foot, under his own courageous example, stood its ground where he had last rallied them ; but the entire column was cut up or captured, Horn and three general officers among the latter.

The defeat of the allies was total, and it was due to Bernard's lack of definite plan. It is said that twelve thousand men were killed or wounded, eight thousand men captured ; one hundred and seventy flags and eighty guns, and the entire train, fell into the hands of the archduke, whose losses are set down as a bare twelve hundred men.

Nördlingen surrendered next day. Bernard retired to Alsatia with his broken forces. The allied cause had been fatally checked. This battle ended what we have called the Swedish period of the Thirty Years' War.

In May, 1635, peace was made at Prague between the empire and Saxony. The elector received Lusatia, and the archbishopric of Magdeburg was given for life to his son Augustus. It was agreed that the ecclesiastical estates which were not held immediately from the emperor, and which had been confiscated before the convention of Passau (1552), should remain to the present possessors forever ; all others should remain until 1667 in the hands of the present possess-

ors, and then forever, unless some new arrangement should meanwhile be made. A general amnesty was given to all except the Bohemian and Palatinate rebels. Common cause was to be made against Sweden, and only Lutheran worship was to be tolerated. This peace was accepted by the elector of Brandenburg and most of the Protestant potentates.



French Sergeant.
(1630.)

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